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Showing 21 to 38 of 38 Records
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1959 (4) TMI 24 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... rom the protected forest or not. In this aspect, the levy would amount to a "tax" or a "cess" which can only be imposed. under the authority of law as provided in Article 265 of the Constitution. 8. In the result, we find that the imposition of a surcharge at 71/2 per cent on the amount of bid on the liquor contract which is being levied against the petitioner is without the authority of law. Further the recovery of the amount as arrears of land revenue is illegal. 9. The petition is allowed. We quash the order dated 6-5-1955 passed by the Divisional Forest Officer, Durg Division, Rajnandgaon, (respondent No. 3) and the order dated 7-5-1955 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Durg (respondent No. 2) and direct that the recovery of the amount shall not be made as arrears of land revenue. The State Govern ment shall pay the costs of the petition. Hearing fee is fixed at ₹ 50/-. The outstanding amount of the security shall be refunded to the petitioner.
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1959 (4) TMI 23 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... n on the part of the Government of Bombay or the Charity Commissioner to apply the provisions of the Bombay Act to any math or religious institution situated outside the State territory. The learned Attorney-General submitted that the Bombay Act could be made applicable, if at all, to any place of religious instruction or worship which is appurtenant to the math and is actually within the State territory. In view of these submissions no decision was given on the point urged. The case cannot, therefore, be taken as a final decision of the question in issue before us. For the reasons which we have already given the Act applies to the Charusila Trust which is in Bihar and its provisions cannot be struck down on the ground of extra-territoriality. The result is that the appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs, the judgment and order of the High Court dated October 5, 1953, are set aside and the petition of Srimati Charusila Dasi must stand dismissed with costs. Appeal allowed.
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1959 (4) TMI 22 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... sh at which the buyer receives the goods from the railway. Mr. G. S. Pathak has argued that in this class of cases actual delivery of the goods is given by the petitioner as vendor at the gate of the godown to the petitioner as agent of the buyer. We are unable to accept this submission as there is no evidence to support the assertion that the petitioner in fact acted in the manner alleged. It is unnecessary therefore to consider whether a seller can in law act as the agent of the buyer for the purpose of taking actual delivery of the goods sold but on the analogy of cases decided under section 17 of the Statute of Frauds holding that one contracting party cannot act as agent of the other for the purpose of signing the note or memorandum of the bargain we entertain considerable doubt whether he can see Farebrother v. Simmons(1), and Sharman v. Brandt(2). In our opinion this petition fails and it is accordingly dismissed with costs which we fix at Rs. 300. Petition dismissed.
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1959 (4) TMI 21 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ved from the Tamil word suriti which means twisting . I do not find any essential distinction between the process involved in the manufacture of cigars and cheroots on the one hand and chuttas on the other hand. It must therefore be held that the contention of double taxation has no foundation. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Ranganathachari, the decision of the Supreme Court in Kailash Nath v. State of U.P. 1957 8 S.T.C. 358. does not seem to have been brought to the notice of the learned Judges who decided the above case. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that printing and dyeing the original cloth does not result in a metamorphosis and notwithstanding the change of appearance and colour, the cloth remains the same. I do not think that the principle of this decision can be applied to the present case. It must therefore be held that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. The writ petition is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1959 (4) TMI 20 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the railway receipts were made out with the company as the consignee?
Whether the railway receipts were made out with Wimco as the consigee?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. There is no evidence that at the date when the agreement for sale was made, the particular logs delivered thereunder were in the Central Provinces in the shape of logs at all. Learned counsel says that, at any rate, they must have been in existence there in the shape of standing timber. Apart from anything else, the agreement here was not "in respect of " any standing timber and there was no provision in the agreement as between the, respondent and WIMCO for severance of the standing timber before sale under that agreement. In order to attract Explanation II the goods, in respect of which the contract of sale is made, must, at the date of the contract be in existence in the Central Provinces, that is to say, that the goods must at the date of the contract be there in the form in which they are agreed to be sold. There is not an iota of evidence on that point.
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1959 (4) TMI 19 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... of the two assessees in respect of whom the reference has already been answered. Those answers and the principles on which they were based appear to be applicable to the cases of these two assessees also. In their cases too therefore the first question referred to must be answered by saying that in respect of the carpets which they have only manufactured to the order of Mr. Fenoulhet and in respect of which the title never vested in them they could not be considered to be dealers and could not be assessed to sales tax. In connection with the carpets of this kind the second question does not arise and need not be answered. If these firms too have supplied any carpets after purchasing the same from the market we do not express any opinion on the assessability of the transactions because we think they are not covered by the present reference. We answer the reference accordingly. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1959 (4) TMI 18 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ccount books in such a way as to result in evading payment of sales tax and in my opinion that is sufficient ground to enable the authorities to take steps under section 14(3) of the Act. The learned counsel then pointed out to me that the documents were seized on 5th July, 1958, and have not been returned by the authorities. This is however in accordance with law. Rule 58 lays down that documents can be retained for more than 21 days only if the Commissioner sanctions such a retention. In the present case the learned counsel for the respondent has shown me this sanction which is dated 30th July, 1958. It was suggested that 21 days expired on 26th July, 1958, and the sanction was granted on the 30th July, 1958, and therefore retention for four days was illegal. That may or may not be so but that is no ground for interference with the order at this stage. For these reasons, I see no force in this petition and I dismiss it with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1959 (4) TMI 17 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... distress warrant should be issued. Rule 21-A of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules shows that both the transferor and transferee will be liable. This must be so, because the Government cannot be done out of the sales tax by each passing the buck to the other. In the present case for the reasons set out in the affidavit of Balakrishnan this distress warrant should be issued in the first instance to the transferor and only when then amount cannot be realised from him, the transferee should be proceeded against. The Fifth Presidency Magistrate, Egmore, Madras, will issue a distress warrant in the light of the observations made above. Ordered accordingly.
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1959 (4) TMI 16 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... vernment to make a rule like the offending one. It follows that rule 31(5) is ultra vires of the rule-making power of the Government and is, therefore, invalid. Consequently, any action taken in exercise of that rule cannot be sustained. In this view, it is unnecessary for us to go into that matter. An additional point was raised by Mr. B.V. Subrahmanyam in Writ Petitions Nos. 293 to 297 of 1958. It is maintained by him that since the assessment was already revised by competent authority, the revenue cannot again resort to re-assessment by way of revising the order of assessment. This position is not contested by the learned Government Pleader. There is no power in the authorities concerned to exercise this revisional jurisdiction more than once. However this need not detain us any further as we have held that rule 31(5) is ultra vires of the rule-making powers of the Government. In the result, the petitions are allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
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1959 (4) TMI 15 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... s to its buyers will be of much help to the appellants. For one thing, it is only a cyclostyled copy of some instructions alleged to have been sent by the local agent of the mills to its buyers. It is dated 1st October, 1946. There is nothing to show that a copy of such a letter was posted to the appellants. Apart from the question of its admissibility, its evidentiary value is not much. That does not, in any way, establish the contentions of the appellants. For these reasons, we cannot acceded to the theory that there was a novation in this case and that there was only one sale between the mills and the appellants buyers and that the transaction between them could not be regarded as a sale attracting the incidents of section 2(h) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act. On this discussion, it follows that the order under appeal is correct and cannot be successfully impugned. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee is fixed at Rs. 150. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (4) TMI 14 - HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN
Winding up – Appointment of official liquidator ... ... ... ... ..... e under section 448(1)(b) of the new Act. Section 448 provides for such appointments for purposes of the new Act only. These appointments under the new Act do not affect the appointment made under the old Act in any way. Learned counsel for Shri Mardia also drew our attention to rules 572 and 607 of the High Court Rules framed under the old Companies Act and argued that Shri Bohra could have been removed and Shri Mardia could have been appointed in his place under these rules. The rules are, however, subject to the Act and under the old Act as pointed out above the removal can only be made on due cause shown. We accordingly hold that Shri Bohra continues to be the official liquidator in the present case and the appointment of Shri Mardia under section 448 of the new Act is only effective with regard to the cases under the new Act. Let a copy of this order be sent to the District Judge, Jaipur City, who has made the reference. We direct that parties shall bear their own costs.
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1959 (4) TMI 7 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the order made under section 35 of the Act be quashed and an injunction issued restraining the Income-tax Officer from recovering the assessed tax?
Held that:- If, for instance, the Income-tax Officer had found that in the assessment year 1952-53 there was an apparent arithmetical mistake in the account of the written down value of the properties which resulted in a corresponding mistake in the assessment of the year in controversy could he not take the corrected figure for the purposes of the assessment and could it be said that the mistake was not apparent from the record. A fortiori if he discovered that the very basis of the different assessments was erroneous because of an initial mistake in determining the written down value could it be said that this would not be a mistake apparent from the record. And if in order to determine the correct written down value the Income-tax Officer makes correct calculations, can it be said that that is not rectifying a mistake apparent from the record but is de hors it. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (4) TMI 6 - SUPREME COURT
Whether under the facts and circumstances of the case, the amount of ₹ 1,30,785 being the excess of sale proceeds of the building, plant and machinery over the written down value of the business of the said newspapers publications could in law be termed to be income, profits and gains of the petitioner ?
Held that:- The question as it has been framed is not aptly worded and we therefore reframe it as under :-
" Whether under the facts and circumstances of the case the amount of ₹ 1,30,785 being the excess of sale proceeds of the building, plant and machinery over the written down value thereof could in law be termed to be income, profits and gains of the petitioner ? "
We accordingly allow the appeal and send down the question as reframed to the High Court for doing the needful in the matter in the exercise of its jurisdiction under section 66(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act
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1959 (4) TMI 5 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on the above facts and in the circumstances of the case the Tribunal was right in refusing the claim for registration of the assessee firm under section 26A of the Indian Income-tax Act?
Held that:- It is clear that neither the deed of partnership nor the application for registration of the firm filed under section 26A of the Income-tax Act fulfilled the requirements of law and the Department was fully justified in rejecting the application for registration. The appeal, therefore, is devoid of any substance and is accordingly dismissed
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1959 (4) TMI 4 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the assessee firm constituted orally in June, 1944, can validly be registered in the assessment years 1945-46 and 1946-47 under section 26A of the Indian Income-tax Act on the basis of a memorandum of partnership executed in June, 1948?
Held that:- The conclusion is reasonably clear that unless the partnership business was carried on in accordance with the terms of an instrument of partnership which was operative during the accounting year, it cannot be registered in respect of the following assessment year. As in these cases, the partnership did not admittedly function under such a deed of partnership, the Department and the High Court were right in refusing registration. We would, therefore, dismiss these appeals.
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1959 (4) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on the true interpretation of the deed of partnership dated February 6, 1948, the partners were : (i) Smaller Patel & Co. ; (ii) Sheth & Co. ; (iii) Maharshi Dayanand Maha Vidyalaya ; or (i) Arjun Kunverjee Patel ; (ii) Jamnadas Bhanji Patel ; (iii) Nanji Kalidas Mehta ?
Whether the firm Patel & Co. was entitled in law to be registered for the year 1949-50 under the Saurashtra Income-tax Ordinance and the rules made thereunder ?
Whether the registration granted by the Appellate Tribunal for the year 1950-51 should be for the entire year of account, namely, 1949 or for the period from July 1, 1949 to December 31, 1949 ?
Held that:- Shri Rajagopala Sastri realised the force of this convention and fairly enough conceded that the appeal for assessment year 1949-50 could not be maintained. The appeal in so far as it concerned the assessment year 1949-50 will, therefore, be dismissed.
We are of the opinion that this is a fair attitude to take up as the deed of partnership of the firm came into existence only on the 12th July, 1949, and under the terms thereof the partnership commenced with effect from July 1, 1949. That being the position the appeal so far as the assessment year 1950-51 is concerned will be allowed and the direction given by the High Court will be modified in that the registration of the firm will be operative for the period between July 1, 1949, and December 31, 1949. The appeal will, therefore, be allowed partially to the extent mentioned above and the order of the High Court will be varied accordingly. Appeal allowed in part.
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1959 (4) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in this case the rental income from immovable property is part of the business income taxable under section 2(5) read with rule 4(4) of Schedule I attached to the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940?
Held that:- In view of the considerations it must be held that the realisation of rental income by the assessee bank, was in the course of its business in prosecution of one of the objects in its memorandum ; it was, therefore, liable to be included in its business profits, and thus was assessable to excess profits tax. The appeal must, therefore, be allowed.
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1959 (4) TMI 1 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Recovery of Government ... ... ... ... ..... be discharged, the Government would be entitled to proceed against the security. 8.As I have held in the earlier part of the judgment that the Government s right to proceed over the said goods is subject to the right of the petitioner the Government will be entitled to recover its dues from the petitioner inter alia, out of the said security if the sale proceeds of the goods is more than the claim of the petitioner. 9.In view of the fact that the Government was entitled to attachment and sale of the equity of redemption in the goods under section 11 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, in my opinion, the Government was entitled to attach and sell the equity of redemption in the said goods. The attachment levied by the Government and challenged in the instant petition was not liable to be set aside altogether in any event. 10.For the reason aforesaid, I do not make any order on this application. 11. The Rule is, accordingly, discharged. There will be no order as to costs.
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