TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2019 (9) TMI 1484
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....at Village Padavewadi, Taluka & District Ratnagiri. Balwant Sawant died on 10-5-1950 leaving behind Smt. Indirabai Balwant Sawant, his widow as his legal heir and representative. Smt. Indirabai Balwant Sawant, widow became the owner of the said property. Her name was mutated in the revenue records. The Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 was amended by Act 15 of 1957. Section 32 as amended provided that on 1-4-1957 (Tillers' Day), every tenant shall be deemed to have purchased from the landlord free from all encumbrances the land held by him as a tenant. The predecessor of the Appellants were tenants prior to 1956-1957 i.e. prior to 1-4-1957. The proceedings for declaring the Appellants as purchaser Under Section 32-G were initiated during the lifetime of the landlady, Smt. Indirabai Balwant Sawant but the mutation Entry No. 1341 recorded that since landlady Indirabai Balwant Sawant is a widow, the proceedings as contemplated Under Section 32-G are suspended. On 12-5-1975, Smt. Indirabai Balwant Sawant executed last will and testament in favour of Anant Mahadev Sawant, Respondent 1. Smt. Indirabai Balwant Sawant died on 7-5-1999. The name of Respondent 1 was mutated....
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....etitions were filed by the Appellants and several other similarly situated tenants. All the writ petitions were dismissed by common judgment dated 1-8-2014 [Arjun Hari Kamble v. Anant Mahadev Sawant, 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 4931] of the High Court, against which judgment, these appeals have been filed. 2. After setting out various provisions of the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), as amended, and after referring to various judgments of this Court dealing, in particular, with Section 32-F of the Act, the Division Bench then stated: 30. The ratio of the abovenoted judgments can be restated in the following words: 30.1. For a landlord suffering from a disability on the Tillers' Day i.e. 1-4-1957, the deemed purchase shall be suspended. 30.2. Landlord suffering from a disability has a right Under Section 31(3) of the Act to give notice of termination of tenancy and file an application for possession. 30.3. Under Section 31(3), a minor, within one year from the date on which he attains majority; a successor-in-title of a widow within one year from the date on which her interest in the land ceases to exist; and landlord....
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....o has attained majority has been made a statutory obligation of the landlord so that tenant may exercise his right of purchase. The other two categories which are a widow or a person subject to mental or physical disability have not been expressly included in the amendment incorporated by Act 49 of 1969. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the amendment given in 1969 as well as the express provisions of such amendment are for the purposes and object to enable the tenant to exercise right of purchase. When for one category of landlord i.e. minor it is mandated that he will intimate the tenant after he attained the majority so that tenant may be enabled to exercise the right of purchase, we are of the view that the same object has to be read in two other categories of landlord that is the successor-in-title of a widow and a landlord whose mental or physical disability has been ceased. When the legislative object is to facilitate a tenant of a disabled landlord after cessation of disability to exercise right of purchase, the same benefit needs to be extended to other two categories of disabled landlord. We do not find any distinction in three categories of disabled landlords nor t....
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....ant is unaware as to when the period has begun. 40. The period prescribed for exercising the right to purchase is not a period of limitation but a reasonable period prescribed for the exercise of a right. The knowledge of cessation of disability of landlord by the tenant can only be commencement of the period prescribed. 41. When a statute gives a right to a tenant, statute needs to be interpreted in a manner so as to make the right workable, effective and meaningful. Such right cannot be defeated unless it is proved that tenant, even after knowing that disability has ceased, does not exercise his right within the period prescribed. 42. A two-Judge Bench judgment of this Court in Appa Narsappa Magdum [Appa Narsappa Magdum v. Akubai Ganapati Nimbalkar, (1999) 4 SCC 443] has expressly rejected the submission that tenant had no intimation of the death of landlady. Further judgments of this Court in Sudam Ganpat Kutwal [Sudam Ganpat Kutwal v. Shevantabai Tukaram Gulumkar, (2006) 7 SCC 200] and Tukaram Maruti Chavan [Tukaram Maruti Chavan v. Maruti Narayan Chavan, (2008) 9 SCC 358] also laid down the same ratio. The judgments in the above three cases were rendered by the two-Judge....
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...., 1957. He argued that in the case of three categories of persons, namely, widows, minors and persons suffering from a disability, the right of the cultivating tenant to become owner was only postponed, and Section 32-F must be read narrowly so as not to interfere with the statutory right of purchase of the cultivating tenant. The 1969 Amendment made this clear, but was limited only to one of the three categories, namely, minors. According to him, therefore, to sub-serve the object sought to be achieved by the 1956 Amendment, it is clear that whether a cultivating tenant is a tenant under a minor on the one hand, or a widow or a person with a disability on the other, should make no difference to the fact that once the landlord's disability ceases, the tenant must first know that such disability has ceased before he can meaningfully exercise the statutory right given to him within the period prescribed. According to him, all the Division Bench Judgments of this Court, which have held that such knowledge is immaterial, are wrong in law and need to be overruled. He stated that a manifestly absurd result would be reached if we were to so construe Section 32-F of the Act. According ....
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.... hand, Shri Ajit Bhasme, took us through various provisions of the Act and argued that the rent by a cultivating tenant needs to be paid at least annually by 31st May every year, which would enable the cultivating tenant to know that his landlady widow has died, as otherwise rent paid to a dead person cannot be credited to such person's account. He also made an emotional appeal to the Court that in all these cases, most landlords and tenants were villagers who would definitely come to know of a widow's death by word of mouth, given Indian village society. On law, he argued that the Division Bench judgments were correct. Section 32-F contains a non-obstante clause, which must be given full effect. Further, the legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and can, therefore, pick up one class among three classes, where the need is felt most, for protection. He referred to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Act of 1969 and argued that the legislature was cognizant of the fact that a large number of cases relating to minors had come to their knowledge, which is why the legislature alleviated the rigor of the Section in so far as minor landlords were conce....
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....rovided in Sub-section (2), terminate the tenancy of any land (except a permanent tenancy), if the landlord bona fide requires the land for any of the following purposes: (a) for cultivating personally, or (b) for any non-agricultural purpose. (2) The notice required to be given Under Sub-section (1) shall be in writing, shall state the purpose for which the landlord requires the land and shall be served on the tenant on or before the 31st day of December, 1956. A copy of such notice shall, at the same time, be sent to the Mamlatdar. An application for possession Under Section 29 shall be made to the Mamlatdar on or before the 31st day of March, 1957. (3) Where a landlord is a minor, or a widow, or a person subject to mental or physical disability then such notice may be given and an application for possession Under Section 29 may be made,-- (i) by the minor within one year from the date on which he attains majority; (ii) by the successor-in-title of a widow within one year from the date on which her interest in the land ceases to exist; (iii) within one year from the date on which mental or physical disability ceases to exist; and (iv) *** Provided that where a p....
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....ed in Section 14, or has so terminated the tenancy but has not applied to the Mamlatdar on or before the 31st day of March, 1957 Under Section 29 for obtaining possession of the land: Provided that if an application made by the landlord Under Section 29 for obtaining possession of the land has been rejected by the Mamlatdar or by the Collector in appeal or in revision by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal under the provisions of this Act, the tenant shall be deemed to have purchased the land on the date on which the final order of rejection is passed. The date on which the final order of rejection is passed is hereinafter referred to as "the postponed date". Provided further that the tenant of a landlord who is entitled to the benefit of the proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 31 shall be deemed to have purchased the land on the 1st day of April 1958, if no separation of his share has been effected before the date mentioned in that proviso. (1A) (a) Where a tenant, on account of his eviction from the land by the landlord, before the 1st day of April, 1957, is not in possession of the land on the said date but has made or makes an application for possession of the land Under S....
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....e Section that falls for construction in the present case and is set out in toto hereinbelow: 32-F. Right of tenant to purchase where landlord is minor, etc.-- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding sections,-- (a) where the landlord is a minor, or a widow, or a person subject to any mental or physical disability, the tenant shall have the right to purchase such land Under Section 32 within one year from the expiry of the period during which such landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy Under Section 31 and for enabling the tenant to exercise the right of purchase, the landlord shall send an intimation to the tenant of the fact that he has attained majority, before the expiry of the period during which such landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy Under Section 31: Provided that where a person of such category is a member of a joint family, the provisions of this Sub-section shall not apply if at least one member of the joint family is outside the categories mentioned in this Sub-section unless before the 31st day of March 1958 the share of such person in the joint family has been separated by metes and bounds and the Mamlatdar on inquiry is satis....
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....e) shall, so far as may be applicable, apply to such purchase. 8. Section 32-G is also important, in that, it is only after notice to the tenant that the price of the land to be paid by the tenant to the erstwhile landlord is then determined. The relevant Sub-sections of this Section states as follows: 32G. Tribunal to issue notice and determine price of land to be paid by tenants.- (1) As soon as may be after the tillers' day the Tribunal shall publish or cause to be published a public notice in the prescribed form in each village within its jurisdiction calling upon,- (a) all tenants who Under Section 32 are deemed to have purchased the lands, (b) all landlords of such lands, and (c) all other persons interested therein, to appear before it on the date specified in the notice. The Tribunal shall issue a notice individually to each such tenant, landlord and also, as far as practicable, other person calling upon each of them to appear before it on the date specified in the public notice. (2) The Tribunal shall record in the prescribed manner the statement of the tenant whether he is or is not willing to purchase the land held by him as a tenant. (3) Where any t....
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.... portion thereof, as the case may be, notwithstanding that it is a fragment, shall be disposed of by sale to any person in the following order of priority (hereinafter called "the priority list"): (i) a co-operative farming society the members of which are agricultural labourers, landless persons or small holders or a combination of such persons; (ii) agricultural labourers; (iii) landless persons; (iv) small holders; (v) a co-operative farming society of agriculturists (other than small holders) who hold either as owner or tenant or partly as owner and partly as tenant, landless in area than an economic holding and who is an artisans; (vi) an agriculturist (other than a small holder) who holds either as owner or tenant as partly as owner and partly as tenant landless in area than an economic holding and who are artisan; (vii) any other co-operative farming society; (viii) any agriculturist who holds either as owner or tenant or partly as owner and partly as tenant land larger in area than an economic holding but less in area than the ceiling area; (ix) any person, not being an agriculturist, who intends to take to the profession of agriculture: Provided that th....
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....ovided therein. Here also the purchase continues to be effective as from the tiller's day until such default is committed and there is no question of a conditional purchase or sale taking place between the landlord and tenant. The title to the land which was vested originally in the landlord passes to the tenant on the tiller's day or the alternative period prescribed in that behalf. This title is defeasible only in the event of the tenant failing to appear or making a statement that he is not willing to purchase the land or committing default in payment of the price thereof as determined by the Tribunal. The tenant gets a vested interest in the land defeasible only in either of those cases and it cannot, therefore, be said that the title of landlord to the land is suspended for any period definite or indefinite. If that is so, there is an extinguishment or in any event a modification of the landlord's right in the estate well within the meaning of those words as used in Article 31-A(1)(a). 11. Importantly, the judgment also referred to the right of the tenant to purchase land where the landlord is a minor or a widow or a person subject to a mental or physical disabili....
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....sfer inter vivos the title of the landlord is extinguished and is created simultaneously in the tenant making the tenant the deemed purchaser. It is an admitted position that on April 1, 1957 Tarachand was the landlord and Janardhan was the tenant. Tarachand landlord was under no disability as envisaged by Section 32-F. Therefore on April 1, 1957 Janardhan became deemed purchaser and Mr. Lalit could not controvert this position. 7. If Janardhan became the deemed purchaser on tillers' day, the relationship of landlord and tenant between Tarachand and Janardhan came to be extinguished and no right could be claimed either by Tarachand or anyone claiming through him such as Ashoklal or the present purchasers on the footing that they are the owners of the land on or after April 1, 1957. This basic fact is incontrovertible. 8. It may be mentioned that Section 32-F has no application to the facts of this case. Section 32-F postponed the date of compulsory purchase by the tenant where the landlord is a minor or a widow or a person subject to mental or physical disability on the tillers' day. Section 32-F has an overriding effect over Section 32 as it opens with a non-obstante c....
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....nd tenant. Also, under the circumstances prescribed Under Section 32(1A), again the tenant shall be deemed to have purchased the land on a date on which a final order is passed by the Tribunal in the circumstances mentioned in the said Sub-section. Again, Under Sub-section (1B), in the circumstances mentioned in the aforesaid Sub-section, land gets restored to the tenant upon which deemed purchase takes place. Statutorily, therefore, in all cases covered by Section 32, the landlord is divested of his title either on Tillers' Day or on a postponed date which is to the knowledge of the tenant, as the aforesaid date is on and from a final order of a Tribunal or a Tahsildar, as the case may be. 14. Section 32-G is a very important pointer to the fact that a tenant must be put on notice in order that the purchase price of land be determined by the Tribunal. This notice Under Section 32-G(1) is in the form of a public notice in the prescribed form in each village. Apart from this, the Tribunal shall also issue a notice individually to each tenant calling upon him to appear before it on the date specified in the notice. The same is the case of a tenant who is deemed to have purchased....
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....n 29 may then be made. In case this is done within the time prescribed, the tenant's right to purchase does not fructify. It is only when this is not done within the period of one year, as aforestated, that the postponed right of the tenant springs into being. 16. Prior to the Amendment Act of 1969, on a plain literal reading of Section 32-F(1)(a), it is true that a tenant had to exercise this right within a period of one year from the expiry of the one year spoken of in Section 31(3) of the Act. Literally speaking, therefore, even if the tenant does not know when the minor became major or when the widow died or transferred her share, this right would cease on the expiry of one year. 17. Realising that this would cause immense hardship for want of knowledge of a special fact which is only within the landlord's ken, the legislature stepped in and amended Section 32-F. The Statement of Objects and Reasons for this Amendment Act is as follows: Statement of Objects and Reasons It has come to the notice of the Government that a number of tenants in the Bombay area and the Vidarbha region of the State, failed to acquire ownership right in the lands held by them on account o....
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....keeping with the object sought to be achieved statutorily divesting the landlord of his title and handing over the land to the cultivating tenant, cannot possibly be achieved unless a special fact within the knowledge of the landlord alone is first intimated to the tenant, so that he may then, with knowledge that the minor landlord has now turned major, meaningfully exercise his right of purchase under the Act. 20. It seems to us that the vast majority of cases which came to the notice of the legislature were cases of landlords who were minor at the time of the 1956 Amendment Act and who turned major only thereafter. The amnesty scheme contained in Sub-section (1A), was, therefore, limited only to such cases. Unfortunately, the legislature, when it inserted words into Sub-section (1)(a) of Section 32-F, appears to have forgotten that these words will govern the right of tenants which has been postponed on account of a landlord's disability. What appears to have been missed is the fact that, apart from minors, there are two other categories mentioned in Section 32-F(1)(a), all of whom would stand on the same footing insofar as the tenant is concerned. It would be wholly anomalo....
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.... the wisdom of the rule, now, I believe, universally adopted, at least in the Courts of Law in Westminster Hall, that in construing wills and indeed statutes, and all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no farther. This is laid down by Mr. Justice Burton, in a very excellent opinion, which is to be found in Warburton v. Loveland [Warburton v. Loveland, (1831) 2 Dow & Clause 480 : 6 ER 806] (see ante, p. 76. n.) 23. In an early Privy Council judgment in Salmon v. Duncombe (1886) 11 AC 627, Ordinance No. 1 of 1856 as it applied to Natal was up for construction. In order to make sense of the provision, the Privy Council found it necessary to cross out certain words of the Ordinance. This they did by stating: It is, however, a very serious matter to hold that when the main object of a statute is clear, it shall be reduced to a nullity by the draftsman's unskillfulness or ignorance of law....
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....ct to the enactment, it might be necessary to answer that question in the affirmative; but, as it destroys the expressed objects altogether unless the word "resident" be construed to mean "domiciled," and in that case destroys the expressed objects so far as regards real property, their Lordships answer it in the negative. It is true that they cannot find a sensible meaning for the nine words in question. Very likely the draftsman, whose want of skill is shown by other expressions in the Ordinance, attributed to residence a legal effect which it does not possess. But he does not make the legislature say that the powers conferred are not to be any greater powers than would be conferred by a residence in England. He makes it in the rest of the Section use terms which, with the easy implication that is necessary to give them meaning and to harmonize with the declared objects, confer the power of escaping from Natal law and coming under English law; and he then adds words which may add nothing to what has gone before, but which ought not without necessity to be construed so as to destroy all that has gone before. A man exercising the powers conferred does not in any way violate or cont....
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....o the other view, "of the offence disclosed". If, in construing the section, the court has to supply some words in order to make the meaning of the statute clear, it will naturally prefer the latter construction which is more in consonance with reason and justice. 26. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Azad Bharat Finance Co. and Anr. (1966) Supp. SCR 473, Section 11 of the Opium (Madhya Bharat Amendment) Act, 1955 was construed as being permissive and not obligatory as follows: ...It is well recognised that if a statute leads to absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence, (vide Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh [ (1955) 2 SCR 457 at 464]). Secondly, it is a penal statute and it should, if possible, be construed in such a way that a person who has not committed or abetted any offence should not be visited with a penalty. Thirdly, if the meaning suggested by Mr. Shroff is given, Section 11(d) of the Madhya Bharat Act may have to be struck down as imposing unreasonable restrictions Under Article 19 of the Constitution. Bearing all these considerations in min....
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....ion of principles of natural justice, how should the Appellate Authority exercise its appellate powers? Obviously it could not withhold its hands and refuse to interfere with Commissioner's order altogether, for, that would amount to perpetuating the Commissioner's erroneous order, nor could it merely cancel or set aside the Commissioner's wrong order without doing anything about the Income Tax Officer's order, for, that would result in perpetuating the Income Tax Officer's order which had been found to be manifestly erroneous as being prejudicial to the revenue. But such result would flow from the view taken by the High Court which has held that the Tribunal acted properly in vacating the Commissioner's order but did not act properly in directing him to dispose of the proceedings afresh after giving opportunity to the Assessee. Such manifestly absurd result could never have been intended by the Legislature. xxx xxx xxx A literal construction placed on Sub-section (2)(b) would lead to such manifestly absurd and anomalous results, which, we do not think, were intended by the Legislature. These considerations compel us to construe the words of Sub-section (....
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....urpose which the legislature had in view in enacting that provision and in the context of the setting in which it occurs. We cannot ignore the context and the collocation of the provisions in which Section 52 Sub-section (2) appears, because, as pointed out by Judge Learned Hand in most felicitous language: ... the meaning of a sentence may be more than that of the separate words, as a melody is more than the notes, and no degree of particularity can ever obviate recourse to the setting in which all appear, and which all collectively create. Keeping these observations in mind we may now approach the construction of Section 52 Sub-section (2). 6. The primary objection against the literal construction of Section 52 Sub-section (2) is that it leads to manifestly unreasonable and absurd consequences. It is true that the consequences of a suggested construction cannot alter the meaning of a statutory provision but they can certainly help to fix its meaning. It is a well-recognised Rule of construction that a statutory provision must be so construed, if possible, that absurdity and mischief may be avoided. There are many situations where the construction suggested on behalf of the ....
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.... pay tax on the basis as if he has received the market value of the property as on the date of re-sale, if, in the meanwhile, the market price has shot up and exceeds the agreed price by more than 15 per cent? Many other similar situations can be contemplated where it would be absurd and unreasonable to apply Section 52 Sub-section (2) according to its strict literal construction. We must therefore eschew literalness in the interpretation of Section 52 Sub-section (2) and try to arrive at an interpretation which avoids this absurdity and mischief and makes the provision rational and sensible, unless of course, our hands are tied and we cannot find any escape from the tyranny of the literal interpretation. It is now a well-settled Rule of construction that where the plain literal interpretation of a statutory provision produces a manifestly absurd and unjust result which could never have been intended by the legislature, the court may modify the language used by the legislature or even "do some violence" to it, so as to achieve the obvious intention of the legislature and produce a rational construction (vide Luke v. Inland Revenue Commissioner [(1963) AC 557]). The Court may also i....
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.... which has to be read in conjunction with Section 24(2) in this case for the present purpose. If the purpose of a particular provision is easily discernible from the whole scheme of the Act which in this case is, to counteract the effect of the transfer of assets so far as computation of income of the Assessee is concerned then bearing that purpose in mind, we should find out the intention from the language used by the Legislature and if strict literal construction leads to an absurd result i.e. result not intended to be subserved by the object of the legislation found in the manner indicated before, and if another construction is possible apart from strict literal construction then that construction should be preferred to the strict literal construction. xxx xxx xxx 48. In view of the aforesaid and in view of the attitude of the law-makers in dealing with this problem as evidenced by the amendment and in the circular originally issued prior thereto and bearing in mind that under the scheme of the Act where the wife or minor child carries on a running business, the right to carry forward the loss in the running business would be available to the wife or minor child if they them....
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.... visualised wherein there was no scope of committing any offence. Such a situation could arise only if the tax liability fell Under Sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Act. The scheme of Section 8 indicated that concessional rates contemplated by Sub-section (1) thereof would be available only with reference to those goods which are covered by the declarations in Form 'C'. The moment it is found that in respect of particular quantity of goods the undertaking given by the Assessee in Form 'C' declaration has not been carried out, the goods were presumed to be such in respect of which no undertaking was existing. Therefore such goods would be liable to normal tax contemplated Under Sub-section (2) of Section 8. Therefore, the penalty should be worked out only on the basis of the normal rates prescribed Under Sub-section (2) of Section 8. That would make sense. That is a reasonably possible construction. That would avoid absurd result. 31. In Hameedia Hardware Stores v. B. Mohanlal (1988) 2 SCC 513, Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 was read harmoniously with the other provisions of the Act, as a result of which the w....
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....s as to advance the remedy intended by the statute. (See: Sirajul Haq Khan v. Sunni Central Board of Waqf [1959 SCR 1287, 1299 : AIR 1959 SC 198].) 20. The tenant of course is entitled to raise all relevant contentions as against the claim of the classified landlords. The fact that there is no reference to the word bona fide requirement in Sections 14-B to 14-D does not absolve the landlord from proving that his requirement is bona fide or the tenant from showing that it is not bona fide. In fact every claim for eviction against a tenant must be a bona fide one. There is also enough indication in support of this construction from the title of Section 25-B which states "special procedure for the disposal of applications for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement". 33. In C.W.S. (India) Limited v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1994) Supp. 2 SCC 296, Section 40(c)(iii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 came up for discussion. The Court held: 10. Now, it may be noticed that Section 40(a)(v) is only an expanded version of Section 40(c)(iii). The idea was to bring the allowances in respect of the assets owned by the Assessee, which assets are used by its employee for his own purpos....
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....of the language used. Lord Reid has said that he prefers to see a mistake on the part of the draftsman in doing his revision rather than a deliberate attempt to introduce an irrational rule: 'The canons of construction are not so rigid as to prevent a realistic solution.' We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court was right in taking the view it did on this aspect and we agree with it. 34. In Molar Mal v. Kay Iron Works (P) Ltd. (2000) 4 SCC 285, this Court construed a provision of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 by interpreting the proviso to Section 13(3) of the said Act by adding certain words as follows: 12. ...We agree with this contention of the landlord that normally the courts will have to follow the Rule of literal construction which Rule enjoins the court to take the words as used by the legislature and to give it the meaning which naturally implies. But, there is an exception to this rule. That exception comes into play when application of literal construction of the words in the statute leads to absurdity, inconsistency or when it is shown that the legal context in which the words are used or by....
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....r to make a reference and get it answered and then subsequently make another application when some other person gets the reference answered and obtains a higher amount. In fact in Pradeep Kumari case [ (1995) 2 SCC 736] the three learned Judges, while enumerating the conditions to be satisfied, whereafter an application Under Section 28-A can be moved, had categorically stated (SCC p. 743, para 10) "the person moving the application did not make an application to the Collector Under Section 18". The expression "did not make an application", as observed by this Court, would mean, did not make an effective application which had been entertained by making the reference and the reference was answered. When an application Under Section 18 is not entertained on the ground of limitation, the same not fructifying into any reference, then that would not tantamount to an effective application and consequently the rights of such applicant emanating from some other reference being answered to move an application Under Section 28-A cannot be denied. We, accordingly answer Question 1(a) by holding that the dismissal of an application seeking reference Under Section 18 on the ground of delay woul....
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...., (1979)1 SCC 380. A Constitution Bench of this Court in paragraph 72 of the aforesaid judgment, after referring to Ram Krishna Dalmia's case (supra) and other judgments, stated 13 propositions insofar as Article 14 is concerned. We are directly concerned with propositions (1), (3), (6) and (8) which are set out as follows: 72. As long back as in 1960, it was said by this Court in Kangsari Haldar that the propositions applicable to cases arising Under Article 14 "have been repeated so many times during the past few years that they now sound almost platitudinous". What was considered to be platitudinous some 18 years ago has, in the natural course of events, become even more platitudinous today, especially in view of the avalanche of cases which have flooded this Court. Many a learned Judge of this Court has said that it is not in the formulation of principles Under Article 14 but in their application to concrete cases that difficulties generally arise. But, considering that we are sitting in a larger Bench than some which decided similar cases Under Article 14, and in view of the peculiar importance of the questions arising in this reference, though the questions themselves a....
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....e (supra) an exception has been engrafted in proposition (6) contained hereinabove. The law may recognise degrees of harm, but in so doing the classification should never be arbitrary, artificial or evasive. This is repeated by way of a proviso to proposition (8) as well. We have referred to the Statement of the Objects and Reasons for the 1969 Amendment. Paragraph 2 thereof stated that a large number of cases involving minor landlords had come to the notice of the legislature, for which reason the amnesty scheme mentioned in Sub-section (1A) of Section 32-F was enacted. However, what was forgotten by the draftsman when the addition to Section 32-F(1)(a) was made was the fact that Section 32F(1)(a) referred to three categories of landlords and not only one. The words added by the 1969 amendment thus gave relief to tenants only qua minor landlords and not the other two categories. Obviously, the classification made in favour of tenants of minor landlords as opposed to tenants of landlords of the other two categories is a classification which is arbitrary in nature. This being the case, such classification would ordinarily have to be struck down as being violative of Article 14 of th....
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....s that if an action is found to be arbitrary and, therefore, unreasonable, it would negate the equal protection of the law contained in Article 14 and would be struck down on this ground. 42. Hiralal P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora (2016) 10 SCC 165, is a case in point. In this judgment, this Court struck down a portion of Section 2(q) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. Section 2(q) of the said Act defined "Respondent" as meaning any adult male person who is, or has been in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person and against whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief. This Court having regard to the object sought to be achieved by the Act, struck down the expression "adult male" as follows: 39. A conspectus of these judgments also leads to the result that the microscopic difference between male and female, adult and non-adult, regard being had to the object sought to be achieved by the 2005 Act, is neither real or substantial nor does it have any rational relation to the object of the legislation. In fact, as per the principle settled in Subramanian Swamy [Subramanian Swamy v. CBI, (2014) 8 SCC 682: (2014) 6 SCC (Cri.) 42: (2014) ....
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....of all the three categories of landlords covered by the provision. 45. It now remains to deal with some of the judgments of this Court on the interpretation of Section 32-F. In Anna Bhau Magdum v. Babasaheb Anandrao Desai (1995) 5 SCC 243, a minor landlord attained majority in 1965 i.e. before the 1969 Amendment Act came into force. After adverting to the amendments made in 1969, this Court held that for this reason the amendment did not apply to the facts of that case. It was also found, as a matter of fact, that despite knowing that the Respondent landlord would attain majority on 17.1.1965, the tenant gave no intimation as required by Sub-section (1A) to Section 32-F even within the amnesty period of two years granted by the said Sub-section. The only argument made on behalf of the tenant in that case was that since there is an automatic purchase, the provisions of Sub-section (1A) are directory in nature. This was turned down stating that the consequences of non-compliance of Section 32-F(1A) are laid down in Section 32-P(1) and that, therefore, the time period contained in Sub-section (1A) of Section 32-F is mandatory in nature. This case is wholly distinguishable on its fact....
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....aruti Narayan Chavan, (2008) 9 SCC 358. This judgment followed the law laid down in Appa Narsappa (supra) and on facts held that the Appellant tenant had complete knowledge of the death of the widow in that case, as a result of which the Appellant's contention that he was confused as to who was the true owner was turned down. To the extent that this judgment follows the law laid down in Appa Narsappa (supra), this judgment also does not lay down the law correctly and is overruled to this extent. 49. It now only remains to consider some of Shri Bhasme's other arguments. The argument made based on Section 14(1)(a) that since a tenant is bound to pay the rent every year before the 31st May thereof, the tenant is bound to know that the person to whom he is paying rent has since died and that, therefore, knowledge cannot be brought in to the construction of Section 32-F need not detain us. On facts in the present case, the landlady was actually at Mumbai, whereas the tenant was at Ratnagiri. Also, Section 14(1)(b) makes it clear that in case the tenant fails to pay rent before the 31st May of every year, the landlord must first give a three months' notice in writing informi....