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Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 191 Records
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1950 (8) TMI 18 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d to the high profits shown by the neighbouring shop-keepers. Thus there seems to be no doubt that the petitioner was given an opportunity to rebut the inference arising against him from the high profits shown by the neighbouring shopkeepers and he did put forward an explanation which was however rejected by the lower Courts. The petitioner cannot make out a question of law on the ground that he has been prejudiced by the use of some information behind his back. 6. We would therefore answer the two questions referred to us by the Tribunal as follows - (1) It is not necessary to decide this question in the present case and we would reserve our opinion. (2) There was no illegality in the assessment of the petitioner under Section 23(3) on the basis of the profits of the neighbouring shop-keepers. 7. The reference is disposed of accordingly and the petitioner is directed to pay five gold mohurs as cost to the standing counsel. RAY, C.J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1950 (8) TMI 17 - ASSAM HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... evy of sales tax is the transaction of sale by the vendor, and not the use to which the vendee may put it. Accord- ingly, we answer the two questions in these terms (i) The State Government is empowered to levy sales tax on tobacco notwithstanding the fact that excise duty upon tobacco has been levied by the Central Government. Neither the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, nor the Constitution of India, 1950, is a bar to a levy of sales tax on tobacco by the Government of the State of Assam (ii) Tobacco, when sold as tobacco leaf, is subject to a sales tax. What is exempted under Item No. 17 of Schedule 3 attached to the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947, is hooka tobacco , and not tobacco, all tobacco being tobacco leaf. The result is that we decline to call upon the learned Com- missioner of Taxes (Sales), Assam, under the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947, to make a reference, as prayed for. The petition is dismissed with costs. RAM LABHAYA, J.-I agree. Petition dismissed.
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1950 (8) TMI 16 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Winding up – Powers of liquidator ... ... ... ... ..... he court if it does not possess the power already to permit such applications, should make rules allowing for applications to be made in place of suits, Wide rule-making powers are given to this court by the Banking Companies Act and it may be that the court could frame rules permitting the liquidator to recover debts due to a bank by way of applications and making suits unnecessary. Such rules are undoubtedly desirable, if they can be framed, because the costs incurred for filing suits in a multitude of small claims are extremely heavy and absorb all the money likely to be obtained as a result of such suits. However no rules have yet been framed and, therefore, no application such as the one made in this case is warranted and it was bound to be dismissed. In the result, therefore, the application is dismissed. But in the circumstances I would make no order as to costs. Certified for counsel. The liquidator may take his own costs out of the assets. Banerjee, J. mdash I agree.
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1950 (8) TMI 10 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Winding up – Delivery of property to liquidator ... ... ... ... ..... has the power to transfer any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending before him for disposal to any Court subordinate to him and competent to try and dispose of the same. We see no illegality in the action which the District Judge took. The third contention was that the official liquidator had no right to take out the execution of the decree without the previous sanction of the High Court. Learned Civil Judge dismissed this contention with the remark that this was a question between the High Court and the liquidator and did not affect any third party. This finding of the learned Civil Judge has not been challenged by the respondents in this Court. The result is that the appeal succeeds and it is hereby allowed with costs. The order of the learned Civil Judge is set aside. The case is remitted to the learned Civil Judge who will restore the execution application to its original number and proceed with the execution of the order, dated 15th September, 1942, according to law.
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1950 (8) TMI 9 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Meetings and proceedings - Annual General Meeting, Power of Company Law Board to Order Meeting to be Called, Chairman of Meeting and Directors vacation ofoffice by
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1950 (7) TMI 4 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
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... ... ..... there are circumstances which account for the delay. Though there is no specific period of limitation, it has generally been the accepted practice of this Court not to exercise the extraordinary power by way of the issue of prerogative writs when there has been a long delay since the passing of the order sought to be quashed. We, therefore, dismiss the application on this ground, but in the circumstances we make no order as to costs.
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1950 (7) TMI 3 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s excess profits tax is concerned and that Section 42(3) of the Income-tax Act applies to the levy of excess profits tax by virtue of Section 21 of the Excess Profits Tax Act. Questions (3). - The Tribunal was right in rejecting the contention that the income, profits and gains are chargeable to tax under Section 42 only. 37. They are also chargeable to income-tax as falling within the purview of Section 4(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act as income received in India on behalf of the assessee company. In such a case Section 42 of the Income-tax Act would have no application. As both parties have partially succeeded they shall bear their own costs of this reference. 38. Mr. Mitra brought to our notice a recent decision of the Supreme Court passed after hearing had concluded and shortly before judgment was delivered. We have looked into the decision and find nothing in it that would lead us to come to any other conclusion than the one at which we have arrived. Chunder, J. - I agree.
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1950 (7) TMI 2 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ey order for a higher sum without there having been any corresponding remittance from Raipur. In any case the fact that the applt. permitted Dhanpalsingh to use the applt's address in no way influenced the resp. in making the payment to the applt. On the contrary, because the resp. paid the money to the applt- as though it had been sent from Raipur, the applt. was induced to pay the money to Dhanpalsingh. When the money was received, the applt. believed that the money was meant for Dhanpalsingh as told by him earlier. The conduct of the applt. is above board. The applt. was misled by the resp's conduct & on the faith of that conduct altered his own position before the discovery of the mistake. In my view, these circumstances are sufficient to disentitle the resp. from recovering the money. The loss must, therefore lie where it fell. 12. The appeal is allowed with costs in all the Cts. The decree of the lower appellate Ct. is set aside & the suit is dismissed.
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1950 (7) TMI 1 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n agent of the customers for purchasing the gunny bags and had only recovered their actual price from the customers, and that, as sales tax had been paid on the original sale by the dealers in gunny bags to him, a second sales tax should not be levied, in justice and equity, now. There is no evidence to show that he was acting as an agent of the customers in purchasing these gunny bags. No customer wrote to him any letter asking him to buy the gunny bags on his behalf, or sent him an advance for purchase of gunny bags nor were accounts for the gunny bags alone rendered by the appellant to his customers. The question of the second payment of sales tax is not material as in some cases sales tax has to be paid, under our rules, twice over not only on these articles but in the case of many others. In the end, therefore, we see no reason to interfere with the judg- ment and decree of the lower Court. This appeal deserves to be and is hereby dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1950 (6) TMI 18 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... dge for amendment of plaint and joinder of parties which was then rejected by the Subordinate Judge. He was a party in the revision petition before this Court which revision petition was allowed ex parts against him and the joinder and the amendment of the plaint allowed. Since then he has not contested that order. The contest is by other persons, namely, defendants 2 to 4 who would not be in any way harassed and vexed by the joint trial of the claim against them with that against defendant l, and as far as they, i.e., defendants 2 to 5, are concerned the trial of the suit will not be at all embarrassed. 25. Therefore, in view of the special and very peculiar facts of this case I am of opinion that the order previously passed allowing the amendment of the plaint and the joinder should not be disturbed and defendants 2 to 5 should not be dismissed from the suit and the suit should be allowed to proceed as it is being done now. 26. The rule is, therefore, discharged with costs.
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1950 (6) TMI 17 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
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... ... ..... cer who has a statutory duty imposed upon him to proceed if he makes a discovery within the meaning of Section 34 of that Act. He has to determine the facts and the law in order to give him the jurisdiction to proceed and if in the determination of this he goes wrong, the proper remedy for an assessee is to go up in appeal and to have a case stated to High Court under the provisions of the Income Tax Act. The determination of the place of assessment of an assessee on the determination of which Courts in England have issued writs of prohibition is a matter to be determined by the Commissioner of Income Tax and not by the Courts. Looked at from any angle, therefore, the petition was misconceived and must therefore be dismissed. As the matter is one which has come up for the first time before this courts and the principles on which this Court will proceed had not been determined before, I would not award costs against the petitioner. Harnam Singh, J. I agree. Petition dismissed.
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1950 (6) TMI 16 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e Board in the Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving, (1905) A. C. 369 (74 L. J. P. C. 77) where it is in effect laid down that, while provisions of a statute dealing merely with matter of procedure may properly, unless that construction be textually inadmissible, have retrospective effect attributed to them provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment." There is nothing is Article 227, Constitution Act, which would indicate that there was such an intendment as is sought to be attributed to Article 227. Certainly there are no express words in the Article which would give the Court the right to interfere with a right in existence at the time of the passing of the Constitution Act. 3. In these circumstances we are of opinion that this Rule must be discharged with costs. Certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court is granted. K.C. Chunder J. I agree.
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1950 (6) TMI 15 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA
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... ... ..... or ancillary to the main legislation, they could not be severed from the rest of the enactment. In my opinion, the impugned Act in this case is of the same nature; the whole texture of the Act is inextricably interwoven, and a large number of the provisions relating merely to possession are ancillary and incidental to the main legislation. It would be impossible to sever some of the provisions from the rest. Such a severance would disturb and defeat the whole scheme of the Act. 87. For the reasons given above, the suit must succeed, and the plaintiff will get a declaration that the Bihar State Management of Estates and Tenures Act 1949, is ultra vires and wholly void. The plaintiff is also entitled to an order of injunction in the terms asked for. The plaintiff is further entitled to his costs against the State of Bihar. 88. As to the applications in the miscellaneous cases, I agree with my learned brethren that they be dismissed without costs, for the reasons given by them.
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1950 (6) TMI 14 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... term in the contract that the payment would be made to the assessee at the office of the Reserve Bank of India, Bombay. But even if this condition was not there the fact that the cheques were issued by the Controller of Military Accounts on the Reserve Bank of India at Bombay and when sent to the assessee were sent by him (the assessee) for collection to the Imperial Bank of India, Bhopal, the inference is clear that the receipt was in British India at Bombay. The cheques given to the Imperial Bank of India for collection were really given to the Bank as agent of the assessee and its receiving the money in Bombay must be held to be receipt by the assessee in British India. In view of this, I would answer the question in the affirmative and hold that the profit made by the assessee from the contracts executed in the Bhopal State was received or deemed to be received in British India by or on behalf of the assessee under Section 4(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act. Soni, J.-I agree.
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1950 (6) TMI 13 - ASSAM HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ng of the Assistant Commissioner on this question, this petition cannot succeed. We have found against the petitioner on this point. We therefore hold, agreeing with the learned Commissioner, that the appeal was summarily dismissed as time-barred and the further finding embodied in the order that tobacco leaf was taxable was unnecessary and could not be made the basis for a demand for reference in the circumstances of the case. The decision of the Assistant Commissioner has been correctly treated as only a decision on the question of limitation and therefore it cannot give rise to any other question of law arising from the dispute as to the liability of the petitioner to assessment. It will be open to the petitioner to question whether tobacco leaf is taxable in any subsequent assessment. For reasons given above, this petition must fail and is dismissed. In view of the peculiar circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. THADANI, C.J.-I agree. Petition dismissed.
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1950 (6) TMI 12 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB
Compromise and arrangement ... ... ... ... ..... the definition given in section 153 (6) widens the definition of the term company . I would, therefore, answer the question in the following way mdash (1)For the purposes of winding up an unregistered company would be covered by the definition of the company given in section 2 (2) of the Indian Companies Act. (2)Section 153 (6) enlarges the definition of the expression company and brings within its ambit all companies which can be wound up under the provisions of the Indian Companies Act which would include foreign companies. See Mercantile Bank of Australia and North Australian Co, v. Goldsborough. (3)A scheme of arrangement between the Indian creditors of the Frontier Bank Limited is allowable under the provisions of the Indian Companies Act. (4)If a proper case is made out, the High Court, having jurisdiction, will sanction a proposed scheme. ORDER OF THE COURT Khosla, Harnam Singh and Kapur, JJ. mdash The question referred to the Full Bench is answered in the affirmative.
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1950 (6) TMI 11 - HIGH COURT OF SIMLA
Winding up – Powers of liquidator and Appeals from orders ... ... ... ... ..... eneral Manager and Oldrich Brazina as Chief Accountant as a mere description. That the absence of a necessary party makes the appeal and the petition incompetent is clear from the rule laid down in Rameshwar Das v. The Official Receiver, Delhi. The petition must fail on the ground that the company which was a party to the original proceedings and is a necessary party has not been a party to these proceedings and the order has become final with regard to it. Mr. Ratan Lal Chowla then prayed that he be allowed to amend the petition and to add parties. I am unable to grant this prayer because by the non-inclusion of the name of the company in the list of respondents the appeal has become barred by time and, therefore, the name cannot be added as a respondent see Rameshwar Das v. Official Receiver, Delhi and Chokalingam Chetty v. Seethai Achai. I am, therefore, of the opinion that these petitions fail and are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Khosla, J. mdash I agree
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1950 (5) TMI 42 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... not be such a matter ? It was argued that a small riot or a affray will not undermine the security of the State, but to this line of argument there is a two-fold answer - (1) The Act, as its preamble shows, is not intended for petty disorders but for disorders involving menace to the peace and tranquillity of the Province, (2) There are degrees of gravity in the offence of sedition also and an isolated piece of writing of mildly seditious character by one insignificant individual may not also, from the layman's point of view, be a matter which undermines the security of the State, but that would not affect the law which aims at checking sedition. It was also said that the law as it stands may be misused by the State executive, but misuse of the law is one thing and its being unconstitutional is another. We are here concerned with the latter aspect only. I shall not pursue the matter further as I have said enough on the subject in the connected case. 15. Petition allowed.
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1950 (5) TMI 41 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he still detains the books, there will be no doubt that he will be acting mala fide in the matter. If the petitioner does not get hold of the books after this judgment, he will be entitled to pursue his proper remedies against the Income-tax Officer. A further point was raised before me by Mr. Sen that the writ of mandamus ought not to issue because there is an alternative specific remedy at law which is equally convenient, beneficial and effective. He argued that a suit would lie against the Income-tax Officer and the petitioner would be entitled to relief in such a suit. As I have come to the conclusion that I cannot make any order in this application because of Section 67 of the Indian Income-tax Act, I do not propose to decide the question as to whether the writ of mandamus or a suit is the remedy. The result is that the petition must fail and is dismissed, but having regard to the circumstances of the case, each party must pay and bear his own costs. Petition dismissed.
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1950 (5) TMI 40 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... m one Income Tax Officer to another. Under Section 5(5), the Commissioner of Income Tax is given the power to transfer a class of cases from one Income Tax Officer to another. The notification dated 8-9-1944, did not direct the transfer of one specified case but of a class of cases. I, therefore, do not think that there is any substance in this objection. 22. It, therefore, appears that the assignment of the Income Tax case of the assessee to the Income Tax Officer, Central Circle IV, Calcutta, was valid. After the assignment that officer was discharging the functions of an Income Tax Officer in regard to the case of the assessee. By reason of the notification dated 14-9-1940, therefore he automatically derived power to make the Excess Profits Tax assessment in that case. 23. The question in my opinion referred to us should be answered in the affirmative. 24. The assessee will pay the costs of this Reference. Certified for two Counsel. Arthur Trevor Harries, C.J. 25. I agree.
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