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1958 (7) TMI 49
... ... ... ... ..... s contention. We do not think that the word has the connotation that is sought to be attributed to it. It only means that the municipality has power to levy the tax at the proportions stated therein and it does not cast a duty or an obligation to assess all agricultural lands. But if it wants to exercise the power it has to proceed under that subsection. That is the only force of the word 'may' in that sub-section. It is not open to the municipality to disregard this provision of law in regard to lands used exclusively for agricultural purposes and to seek the mode of computation enunciated in Sub-section (2). For these reasons we must hold that the view of the Subordinate Judge is unsustainable and the judgment and decree appealed against should be set aside. 13. In the result, the appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs here and in the lower appellate Court. 14. We are obliged to the Advocate-General for the help rendered by him in the present enquiry.
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1958 (7) TMI 48
... ... ... ... ..... is not appealable. In that view of the matter, the preliminary objection succeeds and it is held that the appeal is not maintainable. 4. On behalf of the appellant it has then been contended that the Court should interfere with the order in question under its revisional jurisdiction for which purpose he has filed the civil revision application. On behalf of the respondents, however, it has been submitted that the question involved in this case is a pure question of fact and there is no error of jurisdiction so as to call for an interference by this Court under its revisional jurisdiction. In my opinion, the contention of the respondents is well founded and must be accepted. 5. Assuming, however, that an appeal lay against the order in question, there appears to be no merit in the appeal. (His Lordship discussed the evidence and held that the findings arrived at by the Subordinate Judge were correct and dismissed the appeal and revision application, Ramaswami, C. J. agreeing.)
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1958 (7) TMI 47
... ... ... ... ..... therefore, why I am not competent to deal with it. 4. The result is that this Rule must be made absolute only in part. While the order of reversion of the petitioner to his substantive rank is upheld, that portion of the order passed by the General Manager which relates to the removal of the petitioner's name from the panel of Class III staff, approved for promotion to the lower gazetted services, must be quashed and/or set aside and a Writ is the nature of certiorari is issued therefore; there will also be a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the opposite parties not to give effect to the same, and to restore his name in the panel, 5. If the opposite parties wish to remove the petitioner's name from the panel, it must be done in accordance with law. 6. There will be no order as to costs. 7. I must make it clear, however, that what ever action may have been taken in respect of other persons in the panel who are not before me, will not be affected by this order.
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1958 (7) TMI 46
... ... ... ... ..... lare Section 548(2) to be invalid. As regards Article 276(2) of the Constitution, it is not necessary for me to decide whether the payment should be confined to ₹ 250/-, in view of the fact that the petitioners are quite willing to pay the amount which they were paying before the increase that has been demanded under the impugned notices. This rule and the other rules which have been heard with it, must consequently be made absolute and the impugned resolution of the Corporation dated 14-8-1958 and the notices served on the petitioners in these cases in so far as they relate to an increase in the license fee payable must be quashed by a Writ of Certiorari and there will be a Writ in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondents not to give effect to the same. But this will be without prejudice to the right of the respondents to realise the license fees at the rate that they were being realised previous to the impugned notices. 32. There will be no order as to costs.
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1958 (7) TMI 45
... ... ... ... ..... ld appear as if the Department virtually adopted the accrual of income as the basis for computing the income of the assessee, in the circumstances of this case accrual by credit in the accounts of the mills really meant that that money was available immediately to the assessee, and it had only to be credited in its accounts to complete each "payment". It should be remembered that what the Assistant Commissioner recorded, which we have already set out above, was substantially correct. It was never the contention that the mill was not in a position to pay the money even on the very date on which the credit entry was made in the account books of the mills. We have no hesitation in holding that the Tribunal was justified in confirming the assessment made by the Department on an application of the proviso to section 13 of the Act. We answer the first question in the affirmative and against the assessee. As the assessee has failed it will pay the costs of this reference.
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1958 (7) TMI 44
... ... ... ... ..... und; 500 ought to be included in the assessee's total income. It seems to us that this decision which relates to an annuity cannot be applied to the case of dividends. An annuity, if it resembles anything at all, resembles a salary or a pension, and the amount deducted from an annuity on account of tax must be treated in the same way as an amount deducted from a salary or pension on account of income-tax. We do not consider that the decision cited by Mr. Rama Rao Sahib is applicable. In the result, we hold that the amounts of ₹ 8,024 and ₹ 7,375 cannot be included in the taxable income of the assessees. These amounts were never received by the assessees; at no time did the amount accrue or arise to the assessees; at no time actually or notionally were the money the income of the assessees in any sense of that word. The question is answered in favour of the assessees. Respondent will pay the costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1958 (7) TMI 43
... ... ... ... ..... of arrears the court is deemed to impose a fine, it means that besides the fine of Rs. 25, an additional fine of Rs. 2,302-1-6 which is beyond the maximum punishment for the offence is also imposed. As pointed out earlier, the mere fact that the machinery for realisation of fine is made applicable for collecting arrears due from a person convicted under section 19 (b), (d), (f) or (g) does not mean that the court can impose a further fine and direct a term of imprisonment for non-payment of the same. The court had no jurisdiction to award the latter part of the sentence and the same must therefore be quashed. 3.. The criminal revision petition is accordingly allowed and the direction that the petitioner should undergo imprisonment for three months if the sum of Rs. 2,302-1-6 is not paid is set aside. As the amount of arrears is specified in the order, the Magistrate is directed to recover the same in the manner indicated above. The bail bonds are cancelled. Petition allowed.
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1958 (7) TMI 42
... ... ... ... ..... in respect of this point. As, in our view, the transactions done by the petitioner press with its constituents are sales of goods, and are not in the nature of works contracts, rule 5, sub-rule (3), would not be attracted in the present case, and as this sub-rule itself is arbitrary as held by the Hyderabad High Court in Jubilee Engineering Co. v. Sales Tax Officer 1956 7 S.T.C. 423 A.I.R. 1956 Hyd. 79., the turnover of the petitioner press would not be chargeable to sales tax. Accordingly, the order made by the Sales Tax Tribunal on 7th September, 1956, whereby it confirmed the order of the Deputy Commissioner, Sales Tax, dated 22nd July, 1955, must be reversed and the application must be allowed. The respondents will bear their own costs and also pay the costs of the petitioner. The respondents are hereby restrained from recovering the sales tax from the petitioner press for the year 1951-52, for which a notice of demand was issued upon the petitioner. Application allowed.
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1958 (7) TMI 41
... ... ... ... ..... ed this objection but we are unable to see how the remarks in Deoji s case (Miscellaneous Petition No. 347 of 1953) can possibly affect the clear decision given in paragraph 4 of the order in Miscellaneous Petition No. 374 of 1954. In Miscellaneous Petition No. 375 of 1954, which was the case of the petitioner, the same learned Judge referred to the reasons given by him in paragraph 4 of the order in Miscellaneous Petition No. 374 of 1954 as the reasons for the order passed in Miscellaneous Petition No. 375 of 1954. In view of this, the reasons given in Miscellaneous Petition No. 374 of 1954 became part of the order in Miscellaneous Petition No. 375 of 1954. In the view that we take of this matter, the petition must fail on the short ground that it is bound by the order in Miscellaneous Petition No. 375 of 1954 and must exhaust its remedies as ordered therein. The petition is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances there shall be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1958 (7) TMI 40
... ... ... ... ..... e stated above, the learned Magistrate was right in acquitting the accused in all the three appeals. The appeals, therefore, fail and are dismissed. The other two appeals (Nos. 284 and 285 of 1958) relate to prosecutions for furnishing incorrect returns. In the first case, with regard to three quarterly returns of 30th June, 1953, 30th September, 1953, and 31st December, 1953, the learned Magistrate while dealing with these cases held that the prosecution has not proved that the returns are false, in that the prosecution was not able to prove any sales or purchases made under the purchase vouchers referred to in the prosecution. Mr. Gumaste has conceded, and we think rightly, that there is no merit in the case. It appears from the evidence of Ramchandra Vishnu Gharpure that he had no proof to prove the fact of sales and the respective dates of the so-called goods purchased by the accused. In this view of the matter, the appeals must fail and are dismissed. Appeals dismissed.
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1958 (7) TMI 39
... ... ... ... ..... learned Assistant Government Pleader, who appears on behalf of the State, but he is unable to state from what documents exactly these figures had been taken by Mr. Kulkarni and then mentioned in his evidence. It will, therefore, not be right to convict the accused on the basis of these figures. The appeal is therefore dismissed. In the case giving rise to appeal No. 1218, no evidence has been led by the prosecution. That appeal must therefore also be dismissed. In the case to which Appeal No. 1217 relates the charge against the respondents was that they had not maintained true accounts of the goods purchased by them. There is, however, no evidence to show that the respondents had not entered in the account books any particular goods purchased by them or that the values of some goods purchased by them as entered in the account books were incorrect. The learned Magistrate was therefore right in acquitting the respondents. This appeal is therefore dismissed. Appeals dismissed.
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1958 (7) TMI 38
... ... ... ... ..... passed under section 23. Though this new amendment is made as a proviso to sub-section (6) of section 12, yet it says that the period of limitation of thirty-six months shall not apply to assessment under sub-section (7) or order of fresh assessment made or passed under section 23. This clearly shows that but for this amendment section 12(7) prohibited any fresh assessment after thirty-six months from the end of the period. This amendment of sub-section (6) of section 12 by adding a proviso is, in my opinion, a clear legislative recognition that prior to the amendment no reassessment can be made by the Collector after thirty-six months. 13.. In my opinion, therefore, the orders of reassessment made by the Collector of Sales Tax are contrary to law which is apparent on the face of the orders. The orders are therefore quashed. The petitions are allowed with costs. A consolidated hearing fee for all the three petitions is fixed at Rs. 250. BARMAN, J.-I agree. Petitions allowed.
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1958 (7) TMI 37
... ... ... ... ..... lace, there was no assessment at all and it would be found that the assessee was liable to tax. We will therefore answer the questions which have been submitted to us by the Division Bench of this Court. We will reframe the first question as follows Whether a notice can be issued under sub-section (2) of section 11 of the Act more than three years after the expiry of the period for which it is proposed to make the assessment? and answer the question in the negative. We will also reframe the second question as follows Whether the assessment under sub-section (1) of section 11 can be made more than three years after the expiry of such period? and answer the question in the affirmative. We will therefore quash the two notices, Exs. C and F to the petition, issued by the Commissioner and also issue a writ of prohibition against the Sales Tax Commissioner prohibiting him from taking any proceedings pursuant to or under these notices. Petitioner to get the costs. Petition allowed.
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1958 (7) TMI 36
... ... ... ... ..... horities come to the conclusion that such is its character then it would be open to them to proceed against that part of the contract which is contract for sale of goods and impose a tax thereon. The order that I propose to make is on similar lines to the order made by the Supreme Court in Pandit Banarsi Das Bhanot and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others 1958 9 S.T.C. 388. Acting in exercise of the authority conferred by Article 227 of the Constitution I would allow the application, set aside the order of assessment dated the 27th November, 1956, made by the Superintendent of Commercial Taxes and direct that the case should go back to the Superintendent of Commercial Taxes for further investigation of facts and for bringing to conclusion the proceedings under section 13 of the Sales Tax Act taken against the petitioner in accordance with law. I would accordingly allow this application but there will be no order as to costs. CHOUDHRY, J.-I agree. Application allowed.
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1958 (7) TMI 35
... ... ... ... ..... n the question whether there is sale of materials liable to be taxed in the present case. The facts have not been fully investigated by the Sales Tax Authorities and the petitioners have not furnished all the account books and documents and other relevant information for the purpose of deciding this question. It would be open to the Sales Tax Authorities to investigate the facts and upon proper construction of the contract come to the finding whether, and if so to what extent, the petitioners are liable to pay sales tax. I have no doubt that in deciding this question the Sales Tax Authorities will keep in view the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley and Company (Madras) Limited 1958 9 S.T.C. 353. But, as I have already said, the petitioners have not made out a case for grant of a writ at this stage. I would accordingly dismiss both these applications. There will be no order as to costs. CHOUDHARY, J.-I agree. Application dismissed.
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1958 (7) TMI 34
... ... ... ... ..... hallenge. 5.. Since the department could only assess the firm, the arrears of tax are, in the first instance, recoverable from its assets. Until the assets are realised or cannot be found, the action of the taxing authorities to try to realise the amounts of tax from the partners personally is premature. The department is accordingly directed to realise the arrears of tax initially from the assets of the partnership, whether they may be in the hands of the Court, the receiver, or any of the partners or any other person on their behalf. We leave undecided the question whether the partners would be personally liable for the balance, if any, remaining due. The parties concerned can taken up that matter when the occasion for its determination arises. 6.. Subject to the above direction, the petition is dismissed but in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. The outstanding amount of the security shall be returned to the petitioner. Petition dismissed.
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1958 (7) TMI 33
Amalgamation ... ... ... ... ..... pital is now vested in National, and as, since the transfer date, all the beneficially owned assets of Grindlays have been vested in or are held in trust for National, the position of Grindlays is equivalent to that which would obtain if Grindlays had returned all its capital to its shareholders. It has further been submitted that in those circumstances Grindlays have ceased to be a trust corporation. The Public Trustee Rules, 1912, as amended, however, have chosen to make the qualification for a trust corporation a matter of capital and not a matter of assets. Grindlays still exist as a legal entity, their capital still complies with the test laid down in the Public Trustee Rules, and, in my view, they thus remain a trust corporation. Accordingly, there is no obstacle to their being granted probate as such. My answers to the questions set out in the summons are accordingly as follows (1) Yes. (2) No. (3) and (4) Probate of either will, if proved, can be granted to Grindlays.
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1958 (7) TMI 32
Winding up – Audit of liquidator’s account and Preferential payments ... ... ... ... ..... d to pay the sum of Rs. 87 to the Corporation without any undue delay. Item No. 6 Accounts of the official liquidator for the period between October 1, 1957, and March 31, 1958, at flag H This relates to the accounts submitted by the official liquidator for the period from October 1, 1957, to March 31, 1958. As required by sub-section (3) of section 462 of the Companies Act, 1956, the account has to be audited. Shri Shashidhar Misra audited the previous account for two periods on a consolidated fee of Rs. 75. If he consents, he may audit the present account on a fee of Rs. 37.50. Under sub-section (5) of section 462, the liquidator is required to send printed copies of the account or a summary thereof by post to every creditor and every contributory. As the assets of the company are rather small, I do not think in the circumstances of this case, that copies need be sent to the creditors or contributories. The printing and sending of such copies are, therefore, dispensed with.
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1958 (7) TMI 30
Power of registrar to call for information or explanation, Power of inspectors to carry investigation into affairs of related companies and Seizure of documents by inspector
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1958 (7) TMI 29
Oppression and mismanagement ... ... ... ... ..... oppressor has bought the shares, the company can survive. It can continue to operate. That is a matter for him. It is, no doubt, true that an order of this kind gives to the oppressed shareholders what is in effect money compensation for the injury done to them but I see no objection to this. The section gives a large discretion to the court and it is well exercised in making an oppressor make compensation to those who have suffered at his hands. True it is that in this, as in other respects, your Lordships are giving a liberal interpretation to section 210. But it is a new section designed to suppress an acknowledged mischief. When it comes before this House for the first time it is, I believe, in accordance with long precedent mdash and particularly with the resolution of all the judges in Heydon s case 1584 3 Co. Rep. 7a mdash that your Lordships should give such construction as shall advance the remedy. And that is what your Lordships do today. I would dismiss the appeal.
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