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Showing 21 to 40 of 62 Records
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1961 (1) TMI 82 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... for the assessee was that, considering the scope of the appeal disposed of by the Tribunal which related to the assessment year 1945-46, it was beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to decide in that appeal whether any portion of the income fell to be taxed in any other assessment year, e.g., 1944-45. Interesting though the arguments on both sides were, we do not consider it necessary to record any view of ours at this stage on the scope of the second proviso to section 34(3) either as it stands now or as it stood before it was amended. As we stated earlier, the reference can be disposed of in favour of the assessee without any need to go into the question of limitation; no question of limitation can arise for decision when we have decided that the initiation of proceedings was otherwise invalid. We answer the question in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to his costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Question answered in the negative.
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1961 (1) TMI 81 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the amount of tax payable by the assessee is increased by proceedings taken under section 34 of the Act. We confess that a different view can also be taken. But we should follow the well established rule that in construing a fiscal enactment like the Income-tax Act unless the language is so clear that it could bear only one construction, the assessee will be entitled to, what one may call, "the benefit of the doubt." We should not be understood, however, as having a doubt with regard to the construction of sub-section (6) of section 18A, which we have reached above. In the result, we allow the appeals and quash the orders of the Income-tax Officer dated February 28, 1957, in so far as they include the payment of statutory interest under sub-section (6) of section 18A up to the date of the re-assessment orders. The appellant will be entitled to his costs, but so far as the advocate's fee is concerned, it will be ₹ 100 for the entire batch. Appeals allowed.
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1961 (1) TMI 80 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 12 "On a fair reading of clause (i), it must be held, in my judgment, that there is nothing in proviso (b) to clause (1) of section 4(3) which in any manner touches the case of a business which is held under trust for religious or charitable purposes. The income derived from such business is not to be included in the total income of the person receiving it." In the light of what is stated above we agree with the Tribunal and hold that the income in controversy is exempt under section 4(3)(i) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and that it is not brought back into the net of taxation by clause (b) of the proviso to that sub-section. We answer the reference accordingly though in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Appellate Tribunal as required by section 66(5) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. Reference answered accordingly.
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1961 (1) TMI 79 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... im the nature of the alleged escapement, or to give him an opportunity of being heard, before he decides to operate the powers conferred by the section.........Their Lordships think that the proper answer to be given is that to enable the Income-tax Officer to initiate proceedings under section 34 it is enough that the Income-tax Officer on the information which he has before him and in good faith considers that he has good ground for believing that the assessee's profits have for some reason escaped assessment or have been assessed at too low a rate." In view of the principles counciated in the above decisions, the petitioner cannot legitimately complain that the notices issued to it under section 34 of the Income-tax Act are tainted by any illegality. In the result, all the three writ petitions are dismissed. W.P. No. 574/60 with costs--advocates' fee of ₹ 250 (rupees two hundred and fifty) and W.Ps. Nos. 575 and 576 without costs. Petitioners dismissed.
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1961 (1) TMI 78 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that the stock and the consumption of chlorate in the assessee's factory were being periodically checked by the officer of other departments such as police and the revenue. There seem to have been no complaints with regard to the quantity of consumption from those departments though that is not conclusive. That is a factor which the assessee is entitled to rely upon to show that in so far as the chlorate consumption is concerned it is really accounted for by the match production. The result accordingly is that it is impossible to hold that, in the circumstances of the present case, it could be said that the accounts maintained by the assessee are incapable of reflecting his true income, profits or gains from the match manufacture business. There is no scope for invoking the proviso to section 13 of the Act. Both the questions are answered in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to his costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1961 (1) TMI 77 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ve effect to the original arrangement of 1893 (Ex. D-2); and if the said arrangement is not valid as a family arrangement the subsequent transfer would also be invalid. Besides, out of a total consideration of about ₹ 10,000/- the amount of ₹ 776/- can be taken to represent the debts due by the deceased Mudaliar; the rest of the items of consideration cannot be treated as constituting a legal necessity at all. The amount of ₹ 558/- was the expense incurred for executing the document; similarly the amount of ₹ 409/representing the funeral expense of the deceased Mudaliar, had apparently been spent by the widow who wanted to reimburse herself and that cannot be a legal necessity. The other items of consideration do not even purport to be for legal necessity. Therefore, in our opinion, the conclusion is inescapable that the impugned transfer is not justified by legal necessity. The result is the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (1) TMI 76 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... became payable by the purchasers because of the delay in the payment of the sale proceeds, but so far as the assessee is concerned it represented the advantage which he would have had if the money had been remitted to him at Indore. The source of interest was thus the actual money payable to the assessee at Indore and not the retention of the sale proceeds by the purchasers. The interest which the assessee received was a part of the price itself. It is unnecessary to refer to the authorities cited at the bar for none of them deals with the point arising for determination in the present case. Our answer to the question, therefore, is that the sum of ₹ 12,261 received by the assessee as interest from the purchasers in the taxable territories cannot be regarded as having accrued or deemed to have accrued to him in British India under section 4 or 42. The assessee shall have costs of this reference. Counsel's fee is fixed at ₹ 150. Question answered accordingly.
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1961 (1) TMI 75 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... her section 35(5) nor section 35(1) authorised the Income-tax Officer to rectify the orders of assessment originally passed with reference to the share income of Arulanandam and Murugan. Once again we have to point out that the basis of the rectification was that subsequent to the original orders of assessment the firm had been treated as a registered firm and that view was based on the order dated March 29, 1956 which were themselves passed without jurisdiction. That is why we state that section 35(1) could not apply, and we have explained earlier that section 35(5) could not apply at all. In each of these cases, the rule nisi will be confirmed and the orders of the Income-tax Officer purporting to be under section 35(5) of the Act and the further orders of the Commissioner will stand set aside. One set of counsel's fee will be allowed for all these four petitions to be apportioned equally between Arulanandam and Murugan. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Petition allowed.
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1961 (1) TMI 74 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... am's Government is a corporation. 17. It is also suggested on behalf of the appellant that this Trust Fund is a Commercial Concern created by the Firman issued by H. E. H. the Nizam. We are unable to accept this suggestion for the reason that there is no material to warrant such an inference. 18. In our opinion, the Industrial Trust Fund, H. E. H. Nizam's Government is not a corporation. The Government set apart a particular amount of money for being used for specified purposes and made rules for its control and utilised and it is a department of the Government and the persons in management as per the rules are merely agents or servants of the Government. It follows that any claim made by the petitioner in the O. P. who is the State of Andhra Pradesh, is governed by Article 149 of the First Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act 1908 and is not barred by limitation. 19. No other question is argued before us. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1961 (1) TMI 73 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ell's case cannot, therefore, be introduced in section 35(10), when we have a clear definition of "dividend" in section 2(6A) and in which section a provision was incorporated relating to distribution made to shareholders of a company on its liquidation. On this petition, we are primarily concerned with distribution made to shareholders of a company on its liquidation by the liquidator, and we see no reason why we should not apply the definition of "dividend" in section 2(6A) in its entirety while interpreting section 35(10) of the Act. In the result, the petition fails. Rule will be discharged with costs. In our judgment, we have made mention of Special Civil Application No. 234 of 1960. The contentions there arising are the same, which we have already considered in deciding Special Civil Application No. 233 of 1960. For reasons given by us above, this petition also fails and must be dismissed. Rule will be discharged with costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1961 (1) TMI 72 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... gment "It may be observed at this stage that during, arguments each of the respondents was asked if be wished to apologize for any contempt that might be found against him. Each of the respondents expressed his inability to apologize. At the conclusion of the arguments we made known to the respondents that in our view they were guilty of contempt and asked if they or any of them desired to tender any apology to Court. Respondent No. 4, Bimala Kanta Roy Choudhury, tendered an apology to the Court, but the other respondents refused to do so." In the circumstances the learned Judges, in my view, rightly convicted each of the appellants for contempt of court and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of ₹ 500/-. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. BY THE COURT In accordance with the opinion of the majority the appeal is allowed and the conviction of the appellants for contempt of Court is set aside. The fine, if paid, must be refunded. Appeal allowed.
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1961 (1) TMI 71 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sition would arise in that what was not admissible under 10(2)(XV) would be an admissible outgoing in arriving at the profits within the meaning of section 10(1). Profits had to be ascertained according to the accepted principles of commercial accountancy and if section 10(2)(XV) did not permit deduction of an item of expenditure which was laid out or expended for carrying on the business in contravention of the law, then such an outgoing, though otherwise properly admissible, as set-off against the gross receipts on the principles of commercial accountancy could not be taken into consideration in computing the profits. The learned counsel for the assessee has not been able to assail this view either on principle or authority. In the result, we would answer the question referred to us in the negative. In view of the nature of the points involved, the parties will be left to bear their own costs in this court. MEHAR SINGH J. – I agree. Question answered in the negative.
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1961 (1) TMI 70 - SUPREME COURT
Whether these Salt Works come within the definition of the word " factory " under cl. (m) of s. 2 of the Act?
Held that:- The appellant's Salt Works do come within the definition of the word ',factory" and that the appellant has been rightly convicted of the offence of working the factory without obtaining a licence. We therefore dismiss the appeal.
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1961 (1) TMI 69 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... re not rejected. They did furnish variety-wise stock particulars. As we understand the judgment, the real ground on which the book results were rejected was that the gross profits were low. That, as we said, is not enough to condemn the system of accounts that the assessee consistently adopted. It was not even enough without further investigation to reject the accounts themselves in either of the years. Though the statement of the case is more elaborate than the judgment of the Tribunal, the position still remains the same. The real ground for applying the proviso to section 13 was that the gross profits disclosed by the book results appeared low and compared unfavourably with those of others in the same line of business. That we must emphasise was not enough to reject the books of account. We answer the question in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to the costs of this reference. Counsels fee Rs. 250. Question answered in the negative.
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1961 (1) TMI 68 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... x Act. We are not inclined to accept the argument of the learned counsel that the Validation Act does not cure the defect of the amendment itself for want of the President s assent. As we pointed out the amendment was incorporated in the Act itself and the Validation Act cures all that has been done or all actions which have been taken or have to be taken on the authority of the Sales Tax Act. In other words, it validates both the imposition of taxes and the levy of taxes under the legislation in question. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the taxes so levied were validly and lawfully levied under the terms of the Validation Act on the authority of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act as amended and any defect for want of assent of the President in regard to the amendment in 1956 was adequately cured by this Validation Act. We accordingly find no substance in these applications which are accordingly rejected. There will be no order as to costs. Applications dismissed.
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1961 (1) TMI 67 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... otipur Zamindary Company Limited v. State of Bihar 1959 10 S.T.C. 413. It was held in that case by the High Court that in the context of the expression green vegetables in notification No. 9884-F.T., dated the 28th August, 1947, and having also regard to the dictionary meaning of vegetable , sugar-cane cannot be said to be green vegetable within the meaning of item No. 6 of that notification and is, therefore, not exempt from taxation under the provisions of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947. The principle of this decision applied to the present case, and for the reasons expressed in the previous decision we hold that sugar-cane is not green vegetable within the meaning of item No. 6 of notification No. 9884-F.T., dated the 28th August, 1947, and is not exempted from taxation. We accordingly answer the second question of law against the assessee and in favour of the State of Bihar. We do not propose to make any order as to costs of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1961 (1) TMI 66 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ll Bench of the Napur High Court did not give effect to the said objection and held that a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution was not necessary and invariably liable to be rejected in limine on the ground that it was filed beyond 45 days, and that it will be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case whether the delay caused in making the petition was or was not a good ground for refusing to grant the prerogative writs to the applicant in that case. It would appear from the above observations that none of these rulings has any bearing at all to the facts of the present case. In the circumstances we see no reason at all to require the Financial Commissioner to state the case and refer to this Court the questions of law mentioned in the petitioners application, or the one formulated by Mr. Sethi during the course of his arguments. The petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. MEHAR SINGH, J.-I agree. Petition dismissed.
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1961 (1) TMI 65 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ions and exceptions subject to which exemption has been allowed. 20. Handloom woven cotton or silk cloth of all kinds where the price does not exceed Rs. 10 a piece. The notification does not expressly say that cotton cloth cut from a bigger piece if the price of the bigger piece exceeds Rs. 10 will be outside the scope of the exemption. On the other hand, the words cloth of all kinds may include cut cloth as well as the entire piece. If Government wanted to exclude from the operation of the exemption clause cut pieces also they would have said so unambiguously in the said notification. Hence by giving the natural meaning to the words used I think the Tribunal was right in holding that a cut piece also would come within the scope of the exemption, even if the value of the than from which the piece is cut is above Rs. 10. The question formulated by the Member, Sales Tax Tribunal, is therefore answered in the affirmative. DAS, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1961 (1) TMI 64 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tax against the petitioners on their gross turnover, for that turnover is confined to sales only of sugar and other articles which at this stage are admitted to be articles ordinarily prepared by Halwais. In consequence the impugned order of the Assessing Authority is quashed and, as also prayed for by the petitioners, the Assessing Authority is prohibited from proceeding to levy sales tax on such sales by the petitioners as are of articles ordinarily prepared by Halwais and as articles otherwise exempt under Schedule B to the Act. The parties are, however, left to their own costs in the petition. Petition allowed. JUDGMENT The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BERI, J.-This is a reference under section 15(1) of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954 (Act No. XXIX, of 1954 hereinafter called the Act) by the Commissioner, Excise and Taxation, Rajasthan, Udaipur, made at the instance of the firm of Messrs Motilal and Co., Jodhpur, through its partner Inder Singh, the assessee.
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1961 (1) TMI 63 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... intend to tax sales of both, it should mention them. That view, it is conceded before us, has been reversed by the Supreme Court in appeal. It follows that if the use of the word groundnut in a taxing statute be wide enough to cover its kernel, a different interpretation cannot be placed on the use of the word cashew . Therefore, turnover of kernel has rightly been held liable to sales tax under the Madras General Sales Tax Act. Nor do we see how any help can be got from the observation of Das, J., in State of Travancore-Cochin v. S.V.C. Factory 1953 4 S.T.C. 205., about cashew and its kernel being two different commodities. The observation was in connection with the TravancoreCochin Act, where the statute expressly mentions them and, therefore, observations on such a statute can hardly afford assistance in interpreting a provision of another enactment differently worded. It follows that this revision petition fails with costs, which we assess at Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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