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Showing 21 to 40 of 54 Records
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1956 (4) TMI 57 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... possession commencing from 1920. The learned District Judge, found on both the issues in favour of the plaintiff, and though the correctness of these findings was attacked in the grounds of appeal to the High Court, there is no discussion of the question in the judgment of the learned Judges, and we must take it that the point had been abandoned by the appellants. We accordingly declined to hear them on this question. We may add that the question of limitation cannot really arise on the facts of this case, inasmuch as the possession which is claimed to be adverse is stated to have commenced in 1920, and it is well settled that such possession cannot affect the right of a prior mortgagee to bring the properties to sale, and adverse possession against the purchaser under that sale cannot commence prior to the date of that sale, and the present suit was instituted on 8-1- 1945 within 12 years of the sale, which took place in 1936. The appeal fails, and is dismissed with costs.
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1956 (4) TMI 56 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... power to declare a person to be not in default pending the appeal. There is no provision for stay similar to Order XLI, rules 5 and 6, of the Civil Procedure Code. There is no conferment of an express power of granting a stay of realisation of the tax, though the effect of an order in favour of the assessee under section 45 of the Act is a stay. Nor is there a provision for allowing the tax to be paid in instalments or for taking security for deferred payment. Neither the Appellate Assistant Commissioner nor the Appellate Tribunal is given the power to stay the collection of tax. Whether the law should not be made more liberal so as to enable an assessee who has prefered an appeal, to obtain from the appellate forum, a stay of collection of the tax, either in whole or in part, on furnishing suitable security, is a matter for the Legislature to consider. I agree with my Lord in the view he has taken of the merits of the case and in the order proposed by him. Appeal dismissed.
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1956 (4) TMI 55 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the State of U. P. had no power to enact the impugned Act as the Act is with respect to the subject of industries the control of which by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest within the meaning of Entry 52 of List I and is, therefore, within the exclusive province of Parliament. The impugned Act is, therefore, ultra vires the powers of the State Legislature and is a colourable exercise of legislative power by the State?
Whether the impugned Act is repugnant to Act LXV of 1951 and Act X of 1955 and in the event of the Court holding that the impugned Act was within the legislative competence of the State Legislature, it is void by reason of such repugnancy?
Whether the impugned Act stands repealed to the extent that it has been repealed by section 16 of Act X of 1955 and by clause 7 of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955, made in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of Act X of 1955?
Whether the impugned Act infringes the fundamental right guaranteed by article 14 inasmuch as very wide powers are given to the Cane Commissioner which can be used in a discriminatory manner?
Whether the impugned Act and the notification dated 27th September, 1954, violate the fundamental right guaranteed under article 19(1) (e) in that the Co-operative Societies are not voluntary organisations but a cane grower is compelled to become a member of the Society before he can sell his sugarcane to a factory?
Whether the impugned Act and the notifications infringe the fundamental right guaranteed by article 19(1)(f) and (g) and article 31 of the Constitution?
Whether the impugned Act is void in that it confers very wide powers on executive officials and is a piece of delegated legislation?
Whether the impugned Act is destructive of the freedom of trade and commerce and thus is violative of article 301 of the Constitution?
Held that:- The only provision which was retained by the State Government in the impugned Act for the protection of the sugarcane growers was that contained in section 17 which provided for the payment of price of sugarcane by the occupier of a factory to the sugarcane growers. It could be recovered from such occupier as if it were an arrear of land revenue. This comparison goes to show that the impugned Act merely confined itself to the regulation of the supply and purchase of sugarcane required for use in sugar factories and did not concern itself at all with the controlling or licensing of the sugar factories, with the production or manufacture. of sugar or with the trade and commerce in, and the production, supply and distribution of, sugar. If that was so, there was no question whatever of its trenching upon the jurisdiction of the Centre in regard to sugar industry which was a controlled industry within Entry 52 of List I and the U.P. Legislature had jurisdiction to enact the law with regard to sugarcane and had legislative competence to enact the impugned Act.
There is no repugnancy whatever between these provisions and the impugned Act and the Rules framed thereunder as also the U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954 do not trench upon the field covered by Act X of 1955. There being no - repugnancy at all, therefore., no question arises of the operation of article 254(2) of the Constitution and no provision of the impugned Act and the Rules made thereunder is invalidated by any provision contained in Act LXV of 1951 as amended by Act XXVI of 1953 or Act X of 1955 and the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955 issued thereunder.
There was no repeal of the impugned Act or the U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954 by section 16 of Act X of 1955 or by clause (7) of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955 as contended by the petitioners.
Any cane grower or a Canegrowers’ Cooperative Society or the occupier of a factory can, if aggrieved, take an appeal to the State Government against any order passed by the Cane Commissioner and such provision is a sufficient safeguard provided in the Act and the Rules against any arbitrary exercise of those powers by the Cane Commissioner and takes them out of the ban of article 14.
Just as Cane Commissioner is not bound to become a member of a Canegrowers’ Co-operative Society he is equally not bound to offer his sugarcane for sale to the occupier of a factory even if he happens to be a canegrower within the area reserved for that factory. His freedom in that behalf is absolutely unrestricted and we do not see how it can be urged that the provisions of the impugned Act and the notification dated 27th September,’1954 are violative of his fundamental right under article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution.
The restriction which is imposed upon the cane growers in regard to sales of their sugarcane to the occupiers of factories in areas where the membership of the Canegrowers’ Co-operative Society is not less than 75 per cent. of the total cane growers within the area is a reasonable restriction in the public interest designed for safeguarding the interests of the large majority of growers of sugarcane in the area and works for the greatest good of the greatest number. That being so, it comes well within the protection of article 19(6) and the impugned notification cannot be challenged as violative of the fundamental right guaranteed under article 19(1)(f) and (g). If these impugned notifications are, therefore, intravires the State Legislature, they cannot be challenged also under article 31 as none of the petitioners is being deprived of his property, if any, save by authority of law.
The only provisions alleged to contain such delegation of legislative power are those contained in section 15 and section 16(1)(b) read with section 16 (2) (b) of the impugned Act which we have dealt with above. They are certainly no piece of delegated legislation and the vires of the impugned Act is not affected thereby.
As already stated in the earlier part of this judgment that the restrictions imposed by the alleged notifications are reasonable restrictions imposed on the petitioners in the public interest. We are, therefore, of opinion that this contention also is of no avail to the petitioners.The result, therefore, is that the impugned Act and the notifications dated 27th September, 1954 and 9th November, 1955 issued thereunder were intravires the State Legislature and are binding on the petitioners. Appeal dismissed.
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1956 (4) TMI 54 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nd converted the sugarcane into jaggery and in the present case the assessee was leasing the lands to tenants who raised sugar-cane and paid rent in the shape of jaggery and supplied it to merchants who credited the value of jaggery to the account of the plaintiff would not make any difference, since the question is whether the plaintiff is a person who could be considered to be carrying on the business of selling goods. That jaggery is not agricultural produce and from the fact, as found by the learned District Munsif, that the plaintiff has been systematically growing sugar-cane and converting it into jaggery and has been maintaining account books, there can be no difficulty in holding that he has been doing business, the motive being profit or income. That the property is transferred in the course of business is obvious. In any event, applying the decision referred to, the suit has to be dismissed. The result is, the appeal is allowed with costs. No leave. Appeal allowed.
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1956 (4) TMI 53 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... no goods to the industry as a whole. It is not, however, on this basis that we can determine the legal liability to tax under the Act. Whether these are considerations that should weigh with the Government, and whether the Government should grant a remission of the tax in such cases are questions not germane to the determination of the limited question before us, whether the sales in question came within the scope of Article 286(2) of the Constitution. They did not, is our view. The order of the Tribunal will be modified only to the extent indicated above. The turnover of Rs. 15,000 representing the value of spare parts delivered by the seller to the dealers outside the State, will be excluded from the assessable turnover of the dealer. In other respects the order of the Tribunal will stand confirmed. As the petitioner-assessee has substantially failed in his contention, we direct the petitioner to pay the costs of the respondent. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Ordered accordingly.
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1956 (4) TMI 52 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ayer does not apply to a provision giving a taxpayer relief in certain cases from a section clearly imposing a liability. In the result the conclusion that we have reached is just in accord with what this Court laid down in Chandramouleswara Oil Mills Ltd., Kurnool, In re 1954 5 S.T.C. 340 1954 2 M.L.J. 187. and this is about what we have termed the figure from which the purchase tax has to be deducted. So far as the purchase tax itself is concerned, that is, the tax on the purchase turnover, this is governed by this Court s decision in Radhakrishna Oil Mill v. State of Madras 1954 5 S.T.C. 357 1954 2 M.L.J. 550. Both these decisions are logical complementaries of each other and after a full and exhaustive consideration of the points urged by the learned counsel for the assessees, we are clearly of the opinion that both these decisions correctly interpret the relevant provisions of the Sales Tax Act. In this view all the tax revision cases are dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1956 (4) TMI 51 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e Department. Question No. 3 The legality of the imposition of penalty has been challenged by Mr. Sahay only on the ground that there had already been an imposition of penalty on this assessee on account of non registration and as such it could not be imposed for the second time. There is nothing on the record, however, to show that any penalty was imposed on the assessee on a previous occasion. This point does not seem to have been taken before the taxing authorities and Mr. Sahay cannot be permitted to raise it for the first time before us. It must, therefore, be held that the penalty of Rs. 956-12-0 imposed under section 13(5) of the act is legally valid. This question is thus answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Department. The result is that all the questions referred to above are answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Department which is entitled to its costs. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 250. BANERJI, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1956 (4) TMI 50 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s ought to have resorted to the usual remedies by way of ap- peal etc. to the Tribunals under the Act and that we should, in our discretion, decline to entertain the petition. We are not prepared to up- hold this objection. It is conceded that this is a matter of discretion and not any absolute rule of law that bars our jurisdiction. The questions raised are of great importance and complexity and if the point made by the assessee were upheld it would mean that rule 5 of the General Sales Tax Rules is invalid. This is not certainly a ground which the assessee could put forward before the Tribunals constituted under the Act, and, therefore, we consider that the petitioners were en- titled to approach this Court for relief in the present case. The writ petition succeeds and the rule is made absolute. The assessment on the petitioners made by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer will be set aside. The petitioners are entitled to their costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 200. Petition allowed.
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1956 (4) TMI 49 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... would be exempt from taxation as one in the course of inter-State trade and commerce under Article 286(2). The petitioner therefore would have been entitled to claim exemption from sales tax. But by reason of section 2 of Ordinance III of 1956, the levy of the tax has become valid, notwithstanding the inter-State character of the sale transaction. We have discussed the scope and effect of the Ordinance in our judgment in T.R.C. No. 129 of 1955, and it is unnecessary to go over the ground again. The sale in the present case, which obviously falls within the Explanation to Article 286(1)(a), was taxable before the Ordinance under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, and therefore the tax is rendered valid as the transactions took place between the dates mentioned in the Ordinance. The result is that the writ petition fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. Since reported as Mettur Industries Limited v. The State of Madras 1956 7 S.T.C. 691.
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1956 (4) TMI 48 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... a few, eat betel leaves as an article of food, is enough to bring these leaves into the category of green vegetables . The question is however to determine what the legislature intended, and looking at the list of exemptions as a whole we are of opinion that green vegetables in the present context means such fresh vegetables as are ordinarily grown in kitchen gardens for use at the table. This is also the view taken by the Nagpur High Court in Madhya Pradesh Pan Merchants Association v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1956 7 S.T.C. 99 A.I.R. 1956 Nag. 54. and is in conformity with the conclusion reached in Kokil Ram v. Province of Bihar 1949 1 S.T.C. 217 A.I.R. 1951 Pat. 367. and by Mr. Justice Chaturvedi in Brahmanand v. The State of U.P. 1956 7 S.T.C. 206 1956 A.W.R. 136. We accordingly answer the question which has been referred to us in the negative. The assessees must pay the cost of these references which we assess at Rs. 100 in each case. References answered in the negative.
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1956 (4) TMI 47 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ibunal on appeal. The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer states the facts in relation to this matter thus Due to heavy liabilities the sales were stopped on 9th January, 1952, and the business was suspended. At the time they had a stock of goods valued for Rs. 96,713-8-0. This stock was handed over to Messrs. Associated Trades, a proprietary concern on 2nd April, 1952, in discharge of heavy liabilities due to them. The question whether this is a sale in the course of business by a dealer has not been considered by the Tribunal. We consider that this matter should be investigated by the Tribunal and the assessment should be decided after a decision is reached as regards this point. This revision petition is allowed and the matter is remanded to the Tribunal for investigation of this point raised by the learned counsel for the assessee and for disposal of the appeal before them after considering this point. There will be no order as to costs in this revision case. Petition allowed.
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1956 (4) TMI 46 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cally attracted. In our opinion, the submission in this form also suffers from the same fallacy, viz., it imputes to Parliament the power to enact a sales tax legislation for the State. If the State Legislature itself passed a law imposing a tax, it could take advantage of the lifting of the ban under Article 286(2) by the Ordinance, but section 22 in its present form is not apt to achieve that purpose. Reverting to the facts of this revision case, we are clearly of the opinion that as the cotton was delivered in this State for consumption here, it was subject to tax under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, between the dates mentioned in the Ordinance, and that as the only objection to the liability to tax could be rested on the provision in Article 286(2), the same is overcome by the Ordinance. The order of the Tribunal disallowing the item is therefore correct, and this revision petition fails and is dismissed. There will however be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1956 (4) TMI 45 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the article, and that- it is only ancilliary to that that there will pass to the customer some materials in addition to the skill involved-as in the case of an oil painting-the contract will be one of work. This was so laid down in Robinson v. Graves) 1935 1 K.B. 579. where the earlier cases including Clay v. Yates25 L.J. Ex. 237. relied upon by the assessees were considered. Applying this test, and assuming that there be only a single contract, we can entertain no doubt that they were contracts of sale. We accordingly answer the question referred to us in the affirmative as regards visiting cards and in the negative as regards letter heads. As regards receipt books, registers, forms and handbills the answer is in the affirmative if the sale is of these articles as such it is in the negative if the sale of the paper of which such goods are composed is a transaction separate from the work of binding and/or printing. We make no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1956 (4) TMI 44 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e to submit a return would be a violation of the statutory obligation imposed on the dealer. That, in our opinion, would fall within one or more of the categories of inadvertence, omission or deliberate concealment to which we have referred above. A return voluntarily submitted beyond the prescribed date would be a valid return only if the delay in the submission is condoned by the assessing authority. If the delay is not condoned, it would be a case of a return non est in law. In either case, if there is to be an assessment, it can be only under rule 17(1) the turnover in such a case would be one which had escaped assessment within the meaning of that rule. (1) 1955 6 S.T.C. 318. The Tribunal, in our opinion, was wrong in holding that the assessment in question fell within the scope of rule 17(1). The order of the Tribunal is set aside and the order of the Commercial Tax Officer has to be restored. The petition is allowed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
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1956 (4) TMI 43 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d imperative or only directory. Construing rules 5(1)(k) and 18(2) and (3) in the light of the foregoing principles and having regard to the peremptory and absolute language in which these rules are couched, it is manifest that the deduction referred to in sub-rule (2) of rule 18 is conditional upon the assessee complying with the conditions prescribed under sub-rule (3) of that rule. For the above reasons, we are in agreement with the conclusion reached by the Division Bench of this Court in Boddu Pydanna Sons v. The State of Andhra (Appeal No. 293 of 1951). The answer to the question referred to the Full Bench is, there- fore, in the affirmative. (1) 1921 1 K.B. 64 at 71. (2) (1877) 2 P.D. 203 at 211. ORDER The petition coming on for hearing after the decision of the Full Bench before SUBBA RAO, C.J., and BHIMASANKARAM, J., the Court delivered the following Order Following the Full Bench decision the revision is allowed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250. Revision allowed.
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1956 (4) TMI 42 - HYDERABAD, HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d representative of the appellant that under section 5(1) tax is leviable only when there is more than one sale in a series of successive dealers, is therefore not tenable. Regarding item No. 3 of the grounds of appeal, the contention of the appellant was that a penalty of Rs. 1,000 levied on him is illegal as the same has been included in the assessment order, and that no separate notice has been given and no separate order has been made for the same. It appears from the records that in spite of several notices issued to the appellant no return was submitted and the books of accounts were not produced as desired. Without going into the other merits of the case, on examination we find that this objection to the imposition of the penalty has not been raised at the earlier stage before the Deputy Commissioner, Appellate, and as such the original order has become absolute. The objection is therefore rejected. The appeal is accordingly dismissed on all grounds. Appeal dismissed.
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1956 (4) TMI 41 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... preparing the arecanuts for sale. The process adopted by the horticulturists of South Kanara involves much less than that adopted by those of Coimbatore district. T.R.C. No. 22 of 1955 was concerned with the processing to which the horticulturists of Coimbatore subjected the arecanuts. All that is done in South Kanara is to gather the arecanut, peel and dry the kernel before it is sold. That cannot result in what is sold ceasing to be horticultural produce within the meaning of section 2(i) of the Act. These petitions are dismissed. Petitions dismissed. Since reported as The State of Madras v. R. Saravana Pillai, at page 541 supra.
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1956 (4) TMI 40 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... despite the process, the minimum necessary, that the goods sold had been subjected to, what the assessee sold still retained its character as horticultural produce within the meaning of the proviso to section 2(i) of the Act. As we said, any narrow construction of the term horticultural produce would tend to defeat the very object of the Legislature with which the proviso to section 2(i) was enacted. The view taken by the Tribunal was correct. The learned Government Pleader referred to the decision in Killing Valley Tea Co. Ltd. v. Secretary of State for India(1). That case dealt (1) (1920) I.L.R. 48 Cal. 161. with tea and the decision was under the Indian Income-tax Act. At page 171 the learned judges pointed out the tea that was sold had been subjected to a manufacturing process. We fail to see any scope for applying the test laid down in that decision to the question now before us. The petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1956 (4) TMI 39 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d by the purchaser on the occasion of the sale. They constituted consideration for the sale. There was no separate consideration passing from the dealer for the amounts col- lected by way of tax on the occasion of the sale. The goods sold still constituted consideration for that sale. As we stated, this was the fundamental feature of the turnover which specifically became taxable under section 2 of Act XVII of 1954, and this feature, in our opinion, appears to have been overlooked by the Tribunal. It should, however, be noticed that our decision in Sundararajan and Co., Ltd. v. State of Madras 1956 7 S.T.C. 105, was long subsequent to the decisions rendered by the Tribunal. We differ from the Tribunal, and we hold that the items in ques- tion which were excluded by the Tribunal from the scope of the additional levy under section 3(2)(iv) of the Act, are subject to the additional levy. The petitions are allowed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
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1956 (4) TMI 38 - HYDERABAD, HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... emands payment to it of the amounts retained by the dealers in that regard, such a demand would tantamount to collection of tax, on the same turnover (or a part thereof) on which the State has admittedly no authority to levy tax under the Act. In our opinion, the appellant, as already stated above, is not bound by law to remit the sums so withheld to the State but, however, is bound to refund the same to his non-resident principals whether or not there is a specific condition in the contract of sale for such refund. As regards the sum of Rs. 249-7-3 it is collected from resident principals who are liable to pay at the sale point as these sales have been made within the State and Shri Bhagwat Patil has, therefore, not pressed for this amount. Hence the appeal is partly allowed. The appellant is not bound to remit Rs. 3,513-7-0 to the Department as ordered by the learned Deputy Commissioner. The institution fee of Rs. 35 may be refunded to the appellant. Appeal partly allowed.
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