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Case Laws
Showing 161 to 180 of 706 Records
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1965 (11) TMI 8 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Net Wealth - Interest of the assessee in the corpus is neither a spes successionis nor a contingent interest dependent on the assessee being alive on March 31, 1987, but is a vested interest and, therefore, capable of valuation and should be valued as such.
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1965 (11) TMI 7 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
Income-tax authorities are not authorised by s. 46(5A) to decide any bona fide dispute about the factum of the amount being available with the garnishee or not - further, ITO have jurisdiction to decide the liability of the garnishee to the assessee in case the liability itself is factually in dispute
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1965 (11) TMI 6 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Assessee threw his properties into common hotchpot of the family - held that the sitting fees received by the assessee during the accounting year are chargeable to tax in the hands of the HUF
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1965 (11) TMI 5 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Net wealth - Cash distributed amongst coparceners on last day of previous year - not includible in the total wealth of the assessee
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1965 (11) TMI 4 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Net wealth - Cash distributed amongst coparceners on last day of previous year - not includible in the total wealth of the assessee for the assessment year 1959-60
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1965 (11) TMI 3 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Tribuanl refused to entertain the additional ground of appeal - leave can be granted if the new plea does not require a further investigation into facts which are not already on record - leave can be granted does not mean that the leave must be granted when the circumstances exist - Tribunal exercised their discretion judicially in refusing to entertain the additional ground of appeal and in deciding it
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1965 (11) TMI 2 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Whether, having regard to the powers and the jurisdiction of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner under section 31 of the Income-tax Act, it is open to him to treat the sum of Rs. 30,000 as income from undisclosed sources when it was treated by the Income-tax Officer as income from speculation
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1965 (11) TMI 1 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Wealth Tax - trust properties - application of sub-section (4) of section 21 ... ... ... ... ..... to whether that decision was in any way contrary to the interpretation placed upon section 41(1) of the Income-tax Act in the Patna case above referred to. But the decision in Mahalaxmiwala s case does not assist the learned Advocate-General, nor does it carry further the interpretation suggested by him of the provisions of either section 41(1) of the Income-tax Act or sections 21(1) and 21(4) of the present Act. In our view, the construction placed by the Tribunal on the provisions of section 21 was not correct. We are also of the opinion that the number of beneficiaries as also their shares were both known and determinate within the meaning of sub-section (1) of section 21 and therefore the application of sub-section (4) of section 21 by the Wealth-tax Officer was erroneous. In that view, our answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative. The Commissioner of Wealth-tax will pay the costs of this reference to the applicants. Question answered in the affirmative
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1965 (10) TMI 89 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ing persons like the petitioners, and on the individual question of each one of them. In this connection, it is obvious that when the Union Home Minister spoke in the first person plural, he was speaking for the Union Government and the State Government as well, and when he spoke in the first person singular, he was referring to cases with which he was concerned as the Union Home Minister, and that would take in cases of persons whose detention has been ordered by the Union Government. There is, therefore, no inconsistency or conflict between the statements of the Union Home Minister and the affidavit of the Chief Minister of Madras. That being so, we are satisfied that there is no substance in the grievance made by Mr. Chatterjee that the impugned orders of detention passed against the petitioners were made either mala fide or without the proper satisfaction of the detaining authority. 34. In the result, both the writ petitions fail and are dismissed. 35. Petition dismissed.
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1965 (10) TMI 88 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Court I think the view taken by the Bombay High Court in Hiralal Nawalram's case ILR 32 Bom 505(FB) should be preferred to the view taken by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Moreover the facts of the present case are also more akin to the facts in Hiralal Nawalram's case ILR 32 Bom 505(FB) than to those in (FB). (58)I think the answer in the question referred to us should be as follows -- "The deed in question may be regarded as a conveyance under Article 19 of the Schedule to the Mysore Stamp Act 1957 hence it is unnecessary to consider whether the deed may also he regarded as a release under Article 44 of the said Schedule as under Section 6 of the Act the deed is chargeable to the higher Stamp duty as a conveyance under Article 19 of the said Schedule. (59) The papers will now be returned for being placed before the Division Bench for disposal of the Writ Petition. Hegde, J. (60) 'I agree' Tukol, J. (61) I agree' (62) Reference answered.
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1965 (10) TMI 87 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... iff, for it has and can have no bearing on the question of limitation applicable to the plaintiff's suit. It is correct that the contract between the parties in this case did become void, or let us say was discovered to be void later, but the question still remains when it was discovered to be void the plaint is wholly silent on the point. As we are inclined to think, the contract became void on the coming into force of the Constitution on the 26th of January, 1950, and must have also been discovered to be void at that very time, for the Constitution on this point spoke with no uncertain voice and it was hardly a matter of such legal complexity that the plaintiff or his legal advisers should not have been in a position to ascertain the correct state of law. In this view also the plaintiff cannot escape the bar of limitation. 16. For the reasons mentioned above, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. Under the circumstances, we make no order as to costs of this appeal.
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1965 (10) TMI 86 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... re would be a negative burden on the assessee to disclose non-relevant facts. That cannot be the correct interpretation of clause (a) of section 34(1). A reason to believe that there was escarpment of assessment founded on a fact which is not a primary fact, which did not actually exist and in consequence of which there was actually no escapement cannot confer jurisdiction for invoking the provisions of clause (a). In such a case there is no ground or material which can give raise to reason to believe on the part of the Income Tax Officer that there was non-assessment as a result of non-disclosure 20. In the view we take of clause (a) of section 34(1) we must come to the conclusion that the action of the Income Tax Officer in initiating the proceedings under clause (a) was without jurisdiction and was, therefore, bad in law. Accordingly, out answer is in the negative. The Commissioner will pay to the assessee the costs of this reference. 21. Question answered in the negative.
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1965 (10) TMI 85 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... alt with the goods after the smuggling was over and was not in any way concerned with actual smuggling. He would therefore be guilty under s. 167(81) of the Act. We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the order the acquittal made by the High Court, restore the order of the Presidency Magistrate and confirm the sentence passed on Sitaram Agarwala by the Magistrate. 34. It also follows on facts found that Wang Chit Khaw is guilty under s. 167(81) inasmuch as he was dealing with prohibited or restricted goods and had the necessary knowledge and intent as required under that section. We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court, restore that of the Presidency Magistrate and confirm the sentence passed on him by the Magistrate. ORDER 35. In accordance with the opinion of the majority the appeals are allowed, the orders of the High Court are set aside, the orders of the Presidency Magistrate are restored and the sentences on the respondents are confirmed.
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1965 (10) TMI 84 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o relies on the Medicinal and Toilet Preparations (Excise Duties) Act No. 16 of 1955, in this Court. It is true that the appellant stated in its writ petition that it was holding a licence under the 1955-Act; but there was no clear averment in the petition that chloral hydrate was being manufactured as a medicinal preparation under the 1955-Act. The licence which has been produced shows that chloral hydrate is being manufactured under the Drugs Act and the rules framed thereunder. Further the judgment of the High Court shows that no argument was raised before it to the effect that chloral hydrate was a medicinal preparation under the 1955-Act. In the circumstances we are not prepared to allow the appellant to raise this point for the first time before us, even though there was some kind of denial on this point by the State Government in its affidavit to which we have already referred. 14. In the result the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. 15. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (10) TMI 83 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that the sureties must be such persons as can in all cases be imprisoned in case of default. It must, therefore, be held that the learned Additional Sessions Judge was right in excluding artificial persons from the purview of the relevant provisions. 7. The learned counsel for the State has also taken an objection that by reason of section 502 of the Criminal Procedure Code only the sureties could apply to the Magistrate to discharge the bond executed by them. The accused persons were, according to the learned counsel, not competent to make the said application. In view of my decision on the merits I need not decide this question. 8. A further objection has been taken on behalf of the respondents that the present revision is barred by time. In the circumstances, it is not necessary to deal with the objection as to limitation, particularly because it appears to be a fit case for condonation of delay even if any. 9. In the result, the revision petitions fail and are dismissed.
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1965 (10) TMI 82 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... citor-General who appeared on behalf of the Assam Oil CO. In the present Case, the respondent did not give up any previous job in order to take service under the appellant. She had worked for a period of about 5 months with the appellant. Her appointment with the appellant was somewhat unusual because it was made on the recommendation of Sri B. Patnaik, the.. then Chief Minister of Orissa. There are no special circumstances for 'awarding compensation to two years' salary. Having regard to these considerations we are of opinion that the amount of compensation awarded by the. Labour Court to the respondent should be reduced and. the respondent should be granted a sum of ₹ 4,800 as compensation. She should also be paid 6% interest from the date of order of the Labour Court till the date of payment. We -accordingly modify the award of the Labour Court dated May 24, 1963 and allow the appeal to this extent. There will be no order as- to costs. Appeal allowed in part.
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1965 (10) TMI 81 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ot; In our view, this decision of the Supreme Court furnishes a complete answer to the question referred to us. It makes if deal that there is power of "review" both in cases where judgment has been delivered but not signed and cases in which judgment has been delivered, signed and scaled in the former case the power to alter or amend or even to change completely is unlimited provided notice is given to the parties and they are heard be before the proposed change is made, while in the latter case the power is limited and review is permitted only on very narrow grounds. We are therefore, of the view that (AIR 1961 All 326 1961 All LJ 244), ('supra) was rightly decided and our answer to the question referred to us is as follows "A judgment which has been orally dictated in open Court can be completely changed before it is signed and sealed provided notice is given to all parties concerned and they are heard before the change is made." Question answered.
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1965 (10) TMI 80 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ey-lending and money-lenders) has to be mentioned and rejected. As the subject of the annuity deposit provisions is capable of being comprehended in the entry relating to taxes on income I do not feel called upon to invoke the aid of entry No. 97 by assuming that no entry covers such provisions. This will be a fundamental error in approach to such problems. The provisions are neither colourable nor discriminatory. The apply to upper income groups and this does not lead to discrimination. They are not colourable because, though called annuity deposits, they only defer payment of tax on part of the assessable income and the name does not matter at all. Instead of charging income-tax on the amount forthwith the amounts is ordered to be kept in deposit with Government, one-tenth being returned with interest every year. The returned amount then bears the tax. An election once made is final. 20. I agree, therefore, that the petition be dismissed with costs. 21. Petition dismissed.
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1965 (10) TMI 79 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... reason of any rule of res judicata or on analogy that the parity owner firm is entitled to invoke Art. 32 of the Constitution when it possesses no right of property in the leaves. It has only a contract in its favour and that is to a right of property. No doubt the Adhiniyam indirectly overreaches the decision of this Court but that, in any open to he State Legislature provided it passes a valid law to that effect. The law is not challenged as invalid and it must therefore apply to the petitioner firm, as to any other person. The petitioner firm cannot take shelter of Explanation I till it buys leaves from Government under the Adhiniyam and the Niyamavali. 21. In our judgment the rights of the petitioner firm such as they were, must be held to be no available to it. The petitioner firm must buy its leaves like any person. The petition must, therefore, fail. It will be dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case there will be no orders as to cost. 22. Petition dismissed.
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1965 (10) TMI 78 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... r a transaction which falls within the Explanation to article 286(1)(a) before it was amended by the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act does not affect the jurisdiction of the taxing authority. It is merely a question of interpretation of the contract in the light of the statute and the sales-tax authorities are entitled to entertain the objection, if it be raised before them, that the transaction was not taxable because the State had no power to legislate in respect of an Explanation sale. But in this case, that stage was never reached. The taxpayers in the belief that they were liable to pay tax paid advance tax before any orders of assessment were made. Thereafter realising that they had committed a mistake filed suits for refund. Thereby they were seeking to obtain orders of refund of payments made under a mistake of law they were not seeking to set aside any order of assessment. 18. We agree thereof that the appeals should be dismissed with costs. 19. Appeals dismissed.
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