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Showing 1 to 20 of 722 Records
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2008 (12) TMI 836 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... respondent and his two sisters. It could also not be disputed by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the respondent had no authority to make the agreement to sell on behalf of his sisters. The argument as raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant could help the appellant, only if the suit property was shown to be exclusively in the name of the respondent in the revenue record at the relevant time. Admittedly, the suit property was not recorded exclusively in the name of the respondent at the relevant time. Under the law, the respondent can not be permitted to sell the property belonging to the others. The judgment cited by the learned Counsel for the appellant is of no help to him. In this case, the respondent has no title vested in him to the extent of 2/3rd share of the property in dispute and therefore, he was not competent to alienate the same. 9. For the reasons recorded above, I find no merit in this appeal. No substantial question of law arises. Dismissed.
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2008 (12) TMI 835 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the vendor is concerned because after the purchase of the share of the vendor, the vendor would step into the shoes of the vendor and would become a co-sharer and can always seek a partition. Moreover, defendant No. 1/appellant has at least sold his entire share. Thus, in my view, the question of partition which was posed in this appeal is answered to the effect that in a case where the vendor enters into the contract in respect of his share as also on behalf of the other co-sharer and in case of denial of the other co-sharer in respect of the sale of their share on the ground of no authority having been given to one of the co-sharer, in that eventuality he/the vendor/co-sharer shall be bound and decree for specific performance can be granted to the extent of his share. No other question has been raised by the counsel for the appellant. 15. In view of above discussion, I do not find any merit in the present appeal and the same is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.
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2008 (12) TMI 834 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rther or afresh as commended to or guided by the High Court. In appropriate cases the High Court, while exercising supervisory jurisdiction, may substitute such a decision of its own in place of the impugned decision, as the inferior court or tribunal should have made. Lastly, the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is capable of being exercised on a prayer made by or on behalf of the party aggrieved; the supervisory jurisdiction is capable of being exercised suo motu as well. 13. The above position was highlighted in MMTC Ltd. v. Commissioner of Commercial Tax and Ors. 2008 (13) SCALE 682. 14. In view of what has been stated above, the High Court was not justified in holding that the Letters Patent Appeal was not maintainable. In addition, a bare reading of this Court's earlier order shows that the impugned order is clearly erroneous. The impugned order is set aside. The writ appeal shall be heard by the Division Bench on merits. 15. The appeal is allowed.
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2008 (12) TMI 833 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... at this stage refer to one other subsidiary argument urged on behalf of the appellants. It is argued that because paddy and rice are not different kinds of goods but one and the same, inclusion of both paddy and rice in Schedule C' to the Act would amount to imposition of double taxation under the Act. There is no merit in this contention also because the assumption that paddy and rice are one and the same is erroneous. In Ganesh Trading Co., Karnal v. State of Haryana, arising under the Act, this Court has held that although rice is produced out of paddy, it is not true to say that paddy continued to be paddy even after dehusking; that rice and paddy are two different things in ordinary parlance and, therefore, when paddy is dehusked and rice produced, there is a change in the identity of the goods. 15. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in these appeals which are dismissed accordingly with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs. 25,000/- in each matter.
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2008 (12) TMI 832 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... le to share the view expressed by the High Court in quashing the complaint insofar as the first respondent herein. Accordingly, we set aside the same. The Special Judicial Magistrate (Pollution) is directed to proceed with the complaint and dispose of the same in accordance with law. If the first respondent herein applies for dispensing with his personal presence in the Court, after making the first appearance, the Special Court can exempt him from continuing to appear in the Court by imposing any condition which the Court deems fit. Subject to the above observation, we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and direct the Special Judicial Magistrate (Pollution) to proceed with the case in accordance with law and dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible. We make it clear that we have not expressed anything on the merits of the contents of the complaint and it is for the Special Court to decide the same in accordance with law. The Criminal appeal is allowed.
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2008 (12) TMI 831 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d in English by him. In any case the case of the appellants that the promissory notes are fabricated is difficult to digest. Nothing prevented the appellants from making an application for leave to defend. The impugned order indicates that when the order was passed both the appellants were present. Nothing prevented the appellants from putting forward their case. The order does not indicate that any such attempt was made by the appellants. The outright denial of the respondent's case does not stand to reason. It is difficult to digest that all the 8 promissory notes are fabricated. In our opinion, learned Single Judge has rightly decreed the suit. The appeal must be dismissed for the reason that the appellants have committed a breach of the solemn undertaking given to this Court that Rs. 10 lakhs will be deposited in this Court and also because on merits the appellants have not made out any case for interference with the impugned order. The appeal is therefore, dismissed.
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2008 (12) TMI 830 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the opinion, that, the gross profit declared by the assessee is too low when compared to the nature and volume of business and also keeping in view, that, in the case of the dealers, dealing in liquor in Bar attached Hotels, the normal gross profit is more than 30%, has thought it fit to fix the gross profit at 40% to the conceded turnover of the dealer. The order so passed by the assessing authority was modified by the first appellate authority, by reducing the estimate by adding a gross profit of 25% only. This order of the first appellate authority is confirmed by the Tribunal also. (12) Since there is a concurrent finding by the authorities under the Act and since no question of law as such is involved in this revision petition, we decline to entertain this revision petition and confirm the orders passed by the first appellate authority and the Tribunal. (13) In view of the orders passed in the revision petition, I.A.No.2635 of 2008 is also rejected. Ordered accordingly.
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2008 (12) TMI 829 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... side. We however, affirm the conviction of the appellant under Section 457(1) IPC. The trial court as well as the High Court convicted the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 457(1) IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 2 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 6 months. No effort has been made before us challenging the conviction of the appellant under Section 457(1) IPC. We, accordingly, confirm the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 457(1) IPC imposed by the courts below. The appellant however, had already undergone the sentence. Since there is no appeal preferred by the State as against the judgment of the High Court acquitting the appellant of other charges the same is not interfered with. 33. The appeal is accordingly partly allowed. The appellant be set at liberty forthwith unless required to be in custody in connection with any other case.
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2008 (12) TMI 828 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... not refuse to consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof. He cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. He cannot enquire into the allegations with which the delinquent officer had not been charged with. 19. If the disciplinary proceedings have not been fairly conducted, an inference can be drawn that the delinquent officer was prejudiced thereby. 20. In S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan and Ors. 1981 1SCR746 , this Court has held that non-compliance of the principles of natural justice itself causes prejudice. We are not oblivious of the fact that the said principle has since been watered down but in a situation of this nature, we are of the opinion that the concurrent findings of the Tribunal, as also the High Court cannot be said to be unreasonable or suffering from any legal infirmity warranting interference. 21. The appeal, therefore, is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs. 10,000/-.
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2008 (12) TMI 827 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... he information lay embedded, which the department could discern but did not discern. The information was disclosed in the most transparent manner in the statement of income, which was adopted in the assessment order. Therefore, the ratio of the decision of jurisdictional High Court, above-mentioned, is squarely-applicable to the facts of the case. Accordingly, it is held that the assessing officer did not have jurisdiction to issue notice under Section 147. Consequently, assessment made thereon was bad in law. 7. The facts for assessment years 1992-93, 1993-94 and 1994-95 were stated to be in pari materia with the facts of this case, except for the amount of the provision written back to Profit and Loss Account. That does not make any difference in coming to the conclusion that notices issued under Section 148 for these years were also bad in law. 8. The result of the discussion is that all the appeals of the revenue and all the cross-objections of the assessee are dismissed.
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2008 (12) TMI 826 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rs were carrying tamarind in that lorry belonging to us. We boarded the lorry along with our load of tamarind at Dharamavaram to go to Rajanagaram. We were selling the tamarind at Rajanagaram in retail by taking the tamarind there in our lorry from our village of Dharamavaram. 28. The Tribunal, therefore, correctly recorded that according to PW 2, he was travelling with his goods as owner thereof and not the deceased. We, therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, have no hesitation to hold that the victims of the accidents were travelling in the truck as gratuitous passengers and in that view of the matter, the appellant herein was not liable to pay the amount of compensation to the claimants. 15. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside in so far as the liability of the appellant herein is concerned. The appeal is allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2008 (12) TMI 825 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... based on doctrine of Restitution. In fact, all the decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the respondent in support of his contention are in respect contractual matters. In our opinion, the intervenor who is not party to the proceedings, in this case to the writ petition, cannot ask for any restitution. It is only aggrieved party who had suffered because of the order of the court only can seek restitution, if he is entitled to. In this view of the matter, the appellant is not entitled to avail benefit of the doctrine of restitution. 19. Sequel therefore is obvious. The appeal has to be dismissed. The same is dismissed. It is made clear that any of the above observations shall not be taken as expression of any view on merits if any proceedings of Election Petitions are preferred. Same if so filed shall be decided on its own merits and in accordance with law. 20. In view of the dismissal of L.P.A., nothing survives in the Civil Application and the same is also disposed of.
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2008 (12) TMI 824 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Glossop (1907) Ch. D. 370 could be referred to hold that the resignation of a Director becomes effective on and from the date it is tendered or submitted. 31. Since the cheques in question were signed, dishonored and information in this respect was received after the petitioner had resigned on 25/10/2005, he cannot be made liable for the alleged offence as when a Director has tendered his resignation and the Board of Directors has accepted it and has acted on it, such director cannot be held liable for the liability incurred by the said company after the date of acceptance of his resignation. 32. Admittedly, in these two cases also, the company is not the drawer of the dishonoured cheques. In view of the above discussion, the summoning order passed by the court of Ld. ASJ are quashed and the complaint qua him is dismissed. 33. The appeals are allowed. Crl MC No. 2667/2007, Crl MC No. 1597/2007 and Crl MC No. 1637/2007 34. The petitions are disposed of in the aforenoted terms.
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2008 (12) TMI 823 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... behalf of the Department fairly contended that he cannot join issue with regard to the question as raised by Mr.Khaitan. Such being the position, in our considered opinion, the learned Tribunal had wrongly decided the said question in holding that the gross profit was required to be estimated at the rate which he arrived at and therefore we found that there is no substance in the submission made by Mr.Khaitan in the matter. Further more since the relevant fact that the books of accounts were not rejected and had been taken into account for the purpose of deciding this question which has been raised in this appeal, we allow the appeal and answered the question in the affirmative in favour of the assessee. The appeal is, therefore, disposed of. All parties concerned are to act on a xerox signed copy of this order on the usual under takings. Urgent xerox certified copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties subject to compliance with all requisite formalities.
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2008 (12) TMI 822 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 200 of the said Code. 29. Hence, I pass following order (a) The impugned orders of issue of process dated 7th September 2007 passed by the learned Magistrate are quashed and set aside. Consequently, the judgments and orders dated 17th June 2008 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is quashed and set aside; (b) The learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 43rd Court, Borivali, Mumbai will record the statement of the complainant under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 afresh in accordance with law in the light of the observations made in this judgment. After recording of the verification statement, the learned Magistrate will pass appropriate order on the complaint in accordance with law. All questions on merits are kept open; (c) The Registrar, Judicial (I) will ensure that a copy of this judgment is circulated to all learned Metropolitan Magistrates in the City of Mumbai; (d) The petitions are partly allowed in the above terms with no orders as to costs.
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2008 (12) TMI 821 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... trial Court is valid and sustainable. 18. With regard to the submission made by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner that even prior to the launching of the prosecution, the first accused company has been ordered to be wound up and a Receiver was also appointed by the High Court of Bombay in a suit filed by IDBI, it involves adjudication on facts and this Court at this stage cannot venture into the said factual aspect. It is open to the petitioner herein to urge those points during trial. 19. In the result, all the Criminal Original Petitions are dismissed. Since the Calendar Cases are of the year 2004, the Court of Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (Economic Offences-II), Egmore, Chennai-8 is directed to give utmost priority for early disposal. Consequently, Crl.M.P. Nos. 8137 and 8138 of 2005 are closed. It is made clear, that findings are given only for the disposal of these Crl.O.Ps. and the trial Court is to decide the complaints on its' own merit.
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2008 (12) TMI 820 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t compliance with the provisions of Sub- section (2A) which required deposit of 50% of the recoverable dues. In fact, the petitioner resorted to an innovative procedure in order to avoid the pre-condition of payment of 50% of recoverable dues as stipulated under Sub- section (2A) of Section 154 of the above Act. 17. We agree with Mr. Lalit's submission that the matter was not taken up suo-motu by the Divisional Joint Registrar, but on the basis of the application which had been filed by the petitioner here, though not in the form of a Memorandum of Appeal, and that while an appeal may be filed within the period of limitation prescribed, it could not be entertained or taken up for hearing before the pre-condition indicated in Sub-section (2A) had been complied with, which view is supported by the decisions referred to hereinabove. 18. We, therefore, see no reason to entertain the Special Leave Petition which is accordingly dismissed. 19. There will be no order as to costs.
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2008 (12) TMI 819 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... se, warranting the exercise of power, under Section 482 Cr.P.C., to quash the FIR, conviction, and sentence, recorded by the trial Court. 8. Keeping in view the ratio of law, laid down, in the aforesaid cases, and applying the same, to the facts and circumstances of the instant case, in my considered opinion, once the matter has been compromised, by the parties, no useful purpose, shall be served by proceeding with the appeal, on merits, as that would amount to sheer wastage of time of the Court; harassment to the parties; and abuse of the process of Court. Even otherwise, the compromise is neither abhorrent to lawful composition of the society, nor would it promote savagery. 9. In view of the above, discussion, the petition, under Section 482 Cr.P.C., is accepted. Consequently, the FIR, as also the judgment of conviction, and the order of sentence, dated 29.1.1990, are set aside/quashed, resulting into the acceptance of appeal, and leading to the acquittal of the appellants.
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2008 (12) TMI 818 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... been highly negligent in prosecuting the suit. The plaintiff failed to take steps for service of the defendants after the institution of the suit till 12th September, 2006, as noticed in the order of that date. The plaintiff thereafter also sought adjournments at each and every stage. In the circumstances, I find the plaintiff entitled to interest pendente lite @ 6% per annum only in the principal amount found out as aforesaid. 11. As far as the future interest is concerned, the plaintiff would be entitled to interest on the principal amount at 6% per annum only from the date of the decree and for a period of 90 days, in which time the defendants are expected to pay the decretal amount. However, for the delay, if any, by the defendants in payment of decretal amount beyond 90 days, defendants shall be liable for interest on the principal amount at 18% per annum. The decree sheet be drawn upon accordingly. The plaintiff shall also be entitled to proportionate costs of the suit.
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2008 (12) TMI 817 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... , it was legally permissible for the appellant to support the decree passed in his favour by attacking the finding of the First Appellant Court which were made against him. Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code of civil Procedure, therefore, was available in this case. In S. Nazeer Ahmed v. State Bank of Mysore and Ors. AIR2007SC989 , this Court held Order 41 Rule 33 enables the appellate court to pass any decree that ought to have been passed by the trial court or grant any further decree as the case may require and the power could be exercised notwithstanding that the appeal was only against a part of the decree and could even be exercised in favour of the respondents, though the respondents might not have filed any appeal or objection against what has been decreed. 18. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.
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