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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 62 Records
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1958 (3) TMI 85 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... me was earned'; dealt with the provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act and the decision of the Bombay High Court in In re Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. 1921 1 I.T.C. 125 and said 'The provision we have to deal with is entirely different. For a deduction to be permissible as far as agricultural income in this State is concerned it is not enough if the expenditure was not in the nature of capital expenditure and was in respect of the agricultural operations of the assessee during the accounting year. It must be far more intimately related--so related as to form a link in the chain of causation -to the crop that earned the profits or gains which form the basis of the assessment'." 10. In the light of what is stated above we must hold that the Appellate Tribunal was right in its conclusion and that this application should be dismissed. We decide accordingly. 11. The applicant will pay the costs of the respondent, advocate's fee ₹ 150. Order accordingly.
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1958 (3) TMI 84 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... right. 34. The learned Judges of the Bombay High Court tired to distinguish the Federal Court's judgment on the ground that no bonus had been declared there and so there was no ascertained sum but, as we have pointed out, the ratio of the decision covers the present case and, in any case, that is our view quite apart from their conclusion. 35. On this view, it is not necessary to consider the points that were argued because, if the definition of "wages," as it stood before the amendment, it not wide enough to included a bonus of the kind we have here, namely, one payable under an award of an Industrial Court, then, the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act had in jurisdiction to entertain the petitions made to it under s. 15 of the Act. 36. The appeals are allowed with costs. The decisions of the learned High Court Judges are set aside and also the decrees of the Authority under the Payment wages Act. There will be only one set of costs. 37. Appeals allowed.
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1958 (3) TMI 82 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n into account and given due weight, when we are called upon to exercise our discretion in favour of interference with the award of the tribunal on some of the very grounds specified in the application for leave to appeal that failed. It should be needless to emphasize that had leave been granted- and that was the stage for the exercise of the discretion vested in the Supreme Court- the scope of the appeal could have been much wider than that permissible in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. Though not without hesitation we have reached the conclusion, that in the circumstances of this case it would not be a proper exercise of discretion, despite the findings we have recorded earlier, to set aside the award by the issue of a writ of certiorari, after the Supreme Court had refused the petitioner leave to appeal against that award. It is in these circumstances that we direct that the rule nisi be discharged and that the petition be dismissed, but without costs.
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1958 (3) TMI 81 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the High Court is set aside. The case will now go back to the High Court of (Madhya-Pradesh) to be decided on the merits. The appellant will have the costs here and below. We have here to state that there were three other connected matters. First, there was an application by the appellant to this Court for special leave to appeal from the Judgment of the Divisional Bench, being Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 368 of 1957. Then there was another application by the appellant to this Court for special leave to appeal from the judgment of the Full Bench, being Petition for ,Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 242 of 1957. These had been made by way of abundant caution. Lastly, there was an application for leave to file additional documents in the appeal that has just been disposed of. It was Civil Misc. Petition No. 472 of 1956. None of these applications were pressed and we therefore dismiss them but without any order for costs. Appeal allowed, cause remitted.
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1958 (3) TMI 80 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hat no serious attempt was made to prove the case made by the plaintiff in paragraph 14 of the plaint to the effect that a new board of Directors consisting of Dr. S.P. Bhattacharji, Gunabantrai Ojha, D.N. Bhattacharji and the plaintiff was elected in a meeting convened by five members under Articles 64 and 65 of the Articles and duly held. Similarly, no serious argument was advanced that the suit was bad for non-joinder of Dr. Mukherjee and Dr. Neogy as parties. ( 98. ) For reasons given above the plaintiff succeeds and I pass a decree in terms of prayers (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g) and costs. Certified for three counsel. ( 99. ) I would be failing in my duty if I do not record the great assistance rendered to the court by all the learned counsel-seniors and juniors alike. The case is very heavy and the learn ed counsel did not spare themselves. No Judge got the assistance that I received from the Bar in this case and I wish to record my gratitude to each one of them.
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1958 (3) TMI 79 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... templated under ss. 155 and 156 of the Code. In that case, there would have been no conflict of jurisdiction, and therefore, no question 44 of infringing the sound principle discussed above. But the absence of the leave of the Court and of the necessary notice to the Receiver, makes all the difference between a valid and an illegal sale. The High Court has also relied upon the well-known rule of natural justice-audi alteram partem-as another reason for holding the sale to be illegal. It is not necessary for the purposes of this case to pronounce upon the difficult question of how far a principle of natural justice can override the specific provisions of a statute. For the reasons given above, we agree with the High Court in its conclusion that the auction-sale impugned in this case, was illegal, and that the suit was not barred by the provisions of the Code. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed with costs to the Receiver who alone has contested the appeal. Appeal dismissed.
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1958 (3) TMI 78 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... overnment on appeal is that the title of the petitioner is being challenged in a civil proceeding referred to by them. In my opinion, it is not open either to the first respondent or to the second respondent to take this into consideration in rejecting the application of the petitioner on this ground. Mr . N. Sundara Iyer also mentioned in the course of his arguments that his client has now succeeded in the suit O.S. 400/56, District Munsiffs Court Ottapalam. But as I have already stated in the earlier portion of my judgment, this has no bearing about the issue of a permit under S.3 by the District Collector. In this view, the order of the first respondent and the second respondent so far as S. No. 205/14 is concerned, are set aside and the first respondent is directed to take up all the applications filed by the petitioner under S.3 of the Act and dispose of them in the light of the observations contained in this judgment, as expeditiously as possible. No order as to costs.
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1958 (3) TMI 77 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... come. Here, with respect to the Tribunal, it is obviously wrong because the cheques in payment of the assessee's commission were sent to the assessee in Saurashtra. They were sent by post, but there is no finding that the assessee asked the mills to send the cheques by post. If that finding had been there, possibly it may have been argued that the assessee constituted the post office its agent. But in the absence of any finding, as the cheques were received by the assessee in Saurashtra, what the assessee received was money's worth and, therefore, the receipt of the income must be considered to have been in Saurashtra and not in Part A States. It is difficult to understand how the Tribunal considers the sending of the cheques by the mills from Part A States a relevant factor in order to determine where the income was received. We must, therefore, answer the question submitted to us in the negative. The Commissioner to pay the costs. Question answered in the negative.
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1958 (3) TMI 76 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... irm to pay to the non-resident, nor does it in any way affect the right of the non-resident to receive this amount. The non-resident nominates a particular agent to whom the payment should be made, and pursuant to that instruction the assessee firm paid the sum of ₹ 1,16,000 to the Bombay firm. But in law the responsibility of the assessee firm was to the non-resident, and if that responsibility was there, the application of the section cannot be disputed. In our opinion, therefore, the assessee firm was clearly liable under section 18(3A) to deduct the amount of income-tax, and not having done so, it is responsible for payment of the sum to the Department. Mr. Palkhivala concedes that the position under section 18(3C) with regard to super-tax is identical with the position with regard to payment of income-tax under section 18(3A). We, therefore, answer the question submitted to us in the affirmative. The assessee to pay the costs. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1958 (3) TMI 75 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed counsel for the department has not been able to place before me any authority which would warrant the action sought to be taken against the petitioner by the 2nd respondent. 8. Pursuant to the order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, it is open to the Income-tax Officer to consider the one and the only question referred to him, viz., whether the firm's application for registration should be allowed. There is no other question before the Income-tax Officer and he would certainly be transgressing the limits set down by law if he were to embark upon a fresh enquiry as to the quantum of the income or the loss incurred by the petitioner. 9. As there is a clear and patent want of jurisdiction on the part of the 2nd respondent to make a de novo assessment on the petitioner, a writ of prohibition shall be issued directing the 2nd respondent not to make a de novo assessment. The petitioner will have his costs from the respondents. Advocate's fee ₹ 100/-.
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1958 (3) TMI 74 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... each of them, subject to the question of maintainability of the appeals being open to be urged. These appeals are also covered by the judgment just delivered by us in Petition No. 91 of 1957 & Ors., and the appellants would be entitled to a declaration in each one of them that the decision of the Wage Board ins ultra vires the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955, and therefore void and inoperative. In view of the conclusion thus reached, we feel it unnecessary to consider whether the appeals would be maintainable under Art. 136 of the Constitution. The appellants having substantially succeeded in their respective petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution, the question has now become purely academic and we need not spend any time over the same. The result therefore is that there will be no orders save that all the parties thereto shall bear and pay their own costs thereof. Petitions allowed. Appeals disposed of accordingly.
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1958 (3) TMI 73 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is indeed a curious argument coming from counsel for the Taxing Department. Surely we cannot stretch the language of section 44 or put a construction upon it which it will not bear merely in order to enable the Taxing Department to recover the tax from the petitioner which someone else was liable to pay and which someone else has failed to pay. It is for the Taxing Department to come to us and tell us under which provision of the law this liability is sought to be imposed upon the petitioner. If there is no provision, liability cannot be fastened upon the petitioner. In view of our decision, we do not think it necessary to permit Mr. Palkhivala to urge the other grounds on which he has challenged the notice issued by the Income-tax Officer. The result is, the petition must succeed and the rule will be made absolute and there will be an order against the Income-tax Officer in terms of prayer (b) of the petition. Respondents to pay the costs of the petition. Petition allowed.
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1958 (3) TMI 72 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ould be by excluding this sum of ₹ 40,000 from the assessment of the assessee. Now, if we were to answer question No. 2 in favour of the taxing department and hold that ₹ 40,000 is a revenue receipt and not a capital receipt as contended by the assessee, this direction cannot be carried out by the Tribunal. Having already excluded ₹ 40,000 from the assessment by reason of our answer to question No.1, the Tribunal cannot include this ₹ 40,000 in the assessment of the assessee. It is in this sense that question No.2 becomes academic. If the reference can be disposed of on question No.1 and if the answer given by us to question No.1 is sufficient to enable the Tribunal to dispose of the matter before it, then it would serve no purpose by our proceeding to answer question No. 2, which answer under the circumstances would become academic. We, therefore, answer question No. 2 as unnecessary. The Commissioner to pay the costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1958 (3) TMI 71 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... period, without going into the matter as to whether such profit could be made in the particular variety of business undertaken by the assessee. The result is that we set aside the order of the Tribunal and remand the case to it with the direction that it do disclose the material gathered from private enquiries to the assessee and give full opportunity to the assessee to place any relevant material to meet the substance of the private enquiry. If the Tribunal thinks that for further enquiry the case should go to the Income-tax Officer, it might send it to the Income-tax Officer to act up to the directions of this court. The Department would also be entitled to rebut the evidence that the assessee may place before the authorities. In the view that we have taken we answer the questions of law referred to us as follows Q. 1. In the negative. 2. In the negative. 3. In the negative. 4. All particulars on which they base the assessment. The assessee would be entitled to his costs.
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1958 (3) TMI 70 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... onstruing it in the manner the counsel for the assessee invites us to do. If that were so, no question of law arises to be answered by us. A question of law can be said to arise out of an order of the Appellate Tribunal within the meaning of section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act. In other words, the order of the Tribunal should disclose that the point of law was raised before the Tribunal. If such a question is not raised before the Tribunal, s it cannot be said to arise out of its order even if it could be sustained on the facts in the statement of the case by the Tribunal. There is ample authority for this proposition. See Abboy Chetty v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1947 15 I.T.R. 442 and Commissioner of Income-tax v. Modern Theatres Ltd. 1951 20 I.T.R. 588 In the above circumstances, the question is answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the Department which we fix at ₹ 100. Questions answered in the affirmative.
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1958 (3) TMI 69 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nother transaction. Certain transactions of Dharmaperumal Pillai were shown in annexure C. The range was from ₹ 8-13-6 to ₹ 19-2-7 per cwt. and the average worked out to ₹ 12-6-0 per cwt. Here again we have to point out that even if every one of the dealers in the onion market had an opportunity to sell onions above the controlled rate, what precisely was the excess amount realised with reference to each transaction could not really be the basis of the realisations of the same dealer on another occasion or on even the averages of the transactions of any one given dealer. But this question on what basis the estimate should be made does not arise for consideration; and estimating profits is certainly not within the jurisdiction of this court. We have to answer the question referred to us in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to the costs of this reference. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Question answered in the negative.
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1958 (3) TMI 68 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e, before finally deciding to deduct a substantial sum from ₹ 85,000 as having been set apart for payment of income-tax by the undivided family, at the time of partition. By their omission to do so the Tribunal has committed an error of law. We now understand that the assessments of the Hindu undivided family for the relevant periods were taken up before the Tribunal and ultimately, on the 13th December, 1955, the total income-tax payable by the family for the years 1944-45 and 1945-46 was fixed at about ₹ 70,000 only. The Tribunal may take into consideration this final figure of assessment and also the actual amount of income-tax paid by the petitioner as the kartha of the family for the years in question, before giving full effect to our order. For the aforesaid reasons we would answer the question in the affirmative. The petition is allowed with costs. Hearing fee ₹ 100 (Rupees one hundred only). BARMAN, J.--I agree. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1958 (3) TMI 67 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s to agitate is not before us and it cannot be before us because the procedure laid down by section 66 to bring that question before us has not been followed by the Commissioner. Therefore, we cannot give him the relief which he seeks on the notice of motion. The result, therefore, is that we will answer-Question No. 1 In the negative. Question No. 2 In the affirmative. Question No. 3 In the negative. No order as to costs of the reference. Notice of motion dismissed with costs. Mr. Kolah tells us that the monies collected by the Association are used for a very deserving cause and that the Association makes a large contribution for the maintenance of the Commerce College at Surat. We are sure that, if the Department has any power to exempt the Association from payment of tax on the monies received by them with regard to nominees' commission, the Department will consider whether this is not a proper case where that power should be exercised. Reference answered accordingly.
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1958 (3) TMI 66 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... regarded as trees and not as timber. The difference lies there. The result is that, though such trees as can be regarded as standing timber at the date of the document, both because of their size and girth and also because of the intention to fell at an early date, would be moveable, property for the purposes of the Transfer of Property and Registration Acts, the remaining trees that are also covered by the grant will be immoveable property, and as the total value is ₹ 26,000, the deed requires registration. Being unregistered, it passes no title or interest and, therefore, as in Ananda Behera's case ( 1955 2 S.C.R. 919) the petitioner has no fundamental right which she can enforce. My lord the Chief Justice and my learned brothers prefer to leave the question whether the deed here is a lease or a licence coupled with a grant, open because, on either view the petitioner must fail. But we are all agreed that the petition be dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1958 (3) TMI 65 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ere different But whatever the position may be, in our opinion, it is not open to the Department to put forward this entirely new contention before us. The result, therefore, is that the assessees must succeed, and we will answer the question submitted to us. " Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the sum of ₹ 73,800 and ₹ 3,84,000, realised by the assessee by leasing out the factory was income which could be set off against losses from the business of the manufacture of textiles brought forward from the preceding year under section 24(2) of the Income-tax Act? in the affirmative. We had added the figure of ₹ 3,84,000, because through an oversight that figure has been omitted. The figure of ₹ 73,800 relates to the assessment year 1951-52 and ₹ 3,84,000 to the assessment year 1952-53. In view of our decision on the first question, the second question does not arise. Commissioner to pay the costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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