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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 76 Records
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1957 (9) TMI 79 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... be regarded as ultra vires. 14. The learned trial Judge has not awarded interest to the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs have by their cross-objections claimed future interest on the decretal amount from the date of the suit. On the view we take, it is unnecessary to consider the cross-objections as the plaintiffs are not entitled to an order for refund of the amount of tax paid by them. 15. On the view we take, the decree passed by the trial Court will be modified and paragraphs 8 and 3 of the decretal order will be deleted. For the first paragraph of the decretal order, the following will be substituted "It is hereby declared that the Municipality of Chopda is not entitled to levy from the plain tiffs the Cotton Manufacturing Tax under the Rules framed by the Municipality and brought in to operation on 1-7-1950 at a rate exceeding ₹ 250 per annum." The parties will bear their own costs throughout including costs of the cross-objections. 16. Order accordingly.
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1957 (9) TMI 78 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ly & it must be for antecedent debt or for legal necessity of the joint family, and he finds that plaintiff 1 was the managing member of the family and defendant 7 was not the managing member and for this reason the sale was invalid. The broad proposition, of law acted upon by the learned Subordinate Judge is not correct. It cannot said that under no circumstances can an alienation of a joint family be binding on the family." Thereafter his Lordship discussed two cases of the Patna High Court Inder Chand v. Bidyadhar, 5 Pat LJ 744 (AIR 1921 Pat 48) (I), and the aforesaid case of AIR 1922 Pat 553 (G). 14. For the aforesaid reasons, therefore, we are definitely of the view that the sale deed Ext. A/1 dated 24th May, 1944 is valid and binding as against the plaintiff. In conclusion, threrefore, the judgments and decrees of the Courts below are set aside and the appeal is allowed and the plaintiff's suit is dismissed with costs throughout. P.V.B. Rao J. 15. I agree.
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1957 (9) TMI 77 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sed up. The assessee is entitled to get a credit for the income-tax deemed to have been paid by the company in respect of this amount only, which is the amount by which the dividend of ₹ 360 was increased for the purpose of grossing up. 3.In the negative, but on the particular facts of this reference, the abatement in respect of income-tax has already become effective by reason of the fact that the Income-tax Officer did not appeal against the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner granting such abatement. Desai, J.-I agree with the reasons and conclusions mentioned in the judgment just delivered by my brother Tendolkar. I do not, however, propose to express any opinion on the remarks against item 8 in column 4 of the Schedule. Remarks in any schedule annexed to an agreement may well form part of the agreement itself. In the absence of fuller arguments, I do not deem it necessary for me to express any opinion as to the construction to be placed on those remarks.
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1957 (9) TMI 76 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sale proceeds were received in British India. That precisely is the order which the Tribunal has made, and in making that order the, Tribunal had been extremely fair to the assessee in that they ware provided that, as the Income-tax Officer may not have in the first instance made as thorough an enquiry as he should have for the purpose of determining what part of ₹ 6,02,911 was received in British India, he should determine this matter afresh and assess such portion of the amount as may have been received in British India. In doing so, no doubt, the Income-tax Officer will also have to take into account any argument advanced on behalf of the assessee that a realisation in British India-is not necessarily a receipt in British India so as to attract the provisions of section 4(1)(a). In out opinion, therefore, the Income-tax Tribunal acted within jurisdiction in making the order that they did. The result that the petition fail and the rule will be discharged with costs.
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1957 (9) TMI 75 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y the Appellate Tribunal as to the true import and effect of section 24(2) was correct, the order directing assessments to be made on the returns for 1946-47 and 1947-48 was plainly not correct. The utmost which the Income-tax Officer could be required to do was to investigate into and determine the losses of the earlier years fit to be carried forward, if there were any. In effect, the process might not differ from making an assessment, but, nevertheless, no formal assessment could in law be made. For the reasons given above, the answer to the question referred must, in my opinion, be "Yes, but not to make assessments for the years 1946-47 and 1947-48, but only to investigate into the claim of losses and find whether it was established that losses had taken place during the years in question which the assessee was entitled in law to have carried forward and set off against the profits of 1948-49." As the actual order of the Tribunal is erroneous. Guha, J.-I agree.
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1957 (9) TMI 74 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the one charged in respect of the classes of income falling only under the heads "Income derived from business" and "Professional earnings." There is no reason why the tax charged should not refer to other classes of income referred to in the aforesaid section 5, if such income was derived form the activity business. 123. In the result, I answer the question as reaffirmed in the affirmative. Out of the three judges including myself, who have dealt with this reference, Mr. Justice S. T. Desai and myself have answered the question in the affirmative whilst Mr. Justice Tendolkar has answered the question in the negative. The decision of the court, having regard to the provision of section 66A of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, is that the question is answered in the affirmative. 124. The applicant to pay the costs. Costs to include the costs of the hearing before Mr. Justice Tendolkar and Mr. Justice S. T. Desai. 125. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1957 (9) TMI 73 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and revenue courts. In either ordinary parlance or legal sense, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal cannot be held to be a civil, criminal or revenue court. It also appears that this is the first occasion for the applicant to take any proceeding before the Income-tax authorities, or, at any rate, before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. It is more likely, therefore, that, at the time he gave the power of attorney, it was not in his contemplation that the attorney would have to attend the Income-tax Tribunals. In this context, it is apparent and indeed manifest that the applicant did not intend to authorise the attorney to act for him before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. Nor could we hold that the words used by him were of sufficient amplitude to taken in Tribunals which are not courts. In this view, though the result is unfortunate, we dismiss the application, but, in the circumstances, without costs. Writ petition No. 193 of 1957 is also dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1957 (9) TMI 72 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... same books of accounts, which were produced the other day. Excuse trouble. With my great respects, I am quite unwell here to walk with my leg. And the opening portion of Exhibit II is Ref Your notice under section 28(3), and my letter of 18th from Madras. With further reference to my above letter, I submit with great sorrow the following details of facts for your valuable attention on my behalf for the above notice under section 28(3), so as to relieve me from the assessment and oblige. 13. It follows that both the contentions are untenable and that this petition fails. It is hereby dismissed with costs, advocates fee ₹ 150. 14. In the view I have taken it is unnecessary to consider the submission of the advocate for the Department that the two contentions I have dealt with above have not been raised in Exhibit E, the memorandum of appeal filed before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, and that the petitioner is not as a result entitled to raise them in this court.
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1957 (9) TMI 71 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f in respect of the amount mentioned therein. 10. I therefore, hold that these exhibits her rightly admitted in evidence and that they were properly used against these defendants. 11. A last point, not very seriously pressed by Mr. Sankara Sastry, is that as the plaintiff is the legal representative of the deceased partner she cannot maintain a suit in respect of this particular item and she can only sue for settlement of the accounts of the partnership. It is said that there is a merger of her individual rights in her rights as the legal representative of a deceased partner. I cannot see how this sum of money owned to the plaintiff could be treated as an item in a general account between the plaintiffs deceased husband and the other partners. She cannot lose her individual rights against the partnership merely because she happens also to be the legal representative of a deceased partner. 12. The result is that this second appeals fails and is dismissed with costs. No leave.
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1957 (9) TMI 70 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d, that what was being sought to be done was not to give remuneration for services rendered, but remuneration was provided in the said clause merely for the purpose of adjustment of the rights inter se between the partners. Undoubtedly, V.D. Dhanwatay became a partner by reason of the fact that the joint family invested its capital in the partnership, and in the absence of proof that he rendered any services to the partnership and on the basis of the finding of fact by which we are bound on this reference that the remuneration was only for the purpose of adjustment of the rights inter se between the partners, in our opinion, no other conclusion was possible than that the income was that of the Hindu undivided family and indeed, the Hindu undivided family in making its return, also had taken the same view until legal advice intervened. In our opinion, therefore, the answer to the question is in the affirmative. Assessee to pay the costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1957 (9) TMI 69 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 9, and the provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly." This only means that before proceedings are taken for the recovery of the tax which becomes payable as a result of the revision effected by order passed under section 35(1), there ought to be notice of demand under section 29. On the terms of section 35(1), a limitation is prescribed only for the making of the order of rectification. When once that is made, an order for refund under sub-section (3) or that for payment of the tax under sub-section (4) are only consequential, and so far as these two orders are concerned, they are governed by no period of limitation. I do not see how it is possible to project the limitation provided for in sub-section (1) into the notice of demand which is referred to under sub-section (4). This contention has in my opinion no substance and deserves to be rejected. The result is that this petition fails and is dismissed with costs counsel's fee ₹ 100. Petition dismissed.
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1957 (9) TMI 68 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nt deposed to in paragraph 3 thereof constitutes a variation of the terms of the partnership. The opening words of paragraph 3 "in addition" clearly indicate this. We have, therefore, a case where an instrument of partnership is varied by providing that one of the partners shall be paid a remuneration for rendering services to the partnership. There can be little doubt, in our opinion, that such an agreement is an agreement under which the partner to be remunerated directly gets the remuneration from his or her membership of the firm. It is remuneration payable to a partner in her character as a partner ; and, therefore, on the facts of this case, the Tribunal, in our opinion, rightly came to the conclusion that Mrs. Magnus received this amount of remuneration in her capacity as a partner and it fell within the scope of section 16(3)(a)( i) and it was rightly included in the income of the assessee. Our answer, therefore, to question (2) would be in the affirmative.
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1957 (9) TMI 67 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tivity of any trust at all. The observations in paragraph 2 of the extract from the judgment, in so far as they relate to a business carried on as an integral activity of the trust itself, do not fall for consideration in the present reference; but in so far as those observations indicate that the scope of section 4(3)(ia) is restricted to a business carried on as an integral activity of the trust itself, upon a fuller consideration of the matter, I am of opinion, that the correct view is as we have indicated in this judgment, that the true scope of section 4(3) (ia) is that it includes within its scope income from business carried on on behalf of a religious or charitable institution, whether or not there is any trust either in regard to the business or in regard to the institution. The result, therefore, is that the answer to question No. 2 will be "Under section 4, sub-section (3), clause (i)." Income-tax Commissioner to pay costs. Question answered accordingly.
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1957 (9) TMI 66 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... stake is said to have crept in was that the assessing authority had misconstrued the scope of the second proviso to section 17(1) as enabling him to condone the delay in the exercise of the option. This would certainly not be a mistake apparent from the record. The scope of the second proviso is to say the least not so absolutely clear as to preclude an argument that it would apply to the petitioner's case. In this view, I am clearly of the opinion that the mistake, assuming one existed, was not apparent from the record within the meaning of section 35(1) of the Act and the order of the Income-tax Officer rectifying the mistake with which the Commissioner refused to interfere is clearly beyond the jurisdiction of the assessing authority under section 35 of the Act. The result is that the petition succeeds and the rule is made absolute. The order of the Income-tax Officer is set aside. The assessee is entitled to his costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 100. Petition allowed.
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1957 (9) TMI 65 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ellant or the respondent. We are not at present concerned with the same. Under the circumstances, we are of opinion that the decision arrived at by the Labour Appellate Tribunal which is the subject-matter of appeal before us was correct. It is no doubt true that the Labour Appellate Tribunal recorded a finding in favour of the appellant that in terminating the service of the respondent as it did, the appellant was not, guilty of any unfair labour practice nor was it actuated by any motive of victimisation against the respondent. That finding, however, cannot help the appellant in so far as the Labour Appellate Tribunal held that the appellant had failed to make out a prima facie case for terminating the service of the respondent. We, therefore, hold that the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal refusing permission to the appellant under s. 22 of the Act was correct and this appeal is liable to be dismissed. It will accordingly be dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1957 (9) TMI 64 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pression "lie" may be an expression of doubtful meaning. We have, in any event, here a case where two High Courts have taken two contrary views of the provisions of a statute and it would be reasonable, in any event, to say that the true meaning of the words "shall lie" in the proviso is not beyond doubt; and were it not beyond doubt, we ought to put on the proviso a construction which will favour the assessee and which would not deprive him of the right of appeal altogether, because such a construction would be in consonance with right and justice rather than the construction which would deprive him of that right altogether. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the view taken by the Tribunal as to the correct meaning of the proviso is the view which is preferable to the view taken by the Andhra High Court. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative. Commissioner of Income-tax to pay costs. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1957 (9) TMI 63 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he learned judge’s approach to the question whether the sum of ₹ 800 was an illegal gratification or a loan is such that the judgment falls within the words of Mahajan J. in Ramakrishna’s case (A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 20,), i.e. that the High Court has acted perversely or otherwise improperly. o p /o p The evidence and the circumstances lead to the conclusion that the transaction was not one of loan but illegal gratification. o p /o p In view of the finding that the sum of ₹ 800 was a bribe and not a loan it is not necessary to consider whether in this case the loan would be an illegal gratification within s. 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947) or o p /o p not. We would, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and order of the High Court of Madras and restore that of the Special Judge of Coimbatore convicting the respondent of the offence he was charged with. The respondent must surrender to his bail bond. Appeal allowed. o p /o p
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1957 (9) TMI 62 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... any ground open to him under the income-tax law. Our answer, therefore, to the first issue, which we have set out above and amended is in the affirmative. A second question has also been referred to us and it is in the following terms "Whether for the purpose of disposing of the producer's appeals on the limited question as to their competency, it was obligatory on the Tribunal to go into the question as to whether Judd and/or Haller were resident in the taxable territories in the appropriate accounting year?" It is only if the appeal was competent that the Tribunal would have had to apply their mind to the contention that the applicant was not liable to be taxed under section 18(3) on the ground that Judd and Haller were "resident" in the taxable territories. Our answer, therefore, to question (2) will be in the negative. The Income-tax Commissioner to pay costs. No order on the notices of motion. No order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1957 (9) TMI 61 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... vages of time on the roads. The roads should have been maintained from year to year but not having been so maintained, the cost incurred was more than what would have been incurred if they had been regularly maintained. That again is not the position in the case before us. There is nothing on the facts of this case to show that this pit was to be filled up every year and it is because the pit was not filled up that it had grown deeper and deeper, and, therefore had to be filed up during the accounting year. This appears to us to be a clear case where no asset was sought to be maintained or preserved by the expenses incurred but the expenses were incurred in rendering what was a pit-and therefore a liability and a nuisance to the neighbourhood into an asset which is useful to the assessee. In our opinion, the Tribunal was right in the view they took and our answer to the question referred to us will be in the negative. Assessee to pay costs. Question answered in the negative.
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1957 (9) TMI 60 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d securities and cash and that he was merely employing delaying tactics with the object of postponing the evil day. It is not conduct which is only technically improper or unworthy; it is conduct which is grossly improper and unworthy and as such it calls for a deterrent order. The respondent was appointed a liquidator by the Calcutta High Court presumably because he was a chartered accountant in practice. He thus received the benefit of this appointment as a result of his status as chartered accountant in practice and in acting as a liquidator he has been guilty of conduct which is absolutely unworthy of his status and it renders him unfit to be a member of the Institute. We, therefore, think that the ends of justice require that the respondent's name should be removed from the Register for four years. In regard to costs we direct that the respondent should pay the costs of the appellants in this Court and that the parties should bear their own costs in the court below.
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