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Showing 141 to 160 of 706 Records
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1965 (11) TMI 28 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... out authority of law or ultra vires the Sales Tax Act and the rules. This court in K. S. Venkataraman and Co. (P.) Ltd. v. State of Madras (Civil Appeal No. 618 of 1963 decided on October 18, 1965) held that the Sales Tax Tribunal could only decide disputes between the assessee and the Commissioner in terms of the provisions of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939, and the question of ultra vires was foreign to its jurisdiction. For the same reason, we must hold that the question raised by the appellant before the High Court could not be decided by the sales tax authorities under the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947. The High Court, therefore, went wrong in dismissing the applications on the ground that the appellant should exhaust his internal remedies under the said Act. The order of the High Court is set aside, the appeals are allowed and the matter is remanded to the High Court for disposal in accordance with law. Costs will abide the result. Appeals allowed. Cases remanded.
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1965 (11) TMI 27 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Tribunal misdirected itself in law in disallowing a part of the bonus paid to the employees ?
Held that:- As the High Court held that the Tribunal, inasmuch as it did not take into consideration the relevant factors in terms of the said proviso, misdirected itself in law in disallowing a part of the bonus paid by the assessee to the employees, it will, therefore, be seen that the High Court answered the reference, as in the view expressed by it a question of law arose for its consideration. Therefore no question of want of jurisdiction arises in this case. The argument of the learned counsel, in substance, was not that the question referred to and answered by the High Court did not raise a question of law, but that the circumstances mentioned by the High Court were also taken into consideration by the Tribunal.
Ihis is not a fit case for interference in exercise of our extraordinary jurisdiction under article 136 of the Constitution as the amount involved in the appeal was a few thousand rupees; and no important question of law arises for our decision. Appeal dismissed
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1965 (11) TMI 26 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the assessments should have been made under section 12 of the Assam Agricultural Income-tax Act ? or under section 13 thereof?
Held that:- On this interpretation of the document, it is manifest that it cannot fall under section 13, for the trustees cannot be described as common managers appointed under any law for the time being in force or under any agreement. They are obviously not receivers, administrators or the like on behalf of persons jointly interested in such land or in the agricultural income derived therefrom.
The High Court was right in holding that the case fell under section 12 and not under section 13 of the Act. The answer given by the High Court to the question referred to it is correct. Appeals dismissed.
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1965 (11) TMI 25 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the assessment of the income of the assessee, other than his salary in the hands of the assessee, as an individual and not as a Hindu undivided family till 11th December, 1952, for the assessment year 1953-54 is valid?
Held that:- We would not be justified in introducing uncertainties and anomalies in the working of the Act by introducing this doctrine for the purpose of section 3 of the Act.
Apart from the difficulty of reconciling this doctrine with the scheme of the Act, Mr. Sastri has not been able to satisfy us that any rights of the son are being affected by not recognising his existence for the purposes of section 3 of the Act till he is actually born. Income-tax is a liability and it could not have been the intention of the legislature to impose a liability on persons yet unborn.
Even if a Hindu undivided family was in existence towards the end of the accounting year, still the whole income received or accrued in the accounting year did not thereby become the assessable income of the Hindu undivided family. Till the child was born the income which accrued to, or arose to, or was received by the assessee was his income. The Act disregards subsequent application of income and profits once they have arisen. When the income and profits arose, they belonged to the assessee, as no Hindu undivided family was then in existence. This position cannot be displaced by the birth of the son, which brought into existence a Hindu undivided family. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (11) TMI 24 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the income made by the Corporation can be assessed under the provisions of section 44D of the Income-tax Act in the hands of the present assessees and, if so, to what extent?
Held that:- The words " by means of a transfer of assets " mean nothing more than " as a result or by virtue or in consequence of the transfer ", therefore, reject the first contention of the learned counsel that the expression " by means of a transfer " in section 44D(1) of the Act means a transfer by an assessee and that, as in the instant case the transfer was by the firm, which was a juristic entity separate from the assessees, the income of the Corporation was not assessable to tax in their hands.
The second contention that the said sub-section can be invoked only if at the time of the transfer the income from the said assets was liable to tax and that, as in the present case, when the transfer of the assets was effected in 1933, the income therefrom was not chargeable to income-tax, for it was foreign income not remitted to India---the said assets fell outside the ken of the said sub-section also rejected as the sub-section was designedly couched in the widest phraseology to prevent evasion of tax in the manner prescribed thereunder. If it was not so, a person can transfer his assets to another in a year they have not yielded any income at all, reserving indirectly the right to enjoy the income therefrom in future or he may transfer his assets when they are not yielding any income, but which may, under a scheme of future development, yield enormous profits. On the other hand, a bona fide transferor is amply protected by sub-section (3) of section 44D of the Act.
As it is recorded in the statement of case that it was conceded before the Tribunal that the assessees had power to enjoy the income of the assets transferred within the meaning of section 44D(1) of the Act. In the circumstances, the High Court rightly held that the assessees had the power to enjoy the income within the meaning of section 44D(1) of the Act. The Tribunal found as a fact on the material placed before it that the transfer was to avoid the liability to taxation ; and that being a finding of fact, the High Court rightly accepted it. The correctness of the said finding of fact cannot be permitted to be canvassed in these appeals. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (11) TMI 23 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the sums of ₹ 66,790 and ₹ 3,35,371 are assessable under section 10 for the assessment years 1951-52 and 1952-53 ?
Held that:- In the present case, the covenant was an independent obligation undertaken by the assessee not to compete with the new agents in the same field for a specified period. It came into operation only after the agency was terminated. It was wholly unconnected with the assessee's agency termination. We, therefore, hold that that part of the compensation attributable to the restrictive covenant was a capital receipt and hence not assessable to tax.
The answer to the question referred to the High Court is that only such part of the sums of ₹ 66,790 and ₹ 3,35,371 as is attributable to the loss of the agency is assessable under section 10 of the Act for the assessment years 1951-52 and 1952-53. We accordingly modify the answer given by the High Court in that regard. Appeal allowed in part.
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1965 (11) TMI 22 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, on the facts found, it could be said that the company had been carrying on business in the two accounting years?
Held that:- The company had ceased to carry on business and we would answer the first question in the negative. The appeals must be allowed
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1965 (11) TMI 21 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Demand - In-bond movement ... ... ... ... ..... plication and the transport permit to the officer in charge of such warehouse and the officer incharge, in his turn, after taking account of the goods, complete the re-warehousing certificate on the duplicate and triplicate application and return the triplicate to the consignee for depatch to the consignor. In the instant case, the provisions contained in sub-clause 3 of Rule 156 of the rules were never complied with. The petitioner, therefore, naturally could not comply with the provisions of sub-clause 4 of Rule 156-A. That being the position, Rule 156-B which provides for a penalty of failure to present triplicate application could not be attracted in the instant case. It follows that no action against the petitioner can be taken under Rule 156-B of the Central Excise Rules, and no duty can be demanded from the petitioner. I, therefore, allow the petition with costs and direct the opposite parties not to demand any duty from the petitioner in respect of tobacco in dispute.
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1965 (11) TMI 20 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
... ... ... ... ..... ves to dispose of the contention relevant to W.P. No. 287 of 1963. 8.The earlier notification of 1956 is not so elaborately worded as the later notification. It merely states that where the total output of a manufacturer of such items as indicated does not exceed 50 tons, such output shall be wholly exempt from the excise duty leviable thereon. The expression leviable thereon, attracts the application of Rule 9, for the leviability is strictly at the time of clearance from the factory. It should follow that a like interpretation as that accorded to the notification of 1960 should be given in this case also, for the computation of the duty payable can be made only on the application of the exemption provision. The exemption cannot be therefore claimed except at the time when the duty is leviable, that is to say, at the time of the clearance. It follows that the claim made in N.P. No. 286 of 1963 has also to fail. The petitions are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1965 (11) TMI 19 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Valuation (Central Excise) - Sole Selling Agents/Stockists - Demand ... ... ... ... ..... all. Part of the period beginning from December 17, 1956 to June 3, 1958, covered by the notice dated 18th July 1958, is barred by limitation under Rule 10. The entire period June 4, 1958 to May 27, 1959, covered by the notice dated July 18,1958, is barred by limitation unless saved by the bond I might have directed severance of the barred period from the period not barred and saved part of the demand, where I otherwise inclined to affirm the demands. I have, however, expressed the view that the re-assessments based on prices charged by Santlal Bansidhar were bad because these prices cannot be considered as the prices in the nearest wholesale market. I have also been unable to accept the theory of provisional assessment in respect of the bulk of the goods covered by the demand. 23.I, therefore, make the Rule absolute and quash the demands. The respondents are directed by a mandate to re-adjust the petitioners current account accordingly. I, however, make no order as to costs.
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1965 (11) TMI 18 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Natural Justice ... ... ... ... ..... er firm and asked its representative to distinguish the imported buttons from samples said to have been taken out from consignments of alleged Japanese origin. It is said that before the Deputy Collector, the representative of the petitioner firm failed to find out any distinction. That fact was taken into consideration by the respondent Collector, who called the petitioner for a second hearing, although nothing like that happened before the Collector. In my opinion, when one hears and another passes the penal order, on evidence collected by the other, there are chances of miscarriage of justice and the adoption of such a procedure should not be encouraged. I do not, however, make much of this because the order must be set aside, in any event, on the ground of the violation of the principles of natural justice. 12.I, therefore, make this Rule absolute, without prejudice to rights of the respondents to proceed against the petitioner firm afresh. Let a writ of certiorari issue.
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1965 (11) TMI 17 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA
Statute - Taxing Statute - Removal of goods - Assessment - Revision ... ... ... ... ..... December, 1961 (Annexure III), we must quash not only the orders of the Superintendent of Excise but also the appellate order of the Collector of Central Excise, Patna, and the order under revision passed by the Government of India (Annexure III). It does not appear that the appellate authority gave the petitioner an opportunity of being heard before disposing of the appeal. 16.For these reasons, I would quash the orders of the Superintendent of Central Excise dated the 13th March, 1961 and 17th March, 1961 (Annexures I and II), the appellate order of the Collector of Central Excise dated 30th June, 1961 (Annexure II-A) and the order of the Central Government in the Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue) and direct the Collector of Central Excise, Patna, to rehear the appeal of the petitioner after giving him a reasonable opportunity of representing his case and dispose it of according to law. There will be no order for costs. 17. Assent per S.N.P. Singh, J. . - I agree.
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1965 (11) TMI 16 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Income from the trust - exemption from income-tax under section 4(3)(i) of the Indian Income-tax Act
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1965 (11) TMI 15 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Firm - registration - existaence of partnership ... ... ... ... ..... 959, to March 31, 1960, and, in the light of the decision of the Punjab High Court, the firm will not be entitled to registration under section 26A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. Quite apart from this, the application for registration mentions the date of admittance to partnership as March 1, 1959, and as it has not been established that the partnership was, as a matter of fact, created on that date, we cannot but hold that the Appellate Tribunal was right in affirming the refusal of registration by the Income-tax Officer by his order dated March 21, 1961. In the light of what is stated above, the question referred has to be answered against the assessee and in favour of the department. We do so but, in the circumstances of the case, without any order as to costs. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar will be sent to the Appellate Tribunal as required by sub-section (5) of section 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922
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1965 (11) TMI 14 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Kerala Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1950 - held that benefit of s. 3(3) of the Agrl. IT Act, 1950, is also available in the matter of assessment of the family of which the petitioner is the head
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1965 (11) TMI 13 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Order u/s. 23A of Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 was not an order of assessment and the limitation prescribed in s. 34(3) cannot apply to such an order.
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1965 (11) TMI 12 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Expenditure on the maintenance of the dependants, within the intendment of allotment would fall within the scope of s. 4(ii) Expenditure Tax Act, 1957
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1965 (11) TMI 11 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Section 4(1)(a) of the IT Act, 1922 - Whether certain sale proceeds received by the assessee in respect of sales effected to British Indian buyers were received in British India or outside British India - sale proceeds must be held to have been received by the assessee in Wankaner where the cheques were delivered to the assessee
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1965 (11) TMI 10 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Where there only existed a coparcener and his wife and it was held that they constituted a HUF and the assessment was required to be made in that status
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1965 (11) TMI 9 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Inclusion of interest in the assessment was not legal and valid - amount paid as interest by the partnership firm is not liable to be included in the assessment of the assessee unless the provisions of s. 16(3) are attracted - Tribunal is not justified in holding that the properties received by an issueless male at a partition between coparceners would be his individual properties and not that of the HUF of himself and his wife
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