9911796707
Advanced Search 
TMI Blog2023 (4) TMI 913X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Ms Sapna Mordekar in WP No. 228/2022, Mr T. Gawas in WP No. 229/2022 Mr Deep Shirodkar in WP No. 350/2022, Additional Government Advocates. JUDGMENT : (PER M.S. SONAK, J.) 1. The petitioners in this batch of petitions challenge the non-implementation of this Court's decisions in Writ Petition No. 424 of 2018 and connected matters despite Special Leave Petitions against the same being dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the specious plea that such decisions "stand nullified" or are "rendered ineffective" after the passage of the Goa Value Added Tax (12th Amendment) Act, 2020 (impugned Amendment Act). In the alternative, the petitioners challenge the constitutional validity of the impugned Amendment Act on several grounds, including legislative override, legislative competence, manifest arbitrariness, etc. 2. Since substantially similar issues of law and fact arise in these matters, they are disposed of by a common judgment and order. The petitioners in Writ Petition Nos. 139, 140, 141, 148, 228 and 350 of 2022 (United Spirits Limited vs State of Goa) deal with alcohol for human consumption. Therefore, some of the challenges raised in this petition may not be avail ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e address of the above communication dated 23.07.2020 was shocking and unfortunate. This is because the Hon'ble Supreme Court had already dismissed the SLP on 08.06.2020, even without any notice to the Petitioner. In any case, the time limit for compliance had already expired, and the Hon'ble Supreme Court had granted no interim relief. Thus, even after the SLP was dismissed, the mandamus was not honoured. 3.8. Accordingly, the Petitioner was constrained to institute Contempt Petition under Stamp Number No. 1304/2020. After seeking several adjournments, the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes filed an affidavit in reply on 05.11.2021. 3.9. In this affidavit, a reference was made to the impugned Amendment Act, and based thereon, it was submitted that this Court's decision dated 19.11.2019 in Writ Petition No. 720/2019 and the mandamus issued therein "has been rendered ineffective due to the removal of the bases on which the said order was rendered". 3.10. Accordingly, the Petitioner was constrained to institute the present petition. PETITIONERS' CONTENTIONS : 4. The learned Counsel for the petitioners made the following submissions in support of their re ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ment, whichever is earlier. The learned Counsel, therefore, submitted that as of 16.09.2017, the Goa Value Added Tax Act, 2005 (GVAT Act, 2005) would have lapsed. However, the State legislature enacted and introduced Goa Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, effective from 01.07.2017, to align the tax on goods and services law with the Constitution (101st Amendment) Act, 2016. Therefore, in terms of Section 174 of the Goa Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, GVAT Act, 2005 was repealed except in respect of goods included in Entry 54 of the State List of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, viz. petroleum products and alcohol for human consumption. 4.5 The learned Counsel for the petitioners, therefore, contended that the State legislature could have never amended the repealed GVAT Act, 2005 without even bothering to revive the same, assuming such revival was possible after 16.09.2017. The learned Counsel for the petitioners relied upon several decisions supporting the contention that a repealed Act cannot be amended without revival. These include Reliance Industries Ltd. vs State of Gujarat 2020 SCC OnLine Guj. 694, Sri Sri Engineering Works and Ors. vs. Deputy Commissioner (CT) & Ors. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dment Act by submitting that the same was a validating Act that had removed the bases of the judicial decisions the petitioners sought implementation of. He offered that the judicial decisions were entirely based on the interpretation of Sections 10 and 33 of the GVAT Act, 2005. Now that these Sections and even some linked Sections were substantially amended with retrospective effect, the bases of the judicial decisions stood altered, thereby rendering the judicial decisions ineffective and unimplementable. 5.2 The learned Advocate General submitted that this is a time-tested and permissible legislative exercise. He relied on Goa Foundation and Anr. vs. State of Goa (2016) 6 SCC 602, The Government of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. vs. Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd. (1975) 2 SCC 274, Easland Combines, Coimbatore vs. Collector of Central Excise (2003) 3 SCC 410, Bakhtawar Trust and Ors. vs. M.D. Narayan and Ors. (2003) 5 SCC 298, Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. (supra), State of H.P. and Ors. vs. Yash Pal Garg (dead) by Lrs and Ors. (2003) 9 SCC 92, I.N. Saksena vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (1976) 4 SCC 750 and M/s. Tirath Ram Rajindra Nath, Lucknow vs. State of U.P. and Anr. (1973) 3 SCC 585 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... stries (P) Ltd. vs. State of T.N. (1996) 4 SCC 281, Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat vs. Gujarat Fluoro Chemicals (2014) 1 SCC 126, and Government of India vs. Citedal Fine Pharmaceuticals, Madras and Ors. (1989) 3 SCC 483. CONSIDERATION OF THE RIVAL CONTENTIONS : IMPERMISSIBLE JUDICIAL OVERRIDE? 6. The first question that falls for consideration is whether the impugned Amendment Act is an instance of impermissible judicial override to reverse or set at nought the judicial decisions of this Court even after SLPs against the same were dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The petitioners contend that the Legislature has not removed the fundamental bases of the judicial decisions. On the other hand, the learned Advocate General argued that the fundamental bases are removed with retrospective effect; therefore, this is not an instance of legislative override. 7. Several decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have fairly settled the legal position of validating statutes. However, there are always issues of application of such principles depending upon facts and circumstances peculiar to the cases that fall for consideration. 8. Since both sides relied strongly on Shr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s fundamental to the rule of law and one of the basic tenets of the Indian Constitution. Separation of judicial power is a significant principle under the Constitution of India. Accordingly, breaching the separation of judicial power may negate equality under Article 14. Separation of powers between three organs - the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary, is also nothing but the consequence of principles of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Thus, legislation can be invalidated based on a breach of the separation of powers since such a breach negates equality under Article 14 of the Constitution. 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further elaborated that the doctrine of separation of powers applies to final judgments of the Courts. Therefore, the Legislature cannot declare any decision of a Court of law to be void or of no effect. It can, however, pass an amending Act to remedy the defects pointed out by the Court of law or on coming to know of it aliunde. In other words, a Court's decision must always bind unless the conditions on which it is based are fundamentally altered that the decision could not have been given in the altered circumstances. Fu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ) dated 16.10.2019 in Writ Petition No. 424 of 2018 because this was the lead decision relied upon to dispose of the other petitions in the batch. Then we propose to consider whether the impugned Amendment Act has removed the defects pointed out by the Court or otherwise altered the fundamental bases of this Court's decisions. In short, the scope of inquiry is whether the impugned Amendment Act is genuinely a validating Act or an instance of impermissible judicial override. 19. In USL, the main issue involved was the date from which simple interest at the rate of 8% per annum would become payable on the amount refundable under the provisions of the GVAT Act. The Court held that such interest would become payable on the 91st day from the expiry of the refund order, where such refund is not paid within 90 days of such determination. 20. To support the above conclusion/decision, the Division Bench of this Court did refer to and rely upon the provisions of Sections 10 and 33 of the GVAT Act. However, such reliance was not the sole or exclusive basis to support the above conclusion or decision. In addition, the Court referred to the phraseology of Rule 30, the interplay between th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f the refund orders under Section 29 or from the date of receipt of the application for a refund under Section 10(3) of the GVAT Act. In that case, the assessing authorities could not avoid liability or payment of simple interest at the rate of 8% per annum on the specious plea that such liability commences only from the date of expiry of 90 days from the date of sanction or under Rule 30 of the said Rules. 24. In paragraphs 53 and 54, the Court relied upon Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited vs. Union of India and others (2011) 10 SCC 292., and Union of India and Ors. vs. Hamdard (WAQF) Laboratories (2016) 6 SCC 621., to hold that interest under Section 11-B and 11-BB of the Central Excise Act, 1944 commences from the date of expiry of three months from the date of receipt of an application for refund or on the expiry of three months from the date on which the refund order is made. Accordingly, the Court ruled that interest becomes payable after the expiry of three months from the date of application for refund and payment of such interest cannot be resisted based on any procrastination by the Authorities. 25. Thus, it is clear that this Court's decisions, whether in Writ Petition ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... deprived of interest on the excess tax paid by him. The impugned Amendment Act has not even touched this finding about relating back which attained finality after the dismissal of SLPs by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 30. Fifthly and again, to ensure that no interest is denied to an Assessee due to procrastination by the authorities to issue a sanction order, this Court held that the 90-day time limit provided in Section 33(2) of the GVAT Act was, in fact, the time limit within which the assessing authorities "must obtain sanction in terms of Rule 30 of the said Rules "; Even this finding remains relatively untouched except that now it could be contended that the time limit under Section 10 or 33 is about 180 days. Accordingly, the principle remains unaffected by the impugned Amendment Act. 31. Sixthly, this Court also held that if, for any reason, a sanction order under Rule 30 of the said Rules was not obtained within these 90 days, the Assessing Authorities could not avoid liability for payment of simple interest at the rate of 8% per annum on the specious plea that such a liability commences only from the date of expiry of 90 days from the date of the sanction or under Rule ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... g:- (a) that the impugned Amendment was "in light of recent judgment of the honourable High Court based on interpretation of Section 33 of Goa Value added Tax Act, 2005 read with Rule 30 of the Goa Value Added Tax Rules, 2005, which is different from the interpretation/intentions of the Government of the said provisions of the Act, regarding payment of interest on refund of Tax"; (b) That the Advocate General, in his opinion, tendered to the Government had suggested certain amendments to the GVAT Act "in order to do away with the effect of such an interpretation and to save revenue of the State"; (c) That the Bill seeks to retrospectively bring into effect the amendments of the proposed bill "notwithstanding contained in any order, judgment, decree, directions of any authority, tribunal or court or any other instrument having the force of law and shall apply to all cases from the date of enactment of the Goa Value Added Tax (Act 9 of 2005)"; (d) The Bill seeks to fix the time limit of giving a refund "from three months from the date of the order of the sanctioning authority in case of an application for a refund under sub-section (3) of section 10"; (e) The Bill also ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ction 10 of the Goa Value Added Tax Act, 2005 (Goa Act 9 of 2005) (hereinafter referred to as the "principal Act"), in sub-section (3), for the expression "shall be refunded in the prescribed manner within 3 months from the date of filing of application claiming the refund", the expression "shall upon an "application made by such exporter be refunded in such manner within a period of ninety days from the date of the sanction order of such authority, as prescribed" shall be substituted. 3. Amendment of section 29. - In section 29 of the principal Act, after sub-section (9), the following sub-section shall be inserted, namely: "(10) Where any order passed under this section, results in refund of any amount of tax, interest or penalty and no appeal, review or revision is filed against such order within the time limit specified in this Act, the Appropriate Assessing Authority shall after expiry of time limit for filing of appeal, review or revision shall submit the complete proposal for sanction of refund, within a period of 90 days from the date of expiry of such period to the sanctioning authority as prescribed.". 4. Amendment of section 33. - In section 33 of the principal ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nt of Goa Law Department (Legal Affairs)." 36. The primary amendment applies to Sections 10 and 33 of the GVAT Act, 2005. Because the judicial decisions (that are now sought to be rendered ineffective) had provided that interest on excess and found refundable tax was to be paid from the 91st day of the "refund order " under Sections 10 and 33 of the GVAT Act, 2005, the impugned Amendment Act now provides that such interest would become payable from the 91st day of "sanction order". The other bases, which were fundamental, have not been touched by the impugned Amendment Act. 37. Apart from the wordings of unamended Sections 10 and 33 of the GVAT Act, 2005, the foundation of the judicial decisions of this Court, as affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, was that the Revenue could reap no undue advantage from its own delays or due to the procrastination of its officials. The Court felt such a situation would be arbitrary, and even the statutory scheme did not support such a construction. Therefore, the Court thought that the 91st day from the sanction order could not be the starting point for the statutorily prescribed interest on excess refundable tax payable to the Assesse ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in Articles 14, 265 and 300-A. 40. Therefore, we cannot accept the contention that the impugned amendments to Sections 10 and 33 of the GVAT Act were sufficient to knock off the base or the fundamental premise of this Court's decisions as affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In particular, the Amendment has not even touched the aspect of scope and object of Rule 30 of the said Rules. The Amendment has not even touched the discrepancy arising from the refund to be made forthwith from the date of the sanction order as provided in Rule 30 of the said Rules. The impugned Amendment has not even dealt with the findings, based upon the interpretation of the scheme of the GVAT Act and the said Rules about the sanction order relating back to the date of refund order made by the Assessing Authority at least to the extent of the amount referred to in the sanction order. The impugned Amendment has not even dealt with this Court's finding that 90 days time limit provided in Section 33(2) of the GVAT was the time limit within which the appropriate Assessing Authority had to obtain sanction in terms of Rule 30 of the said Rules. 41. More importantly, the impugned Amendment Act ha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ugned Amendment Act. 44. Moreover, because they relate to the provisions in Articles 14 and 265 of the Constitution, such findings could not have been nullified or watered down by simply amending the requirements of the GVAT Act. Accordingly, notwithstanding the attempt, we think the impugned Amendment Act has not displaced the base or all the bases of this Court's decisions. Some dent to one of the bases is not the same as a complete obliteration of all the grounds or premises on which the two decisions were founded. Therefore, notwithstanding the form of the impugned Amendment, the same cannot be regarded as a proper validating Act sufficient to render the two decisions ineffective, as claimed by the State Government in its affidavit. Based upon the impugned amendments, therefore, the State Government cannot avoid the obligation of complying with the directions in the judgment and decision. 45. The learned Advocate General argued that a Court's judgment could be nullified if the decision is based on a statutory provision and the relief is granted based on the interpretation of such statutory provision. He submitted that the competent Legislature could amend the statute ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... (1999) 6 SCC 418, The Commissioner Of Central Excise vs Mangalam Cement Ltd. 2005 (187) ELT 5 (SC) and Gujarat Ambuja Cements Ltd. & Anr. vs Union Of India & Anr. (2005) 4 SCC 214, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that where the entire basis of a judgment is not removed in the amended statute, then the amended statute would still be struck down on the deficiencies pointed out by the Court. Further, unless the entire deficiencies are removed, a binding decision of the Court cannot be held to be nullified or rendered ineffective. The State cannot refuse to follow such binding decisions based upon part removal of deficiencies or by partly altering the basis of the judicial decisions. 49. The Hon'ble Supreme Court stalled a similar attempt at nullifying a judicial decision in the State of Karnataka & Ors. Vs Karnataka Pawn Brokers Association & Ors. (2018) 6 SCC 363. In this case, the main issue was whether the amendments made to the Karnataka Moneylenders Act, 1961 and the Karnataka Pawnbrokers Act, 1961, in the year 1998, providing that the security deposit furnished by the moneylenders and pawnbrokers in terms of Sections 7-A and 4-A of the Acts respectively shall not ca ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... at nought the judgments which have been pronounced by amending the law not to make corrections or remove anomalies but to bring in new provisions that did not exist earlier. The Legislature may have the power to remove the basis or foundation of the judicial pronouncement. Still, by introducing a new provision, the Legislature cannot overturn or set aside the judgment, that too retrospectively. The mandamus issued by the Court binds the Legislature. A judicial pronouncement is always binding unless the very fundamentals on which it is based are altered, and the decision could not have been given in the altered circumstances. Therefore, by introducing an amendment, the Legislature cannot overturn a judicial pronouncement and declare it to be wrong or nullity. 54. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, by applying the above principles, held that when Manakchand Motilal's case (supra) was decided, there was no provision providing for payment of interest or prohibiting payment of interest. Therefore, there was no error pointed out by the Court that the State Legislature could have corrected. The impugned amendments, thus, did not in any way alter the basis of the judgment. By giving retr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to a class of persons concerned with the entire subject sought to be covered by such an enactment having retrospective effect. 58. The Hon'ble Supreme Court noted that the High Court had not struck down any legislation sought to be re-enacted after retrospectively removing any defect by the impugned provisions. The Hon'ble Supreme Court pointed out that this was a case where the High Court had given certain benefits to the petitioners on an interpretation of the existing law. The order of mandamus was sought to be nullified by enacting the impugned provisions in a new statute. The Court held that this would be clearly an impermissible legislative exercise. 59. The Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to the "overriding effect clause", based upon which the State sought to deny consequential financial benefits to the petitioners and held that the State had tried to get out of the binding effect of the decision by resorting to its legislative power. The judicial decisions which had become final against the State were sought to be done away with by enacting the impugned provisions. Such an attempt cannot be said to be a permissible legislative exercise. Instead, it must be hel ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... permissible legislative overruling. Based on these precedents, we believe the impugned Amendment Act must suffer the same fate. Based upon the impugned amendment Act, the State cannot ignore the binding judicial decisions in these cases. 62. Most decisions relied upon by the Learned Advocate General concerned genuine validation Acts where the defects pointed out by the judicial decisions were removed and the fundamental bases of the judicial decisions altered. Again, most of these decisions reiterate the principles in Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd (Supra) and other decisions referred to above. Accordingly, by accepting the propositions of law in such decisions, the impugned Amendment Act cannot be regarded as a validation Act as contemplated by such decisions. 63. For all the above reasons, we hold that the impugned Amendment Act is an impermissible legislative override. Therefore, based upon the impugned Amendment Act, the respondents cannot decline to implement this Court's decisions in Writ Petition No. 424/2018 and connected matters. These decisions have attained finality after SLPs against the same were dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Accordingly, notwithstan ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rguments based on the General Clauses Act or the provisions of Section 19 of the Constitution (101st Amendment) Act, 2016 on the effect of repeal were also turned down by the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court to conclude that there was no question of purporting to amend a repealed law which stood obliterated post the repeal and in the absence of any appropriate sanctioning clause. The learned Advocate General made similar arguments in the present cases. 70. The Division Benches also relied upon the decision of the Federal Court in Jatindra Nath Gupta (supra), wherein it was held that it is competent to the Legislature in exercising its plenary powers to revive or re-enact legislation which has already expired by lapse of time. The Legislature is also competent to legislate with retrospective effect, but neither of these things seems to have been done in the present case. The Legislature proceeds on the footing that the old Act was alive at the date. Then the new Act was passed, and the new Act merely purports to amend one of the provisions of the old Act. There could be no amendment of an enactment which is not in existence. From the fact that the Legislature purports to am ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... legislative competence, we must refer to the Constitution (101st Amendment) Act, 2016, which entered force on 16.09.2016. This Amendment brought about several changes, including the insertion of Article 246-A and the substitution of new Entry 54 in List II to the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. 76. The Division Benches of the Gujarat High Court, Telangana High Court, Kerala High Court and Allahabad High Court have held that post the Constitution (101st Amendment) Act, 2016, the State Legislatures lost legislative competence to make laws on taxes on sales or purchases of goods other than the six specified goods in substituted Entry 54, List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Even in respect of the six specified goods, the State Legislature would lack the legislative competence to tax sales in the course of inter-State trade or commerce or sales in the course of international trade or commerce of such goods. 77. In Mohit Mineral Private Ltd. (supra) or VKC Footsteps India Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that Article 246-A defines the source of power as well as the field of legislation (with respect to goods and service tax) obvi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... at High Court in the case of Reliance Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Gujarat and others (supra) is thus clearly distinguishable on the facts and would not assist the case of the petitioner". 80. Thus, on facts, the present cases are similar to the facts before the Gujarat High Court. The primary Amendment in the Maharashtra Act was enacted within one year of the coming into force of the Constitution (101st Amendment) Act, 2016. However, Gujarat and the Goa amendments were after one year, i.e., 2018 and 2020 respectively. Further, there is a similarity between Section 174 of the Gujarat GST Act, 2017 and Section 174 of the Goa GST Act, 2017. The Maharashtra VAT Act, 2002 was never formally repealed after the Constitution (101st Amendment) Act, 2016, entered into force though some exercise was undertaken to align its provisions with the constitutional amendments. 81. Therefore, based upon the Division Bench decisions of Gujarat, Telangana, Kerala and Allahabad, the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 23/2021 and 229/2022 have an arguable case based even on legislative competence. This ground may however not be available to the petitioners in the remaining petitions. MANIFEST ARBITRARIN ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ow. If the decision of the High Court is upheld, it would mean that there can never be any wrongful retention by an authority until this Court holds that their stand is not in accordance with the law. 84. In Sandvik Asia Ltd. (supra), the Court noted that where interest was granted after a substantial lapse of time, interest must normally follow. The Court noted that while charging interest from the assesses, the Department first adjusts the amount paid towards interest so that the principal amount of tax payable remains outstanding. Therefore, they are entitled to charge interest until the entire outstanding is paid. But when it comes to granting interest on refund of taxes, the refunds are first adjusted towards the taxes and then the balance towards interest. Hence, as the Department always contends that it is liable to pay interest only up to the date of refund of tax while they take benefit of assessees' funds by delaying the payment of interest on refunds without incurring any further liability to pay interest, the Court found that such a stand on behalf of the Department was discriminatory in nature causing great prejudice to lakhs and lakhs of assessees. The Hon'bl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... al but only a statutory right which could always be taken away. He relied on CMD/Chairman, Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited & Ors. vs. Mishri Lal & Ors. (2011) 14 SCC 739. 88. In CMD/Chairman, Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited & Ors. (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the expression "vested right" could only mean a vested constitutional right since a constitutional right cannot be taken away by an Amendment of rules. The Court relied upon the Constitution Bench ruling in Railway Board vs C.R. Rangadhamaiah (1997) 6 SCC 623 in which it was held that pension is no longer treated as a bounty but was a valuable constitutional right under Articles 19(1)(f) and Article 31(1) of the Constitution, which were then available. Since this was a constitutional right, the Amendment of the rules could not take it away. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Hence, a constitutional right can only be taken away by amending the Constitution, not the rules or the statute. 89. The provisions providing interest on delayed refund of excess tax collected by the Revenue created statutory and constitutional rights. Even though Article 19(1)(f) is no longer a fundamental right under the Co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... judicial decisions. This is because even under the impugned Amendment Act, the State is not absolved from making sanction orders within a reasonable period. The learned Advocate General submitted that the provisions of the impugned Act may not be struck down simply because no period within which sanction orders must be made may have been specified. He submitted that even where no time limit is prescribed, the concept of reasonable time must be read into such provisions. He agreed that powers must be exercised within a reasonable time even where no time limit may have been prescribed. He even relied on decisions in support of such contentions. 95. In all these cases, there is no explanation whatsoever for the unreasonable delay in issuing the sanction orders. Even in the latest affidavit, no such explanation was even attempted to be offered. As noted earlier, refund amounts were already determined by the assessing authorities. Therefore, there could have been no difficulties in issuing the sanction orders within some reasonable period. In the earlier decisions in the petitions instituted by the Petitioners, the Court had found that reasonable time would be about ninety days from t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
