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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 62 Records
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1961 (1) TMI 62 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ngs. There is substance in this contention of the repondents. As observed in Indian Iron and Steel Company Limited v. The Officer on Special Duty (Central Circle), Punjab 1959 10 S.T.C. 150. It has been repeatedly held that a writ should not be.......... employed to secure the adjudication of a disputed right for which such proceeding affords a remedy equally adequate and complete . These observations fully apply to the present case. The dispute raised in these petitions on the merits of the nature of the business carried on by the petitioners is not so clear cut that I should decide the present dispute in the interest of justice. The controversy raised should be determined under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, in accordance with law. I, therefore, refrain from deciding the nature of the transactions carried on by the petitioning firms. The result is that both these petitions fail and I dismiss them with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100 in each case. Petitions dismissed.
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1961 (1) TMI 61 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... should not be taken for non-payment of the admitted tax for the last three quarters. It is, therefore, clear that the Assistant Superintendent of Sales Tax made a clerical mistake in mentioning section 12(3) in the notice and not section 14(3a). There is no prejudice caused to the assessee because he was aware of the true position and he showed cause for non-payment of the admitted tax for the last three quarters. The explanation of the assessee was that he could not pay the tax on account of the falling price of sugar and his indebtedness to others. In our opinion, therefore, the imposition of penalty by the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax under section 14(3a) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act is legally valid and is not vitiated by any illegality. We, therefore, answer the question of law referred by the Board of Revenue against the assessee and in favour of the State of Bihar. The assessee must pay the cost of this reference. Hearing fee Rs. 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1961 (1) TMI 60 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the transactions of the appellant company fall within the definition of the word "sale" under section 2(g) of the amended Bihar Sales Tax Act?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Neither of the words "production" or "manufacture" is defined in the Bihar Sales Tax Act but according to the Oxford English Dictionary "production" means amongst other things that which is produced; a thing that results from any action, process or effort, a product; a product of human activity or effort.
It is obvious that what is described in the report above quoted would fall within the dictionary meaning of the word "production". It is unnecessary to decide what the word "manufacture" means. As what was sold was mica produced in Bihar by the appellant, the answer to the question would be in the affirmative and therefore in favour of the State.
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1961 (1) TMI 51 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Winding up - Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... he dicta expressed in these rulings, I am tempted to observe as Richardson J. did in Oriental Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Bhanaram Agarwalla Given a reasonable amount of goodwill and commonsense and if factious disputes are avoided, I cannot at present see why this company should not make headway. I hold that the petitioner herein has not discharged the onus that is on him to make out that it is just and equitable that the company should be wound up by court, and I dismiss the petition with costs. The receiver will, however, continue for one month from this date. Unless otherwise ordered by the appellate court on being moved in the meanwhile, the receiver will surrender the management of the company to the board of directors and hand back the books and assets belonging to the company within a week thereafter. The receiver is authorised to appropriate all his remuneration from the funds of the company in his hands and also to pay another sum of Rs. 150 to his counsel in this court.
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1961 (1) TMI 43 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... nowledge of the trade in question and the local conditions where these affect the matter. As a result of the foregoing discussion, I hold that the company is unable to pay its debts that it has suspended its business for more than a year and that it is just and equitable to wind up the company. It is, therefore, ordered that the company be wound up under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. The official liquidator will forthwith take charge of all the property and effects of the company and cause a sealed copy of this order to be served on the company by pre-paid registered post. The petitioner shall advertise within fourteen days from this date a notice in the prescribed form of the making of this order in one issue each of the Deccan Chronicle and Urdu Milap. The petitioner shall serve a certified copy of this order on the Registrar of Companies not later than one month from this date. The costs of the petition shall be taxed and paid out of the assets of the company.
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1961 (1) TMI 35 - SUPREME COURT
Scope and effect of the provisions contained in section 89 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, in relation to the law of banking questioned
Held that:- The High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that section 89 cannot be invoked by the company against the bank in making the present claim. The decisions on which the company relied are all decisions in cases where a negotiable instrument was sought to be enforced against the company and had thus given rise to a cause of action. No case has been cited before us in which section 89 has been extended to a claim like the present. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (1) TMI 34 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB
Advertisement of petition ... ... ... ... ..... ifference between a winding up petition on the ground of inability to pay debts and a winding up petition based on disputes between shareholders. In these circumstances I am not prepared to hold that the last part of rule 96 has the restricted meaning placed on it by the respondents, but in any case there is rule 9 which does not appear to have been brought to the notice of the learned single judge and which gives the judge the widest power to disregard the rules in a suitable case where it is considered necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the advertisements of the petition should be suspended for the time being, at least until the petitions for revoking the order of admission and for the rejection of the petition on the ground that it has been filed mala fide had been disposed of. I would, therefore, accept the appeal accordingly but make no order as to costs. G. D. Khosla, CJ. mdash I agree.
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1961 (1) TMI 33 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Winding up – Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... certified by the company s auditors. Wynn-Parry J., applying the principle of the decision in Ledingham rsquo s case (supra), held that the balance-sheets would not constitute a valid acknowledgment in law. At page 824, the learned judge observed as follows I must apply that reasoning to the case before me, and it therefore comes to this, that the difficulty mentioned by Maugham J. in the earlier case remains a difficulty even if all that is relied upon is a mere acknowledgement. In those circumstances, it does not appear to me possible for the applicant to rely upon these two documents as acknowledgments because two directors have signed them, having regard to the fact that over the material period he himself was interested in the loan. In our judgment exhibit A-4 signed by the appellant cannot operate as a valid acknowledgment of a debt due to himself by the company within the meaning of section 19 of the Indian Limitation Act. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1961 (1) TMI 14 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the appellant was liable to be assessed to pay agricultural income-tax for the year in which the estate was in the management of the court receiver?
Held that:- There is no substance in the contention raised by the appellant. The liability to pay tax is charged on the agricultural income of every person. The income though collected by the receiver was the income of the appellant. The taxing authorities may always proceed against the owner of the income and assess the tax against him. The definition in the connotation of " person " undoubtedly included a receiver, trustee, common manager, administrator or executor, and by such inclusion, it is open to the taxing authorities to assess tax against any such persons; but, on that account, the income in the hands of the owner is not exempt from liability to assessment of tax. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (1) TMI 13 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the income-tax assessment of the business of ' Spade Clover Beedies ' belonging to the estate of the deceased and carried on during the previous years 1943 to 1946 as an association of persons for the assessment years 1944-45 to 1947-48 is valid ?
Held that:- The question in the present case is as to what income was to be taxed. The income was the income of a business which was carried on as a single business by the consent of all the parties. The mere fact that a suit was pending at the time for the administration of the estate of the deceased or for the separation of the shares of the co-heirs does not affect the incidence of taxation in this case, because the business was carried on, as said above, as one business with unitary control and by the consent of the parties. The High Court was right in holding that the income was assessable as an income of an association of persons. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (1) TMI 12 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, on the above facts and circumstances of this case, there was any material before the Tribunal to hold that the assessee purchased gold in the year 1918 which he sold in the year under consideration and the sum of ₹ 72,523 represents the sale proceeds of such gold ?
Held that:- This was a perfectly simple case, in which a question of law hardly arose. The Tribunal had believed the assessee's word in view of his conduct and past history, such as they had been able to see. Where the assessee's statement is believed, there is obviously material on which the finding is based ; and to seek for other material is tantamount to saying that a statement made by an assessee is not material on which a finding can be given. In our opinion, the Tribunal having believed the assessee's statement, there was an end of the matter in so far as that fact was concerned, and if the finding was based upon a statement which was good material on which it could be based, no question of law really arose. However, treating the question as one of law, the answer is irresistible that there was material, viz., the statement of the assessee believed by the Tribunal, on which the finding could be given. the answer given by the High Court must be set aside, and the question answered in the affirmative. Appeal allowed.
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1961 (1) TMI 11 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on a proper construction of the deed of assignment dated 7th of May, 1935, and on the facts and in the circumstances of this case the Tribunal was right in holding that the sum of ₹ 77,820 represented a receipt of a revenue nature in the hands of the applicant and assessable as such ?
Held that:- The appellants had, however, not sold the entirety of the rights acquired by them from the Karanpura Company. The conveyance was subject to several restrictions and the appellants retained in part rights in the land conveyed. The transaction was substantially a commercial transaction for sharing the profits of the commercial activities of the Associated Cement Ltd. The High Court was, therefore, right in holding that the transaction dated May 7, 1935, was a commercial transaction and the payment under clause (1) thereof at the rate of 13 as. per ton of cement sold was of the nature of income and not capital. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (1) TMI 10 - SUPREME COURT
Whether paragraph 12 of the Merged States (Taxation Concessions) Order, 1949, precluded the Income-tax Officer from making an order under section 23A in the case of the assessee company in respect of its profits and gains of the previous year ended 31st December, 1946, and 31st December, 1947 ?
Whether in making an order under section 23A in respect of the profits and gains of the year 1946-47 the assessable income of that previous year is to be reduced not only by the amount of income-tax and super-tax payable by the company in respect thereof but also by the amount of interest charged to it in accordance with the provisions of section 18A ?
Having regard to the order passed by the Income-tax Officer under section 23A in respect of the company's profits of the year 1947 and having apportioned the sum of ₹ 17,641 to the shareholder, Pushpakumar, as his proportionate share in the distribution made by the Income-tax Officer under section 23A and having regard to the provisions of section 14(2)(c), whether the said sum of ₹ 17,641 has been properly included in his total income for the purpose of charging it to tax ?
Held that:- The answer to question No. 1 is thus in the negative, with the modification that section 23A applied only to that portion of the income which was earned in British India and not in Bhor State. The answer to the second question is in the negative. The answer to the third question is in the affirmative. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (1) TMI 9 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the orders of the Income-tax Officer dated January 23, 1950, are appealable ?
Whether it was incumbent upon the Income-tax Officer to take action under section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act before he revised the assessment on January 23, 1950 ?
Whether the bar of limitation specified in section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act would apply to the inclusion in the total income of a shareholder of the dividend which is deemed to have been distributed under section 23A(1) of the Act ?
Held that:- Section 23A was either a procedural section or a computation section but did not give the right to the Department to make an assessment. Unable to agree that an assessment could be made under section 23A. That section does not provide for any assessment being made. It only talks of the fictional income being included in the total income of the shareholders 'for the purpose of assessing his total income'. The assessment, therefore, has to be made under the other provisions of the Act, including section 34, authorising assessments. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (1) TMI 8 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the inclusion in the assessee's total income of the profits settled by him on his wife and two daughters is justified in law ?
Held that:- By the deeds in question, the assessee merely allowed a payment to his wife and daughters to constitute a valid discharge in favour of the firm ; but what was paid was, in law, a portion of his profits, or, in other words, his income. A glance at the account books of, the firm, Messrs. Chari and Ram, clearly shows that the amounts were first credited in the khata of Rangachari and then under his directions were transferred from his khata to those of his wife and daughters. The dispositions, therefore, were, in law and in fact, portions of the income of Rangachari, after the income had accrued to him and tax was payable by him at the point of accrual. Thus it cannot be said that the profits were diverted by an overriding title before they accrued to Rangachari. Appeals dismissed.
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1961 (1) TMI 7 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case 'Undivided Profits' of $ 29,534,614.21 shown in the condensed statements of conditions as of December 31, 1946, can be treated as reserves and added to the capital, as required by rule 2(1) of Schedule II to the Business Profits Tax Act for the chargeable accounting period December 25, 1946, to December 24, 1947 ?
Held that:- The amount designated as " Undivided Profits " is a part of the reserves and has to be taken into account when computing the capital and reserves within rule 2(1) of Schedule II of the Act. The question which was referred by the Tribunal should have been decided in the affirmative and in favour of the appellant and the amount should have been added to the capital as allowed by rule 2(1) for the chargeable accounting periods. In the result the appeal is allowed. Appeal allowed.
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1961 (1) TMI 6 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on the facts and circumstances of this case ₹ 72,963-12-0 was a revenue expenditure deductible under section 10(2)(iii) or under section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act ?
Whether on the facts and circumstances of this case ₹ 76,526-1-3 was a revenue expenditure deductible under section 10(2)(iii) or under section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act ?
Held that:- On the facts proved in the present case the trust agreed to finance the business of the appellant on the terms set out in the agreement and there is nothing to show that he could have made any better arrangements or would not have lost the contract if he had failed to enter into the agreement, i.e., the agreement to pay the amounts in dispute. Therefore, in a, commercial sense, the payments were an expenditure wholly and exclusively laid out for the purpose of the business.
Therefore, the High Court was in error and the question referred should have been answered in the affirmative in favour of the appellant. Appeal allowed.
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1961 (1) TMI 5 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there can be said to be transfer of assets to the wife or to " any person " for the benefit of the wife?
Whether there was adequate consideration for the transfer, if there was one?
Held that:- This case falls within the special rules concerning wife and minor child, laid down in section 16(3)(b), and not within the third proviso to section 16(1)(c). It must thus be held that there was a transfer of the assets to the husband-trustee for the benefit of the wife. The answer given by the High Court was thus correct. Appeals dismissed.
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1961 (1) TMI 4 - SUPREME COURT
Appellate Assistant Commissioner ... ... ... ... ..... should be answered against the assessee but Misra J. was of the contrary opinion. That matter was therefore heard by S. K. Das C. J. (as he then was) and he agreed with Misra J. and the question was decided in favour of the assessee, i.e., the respondent, and against that judgment and order this appeal has been brought by the Commissioner of Income-tax on a certificate of the High Court and the only question that survives for decision therefore is the fourth question, the decision on which was against the appellant. The judgment of the majority was based on the decision of Commissioner of Income-tax v. Amritlal Bhogilal and Co. which on appeal to this court was reversed and is reported as Commissioner of Income-tax v. Amritlal Bhogilal and Co. In view of that decision the appeal of the Commissioner of Income-tax must be allowed and the judgment and order of the High Court set aside. In view of the circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1961 (1) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Tribunal misdirected itself in law and/or acted without any evidence in finding that the investment of the assessee in the shares of the Sholapur Mills was a capital investment and not its stock-in-trade ?
Whether in any event in view of the assessments made for the years 1945-46, 1946-47 and 1947-48 and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order for these three years, it was open to the department to hold for the assessment years 1949-50 that the said shares do not represent the assessee's stock-in-trade ?
Whether the Tribunal misdirected itself in law in omitting to consider certain material facts which were taken into account by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and expressly mentioned in the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order, including the fact that the assessee had been holding shares in several other companies as stock-intrade and this position has been accepted by the department although in those shares there have been no sales ?
Held that:- High Court was right in refusing to call for a statement of the case under section 66(2) of the Income-tax Act.
The conclusion of the Tribunal was amply supported by evidence. It cannot be said that because in the previous years the shares were held to be stock-in-trade, they must be similarly treated for the assessment year 1949-50. In the matter of assessment of income-tax, each year's assessment is complete and the decision arrived at in a previous year on materials before the taxing authorities cannot be regarded as binding in the assessment for the subsequent years. The Tribunal is not shown to have omitted to consider the material facts. The decision of the Tribunal was on a question of fact and no question of law arose which could be directed to be referred under section 66(2) of the Income-tax Act. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs.
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