TMI Blog1952 (12) TMI 32X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ial Disputes Act, 1947 (U. P. Act No. XXVIII of 1947), to refer the said dispute to the Labour Commissioner. U. P., or a Conciliation Officer of the-State Government nominated by him for adjudication on seven several issues specified therein and to direct the adjudicator to conclude the adjudication proceedings and submit his award to the Government not later than April 5, 1950. The Labour Commissioner by his letter No. I.M.R. 14-A nominated Shri M. P. Vidyarthi, Regional Conciliation Officer, U. P., as the adjudicator in the above dispute with a direction that be should submit his, award by March 25, 1950, and that if the proceeding, were not likely to be completed within that time he should move the Government for extension of time at least a week before the specified date. By Notification No. 897 (ST)/XVIII-53 (ST)/50 dated March 20, 1950, the Governor was pleased to order that the adjudicator should also adjudicate on an additional issue formulated therein. By a further Notification No. 950' (ST)/XVIII-53 (ST)/60 dated March 24, 1950, the ,Governor was pleased to refer another additional issue for the decision of the adjudicator. The adjudicator did not make his award on or ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s to the matters already referred to would or may take more time than what had been originally estimated, and so ,it may lead to an impossible position if the Government had no power to extend the time originally fixed by it, and it makes no difference, in our opinion, whether the time is extended before or after the expiry of the time originally limited. The present appeal is against that decision of the Appellate Tribunal but limited to the question hareinbefore mentioned. Dr. Tek Chand appearing in support of this appeal urges that the adjudicator derived his authority under the order made by Notification No. 637, dated February 18, 1950. Section 6 (1) provides that the adjudicator shall, within such time as may be specified, submit its award to the State Government. The time specified by the order was not later than April 5, 1950. On the expiry of that time the adjudicator became functus officio and bad no power or authority to make the award. It is true that two more issues were, by the two subsequent orders, added to the list of issues to be determined by the adjudicator but those issues, Dr. Tek Chand submits, did not involve any detailed investigation into facts n ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d upon by Mr. Justice Harring- ton sitting singly on the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court in Shib Krishna Dawn Co. v. Satish Chander Dutt(1) which was a case governed by the Code of 1908. The learned Judge overlooked-the fact that paragraph 8 of the Second Schedule to the Code of 1908 which corresponded to section 514 of the Code of 1882 expressly conferred power on the Court to allow further time and from time to time, either before or after the expiration of the period fixed for the making of the award, to enlarge such period and that paragraph 15 which corresponded to section 521 of the Code of 1882 contained no provision that an award made out of -time was ipso facto invalid and -that consequently the reasoning underlying the decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of Raja Narain Singh v. Chaudhrain Bhagwant Kuar (2) had no application to the case before him, which was governed by the Code of 1908. Having regard to the difference in the language of the relevant provisions of the two Codes, the correctness of the decision of Harrington J. was doubted by Mr. Justice Chitty also sitting singly on the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court in Sri Lal v. Arjun ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e Government any power to enlarge the time fixed originally for the initial making of the award. Therefore, except where ,the State Government under section 6 (2)remits the 'award for reconsideration it has no power even to specify a fresh period of time and much less a power to extend the time for the initial making of the award under section-6 (1). In exercise of the powers conferred by clauses (b), (c), (d) and (g) of section 3 and section 8 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Governor was pleased to make an order embodied in Notification No. 615 (LL)/XVIII-7 (LL)-1951, dated March 15, 1951. The proviso to rule 16 of that order authorised the State Government to extend from time to time the period within which the Tribunal or the adjudicator was to pronounce the decision. These rules were, however, not in force at the time material to the case before us. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent and for the State of Uttar Pradesh have not referred us to any similar rule which, was in force in 1950. In view of the language of section 6 of the U. P. Act and in the absence of a rule like the proviso to rule 16 referred to above it must follow that the State Gover ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n derive no support from that section. Learned advocate for the Intervener, the State of Uttar Pradesh, draws our attention to section 21 of the U. P. General Clauses Act, 1904, and contends that the order of April 26, 1950, should be taken as an amendment or modification, within the meaning of that section,- of the first order of February 18, 1950. It is true that the order of April 26, 1950, does ex facie purport to rectify, the order of February 18, 1950, but, in view of the absence of any distinct provision in section 21 that the power of amendment and modification conferred on the Government may be so exercised as to have retrospective operation the order of April 26, 1950, viewed merely as an order of amendment or modification, cannot, by virtue of section 21, have that effect. If, therefore, the amending order operates prospectively, i.e., only as from the date of the order, it cannot validate the award which bad been made after the expiry of the time specified in the original order and before the date, of the amending order, during which period the adjudicator was functus officio and had no jurisdiction to act at all. We do not think the respondents can derive any support f ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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