|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21 to 37 of 37 Records
-
1958 (11) TMI 25 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... d under section 35 of the Act. What the Income-tax Officer has purported to do in the present case is not to revise his order in the light of the retrospective amendment made by section 13 of the Amendment Act alone, but to exercise his power under section 35 of the Act ; and so the question which falls to be considered in the present appeal centres round the construction of the expression " mistake apparent from the record " used in section 35. That is why we think the principle of the finality of the orders or the sanctity of the existing rights cannot be effectively invoked by the respondent in the present case. " It is true that the observations, as we have already said, were made in a different context. But we have quoted these observations solely for the purpose of showing that the doctrine of finality is not of the nature sought to be made out by the learned counsel. In the result, the petition fails and will be dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
-
1958 (11) TMI 24 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in this case there was inordinate delay in the matter of the presentation of this petition to the court?
Whether the relief sought by the petitioner is in respect of three orders and notices of the Income-tax Officer who is respondent No. 2, as well as the order passed in revision by the third respondent, who is the Commissioner of Income-tax and it is said that there is no ground mentioned in the petition for any writ being issued in respect of the order passed by the third respondent in revision?
Held that:- There can be no rule which may be adhered to in every case, because the very conception of discretion rules out the existence of any rigid formula. In the present case, we do not think we would be justified in rejecting the petition on the ground that there has been inordinate delay in the filing of the petition.
There were clear and tenable reasons for the distinction to be drawn between an appeal and a revisional application when the revisional application was dismissed. There was an appeal against that judgment and the appeal court confirmed that decision. It was held by the appeal court that when the revisional court interferes with the order of the court below, the result is not that the order of the lower court is merged in the order passed by the revisional court, but the result is that the order of the revisional court sets aside or modifies the of the lower court. Whereas in the case of an appeal when the appeal is dismissed the appellate court confirms the decree of the trial court, in the case of a revisional court when it dismisses the petition in revision all that it does is that it does not interfere with the order of the court below. The effect of the dismissal of the petition is not to confirm the order of the trial court, because no confirmation is necessary from the revisional court. When the revisional court dismisses the petition, the true effect in law is that it refuses to exercise the revisional jurisdiction conferred upon it.
The penal interest that can be charged to any assessee under sub-section (6) can only be in respect of an assessee who has paid tax under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) on the basis of his own estimate, and the assessee in the case before us could not have been charged with any penal interest under sub-section (6). If she could not have been charged any penal interest under sub-section (6), says Mr. Joshi, there could be no question of invoking the fifth proviso to that sub-section. In our judgment, there is considerable force in this argument of learned counsel for the Revenue. Appeal allowed.
-
1958 (11) TMI 23 - SUPREME COURT
Scope of an enquiry in an election petition wherein election is called in question under s. 100(1)(c) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (43 of 1951) questioned on the ground that a nomination paper had been improperly’ rejected
Held that:- Allow the appeals, set aside the orders of the court below, and dismiss the writ petitions. The jurisdiction of the High Court to issue writs against orders of the Tribunal is undoubted; but then, it is well settled that where there is another remedy provided, the court may properly exercise its discretion in declining to interfere under Art. 226. It should be remembered that under the election law as it stood prior to the amendment in 1956, election petitions were dismissed on preliminary grounds and the correctness of the decision was challenged in applications under Art. 226 and in further appeals to this Court, with the result that by the time the matter was finally decided, the life of the legislatures for which the election was held would have itself very nearly come to an end thus rendering the proceedings infructuous.
-
1958 (11) TMI 22 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... relied upon the decision of this Court in Government of Andhra v. K. Rajaiah and Co. 1957 8 S.T.C. 164. There it was held by Subba Rao, C. J., and Manohar Pershad, J., that the amendment made to rule 17(1) by the above-mentioned Government Order had, either expressly or by necessary implication, no retroactivity and therefore it could not affect any final assessment already made. There it was argued that any assessment which bad become final before the date of the amendment could only be revised under the original rule within two years next succeeding that to which the tax or licence fee related. This decision is clearly inapplicable to the facts of the present case. Here the assessment had not become final before the date of the amendment. Therefore, the principle of the Madras decision must apply. All the contentions raised by the petitioner, therefore, fail. These writ petitions are dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee in both, Rs. 250 (consolidated). Petitions dismissed.
-
1958 (11) TMI 21 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e Turnover and Assessment Rules framed under the Madras General Sales Tax Act was conditional upon the assessee compplying with the requirement contained in sub-rule (3) of that rule and the Full Bench answered the question in the affirmative. The learned judges expressed the opinion that the exemption could not be claimed in any manner other than that indicated in sub-rule (3) of rule 18. The doctrine enunciated in that case applies to this case also, since rule 9 also contains provision which is absolute and peremptory. It follows that it is only a strict compliance with the provisions of rule 9 that enables an assessee to claim the rebate, since the submission of the application in Form VIII is a pre-requisite to take advantage of the benefit conferred by section 7 of the General Sales Tax Act. It follows that the order of the Tribunal is wrong and has to be set aside. In the result, the revision is allowed with costs. Advocate s fee is fixed at Rs. 200. Petition allowed.
-
1958 (11) TMI 20 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ropounded by the learned counsel for the petitioners. It follows that Act V of 1958 is a valid piece of legislation and cannot be attacked on any ground whatsoever. In the result, these petitions are dismissed with costs in W.P. Nos. 743, 744 and 780 of 1958. Advocate s fee is fixed at Rs. 200 in each. Writ Petition No. 215 of 1957.-The petition as originally filed discloses different grounds but none of them is pressed having regard to the fact that our decision in W. P. No. 530 of 1956 disposed of all the objections originally raised. An amendment of the grounds raised therein was sought by way of raising the plea relating to the legality of Act V of 1958. This petition (C.M.P. No. 4793 of 1958) is allowed. The writ petition (W.P. No. 215 of 1957) also has to be dismissed as we have repelled this contention in W.P. Nos. 743, 744 and 780 of 1958. The petition is dismissed with costs. The Advocate s fee is fixed at Rs. 75. The C.M.Ps. are also dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
-
1958 (11) TMI 19 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... of Article 286 of the Constitution. That these sales are saved from illegality by reason of the Sales Tax Continuance Order, 1950, has been upheld in two reported cases, namely, the East India Match Factory v. State of Madras 1954 5 S.T.C. 269., where it is pointed out that if Article 286(2) applied the President s order issued thereunder justified the levy of the tax by the State of Madras up to 31st March, 1951. In Vedullapalli Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of Madras 1955 6 S.T.C. 405., it was held that if the sales fell within Article 286(2) they would be liable to tax under the Sales Tax Conitnuance Order, 1950, of the President made thereunder. I have dealt with these two points in two recent decisions (S.A. No. 1186 of 1955-Palaniswami Nadar v. State of Madras 1959 10 S.T.C. 207., and S.A. No. 818 of 1956-Indian Drugs Co., Tuticorin v. State of Madras 1959 10 S.T.C. 322. This second appeal fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances without costs. Appeal dismissed.
-
1958 (11) TMI 18 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... fected outside the State. The word delivery in that context is deprived of substance if we regard it as other than delivery of the tea sold and construe it as extending to delivery of documents of title relating to the tea. I hold that the word delivery in section 5 (v) means physical delivery of the tea sold, and not delivery effected by documents. The word delivery does not include anything which the law deems to be delivery but is restricted to physical delivery of the thing sold. It is not disputed that in every one of the sales to which these suits relate the tea was actually delivered in ports in foreign countries. I find that every one of the sales subject to the assessments complained of in these suits was a sale which was exempt from taxation under section 5 (v) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act. The parties will file a memo stating the statistical consequences of the findings recorded in the appeal and in this judgment. Post on 11th November. Ordered accordingly.
-
1958 (11) TMI 17 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... f the Criminal Court to take cognisance of such a plea. Even without that section, the scheme of the Act is complete and it precludes the tribunals from entertaining these objections except in the manner provided by the Act. Hence this contention fails and is rejected. Our answers set out above govern this case also. As there is nothing, further to be done in these cases, no useful purpose will be served by remitting them to the Bench. The respondents have to be convicted since there is no dispute as to the factum of assessments and also admittedly the taxes demanded were not paid within time. The respondents in all the cases are therefore convicted and each of them is sentenced to Rs. 25. In addition the taxes due from them, (viz., Rs. 1080 for the year 1949-50 and Rs. 401-3-0 for the year 1950-51 from the respondent in C.A. Nos. 118 and 119 of 1955 and Rs. 519-6-0 for the year 1953-54 from the respondents in C.A. No. 167 of 1956) will be collected as fine. Appeals allowed.
-
1958 (11) TMI 16 - COURT OF APPEAL
Appointment of directors and proportion of those who are to retire by rotation, Oppression and mismanagement
-
1958 (11) TMI 7 - SUPREME COURT
Court - Revenue authorities (Customs authorities) are not courts of law - Departmental proceedings - Punishment - Double jeopardy
-
1958 (11) TMI 6 - SUPREME COURT
Adventure In The Nature Of Trade, Jurisdiction Of High Court, Law And Fact, Managing Agent, Mixed Question, Question Of Law
-
1958 (11) TMI 5 - SUPREME COURT
Adventure In The Nature Of Trade, Jurisdiction Of High Court, Law And Fact, Managing Agent, Mixed Question, Question Of Law
-
1958 (11) TMI 4 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the collections by the assessee company described in its accounts as " empty bottle return security deposits " were income assessable under section 10 of the Income-tax Act ?
Held that:- Having given the matter our anxious consideration which the difficulties involved in it require, we think that the correct view to take is that the amounts paid to the appellant and described as " Empty Bottles Return Security Deposit " were trading receipts, and therefore income of the appellant assessable to tax. We agree with the High Court that the question framed for decision in this case, should be answered in the affirmative. Appeal dismissed.
-
1958 (11) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was bound by the findings of fact of the Income-tax Officer relating to the nature and division of the assets of the joint family in question which he arrived at in his enquiry under section 25A(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act ?
Whether there was any material or evidence upon which the taxing authorities could legally hold that the amount of ₹ 2,30,346 (Rupees two lakhs thirty thousand three hundred and forty-six) represented undisclosed profits of the accounting year in question ?
Held that:- What that tax is would depend on the assessment of income in proceedings taken under section 23, and an order under section 25A would have no effect on that assessment. It is in this context that we must read the observations in the order under section 25A relied on for the appellant. In fact, that order does not expressly decide that the family had the jewels mentioned in exhibit A, and that they were converted into cash as claimed by the appellant. Nor could such a finding be implied therein, when regard is had to the scope of the proceedings under section 25A and to the fact that the order under section 23(3) holding that the sum of ₹ 2,30,346 did not represent the value of the family jewels sold was passed on the same date as the order under section 25A and by the very same officer.
There is ample authority for the position that where an assessee fails to prove satisfactorily the source and nature of certain amounts of cash received during the accounting year, the Income-tax Officer is entitled to draw the inference that the receipts are of an assessable nature. That is precisely what the Income-tax authorities have done in the present case, and we do not find any grounds for holding that their finding is open to attack as erroneous in law. Appeal dismissed.
-
1958 (11) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT
Whether under section 28(1) read with section 18A(9) of the Act, it is competent to the Income-tax authorities to impose a penalty on a person who has failed to comply with section 18A(3) of the Act. ?
Held that:- It was competent to the Income-tax authorities to impose a penalty under section 28 read with section 18A(9)(b) where there has been a failure to comply with section 18A(3).
Set aside the order of the court below and answer the reference in the affirmative. Appeal allowed.
-
1958 (11) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the assessee could waive the breach of the fundamental right in question?
Whether in the facts and circumstances of this case he had actually done so?
Held that:- Where a right or privilege guaranteed by the Constitution rests in the individual and is primarily intended for his benefit and does not infringe on the right of others, it can be waived provided such waiver is not forbidden by law and does not contravene public policy or public morals.
On a consideration of the nature of the fundamental right flowing from article 14, we have no doubt in our mind that it is not for a citizen or any other person who benefits by reason of its provisions to waive any breach of the obligation on the part of the State.
In this case it is held that there is no foundation on facts to sustain the plea of waiver. Therefore, allow the appeal with costs. The order of the Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi, dated January 29, 1958, must be set aside and all proceedings now pending for implementation of the order of the Union Government dated July 5, 1954, must be quashed.
|
