TMI Blog2019 (12) TMI 386X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ue on 18.06.2014 which he deposited in his account running in the Axis Bank, Danapur which was dishonoured as, the bank had reported that signature is mismatching. From the record, it is evident that nothing has been adduced in defence. On 27.11.2017, while argument was going on, a petition was filed on behalf of defence that the cheque be sent to a hand-writing expert in order to examine the signature over the relevant cheque which the learned lower court vide order dated 10.01.2018 rejected the same and, Respondent No.2/accused had not challenged the same. The appellant is found guilty for an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act and hence is directed to undergo RI for one year as well as fined twice of the amount of cheque, in default thereof, to undergo SI for three months - Appeal allowed. - CRIMINAL APPEAL (U/S) No.7 of 2018 - - - Dated:- 26-11-2019 - MR. ADITYA KUMAR TRIVEDI J. Appearance : For the Appellant/s: Mr. Amardeep Lokpriya, Mr.Dhananjay Kumar Tiwary, Advocates. For the State: Mr.Sri Shyed Ashfaque Ahmad, APP For the Respondent : Mr. Vidhyachal Singh, Adv. CAV ORDER 1. Instan ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ommenced, proceeded and concluded in a manner subject matter of instant appeal. 5. It is further evident from the record of the appellate court that before issuance of summon, Respondent No. 2 put his appearance whereupon, the matter has been heard at length on its merit at the stage of admission itself at the request of the parties, and is finally adjudicated upon. 6. There happens to be categorical argument at the end of the learned counsel for the appellant that concept of law, whereupon, the learned lower court had acquitted the Respondent no. 2, is not at all correct proposition of law as well as happens to be in utter violation of the principle laid down by the Hon ble Apex Court and so, the same happens to be illegal, erroneous, illegal, perfunctory, whereupon, is fit to be set aside. 7. It has also been submitted that learned lower court failed to appreciate that there happens to be no cogent, reasonable explanation at the end of Respondent No. 2/accused that cheque no. 204735 was not issued in his favour by the concerned bank, and in likewise manner, his signature over the same. In the aforesaid background, presumption would be against t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sued by the accused. So far facts of the case is concerned, it is evident that there happens to be no evidence on the record whereupon, one could infer that the complainant/appellant was in possession of such a huge amount, there happens to be no document, suggesting money having been borrowed by the respondent/accused, there happens to be no evidence relating to part payment i.e., ₹ 1,24,000/-, then in that event, even presence of cheque would not justify the prosecution and that happens to be the reason behind presence of inconsistency in the evidence of complainant, PW-3 on every material aspect. 11. It has further been urged that there is no presumption relating to issuance of notice and on account thereof, the complainant is under obligation to satisfy that the notice having been issued against the accused was duly served upon. So far instant case is concerned, as is evident from the record, the complainant/appellant failed to substantiate by cogent, reliable evidence with regard to service of notice upon Respondent No.2/accused. Consequent thereupon, the finding so recorded by the learned lower court does not warrant interference. 12. Also submitted th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n. (4) An appellate court, however, mustbear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the Accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. 15. In Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka reported in 2019 CrLJ 3246, it has been held as follows:- 11. An identical question came to be considered before this Court in the case of Umedbhai Jadavbhai (supra). In the case before this Court, the High Court interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record. However, the High Court, while reversing the acquittal, did not consider ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... proach of the court which is considering the validity of the judgment of an appellate court which has reversed the order of acquittal passed by the trial court, should be to satisfy itself if the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusions arrived at by it are demonstrably unsustainable and whether the judgment of the appellate court is free from those infirmities; if so to hold that the trial court judgment warranted interference. In such a case, there is obviously no reason why the appellate court's judgment should be disturbed. But if on the other hand the court comes to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court does not suffer from any infirmity, it cannot but be held that the interference by the appellate court in the order of acquittal was not justified; then in such a case the judgment of the appellate court has to be set aside as of the two reasonable views, the one in support of the acquittal alone has to stand. Having regard to the above discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment of the trial court in this case. 11.2 In the case of K. Ramakrishnan Unnjithan (supra), after observing that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that the court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the Accused person starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal. If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. (See in this connection the very cases cited at the Bar, namely, Surajpal Singh v. The State : 1952 Cri LJ 331; Wilayat Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh : AIR 1953 SC 122. In our opinion, there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the Appellant that the High Court was not justified in reviewing the entire evidence and coming to its own conclusions. 11.4 In the case of K. Gopal Reddy (supra), this Court has observed that where the trial Court allows itself to be beset with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the course of the proceedings before this Court, the contentions related to the proper interpretation of Sections 118(a), 138 and 139 of the Act. Before addressing them, it would be useful to quote the language of the relevant provisions: 118. Presumptions as to negotiable instruments. - Until the contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be made: (a) of consideration: that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument when it has been accepted, endorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted, endorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration; ... 138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account. Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agree ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he Act by Act 66 of 1988 with the object of inculcating faith in the efficacy of banking operations and giving credibility to negotiable instruments in business transactions. These provisions were intended to discourage people from not honouring their commitments by way of payment through cheques. The court should lean in favour of an interpretation which serves the object of the statute. A post-dated cheque will lose its credibility and acceptability if its payment can be stopped routinely. The purpose of a post-dated cheque is to provide some accommodation to the drawer of the cheque. Therefore, it is all the more necessary that the drawer of the cheque should not be allowed to abuse the accommodation given to him by a creditor by way of acceptance of a post-dated cheque. In view of Section 139, it has to be presumed that a cheque is issued in discharge of any debt or other liability. The presumption can be rebutted by adducing evidence and the burden of proof is on the person who wants to rebut the presumption. This presumption coupled with the object of Chapter XVII of the Act leads to the conclusion that by countermanding payment of a post-dated cheque, a party should not be a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... herein before, proceeded on the basis that Section 139 raises a presumption in regard to existence of a debt also. The courts below, in our opinion, committed a serious error in proceeding on the basis that for proving the defence the accused is required to step into the witness box and unless he does so he would not be discharging his burden. Such an approach on the part of the courts, we feel, is not correct. 32. An accused for discharging the burden of proof placed upon him under a statute need not examine himself. He may discharge his burden on the basis of the materials already brought on record. An accused has a constitutional right to maintain silence. Standard of proof on the part of the accused and that of the prosecution in a criminal case is different. ... 34. Furthermore, whereas prosecution must prove the guilt of an accused beyond all reasonable doubt, the standard of proof so as to prove a defence on the part of the accused is preponderance of probabilities'. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of in criminal cases and shifts the onus on to the accused (...). Such a presumption is a presumption of law, as distinguished from a presumption of fact which describes provisions by which the court may presume a certain state of affairs. Presumptions are rules of evidence and do not conflict with the presumption of innocence, because by the latter all that is meant is that the prosecution is obliged to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The obligation on the prosecution may be discharged with the help of presumptions of law or fact unless the accused adduces evidence showing the reasonable probability of the nonexistence of the presumed fact. 23. In other words, provided the facts required to form the basis of a presumption of law exists, the discretion is left with the Court to draw the statutory conclusion, but this does not preclude the person against whom the presumption is drawn from rebutting it and proving the contrary. A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... law to rely upon all the evidence led in the case including that of the plaintiff as well. In case, where the defendant fails to discharge the initial onus of proof by showing the non-existence of the consideration, the plaintiff would invariably be held entitled to the benefit of presumption arising under Section 118(a) in his favour. The court may not insist upon the defendant to disprove the existence of consideration by leading direct evidence as the existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated and even if led, is to be seen with a doubt. The bare denial of the passing of the consideration apparently does not appear to be any defence. Something which is probable has to be brought on record for getting the benefit of shifting the onus of proving to the plaintiff. To disprove the presumption, the defendant has to bring on record such facts and circumstances upon consideration of which the court may either believe that the consideration did not exist or its non-existence was so probable that a prudent man would, under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that it did not exist. (emphasis supplied) Interestingly, the very same extract has also been ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the accused/defendant cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard or proof. In the absence of compelling justifications, reverse onus clauses usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. Keeping this in view, it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is that of preponderance of probabilities'. Therefore, if the accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. As clarified in the citations, the accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a def ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier. The second condition is that the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, ought to make a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid. The third condition is that the drawer of such a cheque should have failed to make payment of the said amount of money to the payee or as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. It is only upon the satisfaction of all the three conditions mentioned above and enumerated under the proviso to Section 138 as clauses (a), (b) and (c) thereof that an offence under Section 138 can be said to have been committed by the person issuing the cheque. 13. Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act governs taking of cognizance of the offence and starts with a non-obstante clause. It provides that no court shall take ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... notice upon the drawer of the cheque to make payment of the amount covered by the cheque and (b) failure of the drawer to make any such payment within the stipulated period of 15 days of the receipt of such a notice. It is only when the said two conditions are superadded to the dishonour of the cheque that the holder/payee of the cheque acquires the right to institute proceedings for prosecution under Section 138 of the Act, which right remains legally enforceable for a period of 30 days counted from the date on which the cause of action accrued to him. There is, however, nothing in the proviso to Section 138 or Section 142 for that matter, to oblige the holder/payee of a dishonoured cheque to necessarily file a complaint even when he has acquired an indefeasible right to do so. The fact that an offence is complete need not necessarily lead to launch of prosecution especially when the offence is not a cognizable one. It follows that the complainant may, even when he has the immediate right to institute criminal proceedings against the drawer of the cheque, either at the request of the holder/payee of the cheque or on his own volition, refrain from instituting the proceedings based ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... an interpretation which promotes and advances the object sought to be achieved by the legislation, in preference to an interpretation which defeats such object. this Court has in a long line of decisions recognized purposive interpretation as a sound principle for the Courts to adopt while interpreting statutory provisions. We may only refer to the decisions of this Court in New India Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar : AIR 1963 SC 1207), where this Court observed: 8. It is a recognised rule of interpretation of statutes that expressions used therein should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute, and which effectuate the object of the Legislature. If an expression is susceptible of a narrow or technical meaning, as well as a popular meaning, the Court would be justified in assuming that the Legislature used the expression in the sense which would carry out its object and reject that which renders the exercise of its power invalid. 30. Reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in Deputy Custodian, Evacuee Property v. Official Receiver : AIR 1965 SC 951), where th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the facts of the case and the evidence on the record, we need to note the legal principles regarding nature of presumptions to be drawn Under Section 139 of the Act and the manner in which it can be rebutted by an Accused. We need to look into the relevant judgments of this Court, where these aspects have been considered and elaborated. Chapter XIII of the Act, 1881 contains a heading Special Rules of Evidence . Section 118 provides for presumptions as to negotiable instruments. Section 118 is as follows: 118. Presumptions as to negotiable instruments. --Until the contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be made: (a) of consideration --that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration; (b) as to date --that every negotiable instrument bearing a date was made or drawn on such date; XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 9. Next provision, which needs to be noticed is Section 139, which provides for presumption in favour of holder. Section 139 la ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n to consider Section 118(a) of the Act. This Court held that once execution of the promissory note is admitted, the presumption Under Section 118(a) would arise that it is supported by a consideration. Such a presumption is rebuttable and Defendant can prove the non-existence of a consideration by raising a probable defence. In paragraph No. 12 following has been laid down: 12. Upon consideration of various judgments as noted hereinabove, the position of law which emerges is that once execution of the promissory note is admitted, the presumption Under Section 118(a) would arise that it is supported by a consideration. Such a presumption is rebuttable. The Defendant can prove the nonexistence of a consideration by raising a probable defence. If the Defendant is proved to have discharged the initial onus of proof showing that the existence of consideration was improbable or doubtful or the same was illegal, the onus would shift to the Plaintiff who will be obliged to prove it as a matter of fact and upon its failure to prove would disentitle him to the grant of relief on the basis of the negotiable instrument. The burden upon the Defendant of proving the non-existence of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the lands presumed to be retained by the landowners but the same would not mean that the words 'shall presume' would be conclusive. The meaning of the expressions 'may presume' and 'shall presume' have been explained in Section 4 of the Evidence Act, 1872, from a perusal whereof it would be evident that whenever it is directed that the court shall presume a fact it shall regard such fact as proved unless disproved. In terms of the said provision, thus, the expression 'shall presume' cannot be held to be synonymous with 'conclusive proof'. 13. It was noted that the expression shall presume cannot be held to be synonymous with conclusive proof. Referring to definition of words proved and disproved Under Section 3 of the Evidence Act, following was laid down in paragraph No. 30: 30. Applying the said definitions of proved or disproved to the principle behind Section 118(a) of the Act, the court shall presume a negotiable instrument to be for consideration unless and until after considering the matter before it, it either believes that the consideration does not exist or considers the non-existence of the consider ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... C 513, this Court again examined as to when complainant discharges the burden to prove that instrument was executed and when the burden shall be shifted. In paragraph Nos. 18 to 20, following has been laid down: 18. Applying the definition of the word proved in Section 3 of the Evidence Act to the provisions of Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, it becomes evident that in a trial Under Section 138 of the Act a presumption will have to be made that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration and that it was executed for discharge of debt or liability once the execution of negotiable instrument is either proved or admitted. As soon as the complainant discharges the burden to prove that the instrument, say a note, was executed by the Accused, the Rules of presumptions Under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act help him shift the burden on the Accused. The presumptions will live, exist and survive and shall end only when the contrary is proved by the Accused, that is, the cheque was not issued for consideration and in discharge of any debt or liability. A presumption is not in itself evidence, but only makes a prima facie case for a party for whose benefit it ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is of a rebuttal nature and the onus is then on the Accused to raise a probable defence. In Paragraph No. 13, following has been laid down: 13. The High Court in its order noted that in the course of the trial proceedings, the Accused had admitted that the signature on the impugned cheque (No. 0886322 dated 8-2-2001) was indeed his own. Once this fact has been acknowledged, Section 139 of the Act mandates a presumption that the cheque pertained to a legally enforceable debt or liability. This presumption is of a rebuttal nature and the onus is then on the Accused to raise a probable defence. With regard to the present facts, the High Court found that the defence raised by the Accused was not probable. 19. After referring to various other judgments of this Court, this Court in that case held that the presumption mandated by Section 139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, which, of course, is in the nature of a rebuttable presumption. In paragraph No. 26, following was laid down: 26. In light of these extracts, we are in agreement with the Respondent claimant that the presumption mandated by Sectio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. As clarified in the citations, the Accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is conceivable that in some cases the Accused may not need to adduce evidence of his/her own. 21. We may now notice judgment relied by the learned Counsel for the complainant, i.e., judgment of this Court in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, : (2018) 8 SCC 165. This Court in the above case has examined Section 139 of the Act. In the above case, the only defence which was taken by the Accused was that cheque was stolen by the Appellant. The said defence was rejected by the trial court. In paragraph Nos. 21 to 23, following was laid down: 21. In the present case, the trial court as well as the appellate court having found that cheque contained the signatures of the Accused and it was given to the Appellant to present in the Bank, the presumption Under Section 139 was rightly raised which was not rebutted by the Accused. The Accused had not led any evidence to rebut the aforesaid presumption. The Accused even did not come in the w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the Defendant-Accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof. 23. No evidence was led by the Accused. The defence taken in the reply to the notice that cheque was stolen having been rejected by the two courts below, we do not see any basis for the High Court coming to the conclusion that the Accused has been successful in creating doubt in the mind of the Court with regard to the existence of the debt or liability. How the presumption Under Section 139 can be rebutted on the evidence of PW 1, himself has not been explained by the High Court. 22. The above case was a case where this Court did not find the defence raised by the Accused probable. The only defence raised was that cheque was stolen having been rejected by the trial court and no contrary opinion having been expressed by the High Court, this Court reversed the judgment of the High Court restoring the conviction. The Respondent cannot take any benefit of the said judgment, which was on its own facts. 23. We having noticed the ratio laid down by this Court in above cases on Sections 118(a) and 139, we now summarise ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 14. Section 139 of the Act provides that itshall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. 15. Presumptions are devices by use of which the courts are enabled and entitled to pronounce on an issue notwithstanding that there is no evidence or insufficient evidence. Under the Evidence Act all presumptions must come under one or the other class of the three classes mentioned in the Act, namely, (1) may presume (rebuttable), (2) shall presume (rebuttable), and (3) conclusive presumptions (irrebuttable). The term presumption is used to designate an inference, affirmative or dis-affirmative of the existence of a fact, conveniently called the presumed fact drawn by a judicial tribunal, by a process of probable reasoning from some matter of fact, either judicially noticed or admitted or established by legal evidence to the satisfaction of the tribunal. Presumption literally means taking as true without examination or proof . ........ 18. Applying the definition of the word proved ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d debt by leading direct evidence because the existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated. At the same time, it is clear that bare denial of the passing of the consideration and existence of debt, apparently would not serve the purpose of the Accused. Something which is probable has to be brought on record for getting the burden of proof shifted to the complainant. To disprove the presumptions, the Accused should bring on record such facts and circumstances, upon consideration of which, the court may either believe that the consideration and debt did not exist or their non-existence was so probable that a prudent man would under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that they did not exist. Apart from adducing direct evidence to prove that the note in question was not supported by consideration or that he had not incurred any debt or liability, the Accused may also rely upon circumstantial evidence and if the circumstances so relied upon are compelling, the burden may likewise shift again on to the complainant. The Accused may also rely upon presumptions of fact, for instance, those mentioned in Section 114 of the Evidence Act to rebut the presump ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e Act. The defence of the Respondent that though he made payment for the commodities/rice bags, the blank cheques were not returned by the Appellant-complainant is quite unbelievable and unacceptable. The impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside. The Respondent-Accused is convicted Under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in both the complaints; however, considering that the cheque transaction was of the year 2003, at this distant point of time, we do not deem it appropriate to impose any sentence of imprisonment on the Accused. 20. In the result, the impugned judgment ofthe High Court in Criminal Appeal Nos. 53 and 54 of 2006 is set aside and these appeals are allowed. The Respondent-Accused is convicted Under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act and a fine of ₹ 2,97,150/- (₹ 53,171/- + ₹ 1,93,979/- + compensation of ₹ 50,000/-) is imposed on the Respondent in default of which, the Respondent shall undergo imprisonment for six months. The fine amount of ₹ 2,97,150/- is to be deposited before the trial court within twelve weeks from today, failing which the Respondent shall be take ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... se filed. During cross-examination at para-3, he has stated that there was no document relating to aforesaid transaction. Cash payment was made. In para-7, he has stated that no other case has been instituted for realization of the amount. In para-9, he has stated that Advocate notice was sent on 08.07.2014 but neither any reply was received by him nor payment was made, on account of failure of payment, the case has been filed. In para-13, he has stated that he is not remembering the Cheque no.. Cheque was given on 18.06.2014 and on the same day, it was deposited in the bank for encashment. He has received the slip from the bank that on account of insufficient fund, the cheque has not been encashed. In para-15, he has stated that accused has brought the cheque duly signed since before. He had not signed the cheque at his house. In para-17, he has stated that the Advocate notice was sent after the cheque got dishonoured. In para-18, he has stated that he had informed the incident of cheque bounce through Advocate notice. The most surprising feature is the suggestion given to the PW-3 at para28, it is not a fact that no such kind of occurrence had ever taken place rather on account ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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