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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 32 Records
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1958 (5) TMI 59 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... this category as they are persons who worked for the defeated candidate in this election as well as in the election of 1952. This leaves only the evidence of Bholasingh who alleged that one Thanasingh distributed the pamphlet. It has not been shown that Thanasingh was an agent of the appellant. In any case even if he had been proved to be an agent, from one stray instance of the distribution of the pamphlet, the consent of the petitioner cannot be inferred. We accordingly hold that the evidence of Bholasingh has no effect on the case as a corrupt practice by an agent is no longer sufficient to make the election void unless it is further shown that it materially affected the result of which there is no evidence in this case. 76. In view of our finding on issue No. 5, we hold the election of the appellant to be void. We accordingly confirm the decision of the Tribunal and dismiss the appeal. 77. In the circumstances, we direct the parties to bear their own costs of the appeal.
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1958 (5) TMI 58 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
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... ... ..... rch, it is contended that if the conduct of the assessee amounted to a refusal of service the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code required that a copy of the notice be affixed on the door of his house. There cannot in fact be any doubt that the notice sent by the Income Tax Officer was received on behalf of the assessee and the only question is whether the service was invalid on account of any technical flaw. In my opinion the attempt to serve the assessee on the second occasion on the 31st of March was unnecessary, since he had been properly served on the previous day when the notice was presented in his presence and at his own instance it was placed in the hands of his accountant and acknowledged by him. This, in my opinion, amounted in the circumstances to personal service. I therefore, see no reason to require the Tribunal to state the case to this court and would dismiss the petition with costs, counsels fee ₹ 150. A.N. Bhandari, C.J. I agree Petition dismissed.
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1958 (5) TMI 57 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d in so far as it represents loss of profits as opposed to loss of capital and so forth, it is an item of income in any normal sense of the term. It is equally clear that the receipt is inseparably connected with the ownership and conduct of the business and arises from it." 6. A subsidiary question has also been raised, namely that although the amount paid on account of the price of land may be deemed to be profit or gain of the business the amount of 15 per cent paid cannot be so regarded. The question whether this amount of 15 per cent does or does not fall within the ambit of the expression "profits or gains of the business" has not been referred to us by the Tribunal and does not need to be answered. 7. For these reasons I am of the opinion that the question which has been referred to us by the Tribunal must be answered in the affirmative. 8. The respondents will be entitled to costs of this Court which we assess at ₹ 250/-. D. Falshaw, J. 9 I agree.
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1958 (5) TMI 56 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ppropriate direction regard- ing those conditions as it should have done, but allowed the appeal and dismissed the writ application in too. We think that the appropriate order to pass in this case is to dismiss the writ application in so far as it seeks to quash the impugned order of confiscation of the gold and the payment of fine in lieu thereof, and to allow it in so far as it wants a direction restraining respondents 1 to 3 from enforcing the two invalid conditions imposed by the Collector of Customs, which the Collector had no jurisdiction to impose. The time limit of four months given by the Collector will accordingly run from the date of this order. The appeal is accordingly allowed to the very limited extent indicated above but dismissed as to the rest, and in the circumstances of this case, particularly in view of the invalid conditions imposed by the Collector, we direct that the parties must bear their own costs of the hearing in this Court. Appeal allowed in part.
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1958 (5) TMI 55 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... this case, for, whether section 77 applies, as the learned Counsel for the respondents contends, or the terms of the contract would govern the rights of the parties, as the learned counsel for the appellant argues, the result would be the same for the question to be decided is whether under the terms of the mortgage, the mortgagee has the right to appropriate the entire net receipts in lieu of interest. We have already held that in Exhibit A(3) not only there is such a recital but there is a specific term whereunder the mortgagor expressly agreed not to claim any produce received by the mortgagee. Whether section 77 applies or not, under the express terms of the contract, the appellant is not liable to render accounts for the excess receipts. o p /o p 18. No other point is raised before us. In the result, the decree of the High Court is set aside and that of the Subordinate Judge is restored. The appellant will have his costs throughout. o p /o p 19. Appeal allowed. o p /o p
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1958 (5) TMI 54 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... beds. Lord Lindley observed "The purpose for which the machines were obtained and fixed seems to me unmistakable; it was to complete and use the building as a factory. It is true that the machines could be removed if necessary, but the concrete beds and bolts prepared for thorn negative any idea of treating the machines when fixed as movable chattels." In the present case it is clear from the Commissioner's report that the machines are permanently fastened to things attached to the earth. They were set up there with the definite intention of running the Oil Mills and not with the idea of being remo ved after temporary use. I have therefore no hesitation in holding that the plant and machinery of the Company is not moveable property. 8. In the result the Official Liquidator is entitled to the declaration prayed for. It is hereby declared that the holders of the third series of debentures are not secured creditors of the Company but are only unsecured creditors.
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1958 (5) TMI 53 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... reatise" is defined as a literary composition dealing more or less systematically with a definite subject. The leaflet in question is undoubtedly a composition defaming the two persons named in the heading systematically. I am unable to agree that merely because the subject of composition is defamatory it will be taken out of the definition of "treatise". "Literary" merely means occupied with literature. A literate person is one who has some acquaintance with literature. A person who is able to read and write has some acquaintance with literature. Literature need not always be philosophical or moral. It can equally be immoral. 5. I am accordingly satisfied that the leaflet in question is a pamphlet and is therefore a book within the meaning of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867. The conviction of the applicant is therefore proper. The sentence of fine of ₹ 50/- imposed on him is not excessive. 6. I accordingly reject the application.
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1958 (5) TMI 52 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s of the property, that such ownership did not vest from the date of sale, notwithstanding success in the suit, and that the actual substitution of the owner of the pre-empted property dates with possession under the decree." 26. This judgment is, therefore, a clear authority for the position that the preemptor is not substituted in the place of the original vendee till conditions laid down in the decree are fulfilled. We cannot, therefore, agree with the learned Counsel that the compromise decree itself perfected his clients' right in derogation to that of the plaintiffs. But as we have held that the appellants complied with the conditions laid down in the compromise decree, they were substituted in the place of the vendee before the present suit was disposed of. In the aforesaid view, the other questions raised by the appellants do not arise for consideration. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the suit is dismissed with costs throughout. 27. Appeal allowed.
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1958 (5) TMI 51 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... vernment AIR 1951 Nag 58 (R), and it was held that it could not be done. In this case reliance was placed upon several English and American cases. In the present case there is no allegation made that any order adverse to the petitioner has been passed and all that is said is that "the petitioner is being threatened with legal proceedings under this Act both by opposite party Nos. 4 and 5." No notice has yet been issued by either of the respondents Nos. 4 and 5 and no tangible action has yet been taken. It must there-fore be held that none of the rights of the petitioner have either been infringed or invaded. The argument that "if there is a potential threat to the exercise" of a person's fundamental rights by the existence of an unconstitutional provision a writ should be issued was repelled by the Calcutta High Court in the case of Auumati Sadhukhan (Q), referred to above. I follow this decision with respect. 22. The petition is accordingly rejected.
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1958 (5) TMI 50 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ded on an assumption which no court of law can assume. It cannot be assumed that respondent 3 would die first. It may well be that he may survive both respondents 1 and 2, in which case, no question of any suit coming into existence at their instance would arise. If the order allowing respondents 1 and 2 to be added as parties in a suit of the present nature is allowed to stand it will open the way to a wider exercise of powers under O. 1, r. 10, and in a manner which was not contemplated by the Code of Civil Procedure, or s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act or permissible under the Mohammedan law. 32. I would, accordingly, allow the appeal as both the courts below were in error in supposing that this was a case in which the provisions of O. 1, r. 10, applied and would set aside the orders of the courts below. The appellant is entitled to her costs throughout. By Court 33. The appeal is dismissed. Costs to abide the result of litigation in the trial court. 34. Appeal dismissed.
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1958 (5) TMI 49 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... authoritative pronouncements on the scope of the provisions of Section 100, Code of Civil Procedure, some learned Judges of the High Courts are disposing of Second Appeals as if they were first appeals. This introduces, apart from the fact that the High Court assumes and exercises a jurisdiction which it does not possess, a gambling element in the litigation and confusion in the mind of the litigant public. This case affords a typical illustration of such interference by a Judge of the High Court in excess of his jurisdiction under Section 100, Code of Civil Procedure. We have, therefore, no alternative but to set aside the decree of the High Court on the simple ground that the learned Judge of the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere in second appeal with the findings of fact given by the first appellate Court based upon an appreciation of the relevant evidence. In the result, the decree of the High Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed with costs throughout.
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1958 (5) TMI 48 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Act and the period hereinbefore mentioned being excluded, there can be no doubt that the suit was filed well within the prescribed period of limitation and the judgment of the Division Bench cannot be sustained. 12. In the view it took on the question of limitation the Division Bench did not consider it necessary to go into or give any decision on the other issue, namely, as to whether the suit was barred by O. 2, r. 2. The suit should, therefore, go back to the High Court for determination of that issue. The result, therefore, is that we accept the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and remand and case back to the High Court for a decision on issue No. 3 only. The appellant will get the costs of this appeal as well as the costs of the hearing in the High Court resulting in the decree under appeal and the general costs of the appeal and the costs of further hearing on remand will be dealt with by the High Court. 13. Appeal allowed. 14. Case remanded.
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1958 (5) TMI 47 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... it must a fortiori be so, in the interpreting a document drawn up by the Union Government with great care and deliberation. And having regard to the nature of the advisory jurisdiction under Art. 143, the reference should be construed narrowly rather than broadly. But this discussion is academic, as there have been full arguments on the validity of all the provisions, and we are expressing our opinion thereon. 69. In the result, my answer to Question No. 2 is that excepting Cls. (14) and (15), the other provisions of the Bill do not offend Art. 30(1) of the Constitution. 70. As regards schools of the Anglo-Indian Communities, Art. 337 provides for aid being given to them on the conditions and to the extent specified therein. That is outside Art. 30(1) and independent of it, and I agree with My Lord, the Chief Justice, that the provisions of the Bill are, to the extent they affect or interfere with the rights conferred by that Article, bad. 71. Reference answered accordingly.
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1958 (5) TMI 46 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ears in question. The tribunal should also make a finding as to the amount of bonus to which the respondents would, in its opinion, be entitled on this altered finding as to available surplus. We desire that this appeal should be finally disposed of as soon as possible; so we direct that the tribunal should submit its findings along with the evidence to be recorded hereafter to this Court within three months from today. Both parties have stated to us that this matter has to be and would be dealt with by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal functioning at Bangalore. The proceedings will accordingly be remitted to the said tribunal. The appellant will pay the cost of remand in any event. Costs of the present hearing of the appeal will be costs in the appeal. We would like to add that Mr. Sanyal has agreed without prejudice that the appellant will pay to the respondents fifteen days basic wage towards their claim’ for bonus during the relevant years. Case, remanded.
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1958 (5) TMI 45 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... h that it does not, as a rule, put its own assets in jeopardy and makes income principally by earning commission on transactions in which the amounts of profit and loss are borne by other parties. In view of these circumstances, we consider that the prayer put forward by learned counsel for the appellants that we should set aside the order of the learned single Judge and hold up proceedings on these winding up orders, must be rejected. 64. In the view we have taken on the points discussed above, it is not necessary for us to express any opinion at all on other grounds of defence, which were taken on behalf of the respondents, for example, that the action of the company was sub sequently ratified at a meeting of the shareholders. Our conclusion is that the learned single Judge was fully justified in dismissing both these petitions and consequently we dismiss both the appeals with costs which will include ₹ 1000/- as fees for coun sel for the respondents in both appeals.
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1958 (5) TMI 44 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e. Section 342A is in Chapter 24 and there is nothing in the amending Act or the amended Code which makes the provision of s. 342A inapplicable to criminal proceeding-, which are pending before a Magistrate and in which the recording of evidence has commenced. In our opinion on the plain construction of the words used in s. 116 of the amending Act, s. 342A available to the appellant. The High Court, it appears, was misled into construing the words in clause (c) of s. 116 i. e. "as if this Act had not been passed". The High Court was therefore in error and the appellant is entitled, in our view, as a competent witness for the defence to testify in disproof of the charges made against him or any other person charged together with him at the same trial. We would, therefore., allow this appeal, set aside the order of the courts below and hold that the application made by the appellant to appear as a witness was well-founded and should have been allowed. Appeal allowed.
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1958 (5) TMI 43 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... at one stage that the question of the true construction of section 18(3B) had been decided by Das Gupta. J., and myself in Appeal No. 151 of 1958. Dutt v. Anglo-Indian Jute Mills Co. Ltd.(1) decided on march 21, 1957. but on going through the judgment, I do not think that it can be taken as a direct decision on the point. The question involved in that case was whether the residence contemplated by section 18(3A). now section 18(3B), was physical residence or residence in the income-tax sense, but the question as to what sums were chargeable under the provisions of the Act within the meaning of the sub-section did not call for any decision. There are one or two observations the judgment made on the footing that the payments may payments which are gross receipts in the hands of the recipient, but I cannot regard those observations as constituting a decision. For the reasons I have given earlier, this appeal is dismissed with costs. S.C,. LAHIRI, J.- I agree. Appeal dismissed.
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1958 (5) TMI 42 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t may also be relevant to consider another aspect of this matter. If it is held that the property inherited from maternal grandfather is not ancestral property, then it would tend to make the titles of the alienees of -such property more secure. Besides, we are satisfied that the decision of the first Full Bench is wholly unsustainable as a decision on the point of the relevant custom. We are, therefore, inclined to take the view that the doctrine of -stare decisis is in applicable and should present no obstacle in holding that the earlier cases of the Full Bench of the Punjab High Court were not correctly decided. In the result we confirm the finding of the High Court that the property in suit is not ancestral property and that the appellant has no right to bring the present suit. The appeal accordingly fails and must be dismissed. The appellants will pay the respondent’s costs in this Court; and parties will bear their own costs in the courts below. Appeal dismissed.
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1958 (5) TMI 41 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Moral turpitude ... ... ... ... ..... emaining is whether the election of Sar-Panch and Sahayak Sarpanch cannot take place until all the Nyaya Punches have been appointed. Section 44 of the Act requires these offices to be filled by election in the manner and within the period prescribed therefor. Rule 83A fixes the period to be one month from the date on which the appointment of Punches of the Nyaya Panchayats under Section 43 is completed. Such appointments were no doubt made in this ease. Consequently there is no bur to the election of the Sarpanch and the Sahayak Sarpanch. The petitioner cannot object to the election of the Sarpanch and the Sahayak Sarpanch. 27. In view of the above discussion this petition fails except as regards Baijnath respondent No. 3 whose appointment as Nyaya Panch has been found to be invalid. Buijnath is accordingly directed not to function as Nyaya Panch. A vacancy is also declared in the office held by him. In other respects the petition is dismissed. No order is made as to costs.
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1958 (5) TMI 40 - ASSAM HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tates including the State of Assam sales which have taken place outside the State will be deemed to have taken place inside the State if such goods have as a direct result of such sale been actually delivered in that State for the purpose of consumption therein. In such cases the sales are both under the explanation to Article 286(1)(a) and the Sales Tax Act of those States intra-State sales and not outside sales and any prohibition to the taxation of such sales by Article 286(2) has been removed by the Validating Act. The case of Dialdas v. P. S. Talwalkar 1956 7 S.T.C. 675 A.I.R. 1957 Bom. 71. was also of this nature. In the result therefore the sales which are outside sales and are not covered by explanation to Article 286(1)(a) are also hit by Article 286(2) and the Validating Act does not affect such sales. Our answer to this part of question No. (3) is therefore in the affirmative. The parties will bear their own costs. DEKA, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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