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1959 (9) TMI 54 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the matter, and no question of law arises. Indeed, the question as framed shows that the assessee's contention is that there is no foundation for the action taken. The appropriate authorities have found the stock books to be defective, and we cannot say that that matter was not within their special and exclusive powers, in view of the provisions of the Act." Applying the principle of these authorities to the present case we hold that the question of application of the proviso to section 13 of the Income-tax Act has not passed from the region of fact to the region of law because there was sufficient material upon which the income-tax authorities could reject the account books of the assessee and apply the proviso to section 13 of the Income-tax Act. We accordingly answer the question of law referred to the High Court by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in favour of the Income-tax Department and against the assessee. The assessee must pay the costs of this reference.
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1959 (9) TMI 53 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o further litigation, which is not in the interests of the deity. Respondents 6 and 7 raised before us the question of costs. They stated that the trial Judge had given two sets of costs, which was changed to one set by the High Court. These respondents should have cross-objected on this point against the judgment of the High Court, and in the absence of any such cross-objection, no relief can be granted to them. For the same reason, no relief can be given to respondent 7, in respect of whom the finding that he bad no right of performing the seva and getting emoluments attached to that right, as respondents 1 to 4, has not been vacated, as was done in the case of respondent 6. In view of our observations that these matters were alien to the suit which had been filed, we do not propose to deal with them. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. The appellant will personally pay the costs of Respondent 1. The other set of respondents will bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (9) TMI 52 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... if it can be established, it has to be established by lengthy and complicated arguments. We do not think such an error can be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior court to issue such a writ. In our opinion the High Court was wrong in thinking that the alleged error in the judgment of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal, viz., that an order for possession should not be made unless a previous notice had been given was an error apparent on the face of the record so as to be capable of being corrected by a writ of certiorari. 19. For the reasons stated above the judgment and order of the High Court cannot be sustained. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court issuing a writ of certiorari, quashing the order of the Tribunal and restoring the order of the Mamlatdar, and we restore the order of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal. 20. The appellant will get his costs here and in the High Court. 21. Appeal allowed.
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1959 (9) TMI 51 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... by the authority that the appellants have failed to establish sufficient cause for their inaction between May 2, 1952, and the respective dates on which they filed their present applications is fatal to their claim. That is why we think it unnecessary to consider the larger question of law which Mr. Phadke sought to raise before us. 20. We would like to add that the learned Attorney-General had raised a preliminary objection against the validity of the certificate granted by the High Court in the present appeals. He wanted to urge that the High Court was in error in considering the total value of the consolidated appeals for the purpose of granting certificate under Art. 133. We have, however, not thought it necessary to consider this argument. 21. The result is the appeals fail and are dismissed. The respondent has fairly not pressed for his costs, and so we direct that the parties should bear their own costs in this Court. No order as to Court fees. 22. Appeals dismissed.
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1959 (9) TMI 50 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... behind the decree & give the relief to the appellant which was expressly denied to him in the suit. The question so posed can only have one answer. It is a well-settled principle that a Court executing a decree cannot go behind the decree it must take the decree as it stands, for the decree is binding and conclusive between the parties to the suit. If the contention of the appellant were to be accepted, it would contravene the said principle; for, while the decree as construed by us, has directed that it should not be executed against the personal properties of the partners, the executing Court would be directing execution against the said partners. While the decree excluded persona liability, the executing Court would be imposing the same. This cannot obviously be done. 6. The conclusion arrived at by the learned Judges of the High Court is correct. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. The appellant is directed to pay the court, fee payable by him to the State.
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1959 (9) TMI 49 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... mplete the ingredients of the offence, with which the appellant was charged. 14. We differ, therefore, from the appraisal of this evidence by the High Court, and we think that the documents were wrongly regarded by the High Court as confessions, pure and simple, and that it was in error in holding that the guilt of the appellant was brought home to him. No doubt, the sufficiency of evidence is a matter ordinarily for the High Court. Where, however, the High Court, as on the facts of this case, has construed the two documents as amounting to confessions of guilt, which they cannot reasonably be construed to be and there is no other evidence, this Court is entitled to interfere, even though this is an appeal from concurrent judgments of the two Courts below. We are, therefore, of opinion that the conviction in the present case on its facts, cannot be sustained. 15. We accordingly allow the appeal. The conviction and sentence of the appellant are set aside, and he is acquitted.
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1959 (9) TMI 48 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 28 of the Patna High Court Rules. Under the said Rules the application should have been filed immediately after the judgment was delivered. In the affidavit filed in support of that application the only reason given for not doing so was that the appellant did not give the necessary instructions. The learned Judge of the High Court rightly did not accept that reason as a sufficient ground for permitting the application to be filed at a later stage. In the application for special leave filed in this Court, though it was stated that the application filed in the High Court for certificate was rejected, the reason for the rejection was not disclosed. Further, the State, presumably, filed this appeal to get the legal position clarified. We also believe that public interest does not require that the stale matter should be resuscitated. In the circumstances, we would be justified not to exercise our discretionary jurisdiction, and we accordingly dismiss the appeal. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (9) TMI 47 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... at the University was not a State or local or other authority. In the course of the judgment a distinction was drawn between 'state maintained' institutions, to which the provisions of Part III of the Constitution would apply, and to 'state aided' institutions, to which the said articles would not apply. I do not think that this decision has any direct bearing on the facts of this case for two reasons r firstly, the respondent-company is not a state-maintained institution, and secondly, no question of infringement of fundamental rights arises in this case. 13. In the view I have taken that a writ of certiorari cannot be directed against the respondent-company, it is not necessary for me to consider whether, the order that is sought to be quashed to this petition, is in violation of Sub-rule 1 of Rule 24 of the Officers' Service Rules, or whether such a violation could give the petitioner any cause of action at law. 14. The petition fails and is dismissed.
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1959 (9) TMI 46 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lers and buyers into contact and establish privity of contract between them. Nowhere has the witness for the plaintiff stated that the sales of the goods brought by the ryots have been effected in their presence after inviting the purchasers and settling the bargain between the parties. On the contrary it would appear that the ryots simply keep the goods with the plaintiff and the plaintiff sells them whenever desired by the ryots. In these circumstances it has to be held that the plaintiff is entrusted with the custody of the goods and is clothed with authority by the ryots to sell them on their behalf. The plaintiff s claim therefore that he is not liable to sales tax fails for lack of proof. Second Appeal No. 532 of 1954 is therefore dismissed. As, however, the plaintiff proceeded on the basis of a Bench ruling of the Madras High Court and also succeeded in the first Court, we direct that the parties shall bear their own costs in all the three Courts. Ordered accordingly.
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1959 (9) TMI 45 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... eedings would have been pointed out as we have done above. In Sheonarayan Matadin s case(1) as well as in all the other cases concerning section 11(5) the decisions turned upon the plain construction of the section itself and not upon the applicability or analogy of any other section as is here claimed. There was certainly no reference made in those cases to section 11-A of the Act. In the present case the argument is that by analogy the period of limitation in section 11-A should be read into section 10(3) read with section 11(4)(a). In view of what we have said above, we are of opinion that the principle of the Full Bench case is inapplicable to the facts of the present case. This was the only ground upon which the notices in the instant case were challenged. The application, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs. Application dismissed. Since reported as Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Nagpur v. Firm Ramkrishna Ramnath 1960 11 S.T.C. 807. (1) 1956 7 S.T.C. 623.
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1959 (9) TMI 44 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... gave before the Sales Tax Officer. This may probably be the reason why it did not think it proper to reject the explanation given by the assessee in that case. But in the present case the two different explanations given by the assessee at two different times have been noticed by the Board of Revenue, and, in view of the same it was perfectly entitled to come to a conclusion different from that to which it had arrived in the previous case referred to above. The question whether the booklet and the slips that were recovered on surprise inspection belonged to the assessee or to some other person is purely a question of fact, and nothing has been placed before us to interfere with the findings of the Courts below on that question of fact. In my opinion, therefore, the question referred to must be answered against the assessee, who must pay the costs of the reference. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 250 for all these cases. RAMASWAMI, C.J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1959 (9) TMI 43 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... State and consumed in States other than the State of first destination, only one ban is attracted, namely, the ban imposed by Article 286(2), and not the ban imposed by the Explanation to Article 286(1)(a), and, therefore, sales falling under this category have only one hurdle to surmount, namely, the hurdle imposed by Article 286(2), and that hurdle is surmounted by the President s Sales Tax Continuance Order, 1950, and by the Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956, for the period from the 26th January, 1950, to the 6th September, 1955. The assessment periods with which we are concerned in this case fall within these two crucial dates and in view of the principle laid down in Mahadeo Ram Bali Ram v. State of Bihar(2), we hold that the second question referred by the Board of Revenue to this Court must also be answered against the assessee and in favour of the State of Bihar. The assessee must pay the cost of this reference. Hearing fee Rs. 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1959 (9) TMI 42 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ee has been properly assessed under rule 16(2). The revision petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. T.R.C. No. 70 of 1957.-This revision petition relates to the assessment to sales tax for the year 1952-53. The only question raised in this case is whether a tanner, who purchased untanned hides and skins but did not tan the same in his own factory, would be liable to be taxed. This point is covered by our decision in T.R.C. No. 64 of 1956. The conclusion that the turnover in respect of such purchase is assessable is correct. This revision petition fails and is dismissed. T.R.C. No. 71 of 1957.-This revision petition relates to the assessment for the year 1954-55. The questions raised in this case are identical with those raised in T.R.C. No. 226 of 1956. In view of our decision in that case, this revision petition fails and is dismissed. Petitions dismissed. Since reported as Sri Jey Cherish and Co., Ltd. v. The State of Madras 1960 11 S.T.C. 353.
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1959 (9) TMI 41 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... paid the tax within the meaning of rule 16(3). This contention again was not put forward before the Tribunal. Learned counsel for the assessee recognised as a factual position that on the sales of the tanned hides and skins the assessee was not subjected to any tax liability. The word tannery as used in rule 16(3) has to be considered consistently with the scheme of the rules. The tax is to be paid by a person that is a tanner. It is not necessary for us to consider in this case, whether a person who gets hides and skins tanned elsewhere should be deemed to be the owner of a tannery within the scope of rule 16(3). In the circumstances of the case, as we said, the fact that the assessee was proved to have got the untanned hides and skins tanned in tanneries other than his own made no real difference to the tax liability, to which he was subjected under rule 16(2) as a registered tanner. The petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1959 (9) TMI 40 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ut that the incidence of taxation ultimately fell on the consumer the learned judge recorded. As the seller is merely to pass on the tax to the consumer, he is, in fact, constituted collector of the tax on behalf of the State. The learned judge was only explaining the reality of the situation with reference to the economic incidence of the tax. We are now concerned with the question whether what was so passed on could ever be part of the price the consumer has to pay and which could be correlated to the bargain or transaction of sale itself. That aspect we feel was considered in full in Sundararajan s case 1956 7 S.T.C. 105., and we are unable to hold that the view taken was erroneous or that it requires reconsideration. We are bound to follow the authority of the earlier decision, and we hold that the Tribunal rightly included this item also in the assessable turnover of the assessee. The petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petition dismissed.
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1959 (9) TMI 39 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... for spinning. Learned counsel for the assessee pointed out that the amended rule expressly provided for the levy of the tax on the dealer who was the last purchaser, and there was no such express provision in rule 4-A(iv) as it stood in the relevant period. That in no way really affected the validity of the old rule 4-A(iv), because, as we said, it prescribed the single point which could be ascertained with precision for the levy of sales tax on the sale (or purchase) of cotton in the series of such transactions in relation to that cotton. We hold that rule 4-A(iv) as it stood in the relevant period was intra vires and that it was not in conflict with any of the provisions of section 5(ii) of the Act. All the contentions of the petitioner fail. The Tribunal was right in holding that the assessee was liable to be taxed on the purchase turnover we have mentioned above, Rs. 34,61,213-1-9. The petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1959 (9) TMI 38 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ncerned party, it should be held that both the parties intended to effect actual delivery at the place designated by the party having the option. In the present case, there was such an option given to the buyers to designate the place of actual delivery. The buyers exercised the option and required their sellers to send the goods to the various places. It is true that the assessees, after loading the goods in railway wagons, took the relevant receipts in the names of the buyers, namely, the United Coffee Supply Co., Ltd., and thereby gave constructive delivery of the goods to the buyers, but actual delivery was all along intended to be given and was given only at the places designated by the buyers. It follows that the deliveries in the present case were intended to be effected outside the State of Madras, and were so effected. The petitioners would be entitled to the exemption claimed. The revision petitions are allowed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petitions allowed.
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1959 (9) TMI 37 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sales are exempt from sales tax. The learned Superintendent erred in imposing sales tax on such sales. Even in the grounds of appeal the assessee did not claim that they were acting as an agent for the foreign seller with regard to the transaction of supply of goods to the Damodar Valley Corporation and of course there is no finding on this point by the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax or of the Board of Revenue. We do not, therefore, consider that it is open to the assessee to raise this question of agency for the first time in the hearing of this reference. It is manifest, therefore, that the assessee has been validly taxed also with regard to the goods delivered to the Damodar Valley Corporation in Bihar and the second question of law referred to the High Court by the Board of Revenue must accordingly be answered against the assessee and in favour of the State of Bihar. The assessee must pay the costs of this reference. Hearing fee Rs. 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1959 (9) TMI 36 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... al to examine whether in such circumstances the provisions of section 14 of the Limitation Act would come to the help of the petitioner. Nor should it be understood that we accept as correct the petitioner s statement that he received the copy of the order of the Collector of Sales Tax only on the 4th October, 1957. It is primarily the look-out of the petitioner to satisfy the Sales Tax Tribunal about the correctness of the facts, on which his right to appeal to the Tribunal will depend. Whatever may be the ultimate order passed by the Tribunal the petitioner has always a further remedy by way of asking that authority to refer to the High Court any question of law that may arise out of its order, under subsection (1) of section 24 of the Act. Under these circumstances we are not inclined to exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. This application is dismissed, but there will be no order for costs. DAS, J.-I agree. Application dismissed.
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1959 (9) TMI 35 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f the order of the subordinate authority in the order of the appellate authority, we are of the view that the provisions of the Act do not warrant the existence of any power in the Deputy Commissioner to interfere under section 12 of the Act with an order of the Commercial Tax Officer passed under section II, when such an order has itself been superseded by the order of the Appellate Tribunal. In the present case, the assessment order went a stage further. There was the final disposal by the High Court under section 12-B of the Act. The Deputy Commissioner had no jurisdiction to revise an assessment which had been the subject-matter of a final order of the High Court, i.e., an assessment to which the statutory finality attached itself only under the order of the High Court. The view taken by the Tribunal that the order of the Deputy Commissioner was beyond his jurisdiction is correct. The petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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