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1976 (11) TMI 209

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..... t of Dr. Singh. The advertisement said that the appointment was to be temporary but likely to be made permanent later. The plaintiff-respondent, who was already officiating, also applied. He was temporarily appointed on 25th February, 1970. On 23rd April, 1970, the Registrar of the University gave the plaintiff-respondent a notice that his temporary appointment would terminate on 20th April, 1970. The plaintiff-respondent promptly brought his first suit in the Court of Munsif City, Varanasi, to restrain the University from appointing any one else in his place; but, this suit was ultimately dismissed. On 15th July, 1970, Dr. Singh had resigned from his post so that the permanent vacancy was there to be filled up. At that time, the plaintiffs suit, mentioned above, was still pending. A Selection Committee of the University interviewed candidates, including the plaintiff-respondent on 2nd November, 1970, and submitted a list of names for appointment to the post. In this list, the plaintiff-respondent's name was placed first. As the Executive Committee of the University was not in session, it appears that the Vice Chancellor appointed the plaintiff on 1st February, 1971, on the bas .....

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..... ent letter issued by the then Vice-Chancellor have collusively arranged and made manipulation in the report of Selection Committee and resolution of the Executive Committee for an order dated 10th April, 1971, and, in colourable exercise of power, are threatening to treat the plaintiff's appointment as continuing till the end of Session but the plaintiff is continuing to discharge his function as permanent lecturer in Hindi and on account of interim injunction granted in suit No. 289 of 1971 for permanent injunction restraining the defendants terminating the services of the plaintiff the defendants have not been able to do any act adverse to the interest of the plaintiff. 3. The Trial Court had held that, even if there had been on interpolation of the word temporary in the recommendation of the Selection Committee for a proposed appointment, it did not affect the result because the Vice-Chancellor had neither the power to make a permanent appointment nor had he done so by means of his order dated 1st February, 1971, which merely said that the plaintiff-respondent was appointed to lecture without specifying whether the appointment was to temporary or permanent. 4. It appea .....

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..... alid reason the services of the plaintiff are terminated hereafter, the permanent injunctions granted to the plaintiff-respondent by the lower appellate court shall become in operate and unenforceable. 6. After the High Court had diluted the injunction in a type of case which the desirability of granting such a relief was very doubtful, it was perhaps not very necessary for this Court to consider the matter under Article 136 of the Constitution. Nevertheless, as this Court had though fit to grant special leave in this case and the High Court's findings are not unequivocal, we propose to decide the question of interpretation of Section 13(7) of the Act and other questions which appear to us to have a bearing on the question whether it is desirable for Courts to interfere by means of an injunction in the affairs of educational institutions. 7. The High Court itself has held that the ordinary power of making appointments of teachers of the University and of defining the nature of appointments and specifying conditions of service in such cases is vested in the Executive Committee. The emergency powers under Section 13(7) of the Act are obviously intended for certain emergent .....

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..... ode, which lays down: In all cases in which the party pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, willful default, or undue influence and in all other cases in which particulars may be necessary beyond such as axe exemplified in the forms aforesaid, particulars (with dates and items if necessary) shall be stated in the pleading. 9. We do not think it is enough to state in general terms that there was collusion without more particulars. this Court said in Bishundeo Narain and Anr. v. Seogeni Rai and Ors. [1951]2SCR548 as under: General allegations are insufficient even to amount to an averment of fraud of which any Ct. ought to take notice, however strong the language in which they are couched may be, and the same applies to undue influence and coercion. We have already set out the general allegations of alleged collusion by which the plaintiff-respondent seemed to imply some kind of fraud. He indicated no reason for this and made no specific allegation against any particular person. 10. Apart from some suspicion surrounding the alleged alterations in the recommendation of the Selection Committee, which did not have as the Appellate Court right .....

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..... hat the plaintiff-respondent has failed completely to show that the resolution of-17-18th March 1972, of the Executive Committee, which had the final power to appoint and to specify conditions of service, under Section 23(1)(g) of the Act, could be said to be either collusive or inoperative. 12. We would also like to observe that, in a matter touching either the discipline or the administration of the internal affairs of a University, Courts should be met reluctant to interfere. They should refuse to grant an injunction unless a fairly good prima-facie case is made out for interference with the internal affairs of educational institutions. 13. We presume that the plaintiff-respondent has been working as a result of the injunction granted to him. We, however, see no justification for continuing the injunction. We, therefore, allow this appeal to the extent that we withdraw the injunction. This means that the parties are left free to adjust their differences. If, upon the strength of any facts subsequent to the institution of the suit now before us, the plaintiff has acquitted any new rights which have been infringed he is free to seek relief. We make this observation as it was .....

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