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Showing 361 to 380 of 422 Records
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1999 (7) TMI 62 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Investment Allowance, Computation Of Allowance, Central Government ... ... ... ... ..... e present case is covered by the aforementioned decisions. The character of the subsidy in the hands of the recipient, whether revenue or capital, will have to be determined by having regard to the purpose for which the subsidy is given. It is evident from the copy of the extract of the Central Subsidy Scheme, that the said scheme was announced by the Government of India for the industrial units to be set up in selected backward districts/areas. It is an incentive to encourage entrepreneurs to move to backward areas and establish industries. The scheme does not require the subsidy to be utilised towards meeting the cost of the plant and machinery. Therefore, the Central subsidy cannot be deducted from the total cost of the asset for computing the investment allowance. In this view of the matter, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Reference stands disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1999 (7) TMI 61 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Exemption, Sale Of Property ... ... ... ... ..... ect of the capital gains arising from the transfer of the said flat. It was held It is clear from the plain reading of the above section that exemption from tax on profits from the sale of a building under the above section is dependent on fulfilment of the conditions set out therein. One of the conditions precedent is that the property in question should have been used by the assessee mainly for the purposes of his own residence in the two years immediately preceding the date on which the transfer took place. This expression, in the context, in which it appears in section 54, clearly means that the occupation of the assessee must be occupation in the capacity of the owner. It does not contemplate occupation during the period when the property even did not belong to him. In view of the above, the question referred to us is answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The reference stands disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1999 (7) TMI 60 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Interest On Securities, Assessability, Reference, Depreciation, Developement Rebate ... ... ... ... ..... 1992 195 ITR 66. Regarding question No. 2, as noticed above, the assessee s claim for 100 per cent. depreciation and development rebate was allowed by the Tribunal on the basis of its orders for the assessment years 1970-71 and 1971-72. Learned counsel for the Revenue submits that he has not been able to ascertain as to whether any reference on the question in respect of the assessment years 1970-71 and 1971-72 was sought by the Revenue and if so, what was the final result. He is also not in a position to point out the nature of the equipment and the value of each of the items on which the assessee had claimed 100 per cent. depreciation on the plea that the value of each of the those items was less than Rs. 750. In the absence of the requisite details, we are unable to consider and answer the second question. Accordingly, question No. 1 is answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue and question No. 2 is returned unanswered. No costs.
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1999 (7) TMI 59 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Provisional Attachment, Property ... ... ... ... ..... 6,30,000, as against the estimated liability of Rs. 2,68,30,000, the Assessing Officer, on his own, would release the bank accounts and F.D.Rs. from attachment. We are sorry that he has not done so. On the other hand, he wants to retain attachment on the bank accounts and F.D.Rs. and release the immovable properties from attachment. We have given our careful consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case. The two properties of the assessee, which have been attached under section 281B of the Income-tax Act, having been valued even by the Departmental Valuer at Rs. 2.66 crores against the anticipated liability of Rs. 2.68 crores, we do not find any justification whatsoever for allowing the continuation of attachment on the bank accounts and F.D. Rs. We, therefore, direct the respondents to forthwith lift the attachment on the bank accounts and F. D. Rs. Attachment of the two immovable properties would, however, continue until further orders. Certified copy expedited.
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1999 (7) TMI 58 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Capital Or Revenue Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... directly dependent upon the assessee s paying annual subscription to them and not on the assessee being their member. In this view of the matter, we feel that the membership of the organisation did not per se bestow on the assessee any asset or advantage of enduring nature, which in the present case was the right to constantly receive the latest technical information from the aforesaid organisation, that may be found useful for improvement, expansion and diversification of its activities, so as to constitute capital expenditure. In our opinion, the Tribunal was right in holding that the expenditure incurred by the assessee on account of initial membership fee paid to the said organisation could not be said to be capital expenditure and that it shall have to be regarded as an expenditure revenue in nature. For the foregoing reasons, the question is answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. There will, however be no order as to costs.
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1999 (7) TMI 57 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Reference, Penalty, Concealment Of Income ... ... ... ... ..... and cannot be said to be perverse or unreasonable. In any case the same are not sought to be challenged by the Revenue as perverse in the proposed questions. The ratio of the decision of the Karnataka High Court in CIT v. K. P. Sampath Reddy 1992 197 ITR 232, relied upon by Mr. R. D. Jolly, learned senior standing counsel for the Revenue, is not applicable on the facts of the present case. The facts of that case are clearly distinguishable. From a bare reading of even the question referred in that case, it is obvious that the Tribunal had found as a fact that the assessee in that case had not only admitted the concealment of income by means of a letter, its books of account also showed that it had concealed the income, which, according to the Tribunal, is not the case here. For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any infirmity in the order passed by the Tribunal declining to refer the proposed questions. The petition is accordingly dismissed but with no order as to costs.
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1999 (7) TMI 56 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... t of the firm. There is no information from outside. The information was already in the possession of the concerned officer having jurisdiction to assess the wealth for the purpose of wealth-tax. That value which has been disclosed in the wealth-tax return was available to the Wealth-tax Officer. Therefore, it cannot be said that after completion of the assessment for the purpose of estate duty, he received some information which reveals that some value of the deceased s property has escaped. When there is no information in the possession of the Assistant Controller for reopening of the assessment under section 59(b) of the Act, we find no justification to interfere with the order of the Tribunal. Accordingly, we answer questions Nos. 1 and 2 in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the accountable person and against the Revenue. The reference application is, accordingly, disposed of. All parties to act on a signed xerox copy of this dictated order on the usual undertaking.
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1999 (7) TMI 55 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Interest On Borrowed Capital ... ... ... ... ..... t what is allowable as a deduction under section 36(1)(iii) of the Act is any sum paid by way of interest in the commercial sense. This determination has to be done, by the Income-tax Officer having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. There can be, no straitjacket formula. The Income-tax Officer cannot refuse to allow, the deduction of interest on the ground that the rate of interest is high or that the assessee could have borrowed money at a lower rate of interest, But if the Income-tax Officer comes to a finding that what is claimed as, deduction by way of interest is, in fact, not wholly payment by way of interest but partly interest and partly payment for non-commercial considerations, he may allow the deduction of the amount which is interest and disallow the balance which is for extra-commercial considerations. In view of the above discussion, we answer the question referred to us in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
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1999 (7) TMI 54 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
HUF, Individual Income, Share Income ... ... ... ... ..... he mother of the assessee clearly indicated that the funds were to be utilised only for the benefit of the family, It is in that context that the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the decision of the High Court that the assessee was taxable in the status of the Hindu undivided family. Evidently, the above decision of the Supreme Court has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In view of the above, we are of the clear opinion that the Tribunal was not right in holding, that the share income received by the assessee, Jasotiben, from the firm, Vapson Products, was assessable in the status of Hindu undivided family. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it is clear beyond all doubt that the income was assessable in-the hands of the assessee in her individual capacity. The question is, therefore, answered in the above terms in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee Reference stands disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1999 (7) TMI 53 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Reassessment, Change Of Opinion ... ... ... ... ..... petitioner against the loan taken for purchase of silver in the computation of the capital loss, but the succeeding officer has arrived at a conclusion that the claim of capitalisation of interest in computing the capital loss has been incorrectly allowed. Thus, it cannot be said that the petitioner has suppressed any material facts. The petitioner placed all necessary material and it was for the Assessing Officer to consider that material. Earlier the Assessing Officer considered the capitalisation of the amount of interest in computing capital loss. Now, on the same material, the succeeding Assessing Officer wants to take a different view. The view taken by the subsequent officer is nothing but a change of opinion. For the reasons recorded above, this petition is required to be allowed and is allowed. Notice at annexure A to the petition for reopening the assessment for the year 1985-86 is hereby quashed and set aside. Rule made absolute accordingly. No order as to costs.
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1999 (7) TMI 52 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Disallowance Of Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... Tribunal ( the Tribunal ). Hence, this reference. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. The controversy in the above question now stands concluded by the decision of this court dated April 8, 1993, in Income-tax Application No. 40 of 1992 (CIT v. Gannon Dunkerly and Co. 1993 114 CTR 56) wherein it has been held that the local conveyance expenses and other actual expenses which are incurred by the employee on tour for conducting the assessee s business cannot be considered as travelling expenses of the employee under rule 6D of the Rules. In view of the above, we are of the clear opinion that the Tribunal was right in directing the Income-tax Officer to exclude the miscellaneous expenses and local expenses from the computation of disallowance under rule 6D of the Rules. Accordingly, the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Reference disposed of in the above terms with no order as to costs.
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1999 (7) TMI 51 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Appeal To Appellate Tribunal, Writ, Powers Of Tribunal, Power Of Rectification, Alternate Remedy, Order Of Tribunal
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1999 (7) TMI 50 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Charitable Purpose, Charitable Trust, Exemption, Law Applicable, CBDT Circulars ... ... ... ... ..... e or compute the income as per the provisions of the Act. Section 11(1) refers to income and not total income defined in section 2(45) but income itself has been defined in the Act in section 2(24) why the meaning of income given in section 2(24) should not be taken for income referred in section 11(1) of the Act. Therefore the decision referred to also requires reconsideration. But in the case in hand the assessment year involved is 1983-84, even if we differ from the view taken by this court it will take another five years to conclude. The tax effect is only Rs. 7,000 Therefore, no purpose will be served to differ on this issue with the view taken by this court in Jayashree Charity Trust s case 1986 159 ITR 280 and we leave the issue open to consider this issue in the appropriate case in future. In the result, in view of these facts, we answer both the questions in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. RANJAN KUMAR MAZUMDAR J.---I agree.
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1999 (7) TMI 49 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Property, Deduction, Municipal Taxes ... ... ... ... ..... In other words, municipal taxes can be said to be levied under the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act only when the demand notice is served on the owner. Till then there is no accrued liability on account of municipal taxes. In that view of the matter, we are of the clear opinion that municipal taxes pertaining to earlier years demanded during the relevant previous year would also be deductible in computing the annual value of the house property of the year in which the demand is made. We are supported in our above conclusion by the decision of the Madras High Court in CIT v. L. Kuppuswamy Chettiar 1981 132 ITR 416 and the decision of the Karnataka High Court in CIT v. Shankaranarayana Hotels Pvt. Ltd. 1992 198 ITR 373. We are in full agreement with the above decisions. In view of the above, the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The reference stands disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1999 (7) TMI 48 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Depreciation, Building, Law Applicable, CBDT Circulars ... ... ... ... ..... ed in the previous years. 40 per cent. granted under clause (iv) was not deduction up to 1984-85 for arriving at the written down value in accordance with the provisions of law available during those assessment years. Therefore, the principle laid down in Maharana Mills (Private) Ltd. v. ITO 1959 36 ITR 350 is of no help to the Revenue in this case. We are of the view that the effect of deletion of the underlined portion of clause (iv) of section 32(1) by the Finance Act, 1983, will have effect only in cases where initial depreciation under clause (iv) is granted in respect of specified assets with effect from April 1, 1984. In the light of the above, we answer question No. 1 in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue and question No. 2 in the negative against the Revenue in favour of the assessee. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar will be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1999 (7) TMI 47 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Exports, Special Deduction, Law Applicable, Retrospective Effect, CBDT Circulars ... ... ... ... ..... , was prospective and did not apply to the assessment year in question. The assessee filed an appeal against this order on December 31, 1996. The appeal was dismissed by the Commissioner of Income-tax on January 25, 1998, on the ground that the same was barred by limitation. Further appeal filed before the Tribunal was also dismissed on June 26, 1998, thereby confirming the order of the appellate authority. The orders which were passed in appeal by the first appellate authority and the Tribunal have not been challenged by amending the writ petition or by filing a reference petition under section 256 claiming a question of law said to be arising from the order of the Tribunal. Any order passed in this writ petition under the circumstances can result in bringing into force two contradictory orders. We decline to allow this writ petition leaving it open to the assessee to seek his remedy under the Act if available. The cases are disposed of in the terms indicated in this order.
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1999 (7) TMI 46 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Depreciation, Plant, Law Applicable, Effect Of Amendment ... ... ... ... ..... sai, learned counsel for the Revenue. None appears for the assessee. Though at the material time there was a controversy whether livestock would constitute plant within the meaning of clause (3) of section 43 of the Act, that controversy has now been set at rest by the amendment of section 43(3) by Parliament by the Finance Act, 1995, with retrospective effect from the inception of the Act, i.e., April 1, 1962, to exclude tea bushes and livestock from the ambit of plant . It is now made clear in the definition of plant in section 43(3) of the Act that it does not include livestock. In view of the above, horses used for stock-breeding cannot be regarded as plant within the meaning of section 43(3) of the Act and no depreciation would be allowable thereon under section 32 of the Act. The question referred to us is, therefore, answered in the negative, that is, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The reference is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1999 (7) TMI 45 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Company, Surtax, Computation Of Capital, Provision For Doubtful Debt ... ... ... ... ..... the actual losses by way of bad debts and advances, whenever they occur are debited to the profit and loss account and not to the doubtful debts or doubtful advances account. In fact, the sums reserved for doubtful debts or doubtful advances are not even touched. Therefore, the provision for doubtful debts and doubtful advances remains the capital of the assessee till such time as any debt actually becomes bad and part of it is utilised in writing off that amount in the books of account. The Tribunal was, therefore, justified in holding that the reserve for doubtful debts and doubtful advances was a reserve within the meaning of rule 1 of the Second Schedule to the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964, and, therefore, includible in the computation of capital for the purposes of the said Act. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Reference disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1999 (7) TMI 44 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Fines And Penalties, Provident Fund ... ... ... ... ..... he controversy in the above question now stands covered by the decisions of the Supreme Court in Prakash Cotton Mills P. Ltd. v. CIT 1993 201 ITR 684 and Swedeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT 1998 233 ITR 199, wherein it has been held that the amount of damages for delayed payment of contributions under section 14B of the Employees Provident Funds Act, 1952, comprises both the element of penal levy as well as compensatory payment and it will be for the authority under the Act to decide with reference to the provisions of that Act, and the reasons given in the order imposing and quantifying the damages to determine what proportion should be treated as penal and what proportion as compensatory. Since the matter has not been examined in this light by the Tribunal, the matter is remitted back to the Tribunal for consideration afresh in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases cited above. The reference stands disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1999 (7) TMI 43 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Salary, Perquisite, Life Insurance Corporation ... ... ... ... ..... rein accrues to the employees. In the case on hand, as per the single premium annuity policy dated March 1, 1977, the annuity was to vest in the assessee on March 1, 1981, and it was to cease on the expiry of five years, from the date on which the annuity vested in the assessee. As per the second policy dated March 22, 1979, the annuity was to vest in the assessee on October 23, 1983. Therefore, in the previous years ending on March 31, 1977, and March 51, 1978, the amount of premium paid towards single premium insurance policy did not vest in the assessee. At best he had a contingent right therein, In our opinion, the above quoted judgments clearly cover the facts of this case and hence the said amounts cannot be included in the salary income of the assessee for the assessment years 1977-78 and l978-79. In the circumstances, the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Reference disposed of accordingly.
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