TMI Blog1961 (3) TMI 110X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n behalf of the appellants that the village had been granted to their ancestors by the Nizam and the respondent was only entitled to the pan mukta of the village and no more. Pan mukta means a fixed sum which is payable in perpetuity for any land granted by the Ruler or the jagirdar to any person. The respondent s case further was that the lease money was being regularly paid, though some time before the suit there was some default. The respondent had to file a suit to recover the lease money which was decreed and the decretal amount was recovered. In 1917 disputes arose between the parties and consequently in 1918 the respondent asked the appellants to vacate the village. They, however, refused to do so. Thereupon the present suit was filed in 1920 and the respondent s case was that the lease granted to the appellants was not a permanent lease and could only enure for the lifetime of the grantor and therefore the respondent was entitled to possession of the village, particularly as the appellants had begun to assert a title adverse to the respondent. The suit was resisted by the appellants, and their main defence was that the village had been granted as bilmakta with a fixed pan m ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... oto. There was then a reference to a third learned Judge, Ansari, J. He agreed with Schripat Rau, J., on the questions of title and limitation; but as by the time he came to deliver judgment the Hyderabad (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation, No. LXIX of 1358-F had come into force from 1951 and possession could not be granted to the respondent, Ansari, J., held that the respondent would be entitled to the compensation payable on the abolition of jagirs. As Ansari, J., had per force to differ from Schripat Rau, J., as to the part of the relief to be granted to the respondent because of the abolition of jagirs, the case was referred to a Full Bench of three Judges in view of s. 8 of the Hyderabad High Court Act. The Full Bench held that as Ansari and Schripat Rau, JJ., were in agreement on the questions of title and limitation these matters did riot fall-to be decided before them and would be concluded by the judgment of Ansari, J. But on the nature of relief on which Ansari, J., per force had to differ from the view of Schripat Rau, J., the Full Bench upheld the view of Ansari, J. Thereafter the appellants applied for a certificate for leave to appeal to this Court, which was granted ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s plain terms. The courts below were therefore right in the view that the kowl does not show a grant of a permanent lease on a fixed annual payment to the appellants. The appellants however relied on what happened soon after the kowl was granted to them. It appears that soon after 1817 the appellants ancestor made a vajab-ul-arz (i.e., application to the Nizam) with various prayers. One of the prayers was for grant of bilmakta sanad. This was obviously with respect to certain Government lands, which the ancestors of the appellants held. In para 6 of the vajab-ul-arz it is said that in these days your devotee has regularly paid Government dues and expects that he should receive sanads of bilmakta with the seal of Diwani . In para 3 it is said that from out of the Government Talukas whichever is entrusted on Tahud, your petitioner will pay the Tahud amount and will look after and improve the Taluka . On a fair reading of the vajabul-arz there can be little doubt that the ancestor of the appellants was praying that he should be granted a bilmakta sanad of lands held by him from the Government. To this vajab-ul-arz was appended a list of villages which apparently the ancestor of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mounting to ₹ 2,101 was not included in the bilmakta amount of ₹ 1,05,412. It is further contended on behalf of the respondent that the, reason why these three villages were mentioned in this manner in the schedule attached to the bilmakta sanad was that the appellants ancestor had wrongly included these villages in his list filed with the vajab-ul-arz and ever, since then these villages were included in the schedule to the sanads but were always shown as deducted from the bilmakta. We are of opinion that this contention of the respondent is correct and the courts below were right in accepting the respondent s contention in this behalf. The very fact that the revenue of these villages is not included in the bilmakta amount of ₹ 1,05,412 shows that they could not be part of the bilmakta grant by the Nizam. We cannot accept the argument on behalf of the appellants that the revenue of these villages was not included because the ancestor of the appellants had to pay the amount of this revenue in the case of Timmapet and Korotkal to the jagirdars and the revenue of Palmur was given to him free in seri. The very fact that these three villages appear under the heading ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y and was being granted to this other person. As we read the sanad of 1880 we find no clear indication in it that the village of Timmapet which was granted along with other villages as jagir to the respondent s ancestor was being taken away-at any rate in part-and that in future the respondent s ancestor would only be entitled to a fixed sum from the appellants ancestor with respect to this village and no more. On the other hand, in the recital of the sanad unfortunately there is nothing clear for the words etc. appear therein in more than one place as to the land granted. We have therefore to turn to the schedule for whatever help we can get from it. The schedule shows that these three villages were under the heading deduct three villages of separate jagir . From that the only inference can be that these three villages were not being included in the bilmakta sanad. In any case we cannot infer from that the Nizam was intending to take away a part of the rights of the respondent s ancestor in village Timmapet and confer them on the appellants ancestor. Further there is nothing to show that the respondent s ancestors were ever informed that the Nizam had taken away part of their ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... order of the Prime Minister changed but failed and in consequence the appellants ancestor remained in possession thereof. It is urged that this shows that the ancestor of the appellants asserted that he was entitled to possession as a permanent lessee against the respondent s ancestor and this claim was resisted by the respondents ancestor and the resistance failed. Therefore it must be held that adverse possession of this limited kind was asserted to the knowledge of the respondent s ancestor and in consequence twelve years after 1875 the adverse title would be perfected and art. 144 would bar the present suit for ejectment. There is no doubt that there can be adverse possession of a limited interest in property as well as of the full title as owner: see Sankaran v. Periasami(1890) I.L.R. 13 Mad. 467); Thakore Fatehsingji Dipsangji v. Bamanji Ardeshir Dalal (1903) I.L.R. 27 Bom. 515.); and Shrimat Daivasikhamani Ponnambala Desikar v. Periayanan Chetti (1936) L.R. 63 I.A. 261; (1936) I.L.R. 59 Mad. 800). The present however is a case where the original kowl was granted by a jagirdar and the question arises whether in the case of a jagir there can be adverse possession of a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the record and there is nothing in it to show that it was granted perpetually, Therefore, it must be held to be a grant for life-time only; at any rate it is clear that the system of granting sanads on each succession was certainly in force when Raja Govind Narayan succeeded, for he was granted a fresh sanad. In his case it must therefore be held that the jagir was granted to him only for life. Reliance was also placed on Raje Vinaykrao Nemiwant Brahmin v. Raje Shriniwasrao Nemiwant Brahmin (I.L.R. [1942] Nag. 526) where a letter of 1877 from the Government of India, Foreign Department,, is quoted as saying that- The Governor-General in Council also accepts the view that these inams are held in accordance with the custom of the Hyderabad State, which permits the continuance of such jagheers to posterity, notwithstanding the absence of specific provision on the point, but at the same time reserves to the State the right of resuming such grants at pleasure. But even this letter shows that the State has got the right to resume the grant at pleasure and if that is so it cannot be said that the jagirs granted in Hyderabad were permanent and hereditary, though it may be that a so ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ere each grantee holds an estate for his lifetime the limitation would start to run against an heir from the date when his title accrued on the death of the previous heir. From the very fact that the grant of a jagir is only for the life-time of the grantee and that his son when he gets the jagir gets a fresh grant, it follows that it was not open to a jagirdar to make an alienation which would enure beyond his lifetime and thus a jagirdar could not grant a permanent lease, unless he was specifically entitled to do so, under the sanad or the law of the State. Similarly in such cases limitation would only run against an heir from the date when his title accrued on the death of the previous heir. Consequently the appellants cannot take advantage of what happened in 1875 in the time of Raja Ramarao as the starting point of adverse possession against the respondent. So far as the respondent is concerned, he apparently succeeded to the jagir in 1910 and in his case limitation would start from 1910. The present suit was brought in 1920 and therefore so far as the respondent is concerned, there is no question of perfecting even the limited title by adverse possession as against him. Lear ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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