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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 76 Records
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1957 (9) TMI 59 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ax Commissioner has not come upon a reference; but the Tribunal has in question (1) referred to us the question as to whether this was a capital gain. One has merely to read the definition of "capital gain" to realise that this could not conceivably be a capital gain, because there was no transfer, sale or exchange of a capital asset. All that was done was to give the management of that asset to someone else and Mr. Amin has not attempted to argue that this was a case of a capital gain. Therefore, we answer question No. (1) raised on the original reference in the negative. Question No. 2 dose not arise. Question No. 3 It was not competent to the Tribunal to determine whether this was the income of the assessee. Question No. 1 referred to us on the supplementary statement of the case does not arise because we have held that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to determine it. The Income-tax Commissioner to pay the costs of the reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1957 (9) TMI 58 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... uot;But in this case the assessment being on a Hindu undivided family the whole of the income of the Hindu undivided family is liable to assessment, add it is impossible to deduct this sum payable to the widow of a deceased brother, who gets it in her capacity ultimately as a member of the joint family." It is clear law that any amount which an assessee receives as a member of a Hindu undivided family is not taxable in his hands by reason of section 14, sub-section (1), of the Income-tax Act, and the whole of the income of the joint family, howsoever distributed amongst the members, is taxable in the hands of the Hindu undivided family. It is to this principle that this High Court gave effect in deciding this case and the case does not help in determining the question that has been referred to us. In our opinion, therefore, the answer to the question referred to us will be in the affirmative. Commissioner of Income-tax to pay costs. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1957 (9) TMI 57 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hat the question was argued. What is significant, however, is that if the matter was not argued, it is somewhat difficult to see what the Tribunal was referring to in the concluding sentence in their order, namely, "In the view that we have taken we are not considering what income was received in British India." In the statement of the case itself the Tribunal says that this sentence is not clear, and it is difficult to say what the members of the Tribunal had in mind at that time. In this state of the record, where it is necessary to determine whether or not the question was raised before the Tribunal, we would have found it somewhat difficult to do so. But fortunately, in the view that we take of the matter, whether or not it was raised before the Tribunal, it was not open to the Department to raise it before the Tribunal, and, therefore, the second question must be answered in the affirmative. Income-tax Commissioner to pay costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1957 (9) TMI 56 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... within reasonable limits? It repre- sents much less than the annual income of the estate during the year 1950-51 and only a very small fraction or the total value of the estate. The purchasing power of the rupee has gone down considerably and the authorities on which Mr. Sikri places his reliance cannot furnish a good guide for deciding whether the gift which was made in the present case was reasonable. 16. For these reasons, I would hold that the gift of a joint family asset of the value of ₹ 2,40,000/- by Shri Raghbir Singh, karta of the family, to his wife Sardarni Ahalya Bai, being a gift of affection of a reasonable share of ancestral movable property, is valid and effective and divests the family of its title to 300 shares of the Simbholi Sugar Mills Limited even if the said gift was made without the consent of the other adult coparcener, namely Shri Raghbir Singh's son Shri Harindar Singh. 17. Let an appropriate answer be returned. Tek Chand, J. 18. I agree.
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1957 (9) TMI 55 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... se. The Courts below have, on a careful consideration of the facts of this case reached the conclusion that in this case the cow-shed and the bath-room were amenities within the meaning of the Act. It does not seem to me that that finding was unjustified, 9. The implication of the finding of the Controller that the unavailability of the amenities enjoyed by the respondent was attributable to the wilful omission of the petitioner to repair the walls of the storm water drain, is that these amenities were cut off or withheld by him. I believe this finding to be well founded. That being so and having regard to the fact that the petitioner expressed his willingness before the Controller to restore those amenities for a higher rent which the respondent was willing to pay, it docs not appear to me that I would be justified in disturbing in revision the concurrent decisions of the three Courts below. This revision petition is, therefore, dismissed with costs. 10. Revision dismissed.
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1957 (9) TMI 54 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as in his revised estimate and, therefore, he should not have been subjected to a penalty. This again is an argument which does not appear to us to have any bearing on the question whether the provisions of section 28(1)(c) are attracted. The actual result of the assessment has nothing whatever to do with an attempt made by the assessee to conceal the particulars of his income by his first return by which he deliberately furnished, as found by the Income-tax authorities, inaccurate particulars of his real income. In our opinion, therefore, the assessee was rightly subjected to a penalty and the answer to the question referred to us "The assessee is liable to a penalty." There is a notice of motion taken out by the assessee for amending the question. We think the correct question has been raised on the reference before us and the notice of motion will, therefore, be dismissed with costs. The assessee to pay the costs of the reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1957 (9) TMI 53 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ore, send this matter back to the Tribunal for determining that question. We do not find any power in this Court under the provisions of section 66 of the Income-tax Act to remand a matter back to the Tribunal for determining what might have been left undetermined by them, because they took a particular view of the law. We have merely the jurisdiction to answer the question of law referred to us, and we are not concerned with any questions which are pure questions of fact or its determination by the Tribunal. We cannot direct the Tribunal on this reference to proceed to determine the question as to whether the quantum of penalty should be maintained or varied. If they are in law bound to do so by reason of our decision on the question of law that has been referred to us, Mr. Palkhivala must canvass that position before the Tribunal. The assessee shall pay the costs of the reference. No order on the notice of motion. No order as to costs. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1957 (9) TMI 52 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... es to this appeal before the Tribunal; but on the facts of this case no injustice appears to have resulted from that fact, because although it is true that upto the date of the remand order Gokuldas did not appear and probably had no knowledge of the appeal by Kikabhai to the Tribunal, obviously he appeared at all relevant times. He appeared before the I. T. O. in the proceedings upon remand, and he also appeared finally before the Tribunal when the matter was disposed of, although he was not made a party respondent as he should have been. Therefore, we are satisfied that although the proceedings were in some respects irregular, no injustice has thereby resulted to Gokuldas. 8. Our answers to the two questions referred to us are (1) in the affirmative and (2) in the affirmative. 9. Mr. Amin for the Income-tax Commissioner does not ask for any order for costs. The applicant before us, Gokuldas shall pay the costs of Kikatahai of this reference. 10. Answers in the affirmative.
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1957 (9) TMI 51 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hed in the case. We have shown that Muslimbi's existence was itself in doubt and her being in a position to make the cash credits was still more so. We have also shown that the Department established that Yaqub Manihar was not of sufficient wealth to make a deposit of ₹ 20,000 with the assessee and that, therefore, the amount was taken to be that of the assessee and not of Muslimbi and Yaqub Manihar respectively. We think that this contention is without substance, at least in the state of facts that exists in the present cases. Our answers to questions (3), (4) and (6) are accordingly in the affirmative. Our answer to question (5) is that in the absence of satisfactory proof as to the source of the credits the inference of the Tribunal that these credits are the assessee's income from some undisclosed sources is an inference of fact. The costs of the proceedings in both the cases shall be borne by the applicant Seth Kalekhen Mahomed Hanif, Bidi Merchant, Sagar.
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1957 (9) TMI 50 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e same condition as to the satisfaction of the State Government or its delegate as is mentioned in s. 2(1)(a), there is, however, no time limit for the operation of an order made under this section nor is there any provision made for any representation being made to the State Government. The absence of these safeguards in s. 3 clearly makes its provisions unreasonable and the learned Solicitor-General obviously felt some difficulty in supporting the validity of this section. It is surprising how in the same statute the two sections came to be worded differently. For reasons stated above petition No. 95 of 1957 (Virendra v. The State of Punjab) which impugns the Notifications issued under s. 2(1)(a) must be dismissed and petition No. 96 of 1957 (K. Narendra v. The State of Pun ab) which challenges s. 3 must be allowed. In the circumstances of these cases we make no order as to the costs of these applications. Petition No. 95 of 1957 dismissed. Petition No. 96 of 1957 allowed.
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1957 (9) TMI 49 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... has drawn our attention to the preamble and conditions for registration of a society under the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act and wished to urge that the activities that this society carries on by way of banking do not fall within the scope of that Act. The first answer to this contention is that a certificate of registration is by virtue of section 11 of the Act conclusive evidence that all the requisite conditions have been satisfied; and the second answer is that if they are not, it may be open to the Income-tax authorities to get the registration cancelled and the question whether the conditions have or have not been satisfied has no relevance to the question referred to us, because all that we are concerned with determining is if there is a society registered under the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, as the assessee undoubtedly is, it earns exemption by virtue of the notification which we have referred to. Our answer to the question, therefore, will be is exempt.
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1957 (9) TMI 48 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e the contrary. After giving our careful consideration to the questions raised before us, we are clearly of the opinion that even on the assumption that the appellant has ceased to be an Indian citizen and was a Pakistani national at the time of the commission of the offence, he must be held guilty and punished under the Indian Penal Code notwithstanding his not being corporeally present in India at the time. We have been asked to consider the question of sentence. As has been stated ,it the outset the substantive sentences of imprisonment are two years tinder the first count and twenty-two months under the second. The sentences were concurrent on the second and third counts. As a result, the total imprisonment which has been awarded against the appellant would be a period of three years and ten months. We are not prepared to say that the discretion of the trial Court in awarding that sentence has been wrongly exercised. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1957 (9) TMI 47 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ibunal that this item was present to their minds and was taken into account by them in arriving at the percentage of gross profits to be allowed on the entire turnover of ₹ 9 lakhs. If we accept that fact, it may still be open to Mr. Palkhivala to contend that the Tribunal should be asked separately to determine the question of ₹ 12,174; but the consequence of it would necessarily be, in view of the statement of the Tribunal, that they would like to reconsider their estimate of the percentage of gross profits. Mr. Palkhivala does not desire, therefore, that such a course should be adopted. As we accept the statement of the Tribunal, this question of exclusion of ₹ 12,174 from the total income has already been taken into account by the Tribunal and question No. 2, therefore, does not survive for disposal. The result, therefore, is that the assessees fail on this reference and shall pay the costs of the Income-tax Commissioner. Reference answered accordingly.
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1957 (9) TMI 46 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... likely to be present on the bed-sheet. If that is so, the mere fact that the presence of blood is described as stains would show that the prosecution case cannot be true. We do not feel inclined to put such a restricted meaning on the word I stain'. 'Stained with human blood' is an expression commonly found in Chemical Examiner's reports and it does not necessarily refer to specks of blood alone. We do not think that any inference can be drawn from the use of the word 'stain' in the Chemical Examiner's report, that there was not sufficient blood on the bed-sheet. The appellant has given no explanation as to how blood came to be present on material objects Nos. 10 to 12. Agreeing with the High Court that this is corroboration of the confession made by the appellant, we are of the opinion that the confession can be acted upon. If that is so, the appellant's guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1957 (9) TMI 45 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... came into force. It would, therefore, not be reasonable to complain that no protection whatever has been given to this class of thika tenants. It may be that the extent of the protection now afforded to this class may not be as wide as it originally was under s. 28 of Act II of 1949 but the deletion of s. 28 clearly indicates that the Legislature wanted to revise its policy in this matter. The position, therefore, is that the conclusion which follows from a reasonable construction of s. 5, sub-s. (1) is corroborated by the deletion of s. 28 from the Act and by the provision of s. 5, sub-s. (2) of the amending Ordinance of 1952 and s. 9 of the amending Act VI of 1953. We must,accordingly, hold that the Calcutta High Court was right in rejecting the appellant’s argument that civil courts had no jurisdiction to entertain the execution petition filed by the respondent against the appellant. In the result, the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1957 (9) TMI 44 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t that the provisions of that section are a complete answer to the assessee's claim. His dividend income was includible, under section 16(1)(c) of the Act, in the total income of his vendor and therefore no claim for refund in respect of the tax paid on the dividends was maintainable by him. For the reasons given above, the answers to the questions referred should, in my opinion, be as follows Question 1 "Yes". Question 2 "No". These answers are given only with reference to the case of Tarunendra Nath Tagore. We do not deal with the cases of the remaining assessees, because with respect to them, there is no proper reference before us. The Tribunal will be at liberty to make proper references with respect to their cases, if they desire to do so and if and when such references are made, they will be dealt with in accordance with law. The Commissioner of Income-tax shall have the costs of this reference. GUHA, J.- I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1957 (9) TMI 43 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the High Court was right in taking the view that Art. 311 was subject to the provisions of Art. 320(3)(c) of the Constitution, which were mandatory, and, as such, non-compliance with those provisions in the instant case was fatal to the proceedings ending with the order passed by the Government on September 12, 1953?
Held that:- We have already indicated that Art. 320(3)(c) of the Constitution does not confer any rights on a public servant so that the absence of consultation or any irregularity in consultation, should not afford him a cause of action in a court of law, or entitle him to relief under the special powers of a High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution or of this Court under Art. 32. It is not a right which could be recognized and enforced by a writ. On the other hand, Art. 311 of the Constitution has been construed as conferring a right on a civil servant of the Union or a State, which he can enforce in a court of law.
It must be held that the provisions of Art. 320(3)(c) are not mandatory and that non- compliance with those provisions does not afford a cause of action to the respondent in a court of law. It is not for this Court further to consider what other remedy, if any, the respondent has. Appeal No. 27 is, therefore, allowed and appeal No. 28 dismissed.
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1957 (9) TMI 42 - SUPREME COURT
Whether after the commencement of the Constitution this Court could exercise its newly acquired jurisdiction under Art. 32 and issue a writ of habeas corpus as the detention of the petitioners was continuing even after the commencement of the Constitution?
Held that:- Order of dismissal having been passed before the Constitution and rights having accrued to the appellant State and liabilities having attached to the respondent before the Constitution came into force, the subsequent conferment of jurisdiction and powers on the High Court can have no retrospective operation on such rights and liabilities. Even if the order of dismissal of the respondent was a nullity on the ground that it was passed by disregarding the rules of natural justice, the High Court could not properly be asked to exercise its newly acquired jurisdiction and powers under Art. 226 to correct errors, irregularities or illegalities committed by the inferior departmental tribunal before the commencement of the Constitution, for then there will be no limit to its going backward and that will certainly amount to giving the provisions of Art. 226 a retroactive operation. This aspect of the matter does not appear to have been pressed in the High Court or adverted to by it. It is only on this ground that we are constrained, not without regret, to accept this appeal.
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1957 (9) TMI 41 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the respondent was denied a reasonable opportunity to present his case?
Whether he was prevented from cross examining the witnesses, who gave evidence in support of the charge?
Held that:- No violation of the principles of natural justice. The witnesses have been,examined at great length, and have spoken to all relevant facts bearing on the question, and it is not suggested that there is any other matter, on which they could have spoken. We do not accept the version of the respondent that he was not allowed to put any questions to the witnesses. The enquiry before Mr. Byrne was not defective, that the respondent had full opportunity of placing his evidence before him, -and that he did avail himself of the same.
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1957 (9) TMI 40 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... refore, there was no liability upon it to get itself registered as a dealer, and that the order passed by the Sales Tax Officer registering it as a dealer was an erroneous order. As I have said, these remedies were not pursued by the petitioner Club. That being so, we are afraid it is difficult to act upon the bare assertion contained in the body of the petition, an assertion denied by the respondent in the reply filed by him, that there is no profit-making motive in the supplies of goods made by the Club to its members. We leave open the question whether the supply of goods by the Club to its members is done as a business, that is, with a profit-making motive, or otherwise. Unless this question is decided, and we cannot decide it upon the material before us, we cannot say that the order passed by the Sales Tax Officer registering the Club as a dealer is an erroneous order. In the circumstances stated above, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
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