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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 374 Records
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1955 (11) TMI 39 - FEDERAL COURT
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... ... ..... section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code does not bar the suit. o p /o p As regards the objection that the suit is barred by time, all that is necessary to say is that the assessment being void and the tax not having been paid no question of limitation arises. Obviously, the dispute has not been concluded because while the Federation insists on its right to tax, the Province denies any such power in the Federation, and one of the reliefs claimed in the suit, paragraph (b) of the relief clause, seeks a declaration that the plaintiff is not liable to be taxed under the Income-tax Act of 1922 or Excess Profits Tax Act of 1940 in respect of its future income. o p /o p For these reasons we decree the suit and declare that the Government of West Pakistan is not liable to income-tax or excess profits tax in respect of the profits earned by the Province of the Punjab from the Jollo Rosin and Turpentine Factory. Both Governments must bear their own costs. o p /o p Suit decreed. o p /o p
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1955 (11) TMI 38 - HOUSE OF LORDS
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... ... ..... one taxpayer and another, for it eliminates variations which are due to no other cause than any one taxpayer's decision as to what proportion of his total product he will supply to himself. A formula which achieves this makes for a more equitable distribution of the burden of tax, and is to be preferred on that account. Secondly, it seems to me better economics to credit the trading owner with the current realizable value of any stock which he has chosen to dispose of without commercial disposal that to credit him with an amount equivalent to the accumulated expenses in respect of that stock. In that sense, the trader's choice is itself the receipt, in that he appropriates value to himself or his donee direct instead of adopting the alternative method of a commercial sale and subsequent appropriation of the proceeds. Lord Tucker. My Lords, I would allow this appeal for the reasons which have been stated by my noble and learned friend, Lord Radcliffe. Appeal allowed.
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1955 (11) TMI 37 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . As has been pointed out in the counter-affidavit, the Raja was asked to pay up the amount but he said that only ₹ 5,000 was due and that amount also could have been realised by the assessee if he signed a voucher jointly. If the contention of the applicant be accepted that a sum of ₹ 5,000 deposited in Court was due to the assessee from the Raja of Tirwa, still if the amount was lying in Court, it belonged to the Raja Sahib and if it had been made available to the assessee towards the liquidation of his debt, the assessee should have signed the voucher so as to make the amount available to the Income-tax authorities to be realised and set off towards the income- tax liability of the petitioner. It cannot therefore be said that the authorities did not take proper and sufficient steps to realise the amount due to the assessee from the Raja of Tirwa. There is, therefore, no force in this petition and it is rejected. I make no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1955 (11) TMI 36 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... at State or its assignee, and no Jagirdar as such could have claimed such a right, and after the Integration of that State in the present State of Rajasthan, the same right became vested in the new State, and as the lessor Jagirdar himself possessed no right of ownership with respect to any salt deposits in his Jagir, the lease obtained by the present petitioner from the Jagirdar is of no avail whatsoever so far as the manufacture of salt is concerned. We are further of opinion that the concessions granted by the Government of India for stepping up the production of salt, referred to above, do not and cannot possess the effect of adversely affecting the rights of ownership in this connection vested in the former State of Marwar and now the successor State of Rajasthan so far as the territory of the former State of Marwar is concerned. 9. In view of the conclusions at which we have arrived above, this petition fails and is here by dismissed with one set of costs to the State.
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1955 (11) TMI 35 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of Pritam Singh Lohara is a further circumstance against them. No satisfactory explanation was at all rendered by either of them in regard to their absence from their normal place of residence and, they were not available to the police in spite of all their efforts to trace them. This absconding of the accused, therefore, along with the other incriminating circumstances goes a great way to point to their culpability. 28. Having devoted our anxious thoughts to all the arguments addressed to us by the learned counsel for the appellants, we have come to the conclusion that the High Court was quite correct in the summary of the evidence against each of them and in holding that the prosecution had succeeded in establishing the guilt of the accused in regard to the offences with which they had been charged. 29. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal and confirm the conviction and the sentence of death passed upon each of the accused. The sentences will be carried out according to law.
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1955 (11) TMI 34 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... to the High Court within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act. Nor do we think it necessary to express any opinion as to whether the letter complained against constituted a contempt of Court. We may, however, note in passing that the circumstances under which the letter came to be addressed by the appellant to the Commissioner, the terms thereof and the order which was passed by the Commissioner on the application made by the respondent to proceed against the appellant in contempt on date the 2nd February 1953 lend support to the argument which was advanced on behalf of the appellant that the letter complained against did not constitute contempt of Court. The result, therefore, is that the appeal will be allowed, the order passed against the appellant by the Court below will be set aside and the original Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 10 of 1953 filed by the respondent in the High Court of Judicature at Patna will stand dismissed. The fine if paid will be refunded.
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1955 (11) TMI 33 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in the circumstances of this case this Court could have thought fit to grant special leave in terms of Article 136 (1) of the Constitution?
Held that:- That is again a matter for Courts of fact. The learned counsel for the appellant has failed to make out any illegality or serious irregularity in procedure which can be said to have occasioned a failure of justice. No reasons have been adduced for interference with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the Courts below. The appeal must therefore be dismissed.
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1955 (11) TMI 32 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... submit their returns and to permit the Sales Tax Officers to levy taxes on the petitioners and then direct the petitioners to file appeals against the assessment orders. The legal position is amply clear and the action of the Sales Tax Officers being in contravention of the Constitution the petitioners are entitled to relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. The other two points argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners do not arise in view of my decision on the first point. In the result, this petition is allowed. A writ of mandamus shall be issued to the respondents Nos. 1 to 3 directing the said respondents not to take any proceedings against the petitioners under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, either by demanding the returns or by imposing any sales tax, until the Parliament by law provides otherwise. In view of the change of law during the pendency of this petition, I think it is a fit case where parties should be ordered to beat their own costs. Petition allowed.
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1955 (11) TMI 31 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ilar circumstances, the Privy Council, in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax v. Messrs. Khemchand Ramdas(1), has taken a similar view of the power of the Income-tax Officer to make an assessment after the expiry of the period of limitation provided in the statute. The relevant observation is to be found at page 180 of the report and is as follows In view of these express provisions of the Act, it is in their Lord- ships opinion quite impossible to suppose that the Income-tax Officer may in every kind of circumstance and after any lapse of time make fresh assessments or issue fresh notices of demands or that the Commissioner can direct him so to do. The result is that this petition is allowed and a writ of mandamus shall issue to the respondents not to proceed to assess the petitioner to sales tax in respect of its turnover for the year 1948-49, under section 21 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. The petitioner will be entitled to its costs from the respondents. Petition allowed.
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1955 (11) TMI 30 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... with the view that section 12(2) provides for the exclusion of time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment only in computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, an application for leave to appeal and an application for re- view. The application now before the Court being one asking for a reference to this Court of the question of law said to arise out of the order of the judge (Revisions) cannot be said to fall in any of these categories. As such the period taken in obtaining the copy cannot be excluded even if section 12 of the Limitation Act be applicable to the case. I agree that the question referred to this Bench should be answered in the negative. RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.-I agree that the question referred to the Full Bench be answered in the negative as an application under sub-sec- tion (1) of section 11 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act is not covered by the provisions of section 12(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. Reference answered in the negative.
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1955 (11) TMI 29 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cient. The interest grows out of the debt. If the creditor chooses to avail himself of rights in property conferred by the law of New South Wales in respect of land or chattels under the autho- rity of the legislature the law of New South Wales can impose upon him any liability which is relevant to the purpose of his doing so and the purpose of his doing so is to secure repayment of the moneys. Applying the principle laid down by these authorities, I am clearly of opinion that in the present cases there is a real and pertinent nexus or connection between the production of tea and its subsequent sale at Calcutta and the Bihar Legislature had jurisdiction to enact a law taxing such a sale. For the reasons expressed, I hold that all the questions referred to the High Court must be answered in favour of the State of Bihar and against the assessee. The State of Bihar is entitled to the costs of this reference. Hearing fee Rs. 250. IMAM, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1955 (11) TMI 28 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... an embank- ment, earth belonging to Government is usually used. There is no reason to think, in the absence of further materials, that in this parti- cular case the earth was brought from a distant place or was separately charged for by the contractor. We would accordingly hold items 1 and 2 of the final bill should be exempted from assessment to sales tax. The rest of the claim put forward by the petitioners is rejected. The petition is thus allowed so far as the claim relates to items 1 and 2 of the final bill, and the Sales Tax Authorities will revise the assessment accordingly. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs. O.J.C. No. 376 of 1954 In spite of repeated opportunities being given to the petitioner he has not been able to place any material before us to satisfy us that there was no element of sale in the contract undertaken by him. We have therefore no option but to reject this petition. We make no order as to costs. RAO, J.-I agree. Ordered accordingly.
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1955 (11) TMI 27 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... even so, it is not a food. It is not eaten for its food value, but at the highest as an aid to digestion. It is not served as a part of a meal, but as a supplement to it. As a digestive agent, it might perhaps be considered a medicinal preparation, but the notifica- tion is careful to provide that in exempting vegetables, green or dried, medicinal preparations are not included . I respectfully agree with the above decision of their Lordships and hold that betel leaves do not come within the meaning of the expression green vegetables as used in the notification of the U.P. Government dated 7th June, 1948. The relevance of the subsequent notification of 1954 is only this that the State Government has now with effect from 1st July, 1954, exempted betel leaves from the payment of sales tax, but prepared pans will be subject to the payment of tax. For the above reasons this petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed. (1) 1950 1 S.T.C. 217 A.I.R. 1951 Pat. 367.
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1955 (11) TMI 26 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , a sample of which has been produced in Court, can certainly not be sold as wheat or wheat flour nor can it be used as wheat or wheat flour. That to my mind is the correct test and not whether in the last analysis murghi dana is mostly com- posed of condemned wheat and only a small quantity of some other product. The straight way to look at this matter is to ask if an ordinary person would ever confuse or identify this commodity called murghi dana with what is ordinarily called wheat or wheat flour, and I have not the slightest doubt that this can never happen and as ordinarily understood therefore murghi dana is neither wheat nor wheat flour. It follows that the commodity in dispute, namely murghi dana, is not exempt from the East Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948. I would therefore allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the Court below and dismiss the plaintiffs suit and considering all the circumstances leave the parties to their own costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1955 (11) TMI 25 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mand of this amount is likely to interfere with the fundamental right of the petitioners to carry on their trade. If the sales tax depart- ment for some reason which has not been disclosed in this case thinks that the sale deed is invalid, it may bring a suit for setting aside the sale deed. So long as the sale deed stands it is obvious that the sales tax assessed on the previous owner cannot be recovered from the petitioners. The validity of the sale deed has not been challenged in the present proceedings. For the above reasons, this petition is allowed and a writ of mandamus shall be issued to the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 restraining them from recovering the amount of the sales tax for the years 1949 to 1954 from the petitioners as long as they do not succeed in getting the sale deed in favour of the petitioners set aside by some Court or com- petent authority. The petitioners will be entitled to get their costs of this petition from the respondent No. 1. Petition allowed.
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1955 (11) TMI 24 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... thin the State of Madras. The sale was completed within the State before the goods were transported, and in the transport of the goods themselves, which was subsequent to the sale, there was no element of sale. Subsequent transport does not therefore entitle the purchaser to the benefit of Article 286(2) of the Constitution. The Appellate Tribunal was right in rejecting the claim of the peti- tioner Board that this item should be excluded from its taxable turnover. The last item to be considered is Rs. 4,681-7-3, which was the excess collection made by the petitioner Board and was therefore claimed by the Government under Section 8-B(2) of the Act. The decision of the Tribunal was right. The assessee did not press his claim even before the Tribunal because the learned Chairman recorded This point has not been argued. This petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petition dismissed. (1) 1953 4 S.T.C. 133. (3) 1953 4 S.T.C. 205. (2) 1955 6 S.T.C. 446.
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1955 (11) TMI 23 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... re unable to see any real substance in this contention. The Income-tax Act, for instance, cannot become void retrospectively and the assessments made thereunder illegal, because the rates of levy are changed from time to time by the Finance Acts. If, for example, the Sales Tax Act were to be repealed by the legislature, the assessments made under the Act before the repeal could not become illegal, and the plea of discrimination and denial of equal protection of laws would not be available. So long as the taxing power is there, it is open to the legislature to decide the basis of taxation and to alter that from time to time. Such alterations would not fall within the mischief of Article 14 of the Constitution. We are of opinion that Act XVII of 1954 is intra vires and valid. The only point raised in this revision was the validity of Act XVII of 1954, and that contention we have to negative. This revision case is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1955 (11) TMI 22 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Alteration of memorandum ... ... ... ... ..... e appeal. In the suit out of which the appeal has arisen, the plaintiffs challenged the validity of the appointment of Seth Narottamdas Jethalal as the managing agent of Chandulal and Co. Ltd., (defendant No. 1) and prayed for a declaration that defendant No. 5 was not validly and legally appointed managing agent of defendant No. 1 company and for an injunction restraining defendant No. 5 from acting as such. The trial court held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to such a declaration and injunction and dismissed the plaintiffs suit with costs. As the original defendant No. 5, Seth Narottam Jethalal, is now dead, it is obvious that the plaintiffs right to sue does not survive against either defendant No. 1 company or the heirs and legal representatives of defendant No. 5. This position has been conceded by Mr. Munshi. First Appeal No. 549 of 1951 must, therefore, fail and must be dismissed. There will be no order as to costs of the appeal in the circumstances of the case.
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1955 (11) TMI 15 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Directors – Power of ... ... ... ... ..... s without force, as the second defendant himself had stated that the agreement, Exhibit A-8, was intended to enure for the benefit of Subbiah Aiyar s estate, represented by Vengu Ammal, and not for the benefit of Vengu Ammal at all, any more than the acknowledgment in Exhibit A-7 of the entire debts on the same day was for the benefit of Vengu Ammal. In that view the lower court was right in holding that Parameswara Aiyar, the sole administrator appointed by court in respect of Subbiah Aiyar s estate, could rely on Exhibit A-8 also for fixing the personal liability of Sadagopal. We, therefore, reject this contention and are of opinion that the lower court was right in holding that Sadagopal was personally liable and in passing a decree against him personally. It follows from this that Sadagopal s appeal, A.S. No. 357 of 1952, has to be dismissed. It is accordingly dismissed with the costs of the first respondent, Parameswara Aiyar. The other parties will bear their own costs.
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1955 (11) TMI 14 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Directors - Vacation of office by ... ... ... ... ..... mentioned in article 94 and also the grounds mentioned in section 86(1). Mr. Rege wants us to give a wide meaning to the expression otherwise and to hold that this particular contingency which was to take place would be included in the expression otherwise . Otherwise can only mean that the director vacates office according to law or according to the articles of association otherwise cannot incorporate a fresh ground of disqualification which is neither to be found in the articles or in section 86(1) of the Companies Act. Therefore, in our opinion, the learned Judge was right in the view that he took that the mere fact that the first defendant has transferred 150 of his ordinary shares to his grandchildren and he along with his wife and children no longer held the first 250 ordinary shares and thereby he has no longer the power to appoint a director nor has he the power to remove him, does not bring about a vacancy in the office of the first defendant as a nominated director.
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