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Showing 21 to 40 of 374 Records
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1955 (12) TMI 33 - HYDERABAD, HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... esaid orders and notices but if it is necessary, these orders and notices are deemed to have been and are hereby quashed by the issue of writ of certiorari. It follows from our decision that as the applicant is not liable to pay tax as a dealer other than the tax payable as a sales manager on behalf of the Associated Cement Companies Ltd., the demand by the department for payment of sales tax on the applicant as a dealer under the circumstances is illegal and respondents 1 and 2 are directed not to demand from the applicant any sales tax on account of sale of cement by the applicant which he makes on behalf of the Associated Cement Companies Ltd., in pursuance of the agreement dated 21st April, 1954, or to demand from the applicant any amounts collected by him from the customers conditionally during the period when the liability to tax has been contested and which are refundable to customers. The application is allowed with costs which we fix at Rs. 100. Application allowed.
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1955 (12) TMI 32 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... court of law. But it was urged that though the Union of India and the States may sue or be sued, this is not so for every purpose, and that the State is not a person for the purpose of recovery of a tax paid under a mistake of law. The learned Advocate-General conceded that when the payment of tax was not voluntary, but was paid under protest, the State would be sued though not under section 72. If the State can be sued for refund of tax paid under protest, the suit must fall under section 72 and if the State is a person within the meaning of section 72 when the payment of tax is made under protest, it is difficult to hold that the State is not a person when a suit against it is for the refund of tax which is paid under a mistake of law though not under protest. For all these reasons, in my opinion, the State is liable to refund the tax which was paid to it under a mistake of law. BY THE COURT This appeal is dismissed with costs which we assess at Rs. 200. Appeal dismissed.
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1955 (12) TMI 31 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... appliance . In the Indian Customs Tariff, (40th Issue) referred to above, passenger lifts and component parts and accessories thereof have been put under item 72 (4) while we find separate mention in item 73 of electric instru- ments, apparatus and appliances, which are treated apparently as distinct from passenger lifts. In our opinin, this application deserves to succeed in part. We, accordingly, allow the application in part and holding that this is a case falling under clause (a) and not under clause (b) of sub-section (i) of section 6, direct that the general tax at the rate of half an anna in the rupee shall be levied on the applicants turn- over in respect of sales or supplies of the constituent parts of the lifts in question calculated at 80 per cent of the amounts charged by the applicants to their customers in respect of the supply and installation of those lifts. We direct that the orders of the lower authorities shall be modified accordingly. Ordered accordingly.
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1955 (12) TMI 30 - SUPREME COURT
Whether certain sales of goods made by Shri Ganesh Jute Mills, Ltd., to the Government of India, Ministry of Industry and Supplies, are to be deducted from the taxable turnover of the mills so as to be exempt from sales tax demanded by the Commercial Tax Officer of the State of West Bengal?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Restore the orders passed by the Single judge of the Calcutta High Court, with costs throughout
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1955 (12) TMI 21 - SUPREME COURT
Oppression and mismanagement – Right to apply under section 397 and 398 and Winding up - Company when deemed unable to pay its debts
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1955 (12) TMI 20 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Compromise and arrangement ... ... ... ... ..... r is not acceptable to the opposite side. I invited suggestions in order to discover whether the parties would be able to agree on a common name. One side suggested four names and the other side suggested four names, but, there is no individual common to the two lists. It is by no means easy to discover one among the shareholders who is generally acceptable at this stage. I then enquired for the name of a member of the local bar and the name of Mr. K. Ramachandran of Paramakudi was suggested by one side. To that name the other side had no objection. I therefore appoint him as an administrator in the place of Sheik Dawood Sahib, pending further orders. I also direct, since that seems to be the best thing in the interest of the company and the shareholders, that he should be the chairman of the board of administrators. Mr. Ramachandran can apply for his remuneration at a later stage, and he may also apply for directions should the need arise. There will be no order as to costs.
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1955 (12) TMI 19 - IN THE CHANCERY DIVISION
Powers of SEBI and Prospectus – Registration of ... ... ... ... ..... ition that a mere omission to state facts in the circular does not amount to a misrepresentation which would give rise to any cause of action, unless the effect of the omission is to render untrue or at least misleading some positive statement therein. His Lordship then dealt with the circular, referred to the pronouncement in the judgment of Sir George Jesse M.R. in Smith v. Chadwick 1884 9 App. Cas. 127 to the effect that, in circumstances such as those of the present case, the omission to state even material facts would not give rise to any cause of action unless the effect of the omission was to render untrue or at least misleading some positive statement, and held that the circular was not false or misleading. His Lordship then continued In the result, in my judgment, the plaintiff company is not entitled to any of the injunctions for which it asks, and consequently the motion must be dismissed with costs. Motion dismissed. Solicitors Burnett and Co. Slaughter, and May.
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1955 (12) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT
Whether section 5(1) of the Act was discriminatory and violative of article 14 of the Constitution?
Held that:- The only relief which the petitioners would have been entitled to in that event would have been one in regard to the re-assessment proceedings for the year 1942-43 which were pending before the Income-tax Officer by virtue of the notice under section 34 issued by him to the petitioners on the 19th March, 1954. The petitioners are, however, entitled to succeed on the alternative contentions which were raised by them as the result of the conclusion which we have reached above in regard to the proceedings pending before the Commission having become discriminatory after the 26th January, 1950, by reason of section 5(1) of the Act having become unconstitutional after the inauguration of the Constitution on that date.
In the result, the petitioners will be entitled to the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the report of the Income-tax Investigation Commission dated the 29th August, 1952, and the assessment orders of the Income-tax Officer for the years 1940-41, 1941-42 and 1943-44 to 194849 as being unconstitutional, null and void, and also to the issue of a writ of prohibition against the respondents from implementing the findings of the Investigation Commission referred to above with regard to the year 1942-43 and we do order that such writs do issue against the respondents accordingly. Appeal allowed.
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1955 (12) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there is a rational basis of classification to be found in the enactment of section 5(1) of the Act?
Whether the same class of persons were intended to be and could be dealt with under the provisions of section 47 of the Travancore Act XXIII of 1121?
Held that:- The fixation of the date for references for investigation by the Government to the Commission, viz., the 16th February, 1950, was not an attribute of the class of substantial evaders of income-tax which were intended to be specifically treated under the drastic procedure prescribed in the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 but was a mere accident and a measure of administrative convenience. The date of such references could, without touching the nature and purpose of the classification, be extended by the Travancore Legislature by a necessary amendment of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124, and if such an amendment had been grafted on the Act as originally passed, no one belonging to the particular class or category of substantial evaders of income-tax could have complained against the same.
Section 5(1) of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 which has to be read for this purpose in juxtaposition with section 47 of the Travancore Act XXIII of 1121 cannot be held to be discriminatory and violative of the fundamental right guaranteed under article 14 of the Constitution. The proceedings which took place in the course of investigation by the Commission up to the 26th January, 1950, were valid and so also were the proceedings during the course of investigation which took place after the inauguration of the Constitution on the 26th January, 1950, under which the petitioner, as a citizen of our Sovereign Democratic Republic acquired inter alia guarantee of the fundamental right under article 14 of the Constitution. Appeal dismissed.
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1955 (11) TMI 50 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f the same. 17. For all these reasons I conclude that the Plaintiffs' claim for Rs. 34,000/- against the defendant firm must fail. 18. My answers to the issues are Issues Nos. 1 to 4 were conceded by the Defendants and will be answered in the affirmative. Issue No. 5 in the affirmative. Issue Nos. 6 and 7 in the negative. Issue No. 8 Defendants are liable to pay to the Plaintiffs Rs. 5,000/- with interest thereon at 6 p.c. from 19-6-1949 till judgment. There will therefore, be a decree for the Plaintiffs against the defendants for Rs. 5000/- with interest thereon at 6 per cent, per annum from 19-6-1949 till judgment. 19. Mr. Laud states that no order for costs should be made in favour of the Defendants or Plaintiffs. In my opinion the submission is reasonable. Mr. Banaji is content with the suggestion made by Mr. Laud. There will, therefore, be no order for costs and each party will bear its own costs. 20. Interest on judgment will be at 4 per cent. 21. Order accordingly.
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1955 (11) TMI 49 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he medical evidence, could have been used for causing the death. Thus viewing the facts and circumstances disclosed in the evidence against the appellant, it is reasonably clear that he was chiefly instrumental in causing the death of the deceased Chhanga, although it may be true that he could not have perhaps done it single handed. He might have had the assistance of one or two more persons keeping in view the fact that the deceased was a much younger man in the prime of his youth and could not have been easily overpowered by the appellant who was in his declining years. It is not necessary for us to examine the case against those two accused who have been acquitted by the High Court and had been tried along with the appellant for the murder of Chhanga. But so far as the appellant is concerned, he seems to have acted in the way he did as a result of a premeditated plan to get rid of both his wife and her paramour. 10. For the aforesaid reasons both the appeals are dismissed.
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1955 (11) TMI 48 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d by fraud, a plea which has now been negatived. Even in this suit, they did not press the plea on which they have succeeded until they came to the High Court. Under the circumstances, we think it just that they should be deprived of all claims for mesne profits down to this date. 14. In the result, treating the plaint as an execution application, we direct that the properties mentioned in schedule A to the plaint be partitioned and the respondents put in possession of 126 acres 33 cents in Kalavacherla village and of 10 acres 12 cents in Nandarada village in proceedings to be taken in execution of this order. The respondents will be entitled to their share of the net income attributable to 136 acres 45 cents aforesaid from this date down to the date on which they are put in separate possession thereof. 15. Subject to the modification of the decree of the court below as stated above, this appeal will stand dismissed. The parties will, however, bear their own costs throughout.
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1955 (11) TMI 47 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... under article 226, it was the validity of the notice., Exhibit C, with reference to these two matters that the appellants challenged. Tendolkar, J. stated in his judgment-and quite correctly-that these were the two points that &rose for determination. The question of -the rights of the appellants in so far as they related to the purchase by them of the mills and the factory was not raised in the petition, and no contentions were put forward in support thereof at any stage of the proceedings. It is for the first time in the argument before us that those rights are sought to be agitated. Under the circumstances, we must decline to consider them. It will be sufficient if we observe that the rights of the appellants, if any, other than those arising out of the lease, are left open to the determination of the appropriate authorities, and that nothing in our decision should be taken as a pronouncement on those rights. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1955 (11) TMI 46 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... titioner's case as put forward in his reply to the show cause notice and in the petition before us. At one time, it is pointed out, the petitioner contended that the lease was surrendered to him. At another time he contended that the lease was transferred by the partnership deed. In this case the facts are not in dispute, and if the petitioner drew one or the other inference as to his status, it cannot be said that he was guilty of mala fides which would disentitle him to any relief at the hands of this Court. In our opinion, the learned Judge has taken the right view as to the merits of the matter and it is a clear case for interference with the order passed by the Custodian. It may be pointed out again that the Custodian has made the order on an erroneous conception of the law and he has taken the view that the tenancy rights vested in the Custodian although in law there could be no such vesting. 16. The result is that the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs.
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1955 (11) TMI 45 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... are then before it on appeal, and in our judgment it has no power under this section to pass an order or give directions with reference to the proceedings of an earlier year which are concluded. If the firm was dissatisfied with the assessment order in respect of that earlier year, 1941-42, and failed to obtain relief by way of an appeal, its remedy was to ask the Tribunal to state a case under section 66 of the Act. A writ of mandamus cannot in our opinion be issued by this Court to enforce the order of the Tribunal passed without jurisdiction during the hearing of the appeal relating to the assessment year 1942-43 in respect of assessment for the year 1941-42. In our opinion the petitioner has failed to establish a legal right to the relief which he seeks and this petition fails. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. December 2, 1955. This matter was placed in the list for a mention today at the request of the learned counsel for the Department on the question of costs.
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1955 (11) TMI 44 - THE CHANCERY DIVISION
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... ... ..... to exact from the purchasers of the shares by reason of the fact that the appellants' concurrence in the scheme was essential to its success in that 70,000 shares were not available without it. Apart from the holding of the shares, the secretaryship was worth little or nothing. It was only the appellants' special position that enabled them to obtain this money. It was in fact a sum earned in the course of the company's trade, namely, the sale of shares, and, even though not part of the purchase price, was only earned because of the holding of the shares and by way of inducement to part with them. On this analysis, as it seems to me, this was money earned by the company in the course of its trade and therefore a trading receipt and must be charged to tax accordingly. I am therefore of opinion that the commissioners came to a right conclusion and that this appeal should be dismissed. Appeal dismissed. Solicitors Coward, Chance & Co.; Solicitor of Inland Revenue
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1955 (11) TMI 43 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion. This in itself is sufficient to sustain the assessment made by the Income-tax Officer under sub-section (4) of section 23 of the Act. It is therefore, not necessary to consider the contention raised as to the validity of the notice issued under sub-section (4) of section 22. 21. It is urged on behalf of the assessee that the question of validity of the notice is a question of law and therefore the Tribunal should be called upon to state the case. Even assuming that any question of law does arise, it is not incumbent upon this Court to require the Tribunal to state the case when the answer is evident and there has been error on the part of the Tribunal in rejecting the application. We have taken a similar view Sagarmal Spinning and Weaving Mills v. Commissioner of Income-tax M.P. and Bhopal Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 89 of 1954 decided on 10th October, 1955. 22. In the result, this application is dismissed with costs Counsel's fee ₹ 75. Application dismissed.
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1955 (11) TMI 42 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... The learned Sessions Judge himself assumed in his judgment that more than one person must have taken part in the offence. It might be that others committed the murder and robbery and the articles were given to him for hiding them. We, therefore, think that the accused cannot be convicted for murder or robbery. But the question is whether he can be convicted for a lesser offence. 24. From the aforesaid facts, it is obvious that the accused hid the wristlets and the pot of money. This certainly resulted in screening the murderer. It has been held that an accused charged under Section 302, I. P. C., can be convicted under Section 201, I. P. C., though there is no specific charge, if the facts justify it. See Nagan v. Emperor, AIR1954Mad1088 . 25. We therefore, set aside the convictions and sentences passed on the accused tinder Sections 302 and 392, I. P. C., convict him under Section 201, I. P. C., and sentence him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years.
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1955 (11) TMI 41 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Court with reference to the above remark. Moreover, the charge as laid in the complaint is that the declaration of the appellant in the nomination paper that he "was a member of the Balmiki caste" was false. There is accordingly no substance in this contention. 13. It must be emphasised that in the view that the order of the Magistrate dated 17-9-1952 was final, this appeal being really directed against that order there must be exceptional grounds before we can interfere with it in special appeal, and none such has been established. On the other hand, whether action should be taken under section 195 is a matter primarily for the Court which hears the application, and its discretion is not to be lightly interfered with in appeal, even when that is competent. But where, as here, the legislature does not provide for an appeal, it is preposterous on the part of the appellant to invite this Court to interfere in special appeal. 14. This appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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1955 (11) TMI 40 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... made by the petitioner in Pakistan under section 18A of the Income-tax Act. On the other hand, they always proceeded on the assumption that such payments had been made, but they thought that they were not liable to make any refund. Still I do not consider it safe to decide myself what excess payments had actually been made and I propose to leave it to the Income-tax authorities to decide that matter and to grant a set-off of the amount they find to have been paid in excess, under section 18A of the Act. For the reasons given above, this petition is allowed and a writ of mandamus shall issue to the respondent commanding the respondent to determine what excess payments had been made by the petitioner under section 18A of the Income-tax Act in Lahore in respect of the years 1946-47 and 1947-48, and to allow a set-off of those amounts in the assessments of the subsequent years, 1948-49 and 1949-50. The petitioner will be entitled to his costs of this petition. Petition allowed.
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