TMI Blog2019 (9) TMI 1484X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nants-the Explanation-I to Section 2(6) makes this clear - in the vast majority of cases, the landlord is divested of his title on a fixed date i.e. 1st April, 1957. It is only in exceptional cases where the landlord is a widow, minor or a person subjected to disability that this right of the tenant is postponed. What is important to note is that it is to the knowledge of both landlord and tenant that the tenant becomes the owner statutorily on a fixed date i.e. 1st April, 1957. Even otherwise, on postponed dates that are mentioned Under Section 32, the tenant shall be deemed to have purchased the land on such postponed date under the first proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 32 when an application for possession made by the landlord Under Section 29 is finally rejected-a date that is to the knowledge of both landlord and tenant. Given the fact that the object of the 1956 Amendment, which is an agrarian reform legislation, and is to give the tiller of the soil statutory title to land which such tiller cultivates; and, given the fact that the literal interpretation of Section 32-F(1)(a) would be contrary to justice and reason and would lead to great hardship qua persons who are ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hinton Fali Nariman, R. Subhash Reddy and Surya Kant, JJ. For Appellant: Aniruddha Joshi and Shubhangi Tuli, Advs. For Respondents: Ajit S. Bhasme, Sr. Adv., Pankaj Kumar Mishra, Shashank Mangle, A. Bhasme and Nishant Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, Advs. Overruled/Reversed: Appa Narsappa Magdum (D) Thr. Lrs. vs. Akubai Ganapati Nimbalkar and Ors. JUDGMENT Rohinton Fali Nariman, 1. This case has been referred to a Three Judge Bench by a detailed judgment of a Division Bench of this Court reported as Vasant Ganpat Padave v. Anant Mahadev Sawant (2019) 2 SCC 788. The relevant facts that are necessary for determination of the controversy before us are set out in paragraphs 3 to 5 of the referral order as follows: 3. One Balwant Sawant was landlord of Survey No. 92/2, corresponding to new Survey No. 31 Hissa No. 2/10, admeasuring about 0.01.3 H.R. at Village Padavewadi, Taluka District Ratnagiri. Balwant Sawant died on 10-5-1950 leaving behind Smt. Indirabai Balwant Sawant, his widow as his legal heir and representative. Smt. Indirabai Balwant Sawant, widow became the owner of the said property. Her name was mutated in the revenue records. The Bombay Tena ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 2-F within the time as prescribed and no notice having been issued within the time as prescribed, the Appellants have lost right of purchase. 5. The Appellants, aggrieved by the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, filed a revision application before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. There were other revisions filed by several other tenants who were aggrieved by the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal by a common order dated 20-4-2013 dismissed the revisions and confirmed the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal held that applicants were under legal obligation to give intimation expressing their desire to purchase within time stipulated Under Section 32-F, which having not been given, no right of purchase is available to applicants. Aggrieved against the judgment of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, writ petitions were filed by the Appellants and several other similarly situated tenants. All the writ petitions were dismissed by common judgment dated 1-8-2014 [Arjun Hari Kamble v. Anant Mahadev Sawant, 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 4931] of the High Court, against which judgment, these appeals have been filed. 2. After s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ntabai Tukaram Gulumkar, (2006) 7 SCC 200] and Tukaram Maruti Chavan [Tukaram Maruti Chavan v. Maruti Narayan Chavan, (2008) 9 SCC 358], clearly supports the submission of the learned Counsel for the Respondents that the Appellants having not exercised their right to purchase Under Section 32-F(1) read with Section 32-F(1-A) within the time prescribed, the right of purchase of the tenant is lost. But there is one aspect of the matter which needs to be noted and has not been considered in the above judgments rendered by two-Judge Benches of this Court which we shall notice hereinafter. The Division Bench then laid emphasis upon the Statement of Objects and Reasons to the 1969 Amendment of the 1948 Act and opined: 37. Amendment in Section 32-F(1)(a) added by Act 49 of 1969 expressly covered a case of landlord who was minor and has attained majority. Intimation by a minor landlord who has attained majority has been made a statutory obligation of the landlord so that tenant may exercise his right of purchase. The other two categories which are a widow or a person subject to mental or physical disability have not been expressly included in the amendment incorporated by Act 49 of 1 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and the amendments made by the 1969 Act were with intent to facilitate tenants to exercise their right. The amendments by Act 15 of 1957 was agrarian reform making tillers of the soil the owners of the land which was done to achieve the object of making all tillers of the soil as owners of the land. While interpreting the provisions of Section 32-F(1-A) as well as Section 31(3), the purpose and object of the 1948 Act, amendments made therein from time to time cannot be lost sight off. 39. When Section 32-F of the 1948 Act gives right to purchase to a tenant whose landlord was suffering from a disability on Tillers' Day, the exercise of right to purchase by such tenant has to be interpreted in a manner so as to make the exercise of right meaningful and effective. The abovesaid right cannot be defeated on the ground that it was not exercised within the period prescribed when the tenant is unaware as to when the period has begun. 40. The period prescribed for exercising the right to purchase is not a period of limitation but a reasonable period prescribed for the exercise of a right. The knowledge of cessation of disability of landlord by the tenant can only be commencement ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e status quo. 3. We have heard Shri Aniruddha Joshi, learned Advocate for the Appellant and Shri Ajit S. Bhasme, learned Senior Advocate for the Respondent. Shri Joshi painstakingly took us through various provisions of the 1948 Act and was at pains to point out that it was a social welfare legislation enacted in furtherance of an Agrarian Reform Programme and was, therefore, covered by Article 31A of the Constitution of India. He laid great emphasis, in particular, upon the Amendment Acts of 1956 and 1969. By the first mentioned Amendment Act, the statutory scheme was to divest an absentee landlord of his title and vest title directly in the cultivating tenant of agricultural land. The landlord was given only a limited right to ask for resumption of his land provided certain very stringent conditions were met, provided that such application was made on or before Tillers' Day i.e. 1st April, 1957. He argued that in the case of three categories of persons, namely, widows, minors and persons suffering from a disability, the right of the cultivating tenant to become owner was only postponed, and Section 32-F must be read narrowly so as not to interfere with the statutory right ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ate of knowledge of the death of the widow. He cited a number of judgments in support of this proposition. He also argued that in any event, if Section 32-F were to be construed literally, it would violate Article 14 as it would discriminate between cultivating tenants who are similarly situate, namely, tenants whose statutory right to become owners has been postponed on account of the landlord's disability. Whereas in the case of minors, the landlord is bound to intimate the tenant of the date on which such minor attains majority, so that he may exercise his statutory right in a meaningful way, there is no such obligation on a widow's successors to inform the tenant of the death of the widow, resulting in persons who are similarly situate being deprived of their statutory right for no fault of theirs, and contrary to the Object sought to be achieved by the 1956 Amendment. 4. On the other hand, Shri Ajit Bhasme, took us through various provisions of the Act and argued that the rent by a cultivating tenant needs to be paid at least annually by 31st May every year, which would enable the cultivating tenant to know that his landlady widow has died, as otherwise rent paid to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ersons-deemed tenants Under Section 4, protected tenants and permanent tenants, as defined. Under Section 4 of the Act, a person who cultivates lawfully any land belonging to another person shall be deemed to be a tenant if such land is not cultivated personally by the owner or a member of his family or by a servant on wages payable in cash or kind or by a mortgagee in possession. Under Section 4-B tenancies cannot be terminated merely on the ground that the period fixed by an agreement has expired. Section 31 is important and is set out hereinbelow: 31. Landlord's right to terminate tenancy for personal cultivation and non-agricultural purpose.-- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 14 and 30 but subject to Sections 31-A to 31-D (both inclusive), a landlord (not being a landlord within the meaning of Chapter III-AA) may, after giving notice and making an application for possession as provided in Sub-section (2), terminate the tenancy of any land (except a permanent tenancy), if the landlord bona fide requires the land for any of the following purposes: (a) for cultivating personally, or (b) for any non-agricultural purpose. (2) The notice required ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d to have purchased land on tillers' day- (1) On the first day of April 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the tillers day ) every tenant shall, subject to the other provisions of this Section and the provisions of the next succeeding sections, be deemed to have purchased from his landlord, free of all encumbrances subsisting thereon on the said day, the land held by him as tenant, if,- (a) Such tenant is a permanent tenant thereof and cultivates land personally; (b) Such tenant is not a permanent tenant but cultivates the land leased personally; and (i) the landlord has not given notice of termination of his tenancy Under Section 31; or (ii) notice has been given Under Section 31, but the landlord has not applied to the Mamlatdar on or before the 31st day of March, 1957 Under Section 29 for obtaining possession of the land; or (iii) the landlord has not terminated this tenancy on any of the grounds specified in Section 14, or has so terminated the tenancy but has not applied to the Mamlatdar on or before the 31st day of March, 1957 Under Section 29 for obtaining possession of the land: Provided that if an application made by the landlord Under Section 29 fo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... or on the application of the tenant, hold an inquiry and direct that such land shall be taken from the possession of the landlord or, as the case may be, his successor-in-interest, and shall be restored to the tenant; and thereafter, the provisions of this Section and Section 32-A to 32-R(both inclusive) shall, in so far as they may be applicable, apply thereto, subject to the modification that the tenant shall be deemed to have purchased the land on the date on which the land is restored to him. Provided that, the tenant shall be entitled to restoration of the land under this Sub-section only if he undertakes to cultivate the land personally and of so much thereof as together with the other land held by him as owner or tenant shall not exceed the ceiling area. Explanation-In this Sub-section, successor-in-interest means a person who acquires the interest by testamentary disposition or devolution on death. Section 32-F is the Section that falls for construction in the present case and is set out in toto hereinbelow: 32-F. Right of tenant to purchase where landlord is minor, etc.-- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding sections,-- (a) where the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion and value of the land, in the same proportion as the share of that person in the entire joint family property, and not in a larger proportion. (1-A) A tenant desirous of exercising the right conferred on him Under Sub-section (1) shall give an intimation in that behalf to the landlord and the Tribunal in the prescribed manner within the period specified in that Sub-section: Provided that, if a tenant holding land from a landlord (who was a minor and has attained majority before the commencement of the Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Laws (Amendment) Act, 1969) has not given intimation as required by this Sub-section but being in possession of the land on such commencement is desirous of exercising the right conferred upon him Under Sub-section (1), he may give such intimation within a period of two years from the commencement of that Act. (2) The provisions of Sections 32 to 32-E (both inclusive) and Sections 32-G to 32-R (both inclusive) shall, so far as may be applicable, apply to such purchase. 8. Section 32-G is also important, in that, it is only after notice to the tenant that the price of the land to be paid by the tenant to the erstwhile landlord is then dete ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... elow: 32P. Power of Tribunal to resume and dispose of land not purchased by tenant.- (1) Where the purchase of any land by tenant Under Section 32 becomes ineffective Under Sections 32-G or 32-M or where a tenant fails to exercise the right to purchase the land held by him within the specified period Under Sections 32F, 32O, 33C or 43-1D the Tribunal may suo motu or on an application made on this behalf land in case other than those in which the purchase has become ineffective by reason of Section 32-G or 32M, after holding a formal inquiry direct that the land shall be disposed of in the manner provided in Sub-section (2). (2) Such direction shall provide- (a) that the former tenant be summarily evicted; (b) that the land shall, subject to the provisions of Section 15, be surrendered to the former landlord; (c) that if the entire land or any portion thereof cannot be surrendered in accordance with the provisions of Section 15, the entire land or such portion thereof, as the case may be, notwithstanding that it is a fragment, shall be disposed of by sale to any person in the following order of priority (hereinafter called the priority list ): (i) a co-operativ ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a locus poenitentiae and an option of declaring whether he is or is not willing to purchase the land held by him as a tenant. If he fails to appear or makes a statement that he is not willing to purchase the land, the Tribunal shall by an order in writing declare that such tenant is not willing to purchase the land and that the purchase is ineffective. It is only by such a declaration by the Tribunal that the purchase becomes ineffective. If no such declaration is made by the Tribunal the purchase would stand as statutorily effected on the tiller's day and will continue to be operative, the only obligation on the tenant then being the payment of price in the mode determined by the Tribunal. If the tenant commits default in the payment of such price either in lump or by instalments as determined by the Tribunal, Section 32-M declares the purchase to be ineffective but in that event the land shall then be at the disposal of the Collector to be disposed of by him in the manner provided therein. Here also the purchase continues to be effective as from the tiller's day until such default is committed and there is no question of a conditional purchase or sale taking place betwee ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t default in payment of the price thereto as determined by the Tribunal. Therefore, it is unquestionably established that on the tillers' day, the landlord's interest in the land gets extinguished and simultaneously by a statutory sale without anything more by the parties, the extinguished title of the landlord is kindled or created in the tenant. That very moment landlord-tenant relationship as understood in common law or Transfer of Property Act comes to an end. The link and chain is broken. The absent non-cultivating landlord ceases to have that ownership element of the land and the cultivating tenant, the tiller of the soil becomes the owner thereof. This is unquestionable. The landlord from the date of statutory sale is only entitled to receive the purchase price as determined by the Tribunal Under Section 32-G. In other words, the landlord ceases to be landlord and the tenant becomes the owner of the land and comes in direct contact with the State. Without any act of transfer inter vivos the title of the landlord is extinguished and is created simultaneously in the tenant making the tenant the deemed purchaser. It is an admitted position that on April 1, 1957 Tarac ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nd throughout their widowhood, minority or period of disability are deemed to cultivate the land personally through their tenants-the Explanation-I to Section 2(6) makes this clear. As we have seen from the case law extracted above, in the vast majority of cases, the landlord is divested of his title on a fixed date i.e. 1st April, 1957. It is only in exceptional cases where the landlord is a widow, minor or a person subjected to disability that this right of the tenant is postponed. What is important to note is that it is to the knowledge of both landlord and tenant that the tenant becomes the owner statutorily on a fixed date i.e. 1st April, 1957. Even otherwise, on postponed dates that are mentioned Under Section 32, the tenant shall be deemed to have purchased the land on such postponed date under the first proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 32 when an application for possession made by the landlord Under Section 29 is finally rejected-a date that is to the knowledge of both landlord and tenant. Also, under the circumstances prescribed Under Section 32(1A), again the tenant shall be deemed to have purchased the land on a date on which a final order is passed by the Tribunal ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is that the cultivating tenant in all cases where the landlord is a minor, a widow or a person subjected to a disability, does not statutorily become owner of the agricultural land cultivated personally by him on Tillers' Day. This is for the reason that Under Section 2(6) Explanation-I, these three categories of landlords are deemed to cultivate personally through such tenant. The entitlement of terminating a tenancy under any one of these three categories is contained in Section 31(3). In any of these three cases, the moment the disability ceases i.e. that the land in question no longer belongs to a minor, as he has become major, or to a widow, as she has died or transferred her share with permission Under Section 63, or to a person whose mental or physical disability ceases, one year is granted for such persons to apply for resumption of the land on the ground that such persons wish to personally cultivate the said land, pursuant to which an application for possession of land Under Section 29 may then be made. In case this is done within the time prescribed, the tenant's right to purchase does not fructify. It is only when this is not done within the period of one year, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to give the necessary intimation within the period laid down by statute. Under this amnesty scheme, if a tenant held land from a landlord who was a minor and who had obtained majority before the commencement of the 1969 Amendment and no intimation had been given, two years extra was given from the date of commencement of that Act in which such intimation may be given. This statutory object, reflected in paragraph 2 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons, is carried out by the proviso to Sub-section (1A) inserted by the 1969 Amendment Act into Section 32-F. 19. Simultaneously, the same Amendment Act inserted into Sub-section (1)(a), the following: and for enabling the tenant to exercise the right of purchase, the landlord shall send an intimation to the tenant of the fact that he has attained majority, before the expiry of the period during which such landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy Under Section 31: The addition of these words into Section 32-F(1)(a) would show that the legislature, in keeping with the object sought to be achieved statutorily divesting the landlord of his title and handing over the land to the cultivating tenant, cannot possibly be achieved ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... umption. When this does not take place one year is granted from the expiry of this first one year to the tenant to exercise his statutory right. This cannot be done because the tenant does not know of the death of the widow. As a result, this very land which was not required by the landlord's successors in interest for personal cultivation, goes back to the landlord Under Section 32-P in cases in which the landlord either has no land within the ceiling limit or some land which does not exhaust the ceiling limit. This anomaly indeed turns the entire scheme of agrarian reform on its head. We have thus to see whether the language of Section 32-F can be added to or subtracted from, in order that the absurdity aforementioned and the discrimination between persons who are similarly situate be obviated. The Golden Rule of Interpretation 22. In Grey v. Pearson (1857) LR 6 HL Cas 61, what is referred to as the Golden Rule of literal interpretation was stated as follows: ... I have been long and deeply impressed with the wisdom of the rule, now, I believe, universally adopted, at least in the Courts of Law in Westminster Hall, that in construing wills and indeed statutes, and al ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... turn. Now suppose that sect. 1 ended with the words in this district or with the words intents and purposes. Though it would then be very inartificially drawn, it would not be difficult to construe it so as to give effect to the before declared object. The conditional words could or might exercise would require the implication of an unexpressed condition; otherwise the sentence would result in a nullity. But the implication would be by no means a difficult one. By implying after the words customs of England the addition over property subject to those laws and customs, the enactment would become sensible and harmonious. The difficulty is, and their Lordships quite agree that it is a great difficulty, that a condition which is apparently and at first sight the correlative condition of the conditional words could or might exercise is expressed by the last nine words of the section. And the question is whether that expression excludes all other implications. If such a construction left a substantial operative effect to the enactment, it might be necessary to answer that question in the affirmative; but, as it destroys the expressed objects altogether unless the word re ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... language used, the proviso contemplates notice only to persons who are not parties to the petition. The Court, therefore, restricted the word person appearing in the said proviso to mean only persons who are not parties to the election petition. This was done, given the fact that the object of the proviso was to give notice to persons who had hitherto not been given notice of the election petition. Obviously, the parties to the election petition were persons who knew of the existence of such petition. 25. In Ramaswamy Nadar v. State of Madras (1958) SCR 739, this Court found it necessary to supply words which were not found in Section 423(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This the Court did as follows: ...But this argument is wholly ineffective because in either view of the matter the court has to supply some words in answer to the question find him guilty of what? According to the Appellant, those additional words should be of such offence as has been charged and of which he had been acquitted , and according to the other view, of the offence disclosed . If, in construing the section, the court has to supply some words in order to make the meaning of the sta ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eaning of the statute, was not the one intended by the law-makers. In the absence of some other indication that the harsh or ridiculous effect was actually intended by the legislature, there is little reason to believe that it represents the legislative intent. 28. In Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Calcutta v. National Taj Traders (1980) 1 SCC 370, this Court construed Section 33-B of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 in order to avoid a manifestly absurd result as follows: ...According to the construction contended for by the Assessee and which found favour with the High Court the answer was in the affirmative because Sub-section (2)(b), on its literal construction, was absolute. In our view such literal construction would lead to a manifestly absurd result, because in a given case, like the present one, where the Appellate Authority (Tribunal) has found (a) the Income Tax Officer's order to be clearly erroneous as being prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, and (b) the Commissioner's order unsustainable as being in violation of principles of natural justice, how should the Appellate Authority exercise its appellate powers? Obviously it could not withhold i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... discover the intent of the legislature from the language used by it and it must always be remembered that language is at best an imperfect instrument for the expression of human thought and as pointed out by Lord Denning, it would be idle to expect every statutory provision to be drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity . We can do no better than repeat the famous words of Judge Learned Hand when he laid: ... it is true that the words used, even in their literal sense, are the primary and ordinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting the meaning of any writing: be it a statute, a contract or anything else. But it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning. We must not adopt a strictly literal interpretation of Section 52 Sub-section (2) but we must construe its language having regard to the object and purpose which the legislature had in view in enacting that provision and in the context of the setting in which it occurs. We cann ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ued or arisen to him. It would indeed be most harsh and inequitable to tax the Assessee on income which has neither arisen to him nor is received by him, merely because he has carried out the contractual obligation undertaken by him. It is difficult to conceive of any rational reason why the legislature should have thought it fit to impose liability to tax on an Assessee who is bound by law to carry out his contractual obligation to sell the property at the agreed price and honestly carries out such contractual obligation. It would indeed be strange if obedience to the law should attract the levy of tax on income which has neither arisen to the Assessee nor has been received by him. If we may take another illustration, let us consider a case where A sells his property to B with a stipulation that after some time which may be a couple of years or more, he shall re-sell the property to A for the same price. Could it be contended in such a case that when B transfers the property to A for the same price at which he originally purchased it, he should be liable to pay tax on the basis as if he has received the market value of the property as on the date of re-sale, if, in the meanwhile, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... SCC 173 : 1981 SCC (Tax) 293 : (1981) 131 ITR 597] this Court emphasised that a statutory provision must be so construed, if possible, that absurdity and mischief may be avoided. 46. Where the plain literal interpretation of a statutory provision produces a manifestly unjust result which could never have been intended by the Legislature, the Court might modify the language used by the Legislature so as to achieve the intention of the Legislature and produce a rational construction. The task of interpretation of a statutory provision is an attempt to discover the intention of the Legislature from the language used. It is necessary to remember that language is at best an imperfect instrument for the expression of human intention. It is well to remember the warning administered by Judge Learned Hand that one should not make a fortress out of dictionary but remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish and sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning. 47. We have noted the object of Section 16(3) of the Act which has to be read in conjunction with Section 24(2) in this case for the present purpose. If the purpose of a partic ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... er that statutes must have some purpose or object, whose imaginative discovery is judicial craftsmanship. We need not always cling to literalness and should seek to endeavour to avoid an unjust or absurd result. We should not make a mockery of legislation. To make sense out of an unhappily worded provision, where the purpose is apparent to the judicial eve some violence to language is permissible. (See K.P. Varghese v. ITO [ (1981) 4 SCC 173, 180-82 : 1981 SCC (Tax) 293, 300-302 : (1981) 131 ITR 597, 604-606] and Luke v. Inland Revenue Commissioner [(1964) 54 ITR 692 (HL)].) xxx xxx xxx 19. ... The presumption canvassed to be raised that the true effect of the words if the offence had not been committed was to presume a situation in which the undertaking given by the Assessee had been carried out even though in fact the same had not been carried out. That would be an absurd result. In our opinion the use of the expression if simpliciter, was meant to indicate a condition, the condition being that at the time of assessing the penalty, that situation should be visualised wherein there was no scope of committing any offence. Such a situation could arise only if the tax lia ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... which the said provision is enacted the court should construe it in a harmonious way to make it meaningful. 32. This judgment was followed in Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India (1991) 2 SCC 87 as follows: 19. True it is not permissible to read words in a statute which are not there, but where the alternative lies between either supplying by implication words which appear to have been accidentally omitted, or adopting a construction which deprives certain existing words of all meaning, it is permissible to supply the words (Craies Statute Law, 7th edn., p. 109). Similar are the observations in Hameedia Hardware Stores v. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar [(1988) 2 SCC 513, 524-25] where it was observed that the court construing a provision should not easily read into it words which have not been expressly enacted but having regard to the context in which a provision appears and the object of the statute in which the said provision is enacted the court should construe it in a harmonious way to make it meaningful. An attempt must always be made so to reconcile the relevant provisions as to advance the remedy intended by the statute. (See: Sirajul Haq Khan v. Sunni Central Board of Waqf [1 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... void absurdity. The following passage from Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edn.) may usefully be quoted: 1. Modification of the language to meet the intention.--Where the language of the statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity which can hardly have been intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and even the structure of the sentence. This may be done by departing from the Rules of grammar, by giving an unusual meaning to particular words, or by rejecting them altogether, on the ground that the legislature could not possibly have intended what its words signify, and that the modifications made are mere corrections of careless language and really give the true meaning. Where the main object and the intention of a statute are clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the draftman's unskillfulness or ignorance of the law, except in a case of necessity, or the absolute intractability of the language used. Lord Reid has said that he prefers to see a mistake on the part of the draftsman ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by eschewing a literal interpretation thereof, and reading into the Section the words and that reference is entertained and answered . The Court stated: 9. ...It is no doubt true that the object of Section 28-A of the Act was to confer a right of making a reference, (sic on one) who might have not made a reference earlier Under Section 18 and, therefore, ordinarily when a person makes a reference Under Section 18 but that was dismissed on the ground of delay, he would not get the right of Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act when some other person makes a reference and the reference is answered. But Parliament having enacted Section 28-A, as a beneficial provision, it would cause great injustice if a literal interpretation is given to the expression had not made an application to the Collector Under Section 18 in Section 28-A of the Act. The aforesaid expression would mean that if the landowner has made an application for reference Under Section 18 and that reference is entertained and answered. In other words, it may not be permissible for a landowner to make a reference and get it answered and then subsequently make another application when so ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ther interpretation would render them unconstitutional, the Court would lean in favour of the former construction: (see Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar) [ (1962) Supp 2 SCR 769]. 38. In Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar (1959) SCR 279, this Court summarised the case law Under Article 14 in the form of six propositions. We are concerned here with proposition (d), which reads as follows: ... The principle enunciated above has been consistently adopted and applied in subsequent cases. The decisions of this Court further establish-- xxx xxx xxx (d) that the legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest; Based on this proposition, Shri Bhasme has argued that the legislature in the present case has recognised a certain degree of harm, namely, to tenants of minor landlords and may, therefore, confine itself to such cases where the need is deemed to be clearest. 39. Proposition (d) has been later clarified in the seminal judgment of this Court, In Re Special Courts Bill, 1978, (1979)1 SCC 380. A Constitution Bench of this Court in paragraph 72 of the afor ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ould not insist on delusive exactness or apply doctrinaire tests for determining the validity of classification in any given case. Classification is justified if it is not palpably arbitrary. xxx xxx xxx (6) The law can make and set apart the classes according to the needs and exigencies of the society and as suggested by experience. It can recognise even degree of evil, but the classification should never be arbitrary, artificial or evasive. xxx xxx xxx (8) The differentia which is the basis of the classification and the object of the Act are distinct things and what is necessary is that there must be a nexus between them. In short, while Article 14 forbids class discrimination by conferring privileges or imposing liabilities upon persons arbitrarily selected out of a large number of other persons similarly situated in relation to the privileges sought to be conferred or the liabilities proposed to be imposed, it does not forbid classification for the purpose of legislation, provided such classification is not arbitrary in the sense abovementioned. To proposition (d) in Ram Krishna Dalmia's case (supra) an exception has been engrafted in proposition (6) containe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 4 further went on to state that whereas equality before law is a negative concept, the equal protection of the law has positive content. The early judgments of this Court referred to the discrimination aspect of Article 14, and evolved a Rule by which subjects could be classified. If the classification was intelligible having regard to the object sought to be achieved, it would pass muster Under Article 14's anti-discrimination aspect. Again, Subba Rao, J., dissenting, in Lachhman Dass v. State of Punjab [Lachhman Dass v. State of Punjab, (1963) 2 SCR 353 : AIR 1963 SC 222], SCR at p. 395, warned that: (AIR p. 240, para 50) 50. ... Overemphasis on the doctrine of classification or an anxious and sustained attempt to discover some basis for classification may gradually and imperceptibly deprive the Article of its glorious content. He referred to the doctrine of classification as a subsidiary rule evolved by courts to give practical content to the said Article. 63. In the pre-1974 era, the judgments of this Court did refer to the rule of law or positive aspect of Article 14, the concomitant of which is that if an action is found to be arbitrary and, therefore, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... en and the corresponding obligation of the judiciary to deal with such a situation, where the inequalities are created either by the legislation or executive action? Traditionally, this Court and the High Courts have been declaring any law, which created inequalities to be unconstitutional, but in Nakara case [D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305 : 1983 SCC (L S) 145] this Court realised that such a course of action would not meet with the obligations emanating from a combined reading of the directive principles and Article 14. Therefore, this Court emphatically laid down in Nakara case [D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305 : 1983 SCC (L S) 145] that it is possible to give an appropriate inductive relief by eliminating the factors, which creates the artificial classification leading to a discriminatory application of law. 44. Respectfully following the law laid down in these judgments, and in order to read Section 32-F(1)(a) in conformity with Article 14, we eliminate the words ..of the fact that he has attained majority.. so that the intimation that is to be made by the landlord has to be made to tenants of all the three categories of landlords covered b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and not from the date of the knowledge of the tenant. The provision of law being clear, we cannot in such a case grant relief on the basis of equity. Since this judgment does not square with object sought to be achieved by the 1956 Amendment to the 1948 Act or to the declaration of law in this judgment, it does not state the law correctly and is, therefore, overruled. 47. The next judgment that was cited before us is Sudam Ganpat Kutwal v. Shevantabai Tukaram (2006) 7 SCC 200. After setting out the relevant provisions of the Act, this Court held that on the facts of that case since Section 31(3) had ceased to apply, Section 32-F(1) did not apply at all, as a result of which there was no need for the tenant to issue any notice of intimation to the landlord. The other judgments that were cited were distinguished in paragraph 27 stating that they were all judgments in which Section 32-F(1A) would apply. The facts of this case again are far removed from the facts of the present case and the judgment has, therefore, no application to the law laid down in the present case. 48. The next judgment cited before us is Tukaram Maruti Chavan v. Maruti Narayan Chavan, (2008) 9 SCC 358. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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