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Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 612 Records
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1960 (11) TMI 111 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... or purposes of section 5 of the Act or for the computation of a licence fee under the rules. It seems to us therefore that for the purpose of computation of the licence fee only that part of the turnover of the dealer which comes within the scope of section 5 either eligible to total exemption from tax or to concessional rate of tax at a preferential rate or at a single point that should be turnover for purposes of computation of the licence fee. In the view we have taken we set aside the order of the Tribunal and restore that of the Commercial Tax Officer in so far as computation of the turnover for the licence fee is concerned. It is not denied that as a result of the decision in Guruvayya Naidu v. State of Madras 1957 8 S.T.C. 699., the maximum licence fee leviable cannot exceed Rs. 1,000. Subject to this, it will be open to the department to fix the licence fee on the turnover indicated above. The petition is allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1960 (11) TMI 110 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... red at the price fixed. As between the two there is no room for any negotiation. We are not here concerned with contracts arising out of other Control Orders where there might possibly be some room left within the scope of those Orders, to enter into contracts, as in the Andhra case. That question may be left open. As between the petitioner and the Corporation the entire transaction is in the nature of a compulsory transfer of title to the goods from one person to another on payment of the stipulated price. In my opinion, such a transaction will be directly covered by the aforesaid Supreme Court decision and would not amount to a sale within the meaning of the Orissa Sales Tax Act. 9.. The question is therefore answered in the negative. We hold that there was no sale of cement to the Corporation and no sales tax was leviable under the provisions of the Orissa Sales Tax Act. There will be no order as to costs of this reference. DAS, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1960 (11) TMI 109 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Officer was wrong, because if what was enacted by Act VII of 1956 was the law on the date of the original assessment, the original assessment was illegal. Learned counsel for the respondent-assessee urged that the ambit of section 12(2) was more circumscribed than that for instance of section 12-B of the Act, and that the order of the Commercial Tax Officer should not be characterised either as illegal or improper when it was correct and consistent with the law as it stood on that date. But that contention we must negative in view of what we have stated obove. The principle laid down in Venkatachala v. Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co., Ltd. 1959 S.C.R. 703 34 I.T.R.143. , applies with equal force to cases of revision under section 12(2) of the Act also. The petition is allowed. The order of the Tribunal is set aside and the order of the Deputy Commissioner is restored. The petitioner will be entitled for the costs of this petition. Counsel s fee Rs.100. Petitions allowed.
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1960 (11) TMI 108 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the sales tax refunded to an assessee under similar circumstances. Neither the Act nor the Amending Act provided a machinery for effecting recovery of the amount refunded without a revision of assessment. Rule 18(1) provided for rectification, but that machinery was not availed of in this case, and it could not have been availed of by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer. The machinery provided for revision of assessment in rule 17(3) could not have been availed of in this case by the assessing authority to revise not his order of assessment but that of the Tribunal. In our opinion the order passed by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer and ultimately confirmed by the Tribunal was without jurisdiction and has therefore to be set aside. This petition is allowed and the order of the Tribunal confirming the order of the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer dated 7th February, 1957, will stand set aside. The petitioner will be entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
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1960 (11) TMI 107 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n it has created. 5.. The learned Government Pleader drew our attention to Union Leather Company v. State of Madras 1960 11 S.T.C. 318. We are unable to see anything in that decision which militates against the conclusion we have reached. 6.. It follows that the assessments impugned in these petitions have to be quashed. We do so. 7.. Various other contentions are raised in these petitions. It is unnecessary to consider them in this judgment and they are left open for future determination. 8.. We make it clear that the quashing of the assessments will not preclude the Department from making fresh assessments according to law. It was agreed that if and when such assessments are made no question of limitation will be raised and we must record that the said agreement has influenced us in interfering at this stage without leaving the petitioner to his normal remedies under the Act by way of appeal and revision. 9.. The petitions are allowed as above. No costs. Petitions allowed.
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1960 (11) TMI 106 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t obtained by a commission agent he would be exempt from payment of tax in the teeth of section 2(b) and section 8 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act. Again, he did not have any regard to the fact that the plaintiff had included the disputed turnover in the returns submitted by the firm and paid taxes voluntarily and that there was no cogent evidence in support of the theory that these were done under any mistake. The Subordinate Judge disposed of the whole matter by remarking that the authorities must be deemed to have collected the tax on sales of groundnut illegally. To say the least, the judgment under appeal is very unsatisfactory and discloses a straining of every circumstance in favour of the plaintiff. We have, therefore, no option but to reverse it and allow the appeal. In the result, the appeal is allowed with costs and the suit dismissed with costs. The memorandum of cross-objections claiming at 12 per cent. per annum is also dismissed with costs. Appeal allowed.
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1960 (11) TMI 105 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he goods themselves are returned to the seller and the unpaid instalments of the purchase money ceased to be payable under the terms of the agreement, the seller is entitled to claim under rule 5(1)(b) the total of the unpaid instalments as an allowance made within the meaning of rule 5(1)(b), provided of course that factually the liability for the unpaid purchase money is terminated and the other requirement, that the transactions should be shown in the accounts, is satisfied. In the case of the assessee he terminated that liability under the terms of the agreement, and the ledger accounts were closed. It was those accounts that disclosed what the unpaid purchase money was. We hold that the assessee was entitled under rule 5(1)(b) to a deduction of Rs. 21,191-1-6 in the assessment year 1955-56. The petition is allowed to that extent and the assessment be reduced accordingly. The assessee will be entitled to the cost of this petition. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
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1960 (11) TMI 104 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... objection in question was filed by the State. The identical point came up for consideration in Ramachandra Balaram v. Commissioner of Sales Tax Since reported at 1960 11 S.T.C. 480., referred to above. The question referred to this Court in that case was Whether the cross-objection filed by the State in the present case is maintainable in law? After discussing the entire position in law, the answer of this Court was given in the affirmative. Accordingly, this question is also concluded by the aforesaid decision of this Court and must also be answered in the affirmative, that is, the Tribunal was right in entertaining the cross-objection. Thus, both the questions referred to this Court for our decision are answered in the affirmative as stated above and the references are disposed of accordingly. Both parties will, however, bear their respective costs. In the result, both the questions are answered in the affirmative. BARMAN, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1960 (11) TMI 103 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ons will not apply to the present case. Under the Motor Vehicles Act the tribunal is vested with statutory authority in performing its quasi-judicial duties, it could rely upon certain administrative directions issued by the appropriate authority. A disregard of its administrative direction by the quasi-judicial authority under the statute was held not to attract the writ jurisdiction of this Court. Here the Commercial Tax Officer is not exercising any independent or statutory jurisdiction of his own. He, as a subordinate of the Government, was directed to do a public duty and if he failed to do that duty on a misapprehension of the scope of the very direction given to him it should be open to this Court to issue an appropriate writ. The rule nisi is therefore made absolute. The result will be that the Commercial Tax Officer will have to dispose of the petitioner s claim for refund afresh. The petitioner will be entitled to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Ordered accordingly.
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1960 (11) TMI 102 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e excise duty paid, because the assessee would not be entitled to the benefit of the exemption provided by rule 5(i) of the Turnover and Assessment Rules. We are unable to see any real basis for any charge of discrimination to invalidate either section 5(viii) or the rules. What the assessee had to pay his vendor constituted the purchase turnover on which the assessee had to be taxed. All the elements that went into the price charged by the assessee s vendor would be relevant only for determining the price charged to the assessee, and no charge of discrimination could be based on the price the assessee had to pay to his vendor. As we said, the view taken by the Tribunal on the evidence placed before it, that it was the assessee and not the wholesaler, the assessee s vendor, resident in the State of Madras that was the first purchaser of the tobacco within the State of Madras is correct. The petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs.100. Petition dismissed.
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1960 (11) TMI 101 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hority at least of Sidhwani in his favour. It was he who actually started the mischief and the others callously joined him therein. In the result all the 4 accused assaulted all the four officers and bodily lifted them up and put them out of the flat. In our opinion, therefore, accused No. 1 cannot possibly escape a substantive sentence of imprisonment. We would inflict a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for fifteen days on accused No. 1 and maintain the fine as well as the sentence of imprisonment in default imposed by the learned Magistrate. As regards accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4, the amount of fine imposed by the learned Magistrate is only Rs. 100. We enhance the sentence of fine to a fine of Rs. 250 each, in default rigorous imprisonment for three weeks. The application by the State is, therefore, allowed and the rule is made absolute. Warrant of arrest to be issued against accused No. 1. We grant him time to surrender till Tuesday, 22nd November, 1960. Ordered accordingly.
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1960 (11) TMI 100 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he help of smoke. This is done for purposes of preserving the latex and making it fit for marketing. It follows that rubber is still produce from land and not liable to the sales tax. We are fortified in this view by the observation in India Coffee Tea Distributing Co., Ltd. v. State of Madras 1958 9 S.T.C. 769 at p. 772., where the decision of a learned single Judge, holding rubber to be agricultural produce, was not reversed, and indeed conceded by the Government Pleader. The relevant passage in the case reads as follows The learned Judge after considering the several authorities on the subject, held that tea and rubber would be agricultural produce......... The learned Government Pleader conceded that rubber would be an agricultural produce. It follows that rubber is an agricultural produce and this ground for reversing the order sustaining the dealer s objection also fails. Accordingly all the four revision petitions are dismissed, but without costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1960 (11) TMI 99 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... l be issued a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the assessment orders mentioned in paragraph 4 of the petition dated 20th October, 1954, and 19th November, 1954, as also the certificate mentioned in paragraph 6 of the petition and all proceedings had by reason thereof, including the order of the Certificate Officer dated 28th June, 1955, and the orders of the Additional Collector in Appeals Nos. 93 and 94 of 1955 mentioned in paragraph 9 of the petition, and the orders in revision of the Commissioner, Presidency Division, mentioned in paragraph 10 of the petition are quashed and/or set aside. The respondents are restrained by a writ in the nature of mandamus from giving effect to the same. There will be no order as to costs. I make it clear however that this order will not prevent the respondents from making a proper assessment of sales tax for the relevant period, should it transpire that any goods sold by auction belonged to the auctioneers themselves. Writ issued.
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1960 (11) TMI 98 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... meaning of the words or phrases. The need for this enlargement in the instant case gives us a clue to the author s intention, namely, that he used the word cloth in its narrower sense, and with a view to enlarge its denotation he was impelled to have recourse to the usual method of including . The learned counsel for the assessee suggested that he did so because embroidery work in a handloom pagri would have been otherwise outside the pale of handloom cloth. We are unable to accept the suggestion for the simple reason that pagri has been included both with and without challa. In our opinion, therefore, item 3 of the Notification of 14th April, 1955, when it exempted handloom cloth, it did so in its narrower meaning and Durry was not intended to be included in this exemption. We answer the question referred to us in the affirmative. As there was a legitimate dispute relating to interpretation, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1960 (11) TMI 97 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 5. We already pointed out that it is conceded by Sri Ranganathachari, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the petitioner is the first seller after the import of the goods into the State of Andhra and that he is not exempt from taxation under section 3(3) of the Act.. It therefore follows that the petitioner is liable to pay the tax as assessed by the Commercial Tax Officer which was substantially confirmed by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Guntur. The order of remand passed by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal for an enquiry into the question whether the outside dealer is exempt from taxation under section 3(3) is therefore unnecessary. We set aside the order of remand passed by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal in Tax Appeal No. 617 of 1957 on its file and confirm the order of assessment made by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Guntur. The petitioner shall pay to the respondent the costs of this T.R.C., Advocate s fee Rs. 50. Petition dismissed.
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1960 (11) TMI 96 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Hyderabad State, storing them in the warehouse at Valerpad and himself transporting the commodity as his own goods. On the facts as established, namely, that the whole sale was completed within the State of Hyderabad, it is difficult to believe that there would have been any stipulation as alleged in the affidavit. Having regard to the circumstances of this case, Mohanlal Hargovind v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1955 6 S.T.C. 687 1956 1 M.L.J. (S.C.) 5. is of no avail. The petitioner in the cited case, a Bombay merchant, supplied finished tobacco to the petitioner in Madhya Pradesh. That was not a case of sale having been completed within the State of Bombay and delivery having taken place therein. That was obviously a case where deliveries were made in Madhya Pradesh. Therefore, that case can have no parallel to the case on hand. So, this argument also has to be repelled. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 150. Petition dismissed.
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1960 (11) TMI 95 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... here is no basis for the issue of the notice except the ground that it was unlikely that the assessees would have paid higher rates. We do not think that it is permissible for the assessing authority to resort to such guess for the purpose of revising the assessments already made by the department. The notices are, therefore, quashed. If there is any real basis for the issue of such notices, it is open to him to issue fresh notices. In the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction, the principles enunciated in Manepalli Venkatanarayana v. State of Andhra(1) have to be borne in mind. It is open to the assessing authority to have recourse to section 14(4) of the Act, provided it is within time. For the reasons, the notices issued by the Deputy Commissioner and which relate to W.P. Nos. 423, 424 and 526 of 1959 are quashed. The assessment orders in W.P. Nos. 425, 518 and 519 of 1959 are also quashed. There will be no order as to costs in these writ petitions. Ordered accordingly.
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1960 (11) TMI 94 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... port of the expression sale occasioning the movement of goods is, as already stated, that the delivery outside the State should be under a covenant or as an incident of the contract of sale. This clause contains the same principle as that laid down in the various decisions referred to above and the concept underlying this clause does not contain a different one. Therefore, if the petitioners had failed to prove that the sales in question are invested with inter-State character, they cannot succeed in getting them within, the scope of this clause. So, section 3 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, does not render any assistance to the petitioners. We therefore, feel that the order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal confirming that aof the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes cannot be successfully impeached. It follows that the revision petition has to be dismissed with costs. In the special circumstances of the case, Advocate s fee is fixed at Rs. 500. Petition dismissed.
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1960 (11) TMI 93 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... which, in our opinion, are wide words and take in an order passed dismissing an appeal for default. Sub-section (4) says that after giving both parties to the appeal a reasonable opportunity, the Tribunal could pass such orders as it thinks fit. We feel that there is no justification for reading a restriction into sub-section (6)(a). In our considered judgment, the powers vested in the Tribunal are comprehensive enough to include the power to review even an order passed dismissing an appeal for default. It follows that the Tribunal can review its own order dismissing the appeal for default, the only prerequisite being that certain new facts which were not available to the Tribunal at the material time are placed before it. In the result, the revision case is allowed and the order of the Tribunal dismissing the petition in limine is set aside. The Tribunal will restore the application to its file and consider it on merits. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1960 (11) TMI 92 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e related to a contract to paint a portrait. All that was held was that such a contract was not a contract for the sale of goods but a contract for work and labour. 15.. The contention apparently is that the rice and the bags form an integrated commodity and the exemption under section 5(vi) of the Act should hence apply not merely to the rice but to the bags as well. The exemption under section 5(vi) is only in respect of the sale of foodgrains, and we are not prepared to say that when foodgrains are packed in gunny bags, the gunny bags lose their physical or commercial identity and form a part of the foodgrains themselves. As stated in Varasuki and Co. v. Province of Madras 1951 2 S.T.C. 1., any exemption of any article must be strictly construed and confined to the exemption itself and not extended . 16.. In the light of what is stated above, these petitions have to be dismissed and we do so with costs, Advocate s fee Rs. 150 in each of the two cases. Petitions dismissed.
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