TMI Blog1965 (1) TMI 68X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to South Asia Industries (Private) Ltd., the appellant herein. Thereafter, the respondents filed an application before the Controller, Delhi, under s. 14 of the Act for the eviction of the appellant from the said premises on the ground that Messrs. Allen Berry Co. unauthorizedly assigned the said premises in favour of the appellant. The Controller, by his order dated October 10, 1962, allowed the petition. On January 23, 1963, the appeal filed by the appellant against the said order was dismissed by the Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi. Against the said order of the Tribunal the appellant filed an appeal in the High Court of Punjab under S. 39 of the Act. The said second appeal was dismissed on May 10, 1963, by Harbans Singh, J. The appellant filed an appeal against the judgment of the learned single Judge to a Division Bench of the said High Court under cl. 10 of the Letters Patent. That appeal came up for disposal before a Division Bench of the High Court, which dismissed the same on the ground that it was not maintainable. Hence the present appeal. Mr. A. Viswanatha Sastri, learned counsel for the appellant raised before us the following points : (1) Section 39 of the Act conf ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , immediately before the date of the publication of these presents subject to appeal to the Chief Court of the Punjab by virtue of any law then in force, or as may after that date be declared subject to appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Lahore by any law made by competent legislative, authority for India. Clause 10, before its amendment by Letters Patent of 1928, read as follows : And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature at Lahore, from the judgment (not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under the provisions of section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915, or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to section 13 of the said recited Act, and that an appeal shall also lie to the said High Court from die judgment (not being a sentence or order as aforesaid) of two or more Judges of the said High Court, or of such Division Court, whenever such Judges are equally divided in opinion, and do not amount in number to a ma ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e High Court of Judicature at Lahore by any law made by competent legislative authority for India. The second part does not make a distinction between appellate jurisdiction over Courts and that over Tribunals which are not Courts. If a law made by a competent legislative authority declares a case to be subject to appeal to the High Court of Judicature, the said High Court acquires jurisdiction to entertain the same and dispose of it in accordance with law. If the High Court entertains an appeal in terms of cl.11 of the Letters Patent, cl. 10 thereof is attracted to such an appeal. Under S. 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915, the High Court may by its own rules provide, as it thinks fit, for the exercise by one or more Judges or by a Division Court constituted by two or more Judges of the High Court, of original and appellate jurisdictions vested in the Court; and under cl. (2) thereof the Chief Justice of each High Court shall determine what Judge in each case is to sit alone, and what Judges of the Court, whether with or without the Chief Justice, are to constitute the several Division Courts. If in exercise of the jurisdiction under s. 108 of the Government of India Act, 1 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... oticed supra. The result is that under the first part of cl. 10 of the Letters Patent an appeal lies from the judgment of a single Judge of the High Court passed by him in exercise of his original jurisdiction or in exercise of first appellate jurisdiction, whether the appeal is against the order of a Court or not; and in the case of second appellate jurisdiction, if the, appeal is against the order of a Tribunal, which is not a Court. But in the case of a judgment made in a second appeal against the decree or order of a Court subordinate to the High Court, no further appeal lies unless the said Judge declares that the case is a fit one for appeal. It is not permissible, by construction, to restrict the scope of the generality of the provisions of cf. 10 of the Letters Patent. The argument that a combined reading of cls.10 and 11 of the Letters Patent leads to the conclusion that even the first part of cl. 10 deals only with appeals from Courts subordinate to the High Court has no force. As we have pointed out earlier, cl. 11 contemplates conferment of appellate jurisdiction on the High Court by an appropriate Legislature against orders of a Tribunal. Far from detracting from the g ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n in a case where the judgment could not be said to have been delivered pursuant to s. 108 of the Government of India Act', 1915. On the first question, this Court held that the High, Court being seized as such of the appellate jurisdiction conferred by s. 76 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940, it had to exercise that jurisdiction in the same manner as it exercised its other appellate jurisdiction and when such jurisdiction was exercised by a single Judge, his judgment became subject to appeal tinder cl. 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court there being nothing to the contrary in the Trade Marks Act. On the second question. this Court held thus We are therefore of the opinion that section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915, conferred power on the High Court which that Court could exercise from time to time with reference to its jurisdiction whether existing at the coming into force of the Government of India Act, 1915, or whether conferred on it by any subsequent legislation. The difference between that case and the present one is that the single Judge in that case passed a judgment in a first appeal against the order of the Registrar, while in the present c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... was a Court in applying cl. 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court in the appeal in question in that case. This decision therefore covers the question now raised before us. The relevant rule applicable to the present case has been stated by this Court in the aforesaid decision thus; Obviously after the appeal had reached the High Court it has to be determined according to the rules of practice and procedure of that Court and in accordance with the provisions of the charter under which that Court is constituted and which confers on it power in respect to the method and manner of exercising that jurisdiction. The rule is well settled that when a statute directs that an appeal shall lie to a Court already established, then the appeal must be regulated by the practice and procedure of that court. This principle was laid down by the Judicial Committee in a number of decisions : see National Telephone Co., Ltd. v. Postmaster-General([1913] A.C. 546.); R.M.A.R.A. Adaikappa Chettiar V. Ra. Chandrasekhara Thevar ([1947] 74 I.A. 264.) ; Secretary of State for India v. Chellikani Rama Rao((1916) I.L.R. 39 Mad. 617.); Maung Ba Thaw v. Ma Pin ((1934) L.R. 61 I.A. 158. an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the said two sections may be stated thus Subject to the right of appeal to the High Court on a substantial question of law, the order passed by the High Court on appeal is final and it shall not be called in question in any original suit. application or execution proceeding. Mr. Viswanatha Sastri contends that the last sentence, in s. 43 of the Act gives colour to the expression final . According to him, finality is only with reference to collateral proceedings, such as, suits, applications and execution proceedings. The expression final prima facie connotes that an order passed on appeal under the Act is conclusive and no further appeal lies against it. The last sentence in S. 43 of the Act, in our view, does not restrict the scope of the said expression; indeed, the said sentence imposes a further bar. The expression final in the first part of s. 43 of the Act puts an end to a further appeal and the words shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding bar collateral proceedings. The section imposes a total bar. The correctness of the judgment in appeal cannot be questioned by way of appeal or by way of collateral proceedings. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rt, after inquiry into the case, may make such order in the matter as appears to the Court just, which order shall be final. Lord Loreburn, L.C. construed the said section thus Where it says, speaking of such an order, that it is to be final, I think it means there is to be an end of the business at quarter sessions........... The Judicial Committee again in Secretary of State v. Hindustan Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd.( A.I.R. [1931] P.C. 149.) construed the expression final and held that the expression was intended to exclude any further appeal. There, under S. 71 of the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911, a limited right of appeal to the High Court was given from an award of the Tribunal and it provided that, subject to that right only, the award should be final. Their Lordships held that the provision for finality was intended to exclude any further appeal. No further citation is called for. As we have stated, the expression final in S. 43 of the Act indicates that no further appeal is contemplated against the order passed on appeal against the order of the Tribunal. To escape from this construction a larger scope is sought to be given to the expression appeal to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nd, therefore, the High Court was not competent to grant a certificate under Art. 133(1) (a) of the Constitution. For the appellant it was urged that the appeal against the judgment of the single Judge to a Division Bench under cl. 10 of the Letters Patent was a domestic appeal within the High Court and in deciding whether the decree of a Division Bench in an appeal under the Letters Patent from a decision of a single Judge exercising appellate jurisdiction affirmed the decision of the Court immediately below, regard must be had to the decree of the Court subordinate to the High Court, against the decision of which appeal was preferred to the High Court. This Court came to the conclusion that the expression Court immediately below in Art. 133 (1) (a) must mean a Court from the decision of which the appeal has been filed in the High Court, whether such a Judge was a single Judge of the High Court or a Court subject to the Superintendence of the High Court. It will be seen that if a Letters Patent appeal was only a continuation of the appeal filed from the decree of the District Judge by a domestic arrangement, this Court would have held that the judgment in the Letters Patent ap ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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