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TMI Blog2016 (4) TMI 1474X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tions urged on behalf of the parties: The case of the prosecution is that on 29.03.2008, the informant-Mukhtar went to the house of his relative at village-Navdega and stayed there. On 30.03.2008, at about 12.00 noon, his uncle Md. Hasim informed him on telephone that his wife's condition was serious and she was being taken to Singhia for treatment. Mukhtar was asked to reach Singhia. It is alleged by the informant that on reaching Singhia, he neither found his wife nor his uncle. On enquiry from his uncle, he was informed about the death of his wife. Thereafter, he reached his house and saw the dead body of his wife. His uncle disclosed him that his wife-Tamanna Khatoon (since deceased) had gone to maize field wherein she was found lying with her mouth and nose tied with her dupatta. She was spotted by one Hira Sada (PW-2), who was returning with her daughter. Upon hearing the noise made by the deceased she raised alarm and upon hearing the same informant's uncle-Md. Hasim along with others reached the spot and took Tamanna Khatoon to Singhia for treatment. She died on the way to Singhia. On 30.03.2008 FIR was lodged by Mukhtar, husband of the deceased against Md. Raju and Md. H ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ght not to have been quashed by the High Court in exercise of its power under Section 482 of Cr.PC. 12. It was further contended that the High Court has erred in setting aside the cognizance order passed by the learned CJM as the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction to act according to whim or caprice. He further submitted that the power of quashing criminal proceedings is to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection and that too in rarest of rare cases. 13. It was further contended by the learned counsel that at the stage of taking cognizance of the offence it would not be proper, simply on the basis of material placed before the court by investigating agency, to determine whether a conviction is sustainable or not. The High Court has erred in appreciating the same by quashing the cognizance order passed by the learned CJM. He further submitted that the inherent power to quash the proceedings can be exercised only in a case where the material placed before the court does not disclose any offence or the allegations made therein are found frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. At this stage there should not be any meticulous analysis of the ca ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... urther contended by the learned counsel that the instant case is a unique case as the accused-persons are made prosecution witnesses and apart from them another set of tutored witnesses have been introduced in the case, who are not eye witnesses to the incident and have in their deposition under Section 164 of the CrPC, before the Judicial Magistrate deposed that the informant-husband might have killed his wife. The High Court has rightly taken a very serious view of the whole matter and after proper scrutiny of the documents and material placed on record has come to an appropriate finding that the case against the respondent nos.2-9 is merely based on suspicion and therefore, it has rightly quashed the proceedings against them. 18. He further submitted that after the incident Manjoor Alam father of the deceased in his statement before the police did not blame Mukhtar husband of the deceased for the murder of his daughter. As far as other respondents are concerned, apart from the informant, they all are strangers to the matter and have been falsely implicated in this case by the local police at the behest of the real accused persons. 19. It was further submitted by the learned co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... w turning our attention towards the criminal trial, which is conducted, largely, by following the procedure laid down in the CrPC. Since, offence is considered to be a wrong committed against the society, the prosecution against the accused person is launched by the State. It is the duty of the State to get the culprit booked for the offence committed by him. The focal point, here, is that if the State fails in this regard and the party having bonafide connection with the cause of action, who is aggrieved by the order of the court cannot be left at the mercy of the State and without any option to approach the appellate court for seeking justice. In this regard, the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of P.S.R. Sadhanantham's case (supra) has elaborately dealt with the aforesaid fact situation. The relevant paras 13, 14 and 25 of which read thus: "13. It is true that the strictest vigilance over abuse of the process of the court, especially at the expensively exalted level of the Supreme Court, should be maintained and ordinarily meddlesome bystanders should not be granted "visa". It is also true that in the criminal jurisdiction this strictness applies a fortiori since a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... upreme Court relaxed the restrictive attitude towards "standing" in the famous case of Baker v. Carr. Lord Denning, in the notable case of the Attorney-General of the Gambia v. Pierra Sarr N'jie, spoke thus: "... the words "person aggrieved" are of wide import and should not be subjected to a restrictive interpretation. They do not include, of course, a mere busybody who is interfering in things which do not concern him;" Prof. S.A. de Smith takes the same view: "All developed legal systems have had to face the problem of adjusting conflicts between two aspects of the public interest - the desirability of encouraging individual citizens to participate actively in the enforcement of the law, and the undesirability of encouraging the professional litigant and the meddlesome interloper to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts in matters that do not concern him." Prof. H.W.R. Wade strikes a similar note: "In other words, certiorari is not confined by a narrow conception of locus standi. It contains an element of the actio popularis. This is because it looks beyond the personal rights of the applicant; it is designed to keep the machinery of justice in proper working order by ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... But simultaneously the Law Commission also noted that if the right to appeal against acquittal was retained and extended to a complainant the law should logically cover also cases not instituted on complaint. It observed: "Extreme cases of manifest injustice, where the Government fails to act, and the party aggrieved has a strong feeling that the matter requires further consideration, should not, in our view, be left to the mercy of the Government. To inspire and maintain confidence in the administration of justice, the limited right of appeal with leave given to a private party should be retained, and should embrace cases initiated on private complaint or otherwise at the instance of an aggrieved person." However, when the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 was enacted the statute, as we have seen, confined the right to appeal, in the case of private parties to a complainant. This is, as it were, a material indication of the policy of the law." (emphasis supplied by this Court) 24. Further, this Court in the case of Ramakant Rai's case (supra) has held thus: "12. A doubt has been raised about the competence of a private party as distinguished from the State, to invoke the juris ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... urt that Article 136 of the Constitution of India neither confers on anyone the right to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court nor inhibits anyone from invoking it. The relevant para 29 of the case reads thus: "29. A doubt has been raised in many cases about the competence of a private party as distinguished from the State, to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution against a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. We do not see any substance in the doubt. The appellate power vested in this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution is not to be confused with ordinary appellate power exercised by appellate courts and appellate tribunals under specific statutes. It is a plenary power "exercisable outside the purview of ordinary law" to meet the pressing demands of justice. (See Durga Shankar Mehta v. Raghuraj Singh.) Article 136 of the Constitution neither confers on anyone the right to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court nor inhibits anyone from invoking the Court's jurisdiction. The power is vested in this Court but the right to invoke the Court's jurisdiction is vested in no one. The exercise of the power of this Court is not circumscribe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sed with the ordinary appellate power exercised by appellate courts and Appellate Tribunals under specific statutes. It is a plenary power, 'exercisable outside the purview of ordinary law' to meet the pressing demands of justice (see Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh). Article 136 of the Constitution neither confers on anyone the right to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court nor inhibits anyone from invoking the Court's jurisdiction. The power is vested in this Court but the right to invoke the Court's jurisdiction is vested in no one. The exercise of the power of this Court is not circumscribed by any limitation as to who may invoke it. Where a judgment of acquittal by the High Court has led to a serious miscarriage of justice, this Court cannot refrain from doing its duty and abstain from interfering on the ground that a private party and not the State has invoked the Court's jurisdiction. We do not have slightest doubt that we can entertain appeals against judgments of acquittal by the High Court at the instance of interested private parties also. The circumstance that the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (in short 'the Code') does not provide for an appeal to the High ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... careful reading of the material placed on record reveals that the learned CJM took cognizance of the offences alleged against the accused-persons after a perusal of case diary, chargesheet and other material placed before the court. The cognizance was taken, as a prima facie case was made out against the accused-persons. It is well settled that at the stage of taking cognizance, the court should not get into the merits of the case made out by the police, in the chargesheet filed by them, with a view to calculate the success rate of prosecution in that particular case. At this stage, the court's duty is limited to the extent of finding out whether from the material placed before it, offence alleged therein against the accused is made out or not with a view to proceed further with the case. The proposition of law relating to Section 482 of the CrPC has been elaborately dealt with by this Court in Bhajan Lal's case (supra). The relevant paras 102 and 103 of which read thus: "102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercis ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice." Further, this Court in the case of Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor [(2013) 3 SCC 330] has laid down certain parameters to be followed by the High Court while exercising its inherent power under Section 482 of the CrPC, in the following manner: "29. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ial is such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false? 30.3. Step three: whether the material relied upon by the accused has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant? 30.4. Step four: whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice? 30.5. If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, the judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 CrPC. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as proceedings arising therefrom) specially when it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused." (emphasis supplied by this Court) 27. After considering the rival legal contentions urged by both the parties, case law referred to supra and the material placed on record, we are of the view that the High C ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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