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Showing 1 to 20 of 92 Records
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1973 (9) TMI 114 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... that offence. 8. With respect we concur in this view. In the present case the chalan has been prepared and the initials of P.W. 2 obtained. That is most important and crucial step towards cheating. Towards this end both the accused have cooperated. Thereafter it only remained for the appellant Sudhir to affix the stamp and put his signature. Accused Shaw could then have presented it to the company's office and received payment. This is a definite step towards the commission of the offence of cheating though it is not the penultimate step. We hold that the acts of the accused did not stop at the stage of preparation but had reached the stage of attempt. We, therefore, uphold the conviction of the appellants under Section 511 read with Section 420 I.P.C. The appeals are disposed of accordingly. 9. It is, however, stated that the appellants have already suffered the sentence imposed by the Presidency Magistrate and it is not necessary to say or do anything further about it.
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1973 (9) TMI 113 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... al Code. There is nothing in the complaint to show that the respondents had dishonest or fraudulent intention at the time the appellant parted with ₹ 35,000. There is also nothing to indicate that the respondents induced the appellant to pay them ₹ 35,000 by deceiving him. It is further not the case of the appellant that a representation was made by the respondents to him at or before the time he paid the money to them and that at the time the representation was made, the respondents knew the same to be false. The fact that the respondents subsequently did not abide by their commitment that they would show the appellant to be the proprietor of Drang Transport Corporation and would also render accounts to him in the month of December might create civil liability for them, but this fact would not be sufficient to fasten criminal liability on the respondents for the offence of cheating. 5. In our opinion, there is no merit in the appeal, which fails and is dismissed.
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1973 (9) TMI 112 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... dispute raised by the tenant and not by the landlord'. When the landlord himself raises a dispute, and , in our opinion, such a contingency will never arise, it can only be for asking more rent than he has been changing to his tenant. If the landlord raises such a dispute seeking to charge more amount of rent and permitted increases to the regnant,. it would, in any case, ipso facto mean that the tenant has a bona fide dispute about the standard rent and permitted increases,Looked at form any angle, we do not see that the problem posed by Mr. Diwan about the consideration of the "bona fides" is acceptable on the interpretation of the word 'dispute" in Section 12(3)(a). 59. In the result, we hold that the "dispute" contemplated under Section 12(3)(a) must be a "bona fide" dispute to enable a tenant to claim benefit under Section 12(3)(a). 60. The question referred to us is answered in the affirmative. 61. Answered in the affirmative.
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1973 (9) TMI 111 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ility. In Marz v. The Queen 96 Cri.L.R. 62 the High Court of Australia said The Crown is as much precluded by an estoppel by judgment in criminal proceedings as is a subject in civil proceedings.... The laws which gives effect to issue-estoppel is not concerned with the correctness or incorrectness of the finding which amounts to an estoppel, still less with the process of reasoning by which the finding was reached in fact.... It is enough that an issue or issues have been distinctly raised or found. Once that is done, then, so long as the finding stands, if there be any subsequent litigation between the same parties, no allegations legally inconsistent with the finding, may be made by one of them against the other. Here again it is to be remembered that the principle applies to two criminal proceedings and the proceeding with which we are now concerned is not a criminal proceeding. We therefore hold that there is no substance in this contention. 5. The petition is dismissed.
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1973 (9) TMI 110 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... or the Rules. This cannot be said to be true of High Court either on the Original Side or on the Appellate Side. The High Court is invest with the powers of the judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The contention of Mr. Paranjape, therefore that the petitioner should not be driven to comply with the Rules the validity of which he seeks to challenge in this writ application is without any merit. 15. In the result, therefore, the preliminary objection is upheld. We accordingly hold that the petition is virtually under Article 226 of the Constitution and the subject-matter therein substantially arises within the limits of Greater Bombay and as such the petition is liable to be heard in accordance with the O. S. Rules. The entertainment of the petition the Appellate Side is not justified. 16. Office to take notice of this and send the Papers to the concerned section of the Original Side for disposal in accordance with the Rules. 17. Ordered accordingly.
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1973 (9) TMI 109 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... matter which rests ultimately in the discretion of the Court (see R. v. Thames Magistrates' Court, ex. p. Greenbaum(1). In this case, however, the first respondent has not challenged the grant of the lease on the ground of ex debito justitiae but has done so on the ground of a direct infringement of his right to be granted a mining lease over 280.62 acres for which the appellant was given a lease along with other area. Since it is now found that no such right of the first respondent has been affected, he has no locus standi. He is neither a party nor a person aggrieved or affected and consequently his writ petition in the High Court is not maintainable. On this short ground, this appeal will be allowed and the writ petition filed by the first respondent in the High Court dismissed. The appellant will have his costs only against the State of Bihar. V.P.S. Appeal allowed. (1)(1957) 55 L.C.R. 129-extracted in Yardley Source Book of English Administrative Law, 1970, p. 228).
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1973 (9) TMI 108 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e is made to a transfer as being mala fide. In the present case, however, apart from the bare allegation that the transfer was mala fide no other material or details have been placed on record by the petitioner. He has thus not discharged the initial burden on him to show that the transfer was on account of mala fide action of the respondents. In that view, even if the respondents have not given fuller details, the petitioner unfortunately can derive no benefit. I am of the opinion that the petitioner has thus failed to make out a case of mala fide end must, therefore, reject the challenge on this ground. However, as a result of my finding on the first point that the impugned order of transfer dated 23rd November, 1970 was passed without any support either in law or rules, the same deserves to be set aside and I would consequently issue a writ of certiorari and quash the same. The writ petition is thus allowed with costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 200/-. 12. Petition allowed.
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1973 (9) TMI 107 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... is a born criminal aud that a good many crimes are the product of social economic milieu. Although not much can be done for hardened criminals, considerable stress has been laid on bringing about reform of young offenders not guilty of very serious offences and of preventing their association with hardened criminals. The Act statutory recognition to the above objective. 4. Neither the learned Additional Sessions Judge nor the High Court gave any reason why the appellant should be deprived of the benefit of an order under Section 4 of Probation of Offenders Act under which provision the appellant had been released by the trial court. In the absence of any cogent reason the appellant, in our opinion, should not have been deprived of that benefit. We accordingly accept the Appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and direct that the appellant should be released on probation of good conduct under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act as directed by the trial court.
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1973 (9) TMI 106 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... formality of requiring him to be produced before the Court and that it would be sufficient and appropriate instead to examine the validity of the detention without having being brought before the Court, and if the detention is found to be unlawful, pass an order setting him at liberty. We are, therefore, of the view that there is nothing in. Art. 32 which requires that the body of the person detained must be produced be-fore an application for a writ of habeas corpus can be heard and decided by the Court. It is competent to the Court to dispense with the production of the body of the person detained while issuing a rule nisi under Order XXXV, r. 4 and the rule nisi can be heard and an appropriate order passed in terms of Order XXXV, r. 5 without requiring the, body of the person detained to be brought before the Court. This was the only question before us and now that it is deter mined the petition will have to go back to the appropriate Bench for disposal according to law.
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1973 (9) TMI 105 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... implication and co instante, relinquishes or ceases to hold his office as ordinary member. It is inconceivable that he will hold two offices at the same time and that will also reduce the number of members of the Public Service Commission. Therefore, logically and legally we may spell out an automatic expiry of office of the member qua ordinary member on his assumption of office qua Chairman. Nor is the public mischief sought to be avoided by Arts. 316 and 319 defeated by this interpretation. In any case they cannot serve indefinitely, nor remain for anything like twentyfive or thirty years which is the normal tenure of a Government servant. The various rulings we have adverted to earlier substantially adopt the arguments we have set out, although in some of them there is marginal obscurity. The thrust of the reasoning accepted in all but the Calcutta case substantially agrees with what has appealed to us. For these reasons we dismiss the appeal with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1973 (9) TMI 104 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ent or local authority upon a person for giving the consent contemplated by the section, in our opinion, could be of general nature and it was not essential that the order authorising the person should have mentioned specified individual offenses. The amendment made in this section had the effect of making more clear what was already contemplated by the section. The Madras High Court in the case of Corporation of Madras v. Arumugham (A.I.R. 1966 Madras 194) the Mysore High Court in the case of Laxman Sitaram Pai & Anr. v. The State of Mysore (A.I.R. 1967 Mysore 33) and the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Public Prosecutor v. Thatha Rao &Ors. (A.I.R. 1968 A. P. 17) have all taken the view that a general authorisation to launch, prosecutions under the Act is sufficient. For the reasons stated above, we agree with the view taken in the above three cases. We see no cogent ground to interfere with the sentence. The appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1973 (9) TMI 103 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... added). It may be observed that the word ’incurred’ occurs both in section 96 and section 119. ’Incurred’ means "actually spent". The petition was dismissed by the High Court under cl. (a) of s.98. Accordingly, it was incumbent on the High Court to award costs to Dhote. But he is entitled to only such costs as are shown to have been incurred by him. Admittedly, there is no proof of payment of any fee to counsel by Dhote. So he is not entitled to the amount of ₹ 400/- per diem awarded by the High Court. However, he will be entitled to any other costs which are shown to have been incurred by him. Having regard to the foregoing discussion, the appeal is allowed only with respect to counsel’s fees awarded to Dhote and the respondent No. 1 1 by the High Court. As for the rest, the appeal is dismissed. Dbote will be entitled to such costs as have been incurred by him in this Court as well as in the High Court. Appeal allowed re costs.
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1973 (9) TMI 102 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e than that one innocent person should suffer; but no responsible and practical person would accept such a view. For it is obvious that if our ratio is extended indefinitely, there comes a point when the whole system of justice has broken down and society is in a state of chaos." The fact that there has to be clear evidence of the guilt of the accused and that in the absence of that it is not possible to record a finding of his guilt was stressed by this Court in the case of Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & Anr. (supra) as is clear from the following observations "Certainly it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distinction between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure considerations". As a result of the above, we accept the appeal, set aside the judgments of the. trial court and the High Court and acquit the accused. Appeal allowed.
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1973 (9) TMI 101 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 51 from the Secretariat to the Information Department. Ex.4 relates to a proceeding against the appellant which resulted in a censure on the basis of a complaint in 1951. Whatever night be said in justification of the refusal of the inquring officer to give access to the appellant of the confidential records relating to the witnesses we see no justification for not granting the prayer of the appellant to inspect the files containing the proceedings on the ground that the appellant was appraised of the proceedings in 1951, especially when it is seen that these proceedings have been relied upon by the inquiring officer in his report to sub- stantiate one of the charges against the appellant. it was too much to assume that the appellant would be remembering the details of the proceedings of 1951 at the time of the inquiry. We set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and restore the decree passed by the trial court, but in the circumstances, we make no order to costs.
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1973 (9) TMI 100 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... whether regular part time service can be considered even prima facie to suggest anything other than a contract of service. According to the definition in s.2(14) of the Act, even if a person is not wholly employed, if he is principally employed in connection with the business of the shop, he will be a "person employed" within the meaning of the sub-section. Therefore, even if he accepts some work from other tailoring establishments or does not work whole time in a particular establishment, that would not in any way derogate from his being employed in the shop where he is principally employed. We think that on the facts and circumstances of the case the Chief Inspector of Shops and Establishments and the High Court came to the right conclusion that employer and employee relationship existed between the parties and that the Act was therefore applicable. We therefore dismiss the appeal, but in the circumstances, we do not make any order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1973 (9) TMI 99 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... it is the, Central Govt. alone which can direct the termination of service under Regulation 9, as the Central Government is ordinarily the appointing authority. The State Govt. has powers, conferred by Rule 8, of making appointments only in certain contingencies. If it exceeds these powers of making appointment, the appointments may be vitiated. I am, however, not satisfied, on the materials placed before us, that the State Govt. either exceeded its powers or that an order of the Central Govt. to terminate a service was needed. However, as we agree with the conclusion of the Division Bench, for other reasons already given, that the impugned select lists of 1968 and reversion orders passed by the State Government should be quashed, I prefer not to decide this question in these cases. The result is that, for the reasons given above, these appeals are dismissed. But, in circumstances of the cases before us, the parties will bear their own costs in this Court. Appeals dismissed.
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1973 (9) TMI 98 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... icial break in is constitutionally interdicted. But, at the same time, we must hasten to point out that art. 31A is no charter of legislative freedom to refuse compensation altogether in every case. The Court may not strike down a statute for non payment of compensation but the legislature is expected, except in exceptional socio historical setting, to provide just payment for the deprived persons. To exclude judicial review is not to black out the beneficent provisions of arts. 14, 19 and 31. May be the present legislation dealing with extensive antiquated janmam rights relates to the exceptional category. All that we can say is that this is an area where not the court but the elector is the proper corrective instrument. For these and other reasons already mentioned in the leading judgment of our learned brother, Mr. Justice Palekar, we agree that the appeals be allowed and the writ petitions be dismissed with no order as to costs. Appeals allowed. writ petitions dismissed.
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1973 (9) TMI 97 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... aightforward classifications plainly promoting relevant goals can have constitutional validity. To overdo classification is to undo equality. If in this case Govern- ment had prescribed that only those degree holders who had secured over 70% marks could become Chief Engineers and those with 60% alone be eligible to be Superintending Engineers or that foreign degrees would be preferred we would have unhesitatingly voided it. The role of classification may well recede in the long run, and the finer emphasis on broader equalities implicit in the concluding thought of the leading judgment will abide. The decision in this case should not-and does not-imply that by an undue accent on qualifications the Administration can out back on the larger tryst of equalitarianism or may hijack the founding and fighting faith of social justice into the enemy camp of intellectual domination by an elite. The Court, in extreme cases, has to be the sentinel on the qui vive. Appeal allowed.
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1973 (9) TMI 96 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... dent No. 9 (TISCO) contended that they have been unnecessarily made parties to the writ application and they should, in any event, be awarded costs in this case. Having appreciated the facts and the circumstances of this case, it is not possible to accede to their contention. 12.. In the result, this writ application is allowed in part and the order contained in annexure 1 is quashed. The sales tax authorities will now proceed to treat the objection filed on 5th January, 1970, as an objection under section 21(2) of the Act, and, after hearing the parties and permitting them to adduce such further materials as they may be advised, and, on consideration of such further materials as may be available, appropriate order should be passed under section 21(2) in accordance with law. Thereafter, if the petitioners are aggrieved, they may pursue the ordinary remedies provided in the Act. There will be no order as to costs. NAGENDRA PRASAD SINGH, J.-I agree. Application partly allowed.
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1973 (9) TMI 95 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... contention then was that section 8A of the amended Act also indicates that the assessment though validated will have to be reopened. We do not find any words in section 8A which would produce that result. Since no deduction was claimed under section 8A in the writ petitions and no point relating to that was urged before the learned judge, we refrain from making any observation in that behalf. We would, however, like to make it plain that nothing mentioned in section 8A has the effect of reopening the assessment validated under section 9 of the Act. The result of the foregoing is that the notices which the Commercial Tax Officer has given are perfectly valid and in accordance with the provisions of the Act. They are not vitiated on any ground. Since no other contention was raised, we would allow the appeals, set aside the judgment of the learned judge and dismiss the writ petitions with costs throughout. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 in each case and in each court. Appeals allowed.
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