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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 612 Records
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1960 (12) TMI 83 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... cane from outside the local area the levy would be legal and in order. I would read down the Explanation in the same manner, as I have read down the main charging provision so as to confine the levy to entry from outside 'that "local area"-local area being understood in the sense already explained. I would accordingly allow the appeal, and remand it to the High Court for investigating the material facts which I have mentioned earlier with a direction to pass judgment in accordance with the law as above explained. BY COURT. In accordance with the opinion of the majority the appeal is allowed, the order passed by the High Court is set aside and a writ be issued directing that the respondents do forbear from levying and collecting cess from the appellants on account of arrears of cess for the crushing season 1954-55 and successive crushing seasons under the Uttar Pradesh Sugarcane Cess Act, 1956. The appellants will get their costs here and below. Appeal allowed.
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1960 (12) TMI 82 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... son acquitted or convicted of any offence may be afterwards tried for any distinct offence for which a separate charge might have been made against him on the former trial under section 235, sub-section (1)." It would be noticed that it is because of this provision that the respondents before us were originally charged before the Magistrate in Criminal Case 82 of 1953 with offences under s. 409 of the Indian Penal Code as well as s. 105 of the Indian Insurance Act. The respondents in this case did not appear in this Court and as the appeal had to be heard ex parte Mr. N. S. Bindra was requested to appear as amicus curiae to assist the Court at the hearing of the appeal. We express our thanks to him for the assistance he rendered. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the judgment and the order of the High Court is set aside and the case will go back to the Judicial Magistrate, Fourth Court, Poona, for being proceeded with according to law. Appeal allowed. Case remanded.
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1960 (12) TMI 80 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tails given in the extract tallied with the description of the appellant. In the memorandum of appeal filed to the Court of Session challenging the conviction recorded by the Magistrate First Class, it was not contended that the person convicted in the earlier case was some person other than the appellant. But the appellant was merely an employee of Thakur Din. It is not shown that he made himself any profit out of the transaction. Thakur Din has been sentenced to pay a fine of ₹ 200 only. The offence committed by the appellant is a repetition of a similar offence committed by him a few months earlier, but we think that having regard to all the circumstances, this is a case in which there are special and adequate reasons which would justify imposition of a penalty less than the minimum prescribed by a. 16(ii) of the Act. We reduce the sentence to imprisonment to three months and we remit the fine. Subject to this modification, the appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (12) TMI 79 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d not dispute that the mustard oil was adulterated. He was therefore guilty under Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act of storing adulterated food in contravention of the provisions of the Act and he was therefore liable under Section 16(1) of the Act for the penalty imposed upon him. Such adulteration is a very serious offence. The acquittal of the respondent by the Sessions Judge was the result of the wrong view regarding the written consent given by the A person guilty of such a serious offence cannot be allowed to get off as a result It is necessary that I must interfere against the acquittal. 20. The acquittal of the respondent is therefore set aside and he is convicted under Section 16(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and sentenced to pay a fine of ₹ 500/- as directed by the Magistrate and in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months. The fine, if realised, shall be paid to the Administrator of the Agartala Municipality.
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1960 (12) TMI 78 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... arned counsel for the Department pointed out that the assessment of profits and losses for each of the years that preceded 1946 had become final, and he relied on section 24(3) to bar the acceptance of the contention of the learned counsel for the assessee that the entire loss during the period that preceded 1946 should be allowed to be carried forward. It is really unnecessary to pronounce any concluded opinion of ours on the scope of the finality of the assessment of a loss communicated to an assessee under section 24(3). We have said that though there was a computed deficiency of ₹ 86,708 at the end of the period that ended on December 31, 1945, the loss that the assessee could carry forward was only the computed loss of 1945, viz., ₹ 18,096. We answer both the questions in the affirmative and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the Department in R.C. No. 100 of 1956. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Questions answered in the affirmative.
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1960 (12) TMI 77 - SUPREME COURT
Maintainability of an application made by the Employers' Association of Northern India, Kanpur on behalf of , the J. K. Cotton and Weaving Mills Co., Ltd., a member of the Association in connection with the proposed termination of service of certain members of its Watch and Ward Staff challenged
Held that:- The Labour Appellate Tribunal of India rightly held that the application under cl. 5(a) filed on June 13, 1950 was not maintainable and rightly set aside the awards of the Conciliation Board and the Industrial Court. The appeal against the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India is therefore dismissed. As already pointed out the order made by the appellate Bench of the High Court in the writ petition was based on its acceptance of the preliminary objection that the records of the Labour Appellate Tribunal being in Calcutta could not be reached by any writ of the Allahabad High Court. In view of our conclusion that the application under cl. 5(a) was not maintainable, the appellant was on merits not entitled to any writ and on that ground the appeal against the High Court's order must also be dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (12) TMI 76 - SUPREME COURT
Whether Art. 265 of the Constitution is a complete answer to the attack against the constitutionality of the Travancore-Cochin Land Tax Act, XV of 1955, as amended by the Travancore-Cochin Land Tax (Amendment) Act, X of 1957 questioned
Held that:- One can, easily imagine that the property may be sold at auction and may not fetch even the amount for the realisation of which it may be proposed to be sold at public auction. In the absence of a bidder forthcoming to bid for the offset amount, the State ordinarily becomes the auction purchaser for the realisation of the outstanding taxes. It is clear, therefore, that apart from being discriminatory and imposing unreasonable restrictions on holding property, the Act is clearly confiscatory in character and effect. It is not even necessary to tear the veil, as was suggested in the course of the argument, to arrive at the conclusion that the Act has that unconstitutional effect. For these reasons, as also for the reasons for which the provisions of ss. 4 and 7 have been declared to be unconstitutional, in view of the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution, all these operative sections of the Act, namely 4, 5A and 7, must be held to offend Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution also. Appeal allowed.
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1960 (12) TMI 75 - SUPREME COURT
Sales tax liability - Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The two deliveries might synchronise in point of time, but were separate, in point of fact and in the eye of law. If a dispute arose as to the goods delivered under the kutcha delivery order to the third parties against the Mills, action could lie at the instance of the appellants. The third parties could proceed on breach of contract only against the appellants and not against the Mills. In our opinion, there being two separate transactions of sale, tax was payable at both the points, as has been correctly pointed out by the tax authorities and the High Court
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1960 (12) TMI 72 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in view of the composition of tax liability under section 39, the order imposing penalty under sub-section (4) of section 21 could not be passed?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. It is unnecessary to consider this question. Tribunal was right in holding that the Sales Tax Officer had no jurisdiction to forfeit the amount of general tax collected by the respondents.
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1960 (12) TMI 68 - SUPREME COURT
Whether section 19 must be taken to prevail over section 13 of the Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax Act?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Section 19, in addition to recovery of the amount, gives the power to the Magistrate to convict and sentence the offender to fine or in default of payment of fine, to imprisonment. In our opinion, neither of the remedies for recovery is destructive of the other, because if two remedies are open, both can be resorted to, at the option of the authorities recovering the amount. Unless the statute in express words or by necessary implication laid down that one remedy was to the exclusion of the other, the observations of Mahmood, J., quoted above must apply. In our opinion, in the absence of any such provision in the Act, both the remedies were open to the authorities, and they could resort to any one of them at their option.
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1960 (12) TMI 51 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Requirements with respect to memorandum, Winding up – Company when deemed unable to pay its debts and Amendment to petition
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1960 (12) TMI 43 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Company – Incorporation of ... ... ... ... ..... those safeguards which the law of England accords even to the least deserving of natural persons. It would not be in accordance with principle that any person capable of committing, and incurring the penalties of, a crime should be compelled by process of law to admit a criminal offence. In view of this divided opinion, in view further of the definition of the word person in the General Clauses Act, and also because we are unable, in the absence of an adequate reason, to allow a restriction to the scope of a fundamental right, we have come to the conclusion that the protection against self-incrimination is available to companies as much as to natural individuals. Accordingly, these references are accepted and the learned trial Magistrate is directed to withdraw the summonses issued to the store-keeper and the assistant accountant of the company. This order will not prevent action being taken according to law for the search and seizure of the documents required in these cases.
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1960 (12) TMI 42 - IN THE CHANCERY DIVISION
Winding up - Meetings to ascertain wishes of creditors or contributors ... ... ... ... ..... l of pound 33.302 19s. 3d. and also by the company itself. The petitioning creditor, while recognising that the petition must in the circumstances be dismissed, asked that it be not ordered to pay the costs mdash Held, dismissing the petition, that with regard to a judgment creditor deprived, as in the present case, of the right ex debito justitiae to a winding-up order only by the opposition of a majority of the creditors, the fair practice would be to make no order as to costs. That head-note, I think, accurately reproduces the judgment of Wynn-Parry J. 1957 1 W.L.R. 774, 777. It seems to me that that rule of practice is equally applicable today, and for the present purpose it can make no difference, where the judgment creditor s ex debito justitiae right to a winding-up order is defeated by the opposition of the majority, that their wishes merely guide the court in contradistinction to binding the court. I propose therefore to follow the practice laid down by Wynn-Parry J.
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1960 (12) TMI 41 - SUPREME COURT
Appointment of directors and proportion of those who are to retire by rotation, Prohibition assignment of office by director, Directors - Only individuals to be directors, Managing director – Tenure of appointment
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1960 (12) TMI 39 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Company – Incorporation of ... ... ... ... ..... g that the fixed deposit receipts were not genuine, still he was of the view that as the secretary was authorised to receive the money, the petitioner bank should be held responsible. We think that this is not a correct view according to law and according to the bye-laws of the bank. We hold that the fixed deposit receipts bearing No. 1293 for a sum of Rs. 2,300 and No. 1192 for a sum of Rs. 550 issued by the secretary are not valid receipts and they are not binding on the petitioner bank. The learned district munsif has also given a finding that in any event the bank is liable to pay interest for the fixed deposit of Rs. 1,000 as found in -the account books of the bank under the heading F. D. No. 1293 dated 24th January, 1955- We agree with him. In the result, we set aside the judgment and decree of the learned district munsif and declare that the plaintiff is entitled to interest on the fixed deposit of Rs. 1,000 above referred to. The suit is otherwise dismissed. No costs.
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1960 (12) TMI 38 - IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
Winding up - Meetings to ascertain wishes of creditors or contributors ... ... ... ... ..... y of creditors speaking with a clear voice were against a winding up. On the facts of this case the factors in favour of the winding-up order were that the petitioner had, as against the company, an undoubted right to an order, and was not entirely without support from the creditors. On those facts, however, I think the judge ought not to have made a winding-up order. He did so because he wrongly took into consideration the amount of the company s indebtedness, and possibly the amount of the paid-up capital as reflecting the assets position. The former circumstance, at all events, was a major factor in his mind, and he wrongly, in my judgment, allowed it to enter into the balance. In my judgment, the judge erred in law in taking these matters into consideration when he should have excluded them. Accordingly, in this court, we are at liberty to express our own views on the matter, and, on the facts of this case, I, for my part, would allow this appeal and dismiss the petition.
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1960 (12) TMI 16 - SUPREME COURT
Dealer In Shares, High Court To Interfere, Jurisdiction Of High Court, Purchase And Sale, Tax Proceedings
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1960 (12) TMI 15 - SUPREME COURT
Dealer In Shares, High Court To Interfere, Jurisdiction Of High Court, Purchase And Sale, Tax Proceedings
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1960 (12) TMI 14 - SUPREME COURT
Whether section 35 of the Act was a provision for rectification of " mistakes apparent on the record " and in the opinion of the High Court it was a mistake analogous to Order XLVII, rule 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure for grant of review on the ground of mistake or error apparent on the face of the record ?
Held that:- The learned judges of the High Court seem to have fallen into an error in equating the language and scope of section 35 of the Act with that of Order XLVII, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code. The language of the two is different because according to section 35 of the Act which provides for rectification of mistakes the power is given to the various income-tax authorities within four years from the date of any assessment passed by them to rectify any mistake " apparent from the record " and in the Civil Procedure Code the words are " an error apparent on the face of the record " and the two provisions do not mean the same thing.
The restrictive operation of the power of review under Order XLVII, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, is not applicable in the case of section 35 of the Act and, in our opinion, it cannot be said that the order of the Income-tax Officer in regard to the assessment in dispute was without jurisdiction. Appeal allowed.
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1960 (12) TMI 13 - SUPREME COURT
Whether it was open to the taxing officer to reopen the assessment for 1945-46 ? and
Whether the commission received by the appellants was liable to be apportioned under rule 9 of Schedule I of the Excess Profits Tax Act ?
Held that:- High Court was right in holding that the assessment made by the Excess Profits Tax Officer by apportionment of the commission income between the chargeable accounting periods was correct. Appeal dismissed.
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