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Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 464 Records
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1957 (10) TMI 25 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that the right to pass on the tax is an essential requirement of a tax on the sale of goods for a tax might be levied at the stage of the last purchase before consumption. I might add that a tax at purchase point which is legal does not enable this facility to be enjoyed by the taxpayer. Though in the affidavit in support of the petition some point was made of the assessment being on the basis of best judgment of the assessing authority Mr. Venkatasubramania Iyer, learned counsel for the petitioner, did not press this point in view of the fact that the assessment complained of in the petition was only provisional and was liable to adjustment on the basis of the turnover of the assessee computed at the end of the year. The result therefore is that there are no merits in these petitions which fail and are dismissed. The rules nisi will be discharged. The respondents are entitled to their costs which is ordered in W.P. No. 625 of 1956. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petition dismissed.
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1957 (10) TMI 24 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ner should not be assessed in respect of those transactions. Under the Rule, when goods are exported outside the State, the tax is to be levied from the dealer who was the last dealer not exempt from taxation under section 3(3) . It is asserted in the counter-affidavit that the petitioners in this case were the persons who were assessable to tax under section 3(1) in respect of exports made by dealers to whom they sold the untanned hides and skins which dealers did not have an assessable turnover under section 3(3) in view of the fact that they are not licensees and also that there was no sale in their hands which would be assessed in the State in view of their being unlicensed. This statement of the Commercial Tax Officer in paragraph 6 of the counter-affidavit is not challenged before me. This submission, too, cannot be accepted. Thus there is no substance in this writ petition. It must therefore fail and is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1957 (10) TMI 23 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ay that in a sense the two articles with which we are dealing are cleansing agents, but that process of cleansing is not brought about by the action of alkali on fat. Mr. Shah says that vaseline is a fat or a fatty substance but he has not been able to point out any authority for the proposition that vaseline is a fat. On the other hand, Webster s Dictionary says that vaseline is a trade mark for petroleum or certain other petroleum products. It is a matter of common knowledge that Barium sulphide is and alkali, the absence of the fat in these preparations cannot make either of them a cleansing agent by virtue of the action of alkali on fat. In our opinion, therefore, they are not soaps and are not taken out of the category of toilet preparations enumerated in entry 6 of Schedule I and are therefore liable to special sales tax. Our answers to the questions referred to us are (1) In the affirmative. (2) In the negative. Applicants to pay costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1957 (10) TMI 22 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in section 11A but, I think, when such is the situation, it is difficult to say that the Sales Tax Officer s action was without jurisdiction, or in excess of jurisdiction. On the question of limitation, Mr. Mehta may be right or may not be right. In the Sales Tax Act a machinery is provided. If, after the assessment, the applicant feels aggrieved, he can take the matter in appeal. He can next go to the Sales Tax Tribunal. If there is a machinery provided under the law, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for this Court to entertain this application especially when the Sales Tax Officer is, in my view, acting within jurisdiction. On the further question raised by Mr. Mehta, about the question of limitation, we express no opinion on the point. It would be open to Mr. Mehta to agitate the question before the authorities competent to deal with the question. On this ground, I think, the application must fail and the rule will be discharged with costs. Application dismissed.
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1957 (10) TMI 21 - SUPREME COURT
On account of the continued illegal stoppage of work, ’glow down’ tactics, and strikes indulged in by the workmen despite the advice of their Union, the appellant company issued a notice dated August 23, 1953, that in consequence of the illegal strike the Management has no option but to declare a lock-out of the entire works except the special shifts with effect from August 24, 953 The services of all other workers shall be deemed to be discharged with effect from August 24, 953." Subsequently, the company lifted the lock-out. and gave notice on September 17, 1953, to the effect that all employees on the Works rolls of the Company on August 23, 1953, and who wish to report for duty, must resume work on September 18, 1953 A third notice gave extension of time to the workmen to resume work. The question was whether the notice dated August 23, 1953, terminated the services of the respondents by discharging them with effect from August 24, 1953, and the notice dated September 17, 1953, merely gave them an opportunity of reemployment at the pleasure of the company on fulfilment of certain conditions - Held, that, on a construction of the notices, the expression "shall be deemed to be discharged" had to be read in the context of the declaration of a lock-out, and the intention of the company was that the employees whose employment bad been refused during the period of lock-out were to be permitted to resume work without any conditions if they reported for duty by a particular date, and on fulfilment of a condition if they reported for duty after that date. Where some of the workmen who were taken in custody by the police applied for leave when in custody but were refused leave by the company acting under Standing Order No. o, and the Labour Appellate Tribunal took the view that as the http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 14 workmen were in custody the company was not justified in refusing leave, held, that whether in such circumstances leave should be granted or not must be left to the discretion of the employer, unless, it was proved, that it was a case of colourable or mala fide exercise of power under the Standing Order.
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1957 (10) TMI 20 - IN THE CHANCERY DIVISION
Application of premiums received on issue of shares ... ... ... ... ..... le view to take is to regard the provision of section 69 relating to the minute. I shall not trouble about section 70 mdash as inapplicable to cases where the reduction involves either the writing down or the writing off of the share premium account, so far as regards the share premium account. I think that the convenience of the matter and the doubts which have been thrown on the possible reconciliation of section 4 and section 56 make it desirable to alter the practice. I shall therefore propose in this case to accede to the application which has been put forward by Mr. Instone and direct that the minute shall make no reference to the share premium account. I therefore approve the minute without the proposed reference to the share premium account, with the slight exception that the word additional in front of shares in the last line of the minute as appearing in the petition should be omitted. There will be the usual directions as to advertisement. Solicitors Nordon and Co.
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1957 (10) TMI 19 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Winding up - Powers of liquidator ... ... ... ... ..... ny of these purposes. The broad principle on which an order or direction can be issued being the same, we are of opinion, on the basis of such facts as are not in dispute in this case, that it is not open to the respondent to say that if a writ cannot be granted a direction or order should be made. We think it is not possible for this court in summary proceedings under article 226 to grant any order or direction such as is sought by the respondent. In our opinion, therefore, the third preliminary objection raised against the petition on behalf of the appellant is well founded and the petition should have been dismissed on the ground that no effective relief under it could be granted to the respondent. The petition could not, therefore, succeed. In the view indicated above it is not necessary to consider the other contentions raised on behalf of the appellant. The appeal, in our opinion, must succeed. It is consequently allowed and the petition dismissed with costs throughout.
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1957 (10) TMI 5 - SUPREME COURT
Whether it is open to an Appellate Assistant Commissioner on appeal to reject the assessee's books of account, which have been accepted by the Income-tax Officer ?
Whether it is open to an Appellate Assistant Commissioner appeal to invoke the provisions of rule 33 of the Indian Income-tax on Rules for the purpose of computing the income of a non-resident, the Income-tax Officer not having done so ?
Held that:- While we agree that, in the first instance, the Income-tax Officer as the first assessing officer has to form an opinion about the applicability of the proviso to section 13, we do not agree that it is not open to any other authority, which is lawfully in seizin of the order of assessment of which the method of accounting under section 13 is only a part, to come to a different conclusion with regard to the applicability of the proviso. The present is not a case where the Appellate Assistant Commissioner has travelled outside the ambit of his jurisdiction under section 31 of the Act. For the reasons given above, we would answer question No. 1 in the affirmative.
As to question No. 2, only a few words are necessary. A similar expression occurs in the rule : "In any case in which the Income-tax Officer is of opinion etc." For the same reasons which we have given with regard to question No. 1, the answer to question No. 2 is also in the affirmative. Appeal allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court of Bombay dated 4th March, 1953, is set aside and the two questions referred to the said High Court are answered in favour of the Revenue
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1957 (10) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the petitioners had previously been prosecuted and punished for the same offence for which they are now being prosecuted before the Additional District Magistrate?
Held that:- The proceedings before the Customs authorities were under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act. Under Section 186 of that Act, the award of any confiscation, penalty or increased rate of duty under that Act by an officer of Customs does not prevent the infliction of any punishment to which the person affected thereby is liable under any other law. The offences with which the petitioners are now charged include an offence under Section 120B, Indian Penal Code. Criminal conspiracy is an offence created and made punishable by the Indian Penal Code. It is not an offence under the Sea Customs Act. The offence of a conspiracy to commit a crime is a different offence from the crime that is the object of the conspiracy because the conspiracy precedes the commission of the crime and is complete before the crime is attempted or completed, equally the crime attempted or completed does not require the element of conspiracy as one of its ingredients. They are, therefore, quite separate offences.
It is true that the Collector of Customs had used the words "punishment" and "conspiracy" but those words were used in order to bring out that each of the two petitioners was guilty of the offence under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act. The petitioners were not and could never be charged with criminal conspiracy before the Collector of Customs and therefore Article 20(2) cannot be invoked. Appeal dismissed.
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1957 (9) TMI 99 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nditions of services applicable to the appellant. In principle, we cannot see any clear distinction between the termination of the services of a person under the terms of a contract governing him and the termination of his services in accordance with the terms of his conditions of service. The order complained against did not contravene the provisions of Art. 311 and was therefore a valid order. 6. Reversion from a temporary post held by a person does not per se amount to reduction in rank because the temporary post held by him is not his substantive rank. For the purposes of this appeal it is unnecessary to decide in what circumstances a reversion would be regarded as reduction in rank as the appellant has not established as a fact that the order of reversion passed against him was by way of a penalty. The order of reversion, therefore, did not contravene the provisions of Art. 311 and was a valid order. 7. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. 8. Appeal dismissed.
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1957 (9) TMI 98 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e matter and we have come to the conclusion that having regard to all the circumstances of the case it would be reasonable to compute the benefit of reinstatement which was awarded to the appellant at an amount of ₹ 12,500 (Rupees twelve thousand and five hundred only). 25. We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Lucknow as well as the award made by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Calcutta and award that the appellant shall recover from the respondent the said sum of ₹ 12,500 (Rupees twelve thousand and five hundred only) being the computation of the money value of the benefit of reinstatement awarded to him under the terms of the award of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal at Calcutta dated December 5, 1950. The respondent will pay the appellant's costs of this appeal as well as the proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal and the Labour Appellate Tribunal. 26. Appeal allowed.
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1957 (9) TMI 97 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... was done by the clerk, because on his own showing the secretary who was only a honorary secretary was not going to the society daily and the business was left in the hands of the clerk with a check over him by the secretary. This would not make him a person who at the time the offence was committed was in charge and was responsible to the Society for the conduct of the business of the society. The prosecution could have let in evidence when particularly it was prosecuting accused 3 under Clause (1) that the secretary is the person who was responsible to the society for the conduct of the business of the society. In terms of this section, the prosecution has not let in evidence and the evidence let in falls short of the strict standard of proof required for conviction under Section 16 (1). In this view the Secretary, accused 3, cannot be convicted. The acquittal is therefore confirmed but not for the reason given by the lower appellate Court. The appeal is therefore dismissed.
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1957 (9) TMI 96 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lly in his possession, and in this view of the matter, no steps need be taken to compel him to produce the cattle in Court. 9. Before taking leave of this case I should like to point out two things which clearly call for vigilance on the part of those concerned; first, that it is the duty of Magistrate to exercise greater care than they are accustomed to in complying with the provisions of Section 87 the breach of which entails very serious consequences for the person found in default, but which consequences, in the very nature of things, can be allowed to have effect only if the strict preconditions mentioned in the section are properly observed; and secondly that it appears that the printed forms in use in some of the Courts are defective and are misleading and lead to error and those concerned should see that the printed forms in use are correctly formulated, so as to conform to the relevant form prescribed in Schedule V of the Code of Criminal Procedure (See form No. IV).
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1957 (9) TMI 95 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... when the entire claim is barred; in such a case there is no consideration at all and the agreement will be void unless it is saved by Section 26(3) of the Travancore Contract Act. 11. In the light of what is stated above the appeal fails and it is hereby dismissed. The lower Court directed the parties to bear their respective costs. In the circumstances of the case there will be a similar order as to costs in this Court as well. 12. The learned counsel for the respondent drew our attention to the following passage in AIR 1934 PC 147 (B) "Indeed, it follows from the idea of an account stated that whatever the consideration for each item, every item must appear in terms of money, since what is being agreed is matter of account." and contended that Ex. A-1 will not amount to an account stated because it is not in terms of money but of paddy. In view of the conclusion we have reached it is unnecessary to consider this question and it is not considered in this judgment.
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1957 (9) TMI 94 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
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... ... ..... ty. I do not think that in such a case it is necessary to issue a fresh notice, wiping off the entire certificate proceedings had up to that point of time." 15. I pointed out earlier that the notice of demand was issued by the Collector under the provisions of Madras Act II of 1864. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that notice was unenforceable. That was not a point taken by the petitioner in his affidavit, and I need not rest my decision in this case on that feature of the case. It was not the notice of demand issued by the Collector that was really objected to. What the petitioner really wanted was an immunity from payment of the excess profits tax on the ground that the proceedings taken by the Collector to recover that amount as areas of land revenue were barred by the period of limitation prescribed by section 46(7) of the Act. That contention must be rejected. The rule is discharged and the petition is dismissed with costs. Counsels fee ₹ 150.
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1957 (9) TMI 93 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
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... ... ..... the time when the written down value is reduced to a zero; which, in effect, means that he should be given depreciation until the total depreciation exceeds the written down value. The argument, therefore, obviously involves a consequence that we shall have to read in proviso (c) to section 10(2)(vi) the words "written down value" in place of the words "original cost". In our opinion, there is no warrant for adopting any such course. Moreover, the interpretation that Mr. Mehta wants us to put upon the section is opposed to all notions of accountancy or commercial practice, because the aggregate of depreciation allowances can neither in accountancy nor as understood by commercial men ever exceed the original cost to the assessee of the asset in respect of which depreciation has been granted. 6. The result, therefore is that our answer to the question referred to us will be in the negative. 7. Assessee to pay the costs. 8. Reference answered in the negative.
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1957 (9) TMI 92 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ore, an essential pre-requisite for the collection of a water rate is that the building should either have a private supply from the municipal main or a resident of the building should have water from municipal mains. Here again, the rate is imposed directly in exchange for services rendered to the owner or occupier of the building, and in both cases, therefore, it cannot be said that the conservancy tax or the water rate became payable by reason of the mere fact that the property existed and, in addition, that it was payable in exchange for service rendered. In our opinion, therefore, in respect of these two taxes it cannot be said that they are taxes "in respect of the property" within the meaning of the third proviso to section 9, sub-section (2), and the Tribunal came to a correct conclusion on this issue. 7. Our answer, therefore, to the amended question shall be in the negative. 8. The Income Tax Commissioner to pay costs. 9. Question answered in the negative.
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1957 (9) TMI 91 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f defendants 1 and 2. The further proceedings in this appeal will therefore be confined to the dispute in relation to the other items of property covered by Exhibit B-1. 20. As I have already indicated it will not be possible to decide this appeal properly in relation to the items other than the residential house covered by the memorandum of cross-objections without a finding on the question as to whether the plaintiffs and those impugning the deed of gift Exhibit B-1 had proved that there had been no delivery of possession to satisfy the requirement of Muhammadan law. The learned Subordinate Judge will submit a finding on the point just now indicated after recording such further evidence as the parties might adduce in proof of their respective cases. The finding will be submitted to this Court within three months of the receipt of the records by the Trial Court. Time for objections 10 days. The second appeal will be posted for final disposal after the receipt of the finding.
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1957 (9) TMI 90 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... onsideration. Learned counsel for the Department urged for acceptance the view put forward by the Tribunal in its further statement of the case, that from the fact that the amount was assessed, it could be implied that the Tribunal had found against the assessee on both the questions. We are unable to agree. When calling for a further statement of the case, we pointed out that these aspects did not appear to have been considered at all by the Tribunal. There was no evidence either to support any possible finding, whether express or implied, that the amount in question was income that accrued to the assessee in the relevant period, 1st April, 1944, to nth October, 1944. The Tribunal could have been fair to the assessee and helpful to the court by stating so, when it was given an opportunity to submit a further statement of the case. We answer the question referred to us In the negative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to the costs of this reference.
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1957 (9) TMI 89 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to do so with his father before the making of the will; and since this is so, quite obviously the sum of ₹ 5,877 is assessable to tax in his hands. 6. We gather from the assessee that this amount has already been taxed by the Department in the hands of Dinbai. It becomes necessary sometimes for the Department to tax the same income in the hands of two different individuals as a precaution against the Court in one of the assessments taking the view that the income could only be assessed in the hands of one of the two assesses ;but we have always assumed that the State does not desire to tax the same income in the hands of two persons, and if and when the answer that we have given to the issue becomes final and conclusive between the parties, we have no doubt that the Income Tax authorities will refund the tax paid by Dinbai. 7. Our answer, therefore, to the question referred to us will be in the affirmative. 8. Assessee to pay costs. Question answered in the affirmative.
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