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Showing 21 to 40 of 84 Records
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1961 (4) TMI 122 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... or we are clear on the provisions of s. 6(h) and the other provisions of the Act that bhumidari rights created in favour of the appellant cannot be sold in execution of the decree held against him by the respondent under the mortgage of 1914. 15. This brings us to the question of limitation. Mr. Aggarwala conceded that if the appellant succeeds on the first point it would not be necessary for us to consider the question of limitation. Therefore, as the appellant succeeds on the first point we need not consider whether the application for execution by sale of bhumidari rights created under s. 18 is barred by limitation. 16. We therefore allow the appeal and direct that the execution of the decree by the respondent will not be levied against the bhumidari rights created in favour of the appellant under s. 18 of the Act. The appellant will get his costs of this court and of the High Court. Costs of the execution court will be at the discretion of that Court. 17. Appeal allowed.
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1961 (4) TMI 121 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... in the Service. The Article therefore contemplates action in relation to and having effect in the future when once the State forms the opinion about the inadequacy of the Service. If an inadequacy exists today, to give retrospective effect to the reservation, as the impugned notification has done, would be to redress an inadequate representation which took place in the past by an order issued today. In my judgment that is not contemplated by the power conferred to reserve which can only mean for the future. As this point however has not been argued I do not desire to rest my judgment on it, have mentioned it to draw attention to another feature of the notification which deserves consideration. 50. I would therefore dismiss the appeal with costs. BY COURT In accordance with the opinion of the majority the appeal is allowed; the decision of the High Court under appeal is reversed and the respondent's application for a writ is dismissed. Three will be no order as to costs.
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1961 (4) TMI 120 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the assessee. 33. Whether or nor the principle of the above decision would call for implementation in the present case does not however appear to arise. This contention was not taken before any of the officers below or even before the Tribunal. That being the case, the argument outlined above seeks to pose a question which does not arise from the order of the Tribunal. We therefore decline to deal with it. 34. We answer the questions as hereunder 35. Question No. 1 The assessment on the association of persons for the assessment year 1951-52 was not lawfully made. The assessments for the subsequent years in the status of an association of persons are valid. 36. Question No. 2 In the circumstances of the case, the Income Tax Officer was justified in holding the assessee to be the principal officer of M.M. Ipoh. 37. Since the assessee has failed in the major part of the case, he should pay the costs of the reference. Counsels fee ₹ 250. 38. Questions answered accordingly.
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1961 (4) TMI 119 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... iled by him and it being permissible for the income-tax authorities to assess the income on the basis of that return because Udai Narayan was in the control and management of the income of the family, it is clear that the subsequent proceedings for charging the income to tax treating it as the income in the hands of Udai Narayan would be certainly valid. The answer to this question, therefore, automatically flows from our answer given to the second question and this question stands answered in the affirmative without going into the question whether Udai Narayan was or was not in law the karta of the assessee family in view of the provisions of the Indian Majority Act. Since all the questions have been answered in favour of the department and against the assessee, we direct that the assessee shall pay the costs of this reference to the department which we fix at ₹ 150 in each case as representing fee of learned counsel for the department. Questions answered accordingly.
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1961 (4) TMI 118 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ng that the document was an exhibit in the case and has been used by the parties in examination and cross-examination of their witnesses, s. 36 of the Stamp Act comes into operation. Once a document has been admitted in evidence, as aforesaid, it is not open either to the Trial Court itself or to a Court of Appeal or revision to go behind that order. Such an order is not of those judicial orders which are liable to be reviewed or revised by the same Court or a Court of superior jurisdiction. 8. In our opinion, the High Court has erred in law in refusing to act upon those two hundis which had been properly proved - if they required any proof, their execution having been admitted by the executant himself. As on the findings no other question arises, nor was any other question raised before us by the parties, we accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the High Court and restore those of the Trial Court, with costs throughout. 9. Appeal allowed.
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1961 (4) TMI 117 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nstitution. Perhaps another decision of this Court of more immediate relevance, in which the point now raised that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between the claims of the Government and the claims of private individuals-was considered and negatived, is that in Mannalal v. Collector, Jahalwar ( 1961 2 S.C.R. 962) in which judgment was delivered on December 7, 1960. In this last case it was urged before this Court that the summary mode of recovery of amounts due to the Government for which provision was made by the Rajasthan Public Recovery Act there impugned a mode of recovery which was not available to the private citizen- contravened the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by Art. 14 and this contention was repelled. The argument of learned Counsel for the appellants has therefore to be rejected both on the around of principle as well as on the ratio under- lying the decisions of this Court. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (4) TMI 116 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ade by him in the plaint are answered by equally general allegations in the written statement. If the respondent therefore, was allowed to make the case of hostile discrimination, it would have been the Courts duty to read the written statement as containing a denial of this allegation and to see that the respondent established by evidence such discrimination. We have earlier referred to the evidence and held that it was not so established at all. 13. The result then is this. If the respondent is not allowed to raise a case of discrimination, then no. question of violation of Art. l6 would arise. Likewise, no. such question would arise if the respondent is permitted to make that case for he failed to establish it on the evidence. 14. We think therefore, that the appeal must succeed. Accordingly, we set aside the decree passed by the High Court and restore that of the trial Court. The appellant has not asked for any costs of the appeal and there will be no. order as to costs.
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1961 (4) TMI 115 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... after the expiry of three years. No question of deciding the conflicting claims of a lessee and a third party arises in this case; nor is the court called upon to pronounce on the vested rights of a lessee in conflict with those of the Receiver. But this is a simple case of a court in the course of its administration of the estate through the agency of a receiver making a suitable provision for the running of the mills. As the agreed term had expired, the court, in our view, could certainly direct the appellant to put the mill in the possession of the Receiver. 30. Lastly it has been brought to our notice that an application for the discharge of the Receiver is pending in the lower court. Any observations that we have made in this judgment are not intended to affect the merits one way or other in the disposal of that application. That application will be disposed of in accordance with law. 31. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. 32. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (4) TMI 114 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... been committed at Calcutta can be tried by the Court of Session at Madras. 3. We have held this day, in Purushottamdas Dalmia v. The State of West Bengal 1961CriLJ728 that the Court having jurisdiction to try the offence of criminal conspiracy can also try offences committed in pursuance of that conspiracy even if those offences were committed outside the jurisdiction of that Court, as the provisions of s. 239, Criminal Procedure Code, are not controlled by the provisions of s. 177, Criminal Procedure Code, which do not create an absolute prohibition against the trial of offences by a Court other than the one within whose jurisdiction the offence is committed. On a parity of reasoning, the Court having jurisdiction to try the offences committed in pursuance of the conspiracy, can try the offence of conspiracy even if it was committed outside its jurisdiction. We therefore hold that the order under appeal is correct and, accordingly, dismiss this appeal. 4. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (4) TMI 113 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mpany to acknowledge the liability of the company in respect of the debt due to one of its partners, see (1947) 1 All E. R. 749 at p. 753. In view of this finding it is not necessary to consider the further question whether the auditors acknowledged the debt and if so, whether they had any authority to make any acknowledgment on behalf of the company. 14. It must follow that the balance-sheets in question are sufficient acknowledgments within the meaning of section 19 of the Indian Limitation Act and consequently the claim of the plaintiff is not barred by the law of limitation. 15. There is no merit in this appeal. I propose that the appeal be and is hereby dismissed. The appellant do pay to the respondent that costs of and incidental to the appeal and the remand. The liquidator will be entitled to retain the cost of and incidental to the appeal and the remand out of the assets in his hands as between attorney and client. Certified for two Counsel. Lahiri, C.J. 16. I agree.
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1961 (4) TMI 112 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... having had recourse to Section (71) and not having followed up their remedy under Section 72 are bound by the decision of the Charity Commissioner in their appeal before him. 9. On the analysis of the several provisions of the Act and in the view that take of those provisions the learned Joint Judge had no jurisdiction to decide issues 3 and 4. The view therefore taken by the learned trial Judge was right. As is have observed above if the plaintiffs case is that the 1st defendant procured the order of the Assistant Charity Commissioner by playing fraud upon him the plaintiffs could have raised that contention in a proceeding under Section 22A which as I have pointed out above provides a specific remedy. That was however not availed of by the plaintiffs. The revision therefore fails. Rule discharged. The petitioners will pay costs of this revision to the 1st opponent and also to opponents 4 5 and 6 in two sets. Costs of the Charity Commissioner to come out of the trust funds.
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1961 (4) TMI 111 - PUNJAB-HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... after their appropriation by sale the Bank became the owner of the shares and the only right left with the pledgor was as to damages and not as to the return of the shares. Therefore the appellant does not come in the picture so far as the present suit is concerned and there can be no question of limitation running out as between the pledgor and the Bank but so far as the defendant No. 2 is concerned, the question of limitation will only arise after the appropriation by the Bank and that appropriation took place in the year 1954 and it is conceded that if limitation is reckoned from 1954 the suit is within time. Moreover, defendant No. 2 has not appealed and the decision of the Courts below so far as defendant No. 2 is concerned, has become final. Therefore the argument that the suit is barred by time has no merit and must be repelled. (8) For the reasons given above, this appeal fails and is dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs in this Court. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (4) TMI 110 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and, therefore, the claim for refund of the assessee was not barred. Therefore, the answer to the second question must be in the affirmative and the claim for refund must be held to have been made within the period prescribed under Indian Income-tax Act and the Rules thereunder. We think that in fairness the Commissioner of Income-tax should pay the costs of this reference to the assessee in this case because not only did he lose both before the Appellate Commissioner and before the Tribunal but also because he had the Income-tax Manual and the directions and practice all against him on this point, a practice which I hold is not ultra vires and is eminently sensible and which has been followed for may years by the income-tax department and we have failed to see any reason why the authorities suddenly after so many years wanted to take an entirely different view, which we have found to be untenable. Certified for two counsel. BOSE J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1961 (4) TMI 109 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ase to decide as to whether the effect of the setting aside of the assessments would be that no tax was at all due from the assessee in the eye of law at any time and consequently, the assessee cannot be deemed to have been in arrears of tax. On this question we would prefer to express no opinion, but for the reasons which we have already mentioned for holding that, if the payment of the tax is made up to, or that there are no arrears on, the date of hearing of the appeals, the proviso would not stand in the way of the appeals being heard, we answer this reference in the negative and hold that the appeals before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner against the orders imposing penalty were competent and should be heard on merits. The department shall pay to the assessee costs of this reference. We fix the fee of learned counsel for the department at ₹ 200 for purpose of assessment of costs and the same amount as costs of the assessee. Reference answered in the negative.
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1961 (4) TMI 108 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Officer had asked for the deduction being given on the basis of 1/3rd of the profit. We, however, find no such concession stated in the statement of the facts, though the order of the Income-tax Officer does mention such a concession. But even then such a concession is in the alternative and should be relied upon only where the taxing department finds full deduction not permissible on rational grounds. If the case is to be decided on admission then the whole admission should be taken. In other words, the concession would not be available unless the earlier claim be disallowed on rational grounds and we do not find any such ground for reversing the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in this case. In this context we feel that the answer to the question referred to us should be in the negative. Let the aforesaid answer be sent to the department and the assessee will be entitled to his costs, the counsel's fee being ₹ 100. Question answered in the negative.
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1961 (4) TMI 107 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the double tax relief. In this view of the section, coming to the facts of the case, the Malayan income as computed for the purposes of the Indian Income-tax Act is admittedly ₹ 84,466. In respect of it the loss in business at the headquarters came to ₹ 21,325. The income that is brought to charge in both countries is, therefore, only the sum of ₹ 63,141. For the purpose of arriving at this income, the income from other sources which was not subject to any Malayan tax has to be excluded from consideration. If that is so it follows that only a sum of ₹ 63,141 has borne tax both in Malaya and in India. It is only in respect of that sum that double taxation relief is available to the assessee. It follows that the view taken by the Tribunal was erroneous. The question is answered in the negative and in favour of the department. The department will be entitled to its costs of this reference. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Question answered in the negative.
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1961 (4) TMI 106 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s consideration, but that has been rendered unnecessary, because even apart from s. 19 of the Act which opens with the words "Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for tile time being in force", s. 39 of the Act also contains a non obstante clause on the same lines as s. 38 of the Rent Control Act. The result therefore would be that the provisions of the special enactment, as the Act is, will in respect of the buildings in areas declared slum areas operate in addition to the Rent Control Act. The argument therefore that the Act is inapplicable to buildings covered by the Rent Control Act is without substance, particularly when it is seen that it is only when a decree for eviction is obtained that s. 19 of the Act comes into play. We therefore consider that none of the points urged in support of the petition has any substance. The petitions fail and are dismissed. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1961 (4) TMI 105 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... thought it fit and proper to waive its claim thereof." On that submission, the Tribunal was right in pointing out that there was no proof that the alleged waiver was for adequate business consideration. What the assessee had to prove to bring the claim under section 10(2)(xi) was that the debt was irrecoverable. Such evidence the assessee failed to furnish. If a claim properly arising under section 10(2)(xi) cannot be upheld under that sub-section, it cannot be brought again under section 10(2)(xv). Apparently, the Tribunal, when it referred to the absence of adequate business consideration, had section 10 (2)(xv) in view. But independent of what the Tribunal said, the assessee's claim has to fail, because there was no material placed to show that the debt was in fact irrecoverable. All the three questions are answered against the assessee. As the assessee has failed, it will pay costs of this reference. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Questions answered accordingly.
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1961 (4) TMI 104 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t and to this course neither party seems to have any serious objection. As we propose to leave the respondent free to file such a suit if he is so advised, we have not dealt with the evidence on the record on the question of the respondent's nationality so as not to prejudice any proceeding that may be brought in the future. We think, for the reasons earlier mentioned, that the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained and must be set aside and we order accordingly. On behalf of the Union of India the learned Attorney General has stated that the Union will not take immediate steps to enforce the order of January 29, 1958, for the deportation of the respondent so that in the meantime the respondent may if he so chooses, file a suit or take any other proceeding that he thinks fit for the decision of the question as to whether he is a foreigner. In the result the only order that we make is that the order and the judgment of the high Court are set aside. Appeal allowed.
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1961 (4) TMI 103 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... f Property Act read in conjunction with those of the Indian Registration Act, the title to the property was transferred to the vendee immediately on the execution of the document on January 31, 1946 the performance of the two talabs by the appellant on February 2, 1946 would be in time, legal, proper and effective to clothe her with a right to demand a conveyance in her favour. It is only necessary to add that learned Counsel for the respondent did not contest the position that if on a proper construction of the sale deed Ex. 'A'-read in the light of its recitals and the relative statutory provisions-there was a sale effective on January'31, 1946 the talabs performed by the appellant would not suffice to clothe her with the right which she claimed in the suit out of which this appeal arises. We would accordingly allow the appeal and decree her suit with costs throughout. By COURT.-In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the appeal is dismissed with costs.
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