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Showing 41 to 60 of 464 Records
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1957 (11) TMI 27 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... iring Board of Directors. The petitioner's proposal was seconded and thereafter unanimously passed. The petitioner is, therefore, estopped from saying that the three persons, who were proposed by him and on whose proposal they were elected members of the new Board, could not be re-elected without the previous approval of the Registrar. This contention, therefore must be rejected. 38. For the reasons given above, all the contentions raised by Mr. A.B.N. Sinha fail, and accordingly, the rule is discharged. 39. In the result, the application fails, as no case has been made out for issuing any writ under Article 226 of the Constitution against any of the opposite party. The election of the official Chairman, opposite party 3, on the 8th May, 1956, is therefore, held to be valid and legal, and not Invalid as alleged by the petitioner. The application is, accordingly, dismissed. The petitioner will pay ₹ 200/- as costs to opposite party 1. V. Ramaswami, C.J. 40. I agree.
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1957 (11) TMI 26 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... doubt the office prepared a draft of the notice only on October 10, 1955, which after being approved by the members of the Tribunal was despatched on the same day. The order in the notes paper dated October 7, 1955, was in my judgment the initiation of the penalty proceedings. To "initiate" means "to originate" or "to take the first step", and even if the paragraph in the order under section 33(4) which I have extract is not itself the initiation or the first step in the proceedings, the direction to the office to issue a notice on October 7, 1955, was certainly such a step. The terms of section 28(1) were thus satisfied and the order impugned was within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. In this view I have not considered it necessary to deal with the other contentions which Mr. Rama Rao Sahib urged in support of the legality of the impugned order. The petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 150. Petition dismissed.
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1957 (11) TMI 25 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... determine what operated in the mind of a particular officer. The real hurt does not lie in any of those things but in the consequences that follow and, in my judgment, the protections of Art. 311 are not against harsh words but against hard blows. It is the effect of the order alone that matters ; and in my judgment, Art. 311 applies whenever any substantial evil follows over and above a purely "contractual one". I do not think the article can be evaded by saying in a set of rules that a particular consequence is not a punishment or that a particular kind of action is not intended to operate as a penalty. In my judg- ment, it does not matter whether the evil consequences are one of the "penalties" prescribed by the rules or not. The real test is, do they in fact ensue as a consequence of the order made ? I would allow the appeal with costs. BY THE COURT.-In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1957 (11) TMI 24 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... vind Sahai and Bhagwan Sahai acquired no rights as hereditary tenants under s. 29(a) of the U. P.Tenancy Act. In Jai Singh v. Munshi Singh (supra), relied on for the respondents, it was held that " the agricultural lease granted by the mortgagee in favour of Jai Singh was a lease granted in the ordinary course of management ", and that, accordingly, the tenant acquired the rights of a here- ditary tenant. That decision has no application when the lease is, as held by us, not a prudent transaction binding on the mortgagors. In this view, the questions raised by Mr. Sinha on the construction of s. 30(6) and s 11 of the Act and s. 15 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926, do not arise for decision. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the decree passed 996 by the Board is set aside, and that of the Revenue Officer, Meerut affirmed by the Commissioner, restored. The respondents will pay the costs of the appellants throughout, including the costs of the remand. Appeal allowed.
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1957 (11) TMI 23 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ng this test, even if we accept the contention of the appellant that the impugned Act is bad, that would not finally dispose of the suit, as there are other issues, which have to be tried. We are clearly of opinion that the appeal is not competent under Art. 132, and the fact that a certificate has been given does not alter the position. It is said that the certificate is also under Art. 133, but under that article also, an appeal lies Only against judgments, decrees or final orders, and no certificate could be granted in respect of an interlocutory finding. o p /o p The result is that this appeal must be dismissed, as not maintainable. We should add by way of abundant caution that as we express no opinion on the correctness of the decision under appeal, this order will not preclude the appellant from claiming such rights as he may have, in appropriate proceedings which he may take. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. o p /o p Appeal dismissed. o p /o p
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1957 (11) TMI 22 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e, is a notional assessee and the beneficiary is the real assessee. Section 41(2) makes the position further clear that even where there is a receiver, there may be a direct assessment on the beneficiaries or there may be a direct recovery from the beneficiaries although the assessment was in the name of the receiver. I am, therefore, unable to hold that the applicant is not an assessee or a person liable to pay under the Income-tax Act the demand made and to satisfy the certificate. I need only conclude by saying that the applicant did not exhaust the remedies provided in the Public Demands Recovery Act. He did go before the certificate officer who rejected his prayer. But then he did not go in appeal to the Collector, the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue as provided in the Public Demands Recovery Act. For these reasons this application is dismissed and the rule is discharged. Interim order, if any, is vacated. There will be no order as to costs. Application dismissed.
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1957 (11) TMI 21 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e Constitution came into force, and as against the right claimed by the plaintiffs under Art. 26(b), the Government put forward the rights of the Hindu public under Art. 25 (2)(b). There has been a full trial of the issues involved, and a decision has been given, declaring the rights of the appellants and of the public. When the appellants applied for leave to appeal to this Court, that application was resisted by the Government inter alia on the ground that the decree of the High Court was a proper decree recognising the rights of all sections of the public. In view of this, there is no force in the objection that the public are not, as such, parties to the suit. It is their rights that have been agitated by the Government and not any of its rights. In the result, both the appeal and the application for special leave to appeal must be dismissed. The parties will bear their own costs throughout. The appellants will take their costs out of the temple funds. Appeals Dismissed.
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1957 (11) TMI 20 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... whose subject-matter was the prescription regarding assessment and collection of taxes imposed by sections 3 and 5 of the Sales Tax Act and though without their existence, it could not have been possible to levy or collect the tax, they are not in themselves laws imposing the tax within Article 286(3) or section 3 of Act 52 of 1952. Before closing I must add that the question to be decided was a very difficult one, really of first impression being uncovered by authority and I must not fail to acknowledge the assistance I have derived from the arguments of learned counsel on either side. The other point raised in the petitions regarding the validity of the retrospective operation of the G.O. dated 3rd September, 1955, from 1st April, 1955, was not argued by counsel, as this has been decided adverse to the petitioner in W.P. Nos. 625 and 626 of 1956. The petitions fail and are dismissed. The rules nisi are discharged but there will be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1957 (11) TMI 19 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... figuring both as the consignor and the consignee, and the sales were completed at Hindupur itself. The transactions are, therefore, not hit at by Article 286 of the Constitution. Lastly, it is argued that the petitioner s firm and the purchasing firm, the Mysore Starch Manufacturing Company, are one and the same concern and, therefore, the same firm cannot sell to itself. The petitioners firm has three partners whereas the Mysore firm has four partners and each firm has separate accounts and was independently assessed to income-tax. The petitioners have not placed before the Tribunal any documents regarding the constitution of the two firms or the accounts of either firm in support of their contention. On the material placed before the Tribunal, it has no option but to come to the conclusion that the two firms are separate and distinct. The finding is one of fact and we accept it. In the result the revision is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 150. Petition dismissed.
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1957 (11) TMI 18 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er section 386(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the liability merges into a decree and execution as if it were a decree is the only permissible procedure thereafter. 9.. We are satisfied that all that we need do at present is to hold that so long as the procedure indicated in sub-section (3) of section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, is available to the State, it is beyond its competence to commence proceedings under the TravancoreCochin Revenue Recovery Act, 1951, and leave open for future adjudication the question as to whether, if and when the proceedings indicated in section 386(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, becomes unavailable, it will still be open to the State to invoke the provisions of the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act, 1951, or not. 10.. In the light of what is stated above the petition has to be allowed and it is hereby allowed though in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1957 (11) TMI 17 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... erson engaged in buying, selling or supplying or distributing goods within the meaning of the definition of a dealer, that is, an agriculturist when selling the produce from his land can hardly be said to be a dealer. On the other hand, the income from the first sale of the produce from his lands would be agricultural income, as opposed to business income, liable to be taxed in exercise of the legislative power conferred by item 46 of List II of Schedule VII of the Constitution. Therefore, if the agriculturist sellers of the produce cannot be brought within the net of taxation, it is obvious that the purchaser is clearly intended to be reached when the legislature definitely indicated that it is at the point of first purchase in the State that the tax is exigible. We, therefore, hold it so. For the several reasons aforesaid, we are of the view that the applications are not tenable and we accordingly dismiss them with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 50 each. Applications dismissed.
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1957 (11) TMI 16 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is so, the levy of tax in regard to such sales is rendered lawful by reason of the Sales Tax Continuance Order, 1950, which has been made by the President in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to clause (2) of Article 286 of the Constitution. Therefore, this contention also has to fail. For all the reasons mentioned above, we are satisfied that these appeals should be allowed. Therefore, we allow these appeals and set aside the order of acquittal passed in each of these three cases and we sentence the accused in each of these cases to pay a fine of Rs. 50 and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a week. Further, under section 20 of the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1948, we specify (1) a sum of Rs. 14,807-9-0 as the tax due from the accused in C.C. No. 857 of 1952-53 (2) a sum of Rs. 19,743-6-9 as the tax due from the accused in C.C. No. 1342 of 1951-52 and (3) a sum of Rs. 13,494-1-3 as the tax due from the accused in C.C. No. 1410 of 1951-52. Appeals allowed.
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1957 (11) TMI 15 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... it is required to allow all facilities to the Rationing and Food Controllers staff to enter the mill premises (clause 7) (3) that it is required to use bags marked and supplied by Government and is unable to make any profit on the sale of bags (clause 8) (4) that if Government increases the price of gunny bags the petitioner is under an obligation to make a corresponding increase in the price of bags. The question whether the petitioner is or is not a dealer has not been referred to us and it is not within the competence of this Court to raise or decide this question (Kanga on Income-tax, page 93). For these reasons I would answer the questions which have been referred to us as follows (1) It is a sale. (2) Price of gunny bags should be included in the taxable turnover. (3) It is not an adverse order. Let appropriate answers be returned to the reference. The petitioner will pay costs to Government which we assess at Rs. 200. DULAT, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1957 (11) TMI 14 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ause (i) of clause (a) of subsection (1). 13.. Thus, according to my discussions above, the sale to the mills outside the State of Orissa had nothing to do with the sale by the dealer to Messrs Paluram Dhandhania. Further, the sale having been completed at Bargarh, it cannot be held that it had itself occasioned the export and thus assumed a complexion of inter-State trade at its inception. Besides, the sale to outsiders was the result of a separate contract with the outsider millers, and, accordingly, it cannot be said that the sale by the dealer to Messrs Paluram Dhandhania and Co., was in the course of inter-State trade. Thus, the contention of Mr. Mohanty is bound to fail, and the order passed by the Board of Revenue stands unassailed. 14.. In the result, we answer the question in the negative against the contentions of the petitioner and dismiss this application with costs. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 100. NARASIMHAM, C.J.-I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1957 (11) TMI 13 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e goods as were not accepted by those who had bought these goods from the buyer for the petitioner. The learned counsel relied on the observations at page 452 in Heilbutt v. Hickson (1872) Common Pleas 438. It may not be necessary to deal at any length with the facts of that case, which were totally different from what we have had to consider in these cases. In our opinion the Tribunal was right in holding that the turnover of the sales included in items 3 to 8 of what we have listed above was liable to be taxed. The revision is allowed in part. As we have already directed, the turnover of the sales in favour of Gordon Woodroffe and Co. (Rs. 1,80,925-2-10), and the sales in favour of the Madras Hides and Skins Exporters Ltd. (Rs. 1,19,846-10-2) will be deducted from the taxable turnover and the assessment will be accordingly revised. The rest of the claim of the petitioner fails. As neither side has wholly succeeded before us, there will be no order as to costs. accordingly.
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1957 (11) TMI 12 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ases of reckless exercise of authority when there is a total want of bona fides. If the argument of the learned Government Pleader were right, it would be open to the officers of the Sales Tax Department arbitrarily to take away the property of A to realise arrears of sales tax due from B , and A cannot have the protection of the Courts. I enquired of the learned Government Pleader whether in this particular case the second defendant had acted under the advice of the local Government Pleader and I was told that he had not. The evidence of D.W. I which the learned Government Pleader placed before me suggests that the plaintiff was angry and protested angrily. In effect, he dared the second defendant to attach his property and the second defendant dared. He must have been perfectly aware that he had no authority to do what he did. In the circumstances, I am not prepared to hold that section 17 applies to the facts of this case. The second appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1957 (11) TMI 11 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ngs in the normal course cannot be characterised as penal or punitive. The finding of the Magistrate is not binding on the Tribunal and we hold that the Tribunal was right in rejecting the plea of acquittal by the Criminal Court. The next question is whether the assessment can be sustained on merits. This is no doubt a border case. While the taxable limit has been fixed by section 3(3) of the Sales Tax Act at Rs. 10,000 the estimate of which the department has made is at Rs. 12,452-6-1 for 1952-53 and Rs. 10,353-9-6 for 1953-54. As the quantum of turnover ordinarily is a question of fact, we fell disinclined to interfere with the concurrent findings of the three authorities. In fact, no attempt was made to prove before us by a reference to the documents filed in the case that there were no materials which could sustain the estimate. We see, therefore, no grounds to interfere. The revision petitions are dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 50 in each. Petitions dismissed.
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1957 (11) TMI 10 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ank of India and Others 60 C.W.N. 602., it is quite plain that record of facts found by an administrative agency such as the Sales Tax Authorities with special and express provisions made for finding of facts and investigation and enquiry should not be lightly interfered with by constitutional writs. It has been held repeatedly that these proceedings in certiorari or prohibition under constitutional writs in their nature are not appellate or factfinding but only supervisory. Rightly or wrongly, the Taxing Officer has given his reasons why he has rejected the declarations on the basis of which the petitioner claimed exemptions. I do not find his reasons either unnatural or prima facie bad. Speaking for myself I find the reasons cogent, satisfactory and convincing. I am not prepared to interfere with his findings of facts on the records of the present case. I, therefore, dismiss this application and discharge the rule. There will be no order as to costs. Application dismissed.
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1957 (11) TMI 9 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB
Court – Jurisdiction of, Circumstances in which a company may be wound up and Principles for interpretation of statutes
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1957 (11) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the respondent is liable for income-tax, which has been paid by the Hapur firm on the transactions, which were entered into by the appellant with the Hapur firm for and on behalf of the respondent ?
Held that:- In our opinion the Judicial Committee of Ijlas-i-khas was in error in holding that before fixing the liability of a contributory to tax paid by an agent in British India for and on behalf of the non-resident contributory, his liability to pay tax on his "entire income", really total world income, had to be established. Therefore the finding of the High Court that the liquidator cannot claim from the respondent the amount of tax paid by the Hapur firm on transactions entered into by the appellant for and on behalf of the respondent unless it was shown that his total world income was taxable is unsustainable. As between the parties the tax paid by the agent had to be taken into account irrespective of the ultimate result of the assessment on the non-resident.
In the result this appeal is allowed and the judgment and order of the Division Bench of the Pepsu High Court set aside and the order of the learned liquidation judge restored
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