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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 32 of 32 Records
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1953 (4) TMI 19 - SUPREME COURT
Whether by reason of the proceedings taken by the sea Customs Authorities the appellant could be said to have been prosecuted and punished for the same offence with which he was charged in the Court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay?
Held that:- The prosecution of Jagjit Singh therefore before the Magistrate for the offences under sections 332 and 353 and sections 147 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code is not in violation of article 20 (2) or article 21 of the Constitution and must therefore proceed.
The result therefore is that the Petition No. 170 of 1961 filed by Jagjit Singh will be allowed only to the extent that the appropriate writ of prohibition shall issue against the respondent in regard to his prosecution for having committed a jail offence in resorting to hunger strike, but his prosecution under sections 332 and 353 and sections 147 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code will not be affected by this order. The Petitions Nos. 171 of 1951 and 172 of 1951 filed by Vidya Rattan and Parma Nand respectively will be accepted and the appropriate writs of prohibition shall issue against the respondent as prayed for therein. Appeal No. 81 dismissed.
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1953 (4) TMI 18 - SAURASHTRA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... when can an order be deemed to have been made or passed and that question cannot be decided by a comparison of some other provisions. A similar contention made in Muthiah Chettiar s case(1) was rejected by the learned Chief Justice. Another contention made by the Advocate-General was that Sec- tion 12(3) of the Limitation Act would apply, by virtue of Section 29 of the Limitation Act and that the time taken for obtaining the copy of the order should be excluded. In the view we are taking on the first point, this question is not material for a decision of this case and we do not therefore propose to consider it. (1) (1951) A.I.R. 1951 Mad. 204 19 I.T.R. 402. In the result we allow the application, set aside the order of the Sales Tax Tribunal and direct the Tribunal to consider the application made to it by the Sales Tax Commissioner on its merits and to decide it in accordance with law. In the circumstances we make no order as to costs. BAXI, J.-I agree. Application allowed.
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1953 (4) TMI 17 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... U.P. Sales Tax Act should count from the date of the service of notice of such refusal then they would have said so. In view of the clear language of Section 11(2) (b) we cannot hold that the application should be made within thirty days of the date of receipt of notice of the refusal and not within thirty days of the date of refusal. On the other point, as to whether the time taken in filing the requisite copies should or should not be excluded, there is a Division Bench ruling of this Court in Amritsar Sugar Mill Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., Lucknow(1). We are bound by that decision and it is, therefore, not necessary to go into this question further. If the time taken in filing the requisite copies is excluded in the computation of the period then the application would be within time. We, therefore, hold that the applica- tion was within time and direct that notice of the application be issued to the other side. Ordered accordingly. (1) 1952 3 S.T.C. 271.
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1953 (4) TMI 16 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t that the jaggery of Pappanna Rowther was sold. Whether Kathar Nadar was an agent of Pappanna Rowther or only a commission agent makes no difference. The material fact was that through the machinery of Kathar Nadar the goods were sold. It was argued that these items consigned by Pappanna Rowther had been included in the turnover of Kathar Nadar and also assessed. Granting that to be so, Pappanna Rowther was not excused from sending his return. He was bound to have sent his return, though perhaps it might have been open to him to state that it was a nil return by reason of fact that all those items figure in the turnover of Kathar Nadar. The duty to send the return whether it was a nil or not existed and that duty not having been complied with there was a contravention of Section 15(a) of the Act. The conviction was right. I am not prepared to say that the sentence is so excessive as to justify my interference. The criminal revision petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1953 (4) TMI 15 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... plaintiffs were in no sense dealers within the meaning of the General Sales Tax Act. I agree with the learned Judge s view of the law, having regard to the nature of the transaction, that when a transaction is treated by both parties as a loan and entrustment of goods for sale to others to discharge the loan, it cannot be treated as a sale. I may add that the entire sale proceeds are credited to the respective owners of the groundnuts and the fact that the owners are not credited .with any amount representing the purchase price when the groundnut stock is received in the plaintiffs godown support the inference arrived at by the learned District Judge. It is not necessary to refer to any decided cases, and on the facts it is quite clear that the plaintiffs cannot be held liable to pay the tax as dealers. I may say that it was the case neither of the plaintiffs nor of the Government that they were commission agents. The second appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1953 (4) TMI 14 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... therefore, to state a case whenever a question of law arises out of its order unless it is settled by a decision of the Supreme Court. 12.. It is also the duty of the Board of Revenue to refer all questions of law arising out of its order whether they are stated by the applicant in his application under Section 23(1) or not. The provision does not require him to state such questions. He simply points out such questions. The Board of Revenue must consider whether a question of law brought to its notice during the hearing of the case arises or not. No limitation is prescribed for the purpose. 13.. Under these circumstances, we hold that the order of the Board of Revenue rejecting the application under Section 23 (1) is not correct, and require the Tribunal to state the case and the question of law arising out of its order dated the 14th December, 1951. 14.. The application is allowed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 50 if certified. Application allowed. (1) See 1952 3 S.T.C. 343.
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1953 (4) TMI 13 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... erned though the Tribunal may have to reopen the assessment proceedings and make or order further enquiry to give effect to the decision of the High Court. The Letters Patent makes a distinction between judgment and final judgment Manohar v. Baliram . As my brother Hidayatullah, J., stated in that case at page 519 If the intention was that the term judgment should mean only a final judgment, it would have been very easy to qualify the word judg- ment with the word final as has been done in the clause dealing with appeals to His Majesty in Council . 33.. I therefore hold that the decision under Section 23(5) of the Sales Tax Act is a judgment in revenue proceedings. Consequently the applicant is entitled to a certificate under Article 132(1) of the Con- stitution. In this view I would allow the application with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100 if certified. SEN, J.-I agree with my brother Deo, J., and have nothing more to add. Application allowed. (1) I.L.R. 1952 Nag. 471 (F.B.).
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1953 (4) TMI 12 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ty Commercial Tax Officer, Triplicane Division(4), where Mack, J., issued a writ of mandamus in the case of a social club oil the ground that the remedy provided by the Sales Tax Act was a long and tedious avenue. I am unable to derive much assistance from this judg- ment as it seems to have been decided on its own facts. One other fact must be mentioned at this stage. When the peti- tioners counsel was asked if his clients had been charging any sales tax from their clients, we were informed by the client who was present that the petitioners had not been doing so, but when asked for an affidavit in support of this, no affidavit was filed for reasons best known to the petitioners. I would therefore dismiss these petitions and discharge the rules. Counsel fee Rs. 100 in each case. FALSHAW, J. mdash I agree. Petitions dismissed. (1) 1952 S.C.R. 1112. (2) 1952 3 S.T.C. 367 A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 105. (3) 1947 15 I.T.R. 332 A.I.R. 1947 P.C. 78. (4) 1952 3 S.T.C. 77 (1952) 1 M.L.J. 401.
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1953 (4) TMI 11 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ord wheat flour which has ever excluded maida. I would, there- fore, hold that maida is excluded under item 1 of the schedule under Section 6. The petitioner went up in appeal in accordance with the machinery provided for by the Sales Tax Act. He also filed a revision petition which has not yet been heard and it appears that the Excise and Taxa- tion Commissioner has by issuing a circular excluded himself from correctly interpreting the words wheat and its flour . And the peti- tioner s revision petition is not being heard. In this case therefore I am of the opinion that the rule in Wanchoo s case(1) applies, and I would therefore issue a writ of certiorari quashing the order calling upon the petitioner to pay sales tax and would make the rule absolute. The petitioner will have his costs. Counsel fee Rs. 100. FALSHAW, J.-I agree. Petition allowed. (1) 54 P.L.R. 206. Since reported as Khandari Oil Mills, Jullundur v. The Excise and Taxation Commis- sioner 1953 (4 S.T.C. 367).
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1953 (4) TMI 10 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... which is a hair oil or is used as a hair oil, is not necessarily a toilet article within the meaning of item 11 to be taxed at the rate of one anna in the rupee of the sale price. An instance that could be readily cited is ordinary coconut oil used for hair dressing by the poorer classes. It seems difficult to lay down a hard and fast rule as to when exactly an oil becomes a toilet article. Nevertheless two essential criteria would be whether it is a preparation more complex than what might be termed crude natural oils like coconut oil mentioned already and whether the object underlying its use is, mainly to prepare oneself to face the day s tasks with confidence. That, I imagine, is the prime object of all toilet. Judged by these criteria, the commodity under consideration will clearly be a toilet article. 3.. For the reasons given above, the departmental decision appears in essence to be correct. The application for revision is, therefore, dismissed. Application dismissed.
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1953 (4) TMI 9 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Winding up - Liquidator to exercise certain powers subject to sanction and Power of court to assess damages against delinquent, directors, etc.
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1953 (4) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in the circumstances of this case the Tribunal was right in holding that the sum of ₹ 10,895 spent in defending the criminal proceeding was an expenditure laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business as contemplated by Section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act ?
Held that:- The deductibility of such expenses under Section 10(2)(xv) must depend on the nature and purpose of the legal proceeding in relation to the business whose profits are under computation, and cannot be affected by the final outcome of that proceeding. Income-tax assessments have to be made for every year and cannot be held up until the final result of a legal proceeding, which may pass through several courts, is announced. We allow the appeal and answer the question referred in the negative.
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