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Showing 21 to 31 of 31 Records

• 1956 (11) TMI 29 - SUPREME COURT
  

  Whether that the Act does not apply to the premises in question in view of the specify incidents of the tenancy as disclosed in the terms of the lease in the standard form between the appellant and Miss M. Augustin, and as found by the courts of fact below?

  Whether the Court were to come to the conclusion that the premises in question were within the ambit of the Act, clause (g) of s. 9 should be applied to the tenancies in question as determined by the appellate authority aforesaid?

  Held that:- If, as already indicated, the term it, rent " is comprehensive enough to include all payment;. agreed by the tenant to be paid to his landlord for the use and occupation not only of the building and its appurtenances but also of furnishings, electric installations and other amenities agreed between the parties to be provided by and at the cost of the land-lord, the conclusion is irresistible that all that is included in the term "rent" is within the purview of the Act and the Rent Controller and other authorities had the power to control the same. In view of these considerations we overrule the first- contention raised on behalf of the appellant.

  . The Rent Controller gave the landlord credit only for the amount by which the municipal taxes had been increased and no more, by applying the provisions of cl. (b) of s. 9. The Appellate Authority on the other hand, applied the provisions of el. (g) of s. 9 by determining the fair and reasonable rent after taking into consideration the fact that electric charges as also Government duty on the consumption of electric power had been increased. So had the cost of providing for the other amenities and services. In view of our conclusion that the residuary el. (g) applies to the terms of the tenancy in these cases, it follows that the decision of the Appellate Authority was more in consonance with the provisions of cl. (g) than that of the Rent Controller or of the High Court. As the figures arrived at by the Appellate Authority have not been challenged before us, we would direct, that the orders passed by it should be restored and those of the High Court and of the Rent Controller set aside. Appeal allowed in part.

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• 1956 (11) TMI 28 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... e 10. It was however clearly open to the assessee to elect to be assessed under rule 13, and if he considered it convenient to be assessed on an estimate which he himself furnished and which itself was an alternative to an assessment under rule 13, we do not see how he could complain about the validity of the tax. If the argument of learned counsel were accepted it would mean that in every case the provisional assessment should be on the basis of rule 13, which would certainly not improve the position of the petitioner who elected not to be governed by it. As we have stated before, the rules relating to provisional assessment are clearly within the legislative power of the State as providing the machinery for ensuring proper collection of the tax due under Entry 54 of the State List. The result is that all the writ petitions fail and are dismissed. Rules nisi issued will be discharged. There will however be no order as to costs in any of these petitions. Petitions dismissed.

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• 1956 (11) TMI 27 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
  
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  ... ... ..... only to the extent the language renders it necessary. Further if an Act is to a certain extent retrospective, when we reach the line at which the words of the section cease to be plain, the same rule of construction leaning against retrospectivity should be applied. Applying those principles, the Division Bench held that, as the assessment had become final before the amendment, the amendment could not affect the rights conferred on the assessee. It is not disputed that the same principle will apply to the question now raised before us. As in that case, in this case the assessment had become final before the amendment was introduced. As the amendment has not either expressly or by necessary implication given it retroactivity, it cannot affect the final assessment already made. We, therefore, hold, though for different reasons, that the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal is correct. The revision fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.

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• 1956 (11) TMI 26 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... buyer under the terms of the contract itself. The learned counsel for the assessees places reliance on this authority to show that their Lordships have observed that the sale is not complete unless all the ingredients, i.e., bargain or contract of sale, the payment or promise of payment of price, the delivery of goods and the actual passing of the title, are present in the transaction. We agree with this contention, but as we have already held that in the contract of the assessees all these elements are present, we need not pursue the point any further. In the case of State of Bombay v. United Motors Ltd.(2), cited to us, the validity of the right to tax sales or purchases outside the State was questioned and their Lordships of the Supreme Court have laid down the same principle so that this ruling also does not help the petitioners as stated earlier. In the result, we do not find any substance in these revisions. They are therefore dismissed with costs. Petitions dismissed.

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• 1956 (11) TMI 25 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
  
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  ... ... ..... After pointing out that three lines of classification run through the impugned provision, the learned Judges considered only the second classification, namely, the distinction between dealers in articles of food and drink sold in hotels, boarding houses and restaurants and other dealers in such articles and held that it was sufficient to deny the validity of the impugned provision. With great respect we cannot agree. In our view, the characteristics of the dealer covered by the proviso should be cumulatively considered and, if so looked at, the said characteristics will afford a reasonable basis of classification which has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. We, therefore, hold that the classification is founded on intelligible differentia distinguishing dealers like the assessee and that it has a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved. In the result, the revision fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 50. Petition dismissed.

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• 1956 (11) TMI 24 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
  
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  ... ... ..... t agree with the learned counsel that the words quarrying contracts qualified only the word gravel . The more reasonable interpretation is that the words quarrying contracts qualified earthwork, laterite, metal, sand, jelly and gravel. If so construed, what is exempted is quarrying contracts of those materials but not the out and out sale of those materials. It may be that the Government thought it fit to exempt contracts whereunder the lessee or other contracting party agrees to quarry materials mentioned in the notification leaving untouched the right of the State to tax the subsequent sale of the material quarried. As the terms of the notification are clear and unambiguous, it is not necessary to discover the principle behind the notification. We, therefore, agree with the Tribunal that the sales effected by the assessee of metal, gravel, rubbish etc. are not exempt from sales tax. The revision fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Revision dismissed.

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• 1956 (11) TMI 23 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
  
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  ... ... ..... section 25A Commissioner of Excess Profits Tax, Madras v. Jivaraj Topun and Sons, Madras 1951 20 I.T.R. 143. In the recent case of Manindra Lal Goswami v. Income-tax Officer 1956 30 I.T.R. 550. a learned Judge of the Calcutta High Court has held that there is no provision in the Income-tax Act which enables a firm to be assessed after its discontinuance or dissolution. In our judgment an assessment order cannot be made under the U.P. Sales Tax Act on a firm after it has dissolved and has discontinued business on the short ground that the firm as a unit of assessment has ceased to exist. We are therefore of opinion that this appeal must be allowed and a writ must issue quashing the order of assessment dated respectively the 19th July, 1952, and the 17th March, 1953, and quashing also the certificate of the Sales Tax Officer dated the 6th/13th February, 1954, addressed to the Collector, Etawah. The appellant is entitled to his costs which we assess at Rs. 100. Appeal allowed.

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• 1956 (11) TMI 22 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... case for interference in these cases. The Sales Tax Officer will keep our judgment in mind declaring explanation (i) to section 2(t), and rule 7 of the Rules ultra vires when taking further proceedings. We dismiss these applications with costs. In Case No. 121, the proceedings are being taken by the Sales Tax Officer, Bikaner. The Sales Tax Officer has already passed an order requiring the applicants to pay Rs. 654-8-0 as sales tax. It is said that this has been done on the best assessment basis, probably acting on rule 7 of the Rules. In these circumstances, we allow this application and set aside the order assessing Rs. 654-8-0 on the applicants. It will be open to the Sales Tax Officer to take further proceedings in the light of this judgment delivered by us after treating explanation (i) to section 2(t) and rule 7 as ultra vires, and without relying on those provisions for purposes of the assessment. This applicant will get his costs from the State. Ordered accordingly.

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• 1956 (11) TMI 21 - HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
  

  Power of court to rectify register of members

  
  
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  ... ... ..... shares to be registered in the name of the Secretary to the Government of Orissa, Finance Department, which cannot be done that the shares stand in the name of Shri Pratap Chandra Bhanj Deo and as such there should be a transfer by a person as a holder is only a person whose name is entered as the shareholder and that the petitioner took up the contention of his title by devolution of law only in this application and during the correspondence he was mainly, if not absolutely, relying upon a transfer inter vivos by the Maharaja of Mayurbhanj. I have already held that in the first letter of the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Orissa, the claim was based upon devolution by operation of law. The other contentions are too technical and do not appeal to me. The petition is, therefore, allowed with costs. Opposite party No. 1 is directed to rectify the register by inserting the name of the petitioner as the holder of the shares Nos. 1 to 7,500. Hearing fee is fixed at Rs. 250.

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• 1956 (11) TMI 15 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB
  

  Winding up – Appointment of official liquidator

  
  
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  ... ... ..... int a court liquidator for banking companies under the provisions of section 38A of the Act, that when a bank is to be wound up, particularly under section 38 on a petition by the Reserve Bank, the official liquidator to be appointed must necessarily be the official liquidator appointed for the court under the Indian Companies Act, though I think that on general principles such an appointment might well be made. If, however, it is not obligatory, and the Reserve Bank, not wishing to undertake the work of liquidation itself, as it would be entitled to under section 39, has selected some particular person as suitable for appointment as official liquidator, I consider that it is not only open to the court to accept such selection, but also that due weight should be given to the wishes of the Reserve Bank in the matter. I accordingly hold that there is nothing illegal in the appointment of Mr. Bhagirath Das as official liquidator of the bank and dismiss the preliminary objection.

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• 1956 (11) TMI 14 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
  

  Memorandum and articles of association – Registration of and Winding up – Power of Tribunal to make calls

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