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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 191 Records
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1950 (12) TMI 4 - SUPREME COURT
whether a deduction of the interest of ₹ 5,582 is a permissible deduction under Section 10(2)(iii) of the Income-tax Act?
Held that:- This appeal should be allowed on the simple ground that the facts necessary to be established by the respondents to support their claim for exemption under Section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act have not been established at any stage of the proceedings and therefore they are not entitled to the deduction claimed. The appeal is therefore allowed
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1950 (12) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the executors are entitled to get the benefit of the exemption from income-tax in respect of the profits earned only for the nine days between the 1st of April and the 9th of April, 1942, or between the 1st of April, 1942, and 1st of January, 1943, under Section 25(4) of the Indian Income-tax ?
Held that:- It seems clear that if the testator had transferred the business to a trustee, although the trustees will not be the beneficial owners, in law there will be a succession of the business to another person within the meaning of Section 25(4) of the Indian Income-tax Act. If in such a case that result follows there appears no reason why when the legal estate is transferred by operation of law to an executor there should not be considered a succession to the estate by another person within the meaning of the same Section 25(4). The words "in such capacity" in that clause further make the position clear. It makes the distinction of legal and beneficial ownership irrelevant. The contention that the business was to be carried on by the executors as such, as a going concern or that it was being carried on for the benefit or loss of the testator's estate is not relevant for the present discussion. The only relevant question under Section 25(4) of the Indian Income-tax Act is whether in respect of the business there is a succession to another person. This is a provision to give relief and the scope of the relief must be governed by the words used in the Act. In our opinion the answer to this question, on the facts of the present case, must be in the affirmative and the date of such succession must be considered to be the death of the testator, which was on the 9th of April, 1942. The result is that the appeal fails
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1950 (12) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in the circumstances of the case, the assessee (a Hindu undivided family) is 'resident' in British India under Section 4A(b) of the Income-tax Act?
Held that:- In the absence of the material evidence to which reference has been made, the finding of the Assistant Commissioner that the onus of proving such facts as would bring his case within the exception had not been discharged by the assessee and the normal presumption must be given effect to, appears to us to be a legitimate conclusion. In this view, the appeal must be dismissed with costs, but we should like to observe that as this case has to be decided mainly with reference to the question of onus of proof, the decision in this appeal must be confined to the year of assessment to which this case relates, and it would be open to the appellant to show in future years by proper evidence that the seat of control and management of the affairs of the family is wholly outside British India. Appeal dismissed.
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1950 (12) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the attack on the legislation on the ground of the denial of equal protection of law cannot succeed?
Whether there was a transfer of any "liability" by the Order as contemplated in Article 12(2)?
Held that:- The Province of East Bengal having succeeded to the liability to which the Province of Bengal was subject immediately before the appointed day, the former Province is to be deemed to be substituted for the other Province as a party to the suit and the suit must accordingly continue in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Alipore, which has jurisdiction to proceed with it under Article 4 of the Indian Independence (Legal Proceedings) Order, 1947.
In this view it is unnecessary to consider the question of submission to jurisdiction urged in the alternative by the appellant.
In the result the appeal is allowed, the order of the Court below is set aside and the suit now pending in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Alipore will be heard and determined by it.
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1950 (11) TMI 25 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... a Judge and one who is qualified to be appointed as a Judge of a High Court. The provision in our view only makes an exhaustive enumeration of the classes of persons who can constitute an Advisory Board. Such persons must either be or must have been or must be qualified to be appointed as Judges of a High Court. The provision has therefore no bearing on the question whether the first clause of Article 165 has to be read with the first clause of Article 217, which question we have already answered in the negative. The case of the non-applicant is unique. Article 220 is not applicable to him because he did not hold office as a Judge of the High Court after the commencement of the Constitution. So the bar contained in that Article also does not come in his way. (32) The application is rejected. The applicant shall pay the costs of these proceedings including the costs of the paper-book. Counsel's fee Rs. 200. Leave to appeal granted under Article 132(1) of the Constitution.
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1950 (11) TMI 24 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ction is that an offender has been committed by the person harboured. Jung Bahadur's trial, however, has not yet been concluded. Until actually convicted, he is, like every one else, entitled to the presumption that he is innocent. Only the Court can say in due course whether he is actually an offender or not. The Court has not yet said that; and until the Court has pronounced upon the fact, a prosecution for harbouring him is clearly premature. The proper course would have been to hold up this case under 8 '215), until the conclusion of Jang Bahadur's trial, when it might have proceeded in the event of his conviction, but obviously not otherwise. The conviction and sentence in the Division Bench case were accordingly set aside. 4. In this state of the authorities I think the prayer this the trial of the case against the petitioner be stayed until after the disposal of at least one of the case at least the concerned offender, is reasonable and I order accordingly.
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1950 (11) TMI 23 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... ending & in the opinion of the Certificate Officer, at the instance of the Income tax Officer. In any event, I am not satisfied that the remedy provided by Section 33A is such an effective specific remedy at law which should disentitle me from making an order on this appln. 17. I am, therefore, of the opinion that it was incumbent on the Income Tax Officer either to withdraw the attachment effected on 18-8-1949 or at least to revise the same so as to make it consistent with the order for instalments which has been made by the Certificate Officer, 24 Parganas. I am of the opinion, therefore, that the applt. is entitled to a relief on this appln. & the direction which I give is that the Income Tax Officer do revise the order which has been made on 18-3-1949 & make it consistent with the order for instalments which have been granted by the Certificate Officer, 24 Parganas, on 25-5-1950. 18. The petnr. is entitled to the costs of this appln. Certified for two counsel.
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1950 (11) TMI 22 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... citly said "A man may occupy either land or dwelling house without residing." The definition of 'landlord' includes guardians, trustees & receivers for any other person & B such persons happen to be more than one should they all or all the legal owners reside in the premises in order to invoke the aid of Clause 9 (3) (i), House Rent Control Order? In this case resp. 2 is not an individual person but an association the members of which cannot possibly reside together. But they want to conduct a school & for this the building must be in their occupation, directly if the members themselves conduct it or constructively if it is done through others. Clause 9 (3) (b) states that if the Controller is satisfied that the claim of the landlord is bona fide, he can direct the tenant to put him in possession of the building. The order of the Govt. implies that it is so & cannot be considered to be without jurisdiction. The petn. is, therefore, dismissed.
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1950 (11) TMI 21 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on whatsoever for the Govt. to make any reference of the kind in question. The form in which issue 2 has been framed, by the Industrial Tribunal also points to the same conclusion, viz., that in fact there was no dispute to be refd. to a tribunal so far as this petnr. was concerned. If, therefore, there waa no jurisdiction to make any reference, it follows that the whole reference & the award are both invalid & not binding on the petnr. It was this apprehension of the situation. & of the invalidity of the reference & the award that compelled the Govt. to move the Legislature to enact an Amending or Validating Act, viz., Act XII 12 of 1949 the constitutionality of which, has been considered very fully by my learned brother & I entirely agree with the reasoning & conclusions he haa arrived at that the Madras-Amending Act, Act XII 12 of 1949, is ultra vires the Constitution in that it offends against Article 14 & other provisions of the Constitution.
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1950 (11) TMI 20 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the conclusion that both the disputes raised by the respondents fall within the scope of the arbitration clause, then there is an end of the matter, for the arbitrators would have jurisdiction to adjudicate on the disputes, and we are not concerned with any error of law or fact committed by them of any omission on their part to consider any of the matters. In this view, it would not be for us to determine the true construction of the contract and find out whether the respondents' contention is correct or not. Once the dispute is found to be within the scope of the arbitration clause, it is no part of the province of the court to enter into the merits of the dispute. 10. In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the appellate Bench of the High Court and restore the order of Sinha J. The appellants will be entitled to their costs throughout. M.C. Mahajan, J. 11. I agree with my brother Fazl Ali that this appeal be allowed with cost. 12. Appeal allowed.
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1950 (11) TMI 19 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sub-section (2) of Section 30. In fact, as pointed out by Chagla, C.J., in the above mentioned case, the admission of an appeal must follow extension of time. In the present case, it is clear that there has been no extension of the time or condonation of the delay and, therefore, the mere issue of a notice informing the petitioners of the date on which their appeal would be considered does not mean that their appeal had been admitted. For the reasons given above, I would say in answer to the question referred to us by the Income-tax Tribunal that the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in this case was an order under Section 30(2) of the Act and not under Section 31. It is unnecessary to deal with the other questions set out in the petitioner's application as the answer to these questions must follow as corollaries to the answer proposed by me. The petition will be dismissed but I make no order as to costs. WESTON, C.J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1950 (11) TMI 18 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ng a person to carry on and earn profits in the trade." This interpretation was further followed in Spofforth and Prince v. Golder (Inspector of Taxes) 1945 26 Tax Cas. 310 where costs incurred by partners of a firm in defence of a criminal case against them were held deductible as not being disbursements or expenses wholly and exclusively laid out or expended for the purpose of the partners' profession. In the case before us, no material appears in the statement of the case by the Tribunal or in the other papers available to us which might lead to the inference that this expense of ₹ 7,512 was incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business of the assessee. The second question must, therefore, be answered in the negative. Our answer, therefore, to the first question is in the affirmative and to the second in the negative. The Department will be entitled to its costs from the assessee which we fix at ₹ 300. Reference answered accordingly.
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1950 (11) TMI 17 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... India. The commission paid to the nonresident had reference solely to the purchases made outside British India and was in no way affected by the business done in British India. The principle is clear that something more than mere rendering services out of British India for remuneration to a resident businessman is necessary to establish a business connection within the meaning of that expression in Section 42(1). Such evidence is wholly wanting in this case. Our answer to the question, therefore, is that on the facts of the case the sum of ₹ 7,145 earned by the non-resident Shri Jethabhai Javeribhai did not accrue or arise to him through or from a business connection in British India within the meaning of Section 42 of the Income-tax Act. The assessee is entitled to the costs of this reference. Counsel's fee ₹ 100. A copy of this judgment shall be sent to the Appellate Tribunal under Section 66(5) of the Act for further action. Reference answered accordingly.
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1950 (11) TMI 16 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y can be one of the grounds for refusing to grant an application for the issue of such writs. In this case, however, we think there are circumstances which should make us take a more lenient view. Though wrongly advised, the applicant appears to have sought some remedy from the Central Board of Revenue, of course, unsuccessfully. Having regard to this fact, we do not consider that the delay should prevent the party from obtaining the relief to which we have found he is entitled. We think that disallowance of the costs of the petition would amply provide for the justice of the case. As the Commissioner of Income-tax has on a wrong construction of Section 33A(2) of the Act refused to entertain the application made by the party for a revision of the assessment made by the Income- tax Officer, a writ of mandamus will issue to him to take the application on file and dispose of it in accordance with law. As already observed, there will be no order as to costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1950 (11) TMI 15 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... r provisions of the Constitution. The determination by the legislature of what constitutes a reasonable restriction is not final or conclusive; it is subject to the supervision by this Court. In the matter of fundamental rights, the Supreme Court watches and guards the rights guaranteed by the Constitution and in exercising its functions it has the power to set aside an Act of the Legislature if it is in violation of the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. We are therefore of opinion that the impugned statute does not stand the test of reasonableness and is therefore void. The result therefore is that the orders issued by the Deputy Commissioner on 13th June 1950 and 26th September 1950 are void, inoperative and ineffective. We therefore direct the respondents not to enforce the provisions contained in section 4 of the Act against the petitioners in any manner whatsoever. The petitioners will have their costs of these proceedings in the two petitions. Petitions allowed.
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1950 (11) TMI 14 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... question of attestation is perfectly consistent with the circumstances and probabilities of the case and the learned Judge did not omit anything which ought to have been present to his mind in coming to a conclusion. The evidence on the record taken as a whole fully supports the finding, and in our opinion the High Court has reversed it on totally inadequate grounds. The result is that the appeal must be allowed and the judgment of the High Court should be set aside. As the High Court, however, has dismissed the suit only on the ground of non-attestation of the mortgage bond and did not consider the other points which were raised before it, the case must go back to that court in order that the other matters, which have been left undecided, may be heard and decided by the learned Judges and the case dis- posed of in accordance with law. The plaintiff appellant is entitled to costs of this hearing as well as the costs of the High Court against defendant No. 1. Appeal allowed.
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1950 (11) TMI 13 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Compromise and arrangement ... ... ... ... ..... r deciding as to whether on the merits we should sanction the scheme. Further the scheme contemplates reduction of the share capital-It has been held that a scheme which involves reduction of capital must be carried out in accordance with the statutory provisions relating to reduction See In re Cooper Cooper and Johnson Limited. In this case no provisions of the Act relating to reduction have been complied with- That is admitted by counsel for the appellant. There are several technical difficulties in the way of sanctioning the scheme. But if we were convinced that the scheme was a reasonable one or would be a successful scheme, we would have allowed time to the appellant to cure the defects. But in our view the scheme is not a practicable scheme at all. On these considerations we are unable to sanction the scheme. We think that the order made by Bachawat, J., was right and this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Certified for two counsel. Harries, C. J. mdash I agree.
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1950 (11) TMI 12 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Winding up – Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... ies Act and the leave of the company Judge is not required to entitle him to resist or defend a suit filed by the Official Liquidator by pleading a set-off in his written statement. Here the claims advanced by the Official Liquidator and the defendant against each other are money claims which fall within the purview of section 229 of the Indian Companies Act, the set-off claimed by the defendant is really a defence to the plaintiff s claim for recovery of money and section 171 does not apply. Where in a suit for recovery of money by the Official Liquidator the defendant counterclaims with a prayer for injunction or cancellation or specific performance or declaratory relief, different considerations might possibly arise, for there the counter claim is an independent claim affording no defence to the plaintiff s claim though the processual law might allow the counter claim to be tried in the suit itself as effectually as in an independent suit, if that can conveniently be done.
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1950 (11) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
Jurisdiction Of High - Held that:- It cannot be held that the order was passed by the High Court in this case in the exercise of either original or appellate jurisdiction. It is not contended that the matter arose in the exercise of the Appellate jurisdiction of the High Court, because there was no appeal before it. Nor can the matter, properly speaking, be said to have arisen in the exercise of the original jurisdiction of the High Court because the proceeding did not commence in the High Court as all original suits and proceedings should commence. But the High Court acquired jurisdiction to deal with the case by virtue of an express provision of the Bihar Sales Tax Act. The crux of the matter therefore is that the jurisdiction of the High Court was only consultative and was neither original nor appellate.
In this view, the appeal must be dismissed, though, on hearing the parties, it appeared to us that the sales tax authorities including the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue were in error in imposing a penalty upon the appellant under Section 10(5) of the Act which had no application to his case, inasmuch as he had been registered as required by Section 7 of the Act.
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1950 (10) TMI 26 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... m Bali Singh. Of course, as already mentioned, he did not mention that Ram Bali Singh stabbed him at the instigation of these persons. It follows, therefore, that the statement of Nanhku Singh on account of the omission of the names of Harbansh Singh and Param Sukh Lal as instigators throws doubt on the veracity of the witnesses with respect to his mentioning them as instigators on the spot or on the statements of eye-witnesses that they had seen these two persons instigating Ram Bali Singh. 29. I would, therefore, give the benefit of doubt to Harbanah Singh and Param Sukh Lal. 30. By the Court.--We maintain the conviction and sentence of Ram Bali Singh, dismiss his appeal, accept the reference and direct that the sentence of death be carried out according to law. We allow the appeal of Harbansh Singh and Param Sukh Lal, set aside their conviction and sentence and acquit them. They shall be set at liberty unless they are required to remain in custody under some other warrant.
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