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Showing 161 to 180 of 229 Records
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1985 (3) TMI 70 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Acquittal - Smuggled goods
... ... ... ... ..... t set aside the acquittal. If in closely balancing the probabilities of a case, two views, one indicating conviction and the other indicating acquittal, were reasonably possible the High Court would not set aside the acquittal. In Dhan Kumar v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, AIR 1979 SC 1782, 1979 Cr.L.J. 1342 it was reiterated that if two views on the defence are reasonably possible, one favouring acquittal and the other conviction, the High Court should not reverse the order of acquittal. Similarly, in Babu v. State of U. P.-AIR 1983 SC 308 1983 Cr. L.J. 334 it was held that if two views are possible the High Court should not interfere with acquittal, even if the other view was possible, as the trial Court had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses. 15. Applying the foregoing principles of law we consider it safe to uphold the judgment of acquittal which we hereby do. The appeal is accordingly found to be without merit and it is dismissed. Hansaria, J.-I agree.
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1985 (3) TMI 69 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Valuation - Trade discount - Uniformity not necessary ... ... ... ... ..... trade discount, by whatever name it is called, is allowed by the manufacturer to its customers under the terms of sale or agreement, the amount has got to be deducted from the sale price before arriving at the assessable value of the product provided the allowance and the nature of the discount should be known at or prior to the removal of the goods. In the present case, the price list prepared by the respondents discloses that a particular percentage of the total price will be allowed as discount if the payment is made in cash or within a certain time and, therefore, it should be taken that the purchasers are aware of the said discount allowed depending upon when the payment of the price is made Therefore, cash discount is also admissible irrespective of whether each customer avails of the said discount or not. 8. Thus, all the contentions advanced on behalf of the appellants fail and the writ appeals are, therefore, dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1985 (3) TMI 68 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Cosmetics and toilet preparations - Classification of goods - Writ jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... y sense include a bath oil which is applied to the entire body or portions of the body before bath. It is the specific case of the respondent that in the commercial field the thailams manufactured by it are not treated as hair oils much less perfumed hair oils, as the thailams are intended for use for cooling the body as such. These thailams could never be considered as an item of cosmetic or toilet preparation. 6. The learned Counsel for the appellants then refers to the report of the Chief Chemist as indicating that the thailams prepared by the respondent are perfumed hair oils. But a perusal of the said report indicates that he had got a doubt as to the tax liability on the product and he states that the picture of the woman with luxuriant hair on the label may be taken to show the thailams as hair oils. In this view of the matter, we do not see any justification for interfering with the order of the learned single Judge. The writ appeal is therefore dismissed with costs.
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1985 (3) TMI 67 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
PVC coated periglass sleevings or silicon elastomer coated glass sleevings ... ... ... ... ..... d that the articles in question do not fall within Item 53 of the Customs Tariff, the question will arise as to under what tariff item they will fall. It is for that purpose, the learned single Judge had remitted the matter to the authorities concerned. The order of Mohan J. has, therefore, to be upheld. The writ appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500 one set. The matter has been posted before us for being mentioned. It is pointed out by the learned Counsel on either side that because of the pendecy of the appeals, no orders could be passed by the authorities in pursuance of the earlier order passed by the learned Single Judge and that as such this court may fix a time limit for the disposal of the matter finally, as directed by the learned Single Judge. We direct the third respondent to whom the matter has been remitted by the learned Single Judge to pass final orders in the matter classifying the goods in question within six months from this day.
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1985 (3) TMI 66 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Classification list and price list - Writ jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... only upon existence of the conditions precedent therefor and the authority under the Act cannot be permitted, as it were, to collect material for its initiation by directing wholesale production of documents and making a roving and fishing enquiry for the purpose. After all, the provisions of the Act including Section 14, are meant to be administered fairly with a view to ensure the interest of the revenue but without causing unnecessary harassment to the assessee. CONCLUSION 19. We have come to the conclusion, for the aforesaid reasons, that the summons dated September 4, 1984 (Annexure 7 to the writ petition) deserve to be quashed. We quash it. It will, however, be open to the Assistant Collector to proceed afresh in accordance with law and require the Glass Works to produce for his perusal such documents as are material, albeit by issuing summons under Section 14, if occasion arises therefor. The petition succeeds in these terms. Parties are left to bear their own costs.
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1985 (3) TMI 65 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
Rule 10 of Central Excise ... ... ... ... ..... 10 does not appeal to us. 9. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that the order passed by the Assistant Collector, vide Annexure H should be struck down as it was passed without authority of law. As we are inclined to accept the first ground of the petitioners, we do not propose to go into discussion of the other grounds which have been taken by the petitioners. 10. The petition is allowed. The notice, Annexure D , dated 1-8-1978 and the order, Annexure H , dated 29-6-1984 passed by the Assistant Collector are declared to be without any authority of law and, therefore, they are quashed. Rule is accordingly made absolute, with no order as to costs. 11. The learned Standing Counsel Mr. S.R. Shah prays for a certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. In our opinion, this matter does not involve any question of law of general importance required to be decided by the Supreme Court and, therefore, we are not inclined to grant that request. The request is rejected.
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1985 (3) TMI 64 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Inquiry and investigation - Confession ... ... ... ... ..... ld also keep in view that if the presence of a lawyer during examination or interrogation is refused, the ultimate statements recorded .......... will become questionable as not voluntary or were statements whichwere obtained under duress and thereby making them not reliable statements in any proceeding. 4. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the view that the appeal and the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed and they are accordingly dismissed W.A. No. 114 of 1985 and W.P. 65, 510 and 511 of 1985 - V. Ramaswami, J Learned Counsel for the petitioners makes an oral request under Article 134-A of the Constitution of India for grant of leave to appeal to Supreme Court. We are not satisfied that any substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution arises out of the order or that any substantial questions of law of general importance which need be decided by the Supreme Court arise in this case. Accordingly, we reject the request for grant of leave.
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1985 (3) TMI 63 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE
Refund admissible if it is not proved that the burden of levy was passed on to the consumers ... ... ... ... ..... wards on flush doors under Tariff Item No. 16-B of the Act and excise duty payable thereto under residuary Item No. 68 till Entry No. 16-B of the Act was amended by including flush doors also in that entry. But notwithstanding this declaration, the claim of the petitioner for refund of difference of excise duty paid for the periods prior to 1-1-1978 is dismissed as barred by time. (ii) I direct the respondents to compute the difference of excise duty paid by the petitioner for the period from 1-1-1978 on the basis of the above declaration and refund the same, however exercising the first option to adjust those amounts to any of the amounts that are due from the petitioner under the Act with all such expedition as is possible in the circumstances of the case and in any event within 4 months from the date of receipt of this order. 24. Writ petition is disposed of in the above terms. But in view of their decided success and failure, I direct the parties to bear their own costs.
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1985 (3) TMI 62 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the plywood manufactured by the Respondent and utilised by the respondent in manufacturing plywood circles to be used as component parts of packing material for wires and cables is exigible to excise duty under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944?
Held that:- Item 16B makes it clear that plywood in sheets, blocks, boards or the like attracts excise duty. A special provision by way of exception is made only in the case of plywood for tea-chests when cut to size in panels or shooks and packed in sets. The provision in Item 16B that plywood in sheets, blocks and board or the like, which attracts duty is indeed in very broad terms and the expression `like' does necessarily include circles. There is nothing to indicate in this item that plywood must be trimmed or sanded. Plywood is manufactured as soon as it comes out of the press, though the same may not be trimmed or sanded out of which circles are to be produced. There is nothing to indicate that plywood in panel stage, not trimmed and not sanded, is not known in the market as plywood. Plywood when it comes out of the press at the panel stage, therefore, clearly falls within Item 16B of the First Schedule, and the authorities concerned were, therefore, justified in seeking to levy duty on plywood at the panel stage. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court was in error in allowing the writ petition and in quashing the said two Notices. We must, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court holding that the two notices issued which were quashed by the High Court, are valid and lawful.
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1985 (3) TMI 61 - SUPREME COURT
Whether a female who inherits a share in a joint family property by reason of the death of a male member of the family ceases to be member of the family?
Held that:- This case has to be treated as an authority for the position that when a female member who inherits an interest in the joint family property under section 6 of the Act files a suit for partition expressing her willingness to go out of the family, she would be entitled to get both the interest she has inherited and the share which would have been notionally allotted to her as stated in Explanation I to section 6 of the Act.
In the instant case, the theory that there was family settlement is not pressed before us. There was no action taken by either of the two females concerned in the case to become divided from the remaining members of the family. It should, therefore, be held that notwithstanding the death of Sham Rao, the remaining members of the family continued to hold the family properties together though the individual interest of the female members thereof in the family properties had become fixed. Narayan Rao, Sulochanabai and Gangabai alias Taibai were together entitled to retain only one unit of ceiling area. In the result, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer which was affirmed by the Tribunal is restored. Appeal allowed.
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1985 (3) TMI 60 - SUPREME COURT
Whether or not a clear allegation of entrustment and misappropriation of properties was made by the appellant in her complaint?
Whether the High Court justified in quashing the complaint at that stage?
Held that:- The allegations of the complainant in this appeal and the appeals before the Allahabad and the Punjab and Haryana High Court show that it is not so but is pure figment of the High Courts' imagination as a result of which the High Courts completely shut their eyes to the fact that the husband could also be guilty under s. 405/406, IPC, in view of the clear allegations made in the complaint. In other words, the High Courts simply refuse to believe that there can be any such entrustment and even if it is so, no offence is committed. Such an approach amounts to a serious distortion of the criminal law, resulting in perpetrating grave and substantial miscarriage of justice to the wife at the hands of the High Courts. We cannot countenance such a wrong and perverse approach.
For the reasons given above, we are satisfied that as the complaint prima facie disclosed an offence of criminal breach of trust, as defined in s. 405/406 of the Indian Penal Code, the High Court was not justified in quashing the complaint. Appeal allowed, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore the complaint filed by the appellant and direct that the accused may be summoned, if not already summoned, and put on trial in accordance with law.
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1985 (3) TMI 59 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Reference, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... efore this court, it is settled law that if the answer to the questions referred to us by the Tribunal in the instant reference goes in favour of the assessee, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal will have to decide the appeal before it in pursuance of and in the light of the answers given by this court. On the same principle as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Gurdwara Parbhandhak Committee, AIR 1955 SC 576, any decision by the WTO in pursuance of the order of remand passed by the AAC and affirmed by the Tribunal shall be subject to the result of the opinion of this court which will have to be given effect to by the Tribunal. It is for this reason that we are of the opinion that the instant reference will not become infructuous even if the WTO passes a fresh order of assessment in pursuance of the aforesaid order of remand. For these reasons, we are of the opinion that the prayer contained in the present application cannot be granted. It is accordingly dismissed.
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1985 (3) TMI 58 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... expenses, or in any case, the expenses had been incurred for a dual purpose and, therefore, do not qualify for an allowance under s. 37(1) of the Act. That section does not permit such an allowance from the point of view of the indirect advantages that may be secured as a result of the expenditure. Indeed, the section is totally silent with reference to the advantages secured as a result of the expenditure. Therefore, in the absence of materials with reference to the securing of advantages, it cannot be presumed that such advantages resulted to the assessee in its business activities as result of the foreign tour undertaken by the wife of the partner of the assessee and that would justify the allowance of the expenditure as one appropriately falling under s. 37(1) of the Act. In view of the foregoing, we answer the questions referred to us in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. The assessee will pay the costs of this reference to the Department. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1985 (3) TMI 57 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Burden Of Proof, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... mpugned assessment proceedings, the Tribunal itself (vide annex. C) had unequivocally held that the explanation offered by the assessee was rightly rejected by the taxing authorities. However, in the penalty proceedings, the Tribunal, while not in any way deviating from the earlier finding of rejection of the explanation, has proceeded to observe that since the Revenue had not been able to show any specific item of omission of sales or purchases, the penalty imposed could not be sustained. Clearly enough, once the Explanation to s. 271(1)(c) was attracted, no burden lay on the Revenue and indeed it was squarely on the shoulders of the assessee which had remained undischarged. The Tribunal s setting aside of the penalty order was thus plainly unwarranted. Accordingly, we answer the question of law referred to us (recorded at the end of paragraph 3 above) in the negative, that is, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. UDAY SINHA J.-I agree. NAZIR AHMAD J.-I agree.
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1985 (3) TMI 56 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Determination Of Fair Market Value Of Property ... ... ... ... ..... f the property in three names, and Form No. 37-G discloses only one transfer and not three as claimed by the transferee. So far as the deed is concerned, there is nothing wrong if a common deed is drawn up between the transferor and several transferees. On the evidence led before the Competent Authority, he found that since the consideration for the shares of Ghanshyam Das and Dwarka Das was also given by Jumramal, there was one sale deed and, therefore, the sale deed having been executed for a price less than the fair market value, was liable to be cancelled. This aspect of the matter was not touched by the Tribunal. Consideration of this question requires reappraisal of evidence led by the parties. We, accordingly, think it appropriate to remand this controversy as well. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment of the Tribunal is set aside. The appeal is sent back to it for a fresh decision in accordance with law. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1985 (3) TMI 55 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... t this contention. The question of ascertaining the average amount of capital employed in the business during any computation period for the purpose of relief under s. 84 is dealt with by rule 19(5). There is obviously difference of opinion between the ITO and the Audit Department as to the true meaning and content of rule 19(5). By the audit note, the Audit Department wanted the ITO to construe rule 19(5) according to the construction placed by the Audit Department. It is, therefore, clearly a case where an error of law is sought to be pointed out to the ITO, and, in our view, this case would be squarely covered by the decision in Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society v. CIT 1979 119 ITR 996 (SC). Having regard to the view which we have taken, we do not find any error in the view taken by the Tribunal. The questions referred to us in all the four cases are, therefore, answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. Assessee to get the costs in these cases-one set.
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1985 (3) TMI 54 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Additional Grounds, Assessee's Appeal, Export Market Development Allowance, Tribunal ... ... ... ... ..... stion further in CIT v. Cellulose Products of India Ltd. 1985 151 ITR 499 and the earlier decision of the said High Court in Orient Prospecting Co. 1983 141 ITR 301, has to be considered in the light of the later Full Bench decision. So far as this court is concerned, the matter appears to be covered by a judgment delivered by this Bench in Income-tax Reference No. 303 of 1982 (intituled Madhu Jayanti Private Limited v. CIT) on March 20, 1985 In this judgment, almost all the decisions cited by the Revenue in the instant case as noted above have been considered. Following the said decision, we answer the said question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. Learned advocate for the Revenue made an oral application for a certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. In our view, the matter being concluded by a decision of the Supreme Court, we refuse such leave. The oral application is rejected. AJIT K. SENGUPTA J.-I agree.
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1985 (3) TMI 53 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Additional Grounds, Assessee's Appeal, Export Market Development Allowance, Tribunal ... ... ... ... ..... s. 37 of the Act. We hold that the decision of the Supreme Court in Gurjargravures case 1978 111 ITR 1 has no application to the facts before us. Following the decision of the Supreme Court in Hukumchand Jute Mills Ltd. s case 1967 63 ITR 232, we hold that the subject-matter of the appeal before the Tribunal was the claim of the assessee under s. 35B of the said Act in which the assessee was entitled to include new items. We agree with respect with the view expressed by a Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Cellulose Products of India Ltd. s case 1985 151 ITR 499, that the subject matter of the appeal is a relevant factor to be considered when additional grounds are sought to be raised in an appeal. For the above reasons, we answer question No. 1 in the negative and in favour of the assessee. In view of our answer to question No. 1, no answer is called for question No. 2 and we decline to answer the same. There will be no order as to costs. AJIT K. SENGUPTA J.- I agree.
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1985 (3) TMI 52 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Income, Sales Tax Refund, Unclaimed Balances ... ... ... ... ..... unt, it could not be treated as its trading receipts. The submission has only got to be stated to be rejected. The dictum of the Supreme Court in Chowringhee Sales Bureau (P.) Ltd. v. CIT 1973 87 ITR 542, at paragraph 13, is a complete answer to this submission. For all the reasons stated above, I am definitely of the view that sales tax refunded to the assessee and not returned to the dealers must be held to be a trading receipt of the assessee. The same must be the position in regard to the sum of Rs. 1,49,954 realised by the assessee for payment to the Indian Sugar Syndicate, but not paid till the assessment year in question. Both items must, therefore, be held to be trading receipts of the assessee. Both the questions referred to this court must, therefore, be answered in the affirmative, against the assessee and in favour of the Department. The reference is thus disposed of with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 250 payable by the assessee to the Department. NAZIR AHMAD J.-I agree.
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1985 (3) TMI 51 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Delay In Filing Form No. 12, Firm, Registration ... ... ... ... ..... roduction of what was observed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and as the Tribunal chose to remand the matter, it did not decide it on merits and, therefore, it could not be said that this part of the question arises out of the order of the Tribunal. It is plain that the second part of the first question, i.e., part (b) does not arise out of the order and, therefore, it is not necessary for this court to answer that question. So far as the first part of the question, i.e., part (a), is concerned, it is answered in the affirmative that the Tribunal was justified in directing the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) to decide the question of status afresh. The rest of this question does not arise from the order and, therefore, is not necessary to be answered. The question No. (ii) admittedly is redundant in view of our answer to the first question. The reference is answered accordingly. In the circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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