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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 422 Records
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1999 (7) TMI 695 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... India and it could not be said that the Central Government owned the properties. Board in the present case is not a department of the Central Government rather it has the attributes of a company. It is distinct from the Central Government. It cannot, therefore, claim exemption from taxation under Article 285 of the Constitution. 5. In a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. etc. etc. v. Secretary Revenue Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. etc. etc. AIR1999SC1734, it was held that the Electronics Corporation of India Ltd., a Government company, was distinct from the Central Government and Article 285 was not applicable in the case of a Government company. Following the ratio in the aforesaid two decisions it has to be held that Board is not exempt from taxation under Article 285 of the Constitution. 6. Accordingly Civil Appeal No. 1810 of 1988 is allowed and Civil Appeal Nos. 1997-98 of 1990 are dismissed with costs.
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1999 (7) TMI 694 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ng the power to contract. It may also sue or be sued by its own name and the Government does not figure in any litigation to which it is a party. It is true that its original share capital is provided by the Central Government (S.5 of the F.C. Act) and that 11 out of 12 members of its Board of Directors are appointed by that Government (S.7 of the F.C. Act) but then these factors may at the most lead to the conclusion (about which we express no final opinion) that the Corporation is an agency or instrumentality of the Central Government." The Court further said that even if the Corporation is an agency or instrumentality of the Central Government, that did not lead to the inference that the Corporation is a Government department. The reason is that Act has given the Corporation an individuality apart from that of the Government. Thus we hold that the Corporation is not exempt from taxation under Article 285 of the Constitution. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs.
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1999 (7) TMI 693 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... here exists a hut for the defendant to reside in the garden and the failure of the defendant to prove his plea of tenancy are the circumstances in my considered view would go ultimately in favour of the plaintiffs in probabilising the fact that the defendant is if not a tenant, but is a watchman or a licensee. Certainly it is not a surmise or conjuncture to eliminate any valid foundation to base the plea of tenancy. After all in a civil suit ultimately the test is preponderance of probability. These probabilities would go in favour of the plaintiffs to establish that the status of the defendant is that of a watchman who failed to establish his specific plea that he is a tenant. 14. For the foregoing reasons this Court has no option except to dismiss the appeal while confirming the judgment and Decree of the lower Court. 15. In the result, the Appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed. Under the circumstances, I direct the parties to bear their respective costs throughout.
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1999 (7) TMI 691 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as to whether the arbitration agreement between the parties still survives even assuming that the agreement dated 20.5.1994 was rendered invalid because of non-approval of the Government of India. In my opinion, this Court will not interfere in the proceedings before the Arbitrator and it will be open for the plaintiff to take all such pleas before the Arbitrator as it may be advised to take and have a decision thereon. 12. In my opinion, the plaintiff has not been able to make out any case for the grant of any relief in his application for injunction and this Court will not interfere with the proceedings before the Arbitrator. In my opinion, the suit by the plaintiff is also misconceived and is barred by the provisions of Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. While, Therefore, dismissing the application of the plaintiff for the grant of injunction, I allow the application of defendant no.1 under Order 7, Rule 11 and dismiss the suit with no order as to costs.
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1999 (7) TMI 690 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ience is also not in favor of the plaintiffs. No irreparable injury is likely to be caused to the plaintiffs. 152. The plaintiffs application under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 CPC at this stage being devoid of any merit is rejected. However, looking to the important questions of law of general public importance which are involved in the suit, I deem it appropriate that the hearing of the suit be expedited and accordingly, I direct that the suit be listed before the Court for framing of issues on 23.9.1999. The list of witnesses be furnished by the parties within four weeks. The suit shall be listed for recording of the evidence from 2nd to 5th November, 1999. The preliminary submissions advanced by Mr. D.Dave, Sr. Advocate for the plaintiffs 9-16 shall be decided at the time of hearing of the suit. 153. Before parting with this case, I would like to place on record my deep appreciation for the extremely able assistance provided by the learned counsels appearing for the parties.
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1999 (7) TMI 689 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... d, the responsibility of every other person who was incharge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business was required to be determined. Furthermore, language of the proviso of this deeming provision is such that it is required to be examined where the burden of proof lies and when the onus shifts. In view of these provisions it was necessary for the adjudicating authority to examine the facts w.r.t. these provisions in greater details but his order regarding the liability of penalty on the Directors is virtually a non-speaking order. It is therefore required to be set aside but the matter is required to be remanded for passing an appropriate order after giving opportunity to the appellants to be heard in the matter. 11. Therefore, while I agree with my ld. Colleague that the appeal of M/s. Garware Synthetics is required to be rejected, I hold that the remaining six matters are required to be remanded for de novo consideration in accordance with law.
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1999 (7) TMI 688 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e police to conduct further investigation. This has been so stated by this Court in Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Admn.) 1979CriLJ1346 . The only rider provided by the aforesaid decision is that it would be desirable that the police should inform the court and seek formal permission to make further investigation. 11. In such a situation the power of the Court to direct the police to conduct further investigation cannot have any inhibition. There is nothing in Section 173(8) to suggest that the Court is obliged to hear the accused before any such direction is made. Casting of any such obligation on the Court would only result in encumbering the Court with the burden of searching for all the potential accused to be afforded with the opportunity of being heard. As law does not require it, we would not burden the Magistrate with such an obligation. 12. For the aforesaid reasons, we are unable to interfere with the order passed by the Magistrate. Appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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1999 (7) TMI 687 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... urt ought not to have dismissed the writ petition on this ground but ought to have helped the writ petitioner gain redress, having regard to the circumstances of the case. In this behalf, he refers to the Judgment of a learned single Judge of the High Court (1992) 1 P&h LR 579, where this view was taken. 3. The High Court must decide according to the law. The law mandate that it can issue directions if the cause of action or a part of it has arisen within its territorial jurisdiction. In the absence of an averment to that effect in the writ petition, and even on the facts of the case, the High Court was justified in dismissing the writ petition. 4. Learned Counsel now asks us to remand this matter to the High Court. He says that in the circumstances of the case that is the appropriate order to pass. It would be remarkable if we remand to a High Court a matter in respect of which we have already held that it has no jurisdiction. 5. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed.
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1999 (7) TMI 686 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... he appeal for which no satisfactory explanations given. Hence, the Civil Appeal is dismissed.
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1999 (7) TMI 685 - COMPANY LAW BOARD
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... ... ..... on and will bear the same. The valuer will take into consideration oral as well as written submissions made by the parties in regard to the valuation. The valuation report will be binding on all the parties. The valuation report should be made available to the parties as well as to this Bench latest by October 31, 1999. The shares will be purchased either by the respondents or by the company as may be decided by the respondents and in case the company purchases the shares, reduction of share capital may be effected on the authority of this order. Within 15 days from the date of receipt of valuation report, the petitioner's group will hand over all the share certificates along with blank transfer forms to the respondents and the respondents will make payment as per the valuation report, to the respective shareholder. 20. With the above directions we dispose of the petition without any order as to costs, Liberty to apply in case of any difficulty in working out this order.
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1999 (7) TMI 684 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... . ORDER Delay is condoned. The civil appeal is dismissed.
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1999 (7) TMI 683 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e declared on the package at the maximum of such retail price. It may be that such difference in the price Is on account of regional state basis or even District level basis. No distination has been drawn by explanation 2. As such note appended to the proforma of declaration cannot be considered to be violative of Sec.4A. The contention is raised that the note is violative of Article 301 of the constitution. This argument has also not force because the provisions of Article 301 does not confer power on the revenue and the provisions of Article 304 would be attracted only when there is a restriction in the movement of goods. The delegated delegated authority has not restrained any moving of goods from one State to another. It has uniformity with regard to the valuation of the commodity for the purpose of excise duty which has been fixed at the maximum of the price declared on the package which could be of any State. The writ petition, therefore, having not force in dismissed.
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1999 (7) TMI 682 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tation of the issue of charging of interest under s. 139 in regard to both its liability and quantum in a valid and competent appeal against an order of assessment, though an appeal may not lie against a separate order levying interest and nothing more. 4. In the instant case, we find from the appellate orders that the assessee had disputed the levy of interest under s. 215 of the Act and had also disputed certain other additions/disallowances, which had resulted in enhancement of total income and levy of interest under s. 139 of the Act. In this view of the matter, in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Central Provinces Manganese Ore Co. Ltd. vs. CIT and of this Court in CIT vs. Mahabir Parshad & Sons (supra), we are of the opinion that an appeal lies to the AAC against the charging of penal interest under ss. 215 and 139 of the Act. Accordingly, the question is answered in the affirmative i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No costs.
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1999 (7) TMI 681 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... ustrial undertaking eligible for deduction under section 80-I, then the same has got to be reduced from the profits and gains of business of such undertaking before computing the deduction under section 80-I. However, if the investment qualifying for deduction under section 32AB has been made out of the profits and gains of business other than the business of the industrial undertaking eligible for deduction under section 80-I, then deduction under section 32AB is not to be made for the purpose of determination of the profits and gains derived from the industrial undertaking and the deduction under section 80-I shall have to be computed on the profits and gains of the industrial undertaking without reducing it by the deduction under section 32AB. For this purpose we restore the issue to the file of the CIT(A), who will decide the issue afresh in accordance with our decision after doing necessary verification. 14. For statistical purposes the appeal of the revenue is allowed.
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1999 (7) TMI 680 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed that the law as interpreted by the Division Bench was before the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Real Value Appliances Ltd. v. Canara Bank and others, . By that judgment, the Apex Court reversed the decision of this Court which was relied on by the Division Bench. The Apex Court has now held that once proceedings are registered all further proceedings in the suit must be stayed. Considering the above, I am clearly of the opinion that even proceedings against the guarantors for the enforcement of guarantees, given as guarantee for loan or advances to the company, in respect of which proceedings are registered under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 will have to be stayed. In view of the above, the various other contentions have not been discussed or disposed. 8. In the light of that proceedings cannot be proceeded with. However as the relief sought is over ₹ 10 lakhs, suit and all proceedings transferred to Debt Recovery Tribunal.
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1999 (7) TMI 679 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s below were not attentive to the procedural laws and their duty to do substantial justice in the case. Had that been so the plaintiff would have been spared the tribulations of knocking at the doors of the highest court of the land. Courts below fell into error in going into the question of privity of contract and lost sight of the basic issue involved in the case. It was a case where perhaps action could have been taken against the 1st defendant as he was apparently guilty of perjury in not only denying his signatures on Exh.P-1 and Exh.P-2 but also on written statement and the Vakalatnama filed by him. We allow the appeal, set aside the judgments of the trial court as well as of the High Court and decree the suit of the plaintiff for ₹ 1,36,167/- against the 1st defendant with costs throughout. Plaintiff shall also be entitled to interest at the rate of 10 per annum on the principal amount of rupees one lakh from the date of institution of the suit till realisation.
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1999 (7) TMI 678 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... more. Borrower continues to be the owner of the fund and therefore a charge is created in respect of those amounts for which a power of attorney has been executed. According to the decisions cited above, lower Court has not properly understood the scope of decision reported in AIR 1969 S.C. 313 (cited supra) and AIR 1974 Madras 190 (cited supra). As I said earlier in both the cases, priority of debt was not the matter in issue nor the relevant provisions of Sales Tax Act, Income-tax Act or Estate Duty Act came for consideration. (11.) IN the result, the decree and judgment of lower Court is set aside as against appellant. It is declared that 7th defendant has got priority over the amounts due to it and any amount paid by appellant to 7th defendant pursuant to Ex. B5 notice will amount to discharge and appellant cannot be further made liable for paying that amount to bank, plaintiff in the case. The appeal is allowed as indicated above, however, without any order as to cost.
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1999 (7) TMI 677 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... namely, the recall of our earlier order of the court, it becomes mandatory for the court to restore the status quo ante prevailing on the date of its first order. Restitution is a must. Further, Bharat Petroleum having got back its plot at the Ridge, it cannot lay further claim to the one at San Martin Marg which was given to it only in lieu of the Ridge plot. Similarly, HPCL has to get back its plot in San Martin Marg plot inasmuch as, otherwise, it will have none and Bharat Petroleum will have two. Bharat Petroleum cannot retain the advantage which it got from an order of this court which has since been withdrawn. Thus, what is permissible and what is possible is a single view and the case on hand comes squarely within the exception laid down by Chinnappa Reddy, J., in S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan 1980 (4) SCC 379 . 25. For the aforesaid reasons, IA 481 is allowed, and the unnumbered IA of Bharat Petroleum is dismissed. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
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1999 (7) TMI 676 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tation of 30 days will run from the date of receipt of order/certificate from the competent authority. In case the petitioner fails to approach the competent authority within a week, the benefit of this order will not enure to him. Moreover, as the order could not be served on the petitioner for reasons beyond the control of the department and the petitioner failed to furnish the proper address for service, we direct payment of interest at the rate of 15 per cent from 1-4-1999 till the date of payment of tax. 2. With the above observation, the writ petition is disposed of. No costs.
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1999 (7) TMI 675 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... in computing the perquisite value of the flat occupied by the assessee. This decision would be applicable when the notional value of the property is to be adopted. In adopting the notional value it is now well-settled that various factors are to be taken into account and the factor of interest free security deposit may also be a relevant factor. But for purposes of section 23(1)(b) the consideration is the actual rent received or receivable and there is no scope for taking into consideration any notional value. The aforementioned decision of the Bombay High Court, therefore, does not advance the claim of the revenue. 24. On the final analysis we hold that the revenue was not justified in assessing the notional value of the security deposit as part of the actual rent received or receivable within the meaning of section 23(1)(b). The Assessing Officer is directed to recompute the income from house property accordingly. 25. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is allowed.
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