TMI Blog2015 (2) TMI 1374X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and is conferred to exercise all powers as are vested in a Civil Court - On a plain reading of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, it is evident that the prescribed period of limitation can be extended if Court is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within the period of limitation. In INDUSTRIAL CREDIT AND INVESTMENT CORPN. OF INDIA VERSUS GRAPCO INDUSTRIES LTD. [ 1999 (5) TMI 613 - SUPREME COURT] , the Apex Court, while dealing with Section 22 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 which is pari materia with the Section 22(3) of the Act, held that Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 also confers power on the Tribunal to travel beyond the Code of Civil Procedure and only fetter that is put on its power is to observe the principles of natural justice. The provision regarding period of limitation provided in Rule 17 howsoever peremptory or imperative the language may be, is not sufficient to displace the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is true that the language of Rule 17 is mandatory and compulsive, in that, it provid ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in the instant case by the Division Bench does not formulate the question, but it is implicit in that, we have to answer whether the Central Administrative Tribunal constituted under the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 has jurisdiction to condone the delay in the event an application for review is filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation? 4. We have heard Mr.K.Mohanty, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr.A.K.Bose, learned Asst. Solicitor General for the opposite parties. 5. Before we proceed, we deem it necessary to note the relevant provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ) with regard to the jurisdiction, power and authority of the Tribunal. Section 19 of the Act postulates that subject to the other provisions of the Act, a person aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of a Tribunal may make an application to the Tribunal for the redressal of his grievance. Section 21 of the Act deals with limitation in filing the original application. Sub-section (3) of Section 21 confers power on the Tribunal to condone the delay in filing the original application, if th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ne the delay, if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he was prevented by sufficient cause in not preferring the application for review within the prescribed period of limitation? 8. The Limitation Act, 1963 is the general legislation in the law of limitation. Section 5 of the Limitation Act provides thus: 5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.-Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. 9. Section 29 of the Limitation Act is the savings clause. Sub- section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act is quoted hereunder: 29. Savings.- (1) xxx xxx xxx (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Tribunal functions as a court within the limits of its jurisdiction. It has all the powers conferred expressly by the statute. Furthermore, being a judicial body, it has all those incidental and ancillary powers which are necessary to make fully effective the express grant of statutory powers. Certain powers are recognized as incidental and ancillary, not because they are inherent in the Tribunal, nor because its jurisdiction is plenary, but because it is the legislative intent that the power which is expressly granted in the assigned field of jurisdiction is efficaciously and meaningfully exercised. The powers of the Tribunal are no doubt limited. Its area of jurisdiction is clearly defined, but within the bounds of its jurisdiction, it has all the powers expressly and impliedly granted. The implied grant is, of course, limited by the express grant and, therefore, it can only be such powers as are truly incidental and ancillary for doing all such acts or employing all such means as are reasonably necessary to make the grant effective. As stated in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (11th edn.) where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... provides for the applicability of Section 5 and the ratio of the decision in Kaushalya Rani's case can, therefore, have no application in cases governed by the Limitaton Act, 1963, since that decision proceeded on the hypothesis that the applicability of Section 5 was excluded by reason of Section 29(2)(b) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. Since under the Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5 is specifically made applicable by Section 29, sub-section (2), it can be availed of for the purpose of extending the period of limitation prescribed by a special or local law if the applicant can show that he had sufficient cause for not presenting the application within the period of limitation. It is only if the special or local law expressly excludes the applicability of Section 5, that it would stand displaced. Here, as pointed out by this Court in Kaushalya Rani's case AIR 1964 SC 260 = (1964 (1) Crl. LJ 152) the time limit of sixty days laid down in sub-section (4) of Section 417 is a special law of limitation and we do not find anything in this special law which expressly excludes the applicability of Section 5. It is true that the language of sub- section (4) of Section 417 is mand ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he report, it is held as follows: 8. Once it is held that the appellate authority functioning under Section 18 of the Rent Act is not a persona designata, it becomes obvious that it functions as a court. In the present case all the District Judges having jurisdiction over the areas within which the provisions of the Rent Act have been extended are constituted as appellate authorities under Section 18 by the Government notification noted earlier. These District Judges have been conferred the powers of the appellate authorities. It becomes therefore, obvious that while adjudicating upon the dispute between the landlord and tenant and while deciding the question whether the Rent Control Court's order is justified or not such appellate authorities would be functioning as courts. The test for determining whether the authority is functioning as a court or not has been laid down by a series of decisions of this Court. We may refer to one of them, in the case of Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. Sitamarhi Central Coop. Bank Ltd. In that case this Court was concerned with the question whether the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies functioning under Section 48 of the Bihar and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on 29(2) of the Limitation Act. It is therefore, necessary for us to turn to the aforesaid provision of the Limitation Act. It reads as under: 29(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. A mere look at the aforesaid provision shows for its applicability to the facts of a given case and for importing the machinery of the provisions containing Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act the following two requirements have to be satisfied by the authority invoking the said provision. (i) There must be a provision for period of limitation under any special or local law in connection with any suit, appeal or application. (ii) The said prescription of perio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to the cases. In that context, the apex Court held that ordinarily, right of review is available only to those who are party to a case. It was further held that right of review is available if such an application is filed within the period of limitation on the grounds mentioned in Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus K.Ajit Babu (supra) cannot be understood as laying a law that the Tribunal is dehors of its power in entertaining an application for review filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation, if the same is accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 22. The logical sequitur on the analysis made in the preceding paragraphs is that neither Section 22 of the Act nor Rule 17 of the Rules expressly excluded the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In the event an application for review is filed beyond the period of limitation along with an application for condonation of delay and the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not preferring an application within the time, the Tribunal can condone the delay. 23. Thus we hold that the decisions in Smt. Kanchana Badaseth (supra) and Rajayya Bisoi (supra ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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