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Showing 1 to 20 of 106 Records
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1971 (2) TMI 133 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... stion must be answered in favour of the respondent, and therefore, the-Division Bench was right in holding that the power under the proviso was quasi judicial, or at any rate, one requiring a judicial approach. Consequently, an opportunity of being heard ought to have been given to the respondent before orders for extension were made. The High Court, consequently, was justified in ordering restoration of the watches in question to the respondent. 18. In this view it is not necessary for us to decide the second question raised by counsel for the respondent. We are also not dealing with the question as to whether the notice under Section 124(a) was vague, and therefore, void as decided by the Division Bench. That part of the decision of the High Court was not challenged before us, and therefore, we are not called upon to give our decision on that part of the case. 19. In the result, the judgment of the Division Bench has to be upheld. The appeal will stand dismissed with costs.
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1971 (2) TMI 132 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... into between the parties in the present case would involve an illegal or unlawful act. In our judgment Section 1-A. was meant for the benefit of owners of buildings which were under erection or were constructed after January 1, 1951. If a particular owner did not wish to avail of the benefit of that section there was no bar created by it in the way of his waiving or giving up or abandoning the advantage or the benefit contemplated by the section. No question of policy, much less public policy, was involved and such a benefit or advantage could always be waived. That is what was done in the present case and we are unable to agree with the High Court that the consideration or object of the agreement entered into between the parties in June 1962 was unlawful in view of Section 23 of the Contract Act. 9. In the result the appeal is allowed, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and that of the trial court restored. The appellant will be entitled to his costs in this Court.
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1971 (2) TMI 131 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nce the Code is' made applicable to the whole of India by the Amendment Act II of 1951 the decree is no longer a foreign decree qua the Morena Court which is a Court under the Code to which the Bankura Court could transfer the decree for execution. No doubt in Shitole case it was observed that Section 13 of the Code creates substantive rights and not merely procedural and therefore defence that were open to the Respondents were not taken away by any Constitutional changes but the ratio of the decision was that the Gwalior Court not being a Court that passed the decree after the coming into force of Act IT of 1951 the Allahabad Court could not execute it. That im. pediment does not exist now in that the Bankura Court has transferred the decree to a Court under I the Code. 'Me plea that Section 48 Civil Procedure Code presents a bar of limitation is also not tenable. In the result-I agree that the appeal should beallowd as directed by my learned brother. Appeal allowed.
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1971 (2) TMI 130 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... In the conclusion I should record that Mr. Deb appearing in support of this Rule had tried to challenge the order of the State Government revoking the grant on the ground that such revocation was not competently made under the Rules of Business framed under Article 166 of the Constitution but I propose not to deal with this point firstly because such a case had not been made in the pleadings and secondly because it is not necessary to decide it inasmuch as if it was open to this Court to enter into the validity or otherwise of the order of the State Government, It would have held the order to be void on a still more fundamental objection raised by Mr. Deb and upheld on my findings made hereinbefore to the effect that such an order was passed in breach of fundamental principles of natural justice. On the conclusions as above this writ petition falls and the Rule is discharged. There will be no order for costs in this Rule. Let the operation of this order be stayed for a month.
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1971 (2) TMI 129 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... concerned with is whether the sale by the Liquidator is under "an operation of law" and since we have held that the sale is by the company which is still in existence till it is finally dissolved and is not by "operation of law". The sale is, Therefore, subject to all the liabilities which govern the company. 46. There is no provision in the Companies Act that the Liquidator shall sell properties of the company free of all restrictive covenants and if law places a restriction on assignment by the assignee including a company, there seems no reason why it should not apply to an assignment when the company has to act through its Liquidator. This is the conclusion which the Division Bench of this Court has reached and we are in complete agreement with that conclusion. We, Therefore, hold that the application field by the Official Liquidator should be dismissed and we order accordingly. But in the circumstances, we do not propose to make any order as to costs.
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1971 (2) TMI 128 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... be effective must have an integrated machinery for enforcement. Economic crimes are also often inter related. It is time for the Parliament to consider the desirability of an Economic Code to fulfil the integrated purpose of economic planning, control and development. That power, is a matter for a proper legislative provision. 10. In view of the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 as they are, it must, however, be held that the show cause notice as it was only on the two grounds mentioned hereinbefore, is liable to be quashed for the reasons mentioned hereinbefore. 11. In the result, the said notice dated 10th of July, 1970 being Annexure G to the petition, is hereby quashed and the respondents are restrained from proceeding with the said notice. Let appropriate writs in the nature of certiorari and mandamus be issued accordingly. The Rule is made absolute to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs. The operation of this order is stayed for five weeks.
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1971 (2) TMI 127 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t of the Nizam and got the properties released by asserting that they were not Dargah and Khankah properties in the year 1927. Abdul Hai did not inform the same to any of the parties. The unmistakable intention of Abdul Hai all along was to enjoy the properties by stating these to be Dargah and Khankah. When the parties came to know the real character of the properties even then Abdul Hai was not willing to have partition. On these facts it is established that the fraud committed by Abdul Hai relates "to matters which prima facie would be a reason for setting the judgment aside". That is the statement of law in Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, Volume 22, paragraph 1669 at page 790. For these reasons we accept the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore the judgment and decree of the trial court. The appellant will be entitled to costs of this Court. The parties will pay and bear their own costs in the High Court. Appeal allowed.
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1971 (2) TMI 126 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... was taken away by Makhan, much less to say that she was taken away forcibly or by deceit. 11. For these reasons we cannot accept the contention of the learned Advocate that Chameli was being abducted In this view it would be unnecessary to consider the other question whether in fact if she was being abducted it would be open to the Appellant to plead that he had a right of private defence and if such a defence is open to him he had not exceeded his right when he in concert with the other co accused inflicted injuries on Makhan and the deceased. In the result the conviction and sentence Under Section 302 is set aside and the accused is acquitted on that charge. He is however found guilty Under Section 325 read with 34 and sentenced to five years Rigorous imprisonment. In all other respects the convictions and sentences for offences Under Section 324, 323 read with 34 are maintained. All these sentences are directed to run concurrently. The Appeal is accordingly partly allowed.
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1971 (2) TMI 125 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t must pay plaintiffs' costs of issue No. 5 and his own costs of that issue. 21. Defendants Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5 will be paid one set of costs between them (out of the assets). 22. Mr. Setalvad asks for directions of the Court about one existing lease which will run up to 1920. 23. Mr. Inverarity replies no order can be made until the Shilotri and the Collector are communicated with. 24. Order.--I make an order for sale by the Commissioner of the interest of the defendant under the lease referred to. There is no doubt that the consent of the Shilotri and the Salt Collector will have to be obtained so that the purchaser can obtain a good title. I have no doubt that the Shilotri and the Salt Collector will put no obstacles in the way when the circumstances are explained to them. The first defendant is the only person who is entitled under the lease. If he chooses to do nothing under the lease, then there is nothing to be done. 25. Parties to have liberty to bid at the sale.
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1971 (2) TMI 124 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of rendering the resolution void and ultra vires. In the eye of law, such resolution is to be deemed as being never in existence. Such an event took place when the company, in the instant case, purported to pass a resolution which was not at all notified in gross violation of the mandatory obligations under the statute. The resolution impugned in the suit is accordingly void and ultra vires and has no existence in law. The plaintiff accordingly became entitled to a declaration prayed for in prayer (a) of the plaint. As consequential reliefs the plaintiff is also entitled to further reliefs as decreed by the courts below. 34. As all the contentions raised On behalf of the appellants fail the appeal is dismissed without however any order as to costs in the court. 35. Leave under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is prayed for and granted. 36. As prayed for by the learned counsel for the appellant, let operation of this decree remain stayed for a period of three weeks from date.
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1971 (2) TMI 123 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ., Additional District Magistrate, then he had authority by virtue of the notification dated September 15, 1959, mentioned above. 14. The learned Counsel, referring to the Acquisition Act, as it stood in 1959, and the definition of "Collector" ("the Collector of a district and includes a Deputy Commissioner and any officer specially appointed by the State Government to perform the functions of a Collector under this Act) urged that the Additional District Magistrate was not "specially appointed." There is no force in this point. The notification of September 15, 1959, amounts to special appointment within the definition of "Collector." 15. We referred the following question to the Constitution Bench which has answered it in the negative Whether the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act 1948 is ultra vires the Constitution Under Article 19(1)(f) read with Article 19(5)? In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1971 (2) TMI 122 - HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
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... ... ..... the creditors take action against their original debtors for recovery of the amounts due to them which this Cooperative Society in liquidation is unable to discharge. ( 7. ) After giving the matter our anxious consideration we have come to the conclusion that the order of the Deputy Registrar dated 10th August, 1960 and the order of the Board of Revenue dated 10th October, 196s are without jurisdiction to the extent that they impose liability on the petitioners with regard to their dealings with the Gwalior private Bank before it was transferred to the Cooperative society. To that extent those orders are quashed. The case has already gone back to the Deputy Registrar for dealing with each item according to the directions of the Board of Revenue. The Deputy Registrar will now deal with the matter according to law as explained above. ( 8. ) Parties shall bear their own costs of this petition. The outstanding amount of the security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioners.
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1971 (2) TMI 121 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... perties formed part of the asthal and are not the properties of the mahant as distinct from those ,of the asthal. (see Sri Thakurji Ramji v. Mathura Prasad(A.I.R. 1941 Pat. 354, at 358.) But unless the asthal itself is a public trust for religious or charitable purposes, the properties appertaining thereto would not be properties of a public trust for religious or charitable purposes. The use of the expression ’appertaining to the asthal’, therefore, cannot lead to the conclusion that. the properties in question were stamped with a trust for public purposes. These were all the contentions urged before us. In our view, the appellant-Board failed to establish that the proportion in suit, fell within the ambit of the Act and he respondent-mahant was subject to its provisions. The High Court accordingly was right in reversing the Trial Court’s judgment and decreeing the respondent’s suit. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1971 (2) TMI 120 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ite of this discrepancy that both the complainant and Shetty were present in the Mamlatdar's office and conclude that the association of the Complainant at every stage until legal transfer of the name, therefore, must be inevitable. 15. On a consideration of the evidence, we think that the reversal of the order of acquittal by the High Court was not warranted. Though the High Court has power on a review of the evidence to reverse the order of acquittal, yet in doing so it should not only consider all matters on record including the reasons given by the Trial Court in respect of the order of acquittal, but should particularly consider those aspects which are in favour of the accused and ought not also to act on conjectures or surmises nor on inferences which do not arise on the evidence in the case. In the view we have taken, the Appeal is allowed, the judgment of the High Court reversed and the Appellant acquitted. The Appellant being on bail, his bail bond is cancelled.
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1971 (2) TMI 119 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Art. 226, where the aggrieved party seeks relief against infringement of civil rights by authorities purporting to act in exercise of powers conferred upon them by revenue statutes. The preliminary objections raised by Counsel for the assessee must therefore fail." This authority was cited and followed in the Jay Engineering Works Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, a Full Bench decision of this Court in 12. We, therefore, remand the appeal on the four specific points sot out above. The costs of this proceeding will be reserved and will abide by the result of the final disposal of the appeal after it comes back from the remand and when it is finally disposed of. The parties will be at liberty to mention this matter to the learned judge for expeditions hearing and who will take it up and will deal with these four specific points according to his convenience and to the convenience of the parties. B.C. Mitra, J. 13. I agree.
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1971 (2) TMI 118 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ting authorities have an unguided licence to prosecute his clients under one or the other statute and since the penalty under the Adulteration Act is more severe than that under the Fruit Order the principle of equality before the law is violated As this point was not taken in any of the courts below we did not permit him to raise it in this Court. It would, however, be open to the respondent, if so advised, to raise this point in accordance with law in the court below, because the cases have not yet been finally disposed of. The competence of the prosecution having been challenged at an intermediate stage, the cases will have to go back to the trial court. As these cases have been pending since 1962 the trial court should dispose them of with due dispatch and without any further avoidable delay. The appeals are accordingly allowed and the cases remitted to the trial court for further proceedings according. to law in the light of the observations made above. Appeals allowed.
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1971 (2) TMI 117 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... affairs of the Society were probably in a mess. The remedy, however, could not lie in depriving the Society of its property altogether. Reasonable restrictions could have been imposed so as to ensure the proper preservation of the property of the Society and its proper management. If the law is passed not merely for ensuring proper management and administration of the property, but for totally depriving the persons, in whom the property vested, of their right to hold the property, the law cannot be justified as a reasonable restriction under Art. 19(5). Consequently, even on this alternative position taken up by counsel for the respondents, the Act cannot be held to be valid. As a result, the petition and the appeal are both allowed with costs. The Act is declared to be invalid, so that there will be restraint on the concerned bodies, including the Union Government, from taking or continuing any action under the Act.There will be one hearing fee. Petition and Appeal allowed.
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1971 (2) TMI 116 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ad Master to Teacher-in-Charge. In the absence of any rules lawfully promulgated for employment of backward classes promotions could be made only in accordance with rule 25 and there can be no manner of doubt that there was absolute non-compliance with the provisions of that rule. The promotions thus de of all the respondent-, teachers were illegal and unconstitutional being violative of Article 16 of the Constitution. They have, therefore, to be set aside. All the promotions made to the higher posts or the higher grade pursuant to the communal policy would have to be revised and reconsidered and appropriate orders must be passed by respondents 1 and 2 with regard to them as also the petitioners in accordance with law. The new rules stated to have been framed have not been shown to us and we wish to express no opinion on their applicability. The present petition shall stand allowed in the manner indicated above. The petitioners shall be entitled to their costs in this Court.
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1971 (2) TMI 115 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d back nor his daily allowance, and did not think that the other questions raised therein were such as to merit leave being granted. Apart from this consideration even on the question of jurisdiction of the High Court to make the impugned orders there is a decision of this Court is Rajeswar Prasad Mishra v. State of West Bengal which supports the contention of the learned Advocate for the Respondent that the Criminal Courts and the High Courts have ample power and jurisdiction even in a case of a conviction to direct additional evidence in the interest of justice and fair play rather than take a different view of the oral evidence. Much more so can the High Court in a case of discharge direct even before setting aside the order of discharge to take further evidence or additional evidence if it considers that it is necessary in the interest of justice to do so. In any view of the matter this is not a case in which leave should be granted. The petition is accordingly rejected.
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1971 (2) TMI 114 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ahadev were transferred under the said transaction in favour of plaintiff's father. We have also held that there is no bar of res-judicata. From all this it follows that at any rate in the hands of the plaintiff's father, both rights have merged and he was entitled to ask for recovery of possession. 20. Mr. Sarjoo Prasad again made a request that his clients may be given an opportunity to raise the contention that Ex. 78 is not binding on them as it is not supported by legal necessity. For this purpose he made a request that the appellants may be permitted to amend suitably the written statement and that the matter may be remitted to the trial Court for further consideration. We have already indicated that a similar, request was made to the High Court, which was rejected. We have also no hesitation in rejecting this request. 21. In the result the decree and judgment of the High Court are confirmed and the appeal dismissed with costs of the first respondent-plaintiff.
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