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Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 84 Records
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1961 (4) TMI 82 - SUPREME COURT
Whether this Court has jurisdiction to try the suit?
Whether the plaintiff’s suit for possession of the suit property is maintainable in view of the Notification issued by the Government of Bombay on 16th August, 1958, applying Part II of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act? If not, what order should be passed?
Held that:- The appeal is allowed, and the two preliminary Issues are answered in favour of the appellants.
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1961 (4) TMI 81 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t of the house, and the officers could not be held protected by the colour of their duties as public servants. As the learned Magistrate observes what is meant by good faith is due care and attention. P.Ws. 1 and 2 entered accused 1 s house on some information. That information was not verified. Nor was any attempt made to find out if it were correct, and if it could be relied upon and acted upon. I hold that there is not the slightest warrant for interference with the acquittals of the respondents, with reference to the charges against them. I further hope that these observations will be duly noted by the concerned authorities, as what happens frequently in these cases is not a wilful abuse or perversion of power, but an insufficient realisation of the fact that governmental agencies have a special responsibility to determine and verify the ambit of their powers, particularly with regard to private citizens before acting upon them. The appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (4) TMI 80 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o sale of the materials as such involved in the transaction. From the above discussion it follows that the decisions of this Court in Krishna and Co., Ltd., Guntur v. State of Andhra(1) 1956 7 S.T.C. 26. , and Hanumantha Rao v. State of Andhra 1956 7 S.T.C. 486. do not accord with the principle laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley and Co. 1958 9 S.T.C. 353. It must be held that having regard to the nature of the transactions in the present cases, it is not within the competence of the assessing authorities to impose the tax on the supply of the materials used in the contracts treating them as sales. On this conclusion, it follows that the assessment made on the impugned transactions cannot be sustained. These revision cases are allowed, and the taxes, if collected, shall be refunded to the petitioners. The petitioners will have their costs from the respondents. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 in each of the cases. Petitions allowed.
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1961 (4) TMI 79 - SUPREME COURT
Whether a sale by a widow of properties which are the subject matter of a usufructuary mortgage is beyond her powers when the mortgagee cannot sue to recover the amount due on the mortgage?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. When there is a mortgage subsisting on the property, the question whether the widow could sell it in discharge of it is a question which must be determined on the facts of each case, there being no absolute prohibition against her effecting a sale in a proper case. What has to be determined is whether the act is one which can be justified as that of a prudent owner managing his or her own properties. If the income from the property has increased in value, it would be a reasonable step to take to dispose of some of the properties in discharge of the debt and redeem the rest so that the estate can have the benefit of the income. Thus a sale by a widow of a property which is subject to a usufructuary mortgage is not binding on the reversioners must be held to be wrong.
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1961 (4) TMI 78 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the State Legislature went beyond its legislative competence in enacting by the impugned Madras General Sales Tax Act that the amounts collected by the dealer by way of tax shall be deemed to have formed part of his turnover?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The only question which has been raised in these appeals is regarding the validity of the impugned Act. That question having been decided against the appellants.
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1961 (4) TMI 74 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the appellants in the two appeals are liable to pay sales tax on the value of the materials used by them in the execution of the works under the contract?
Whether on the construction of the agreement dated December 19, 1953, it could be held that there was a sale by the appellants of the materials used in the construction works, apart from the execution of those works?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. We are satisfied that the proceedings have at all stages gone on the footing that the liability of the, appellants arose under the contract and not otherwise. In that view, we must hold, following the decision in The State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. (Madras) Ltd. [1958 (4) TMI 42 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA] that the proceedings taken by the respondents for imposing sales tax on the supplies of materials by the appellants, pursuant to the contract dated December 19, 1953, are illegal and must be quashed. In the result, the appeals are allowed and appropriate writs as prayed for by the appellants will be issued.
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1961 (4) TMI 69 - SUPREME COURT
Whether section 15 of the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947, and rule 80 framed under the Act were ultra vires, being a breach of Article 286(2) of the Constitution?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Sub-section (2) stated that every dealer to whom sub-section (1) did not apply, shall be liable to be taxed under this Act, and that there was no mention of sub-section (1)A there. No doubt, sub-section (2) does not mention sub-section (1)A; but sub-section (1)A is not rendered ineffective by the omission. Sub-section (1)A speaks of its own force, and has to be given effect to, along with the remaining sub-sections of section 3. Sub-section (1)A has the added support of Article 286, and the Constitution must prevail. Thus, both Article 286 and sub-section (1)A of section 3 are there to save from taxation all sales in the course of inter- State trade or commerce, and there is no need to look further into the Act to see whether they are exempted once again or not.
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1961 (4) TMI 66 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Validation Act is within the ambit of entry 54 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. None of the grounds urged by the petitioner in support of the contention that the Validation Act is ultra vires can be sustained. In the result we must hold that the Validation Act is intra vires, and the impugned notification dated March 31, 1956, stands validated by it.
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1961 (4) TMI 58 - SUPREME COURT
Best judgment assessment - Held that:- Petition allowed. A writ will issue restraining the respondent from making any best judgment assessment on the petitioner for sales tax for any quarter of the financial years 1955 and 1956. The petitioner will get the costs of this petition.
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1961 (4) TMI 47 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Shares warrants and entries in register of members, Power of court to rectify register of members
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1961 (4) TMI 46 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Managing agent ... ... ... ... ..... of the company to the exclusion of other creditors. The learned judge disposed of this matter by observing that if the other creditors of the company are also entitled to similar rights, it was for them to present their case to court. If they did, they would not obtain any relief, because the learned judge directed that the first respondent was to have a first charge on the net proceeds of the sale of the company s assets. We understand that the balance in the hands of the joint liquidators will hardly suffice to discharge the debt due to the first respondent. The truth of the matter appears to be that the other creditors realised that the terms of the tripartite agreement by themselves could not confer any right on them, either as debenture holders or as charge holders. In the result, we allow the appeal and dismiss the first respondent s application. There would be no order as to costs, but the liquidators will be entitled to take their costs from the funds in their hands.
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1961 (4) TMI 45 - HIGH COURT OF MYSORE
Winding up - Preferential payments ... ... ... ... ..... lauses Act. If really the Board is a local authority as defined in the General Clauses Act there was absolutely no need for the Legislature to enact sub-section (3) of section 3 of the Mysore Housing Board Act, 1955, and mention in it that the Board shall be deemed to be a local authority for the purpose of certain acts. It is by legal fiction that the Board is treated as a local authority for the purpose of the Mysore Housing Board Act, 1955, and the Mysore Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and it means that it is not a local authority for any other purposes. The claim of the Board is, therefore, clearly untenable. In the result, therefore, for the reasons stated above the claim of the respondents for preferential payments cannot be allowed to stand. The official liquidator is permitted to rectify the mistake in his report and expunge the names of the respondents from the list of secured creditors and add them to the list of unsecured creditors. There will be no order as to costs.
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1961 (4) TMI 44 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Winding up – Power of court to assess damages against delinquent directors, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... consequences of the expiry of a temporary statute were different from the repeal of a statute, to persuade me to a different view. So far as I can see, the several heads of claim in the application fall broadly under two classes, in some cases under both. One class is based on the contractual liability of the directors. In respect of this, by reason of section 45-O there is no bar of time at all and the liquidator may take separate steps for recovery either by way of suit or by way of a claim under section 45D of the Banking Companies Act. The other class is based on the misfeasance and the claims thereunder can lie only in respect of acts committed within the twelve years preceding the presentation of this application, that is after May 21, 1946. I direct the liquidator to file a statement showing clearly which are the acts of misfeasance committed on and after this date and which of the respondents are liable in respect of them. This statement he will file by July 12, 1961.
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1961 (4) TMI 23 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Central Government exercising appellate powers under section 111 of the Companies Act, 1956, before its amendment by Act 65 of 1960 is a tribunal exercising judicial functions and is subject to the appellate jurisdiction of this court under article 136 of the Constitution?
Whether the Central Government acted in excess of its jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally in directing the company to register the transfer of shares in favour of Shyam Sunder;and Savitadevi?
Held that:- All the documents which were produced before the Deputy Secretary are not printed in the record before us and we were told at the bar that there were several other documents which the Deputy Secretary took into consideration. In the absence of anything to show that the Central Government exercised it restricted power in hearing an appeal under section 111(3) and passed the orders under appeal in the light of the restrictions imposed by article 47B of the articles of association and in the interest of the company, we are unable to decide whether the Central Government did not transgress the limits of their power. We are however of the view that there has been no proper trial of the appeals, no reasons having been given in support of the orders by the Deputy Secretary who heard the appeals. In the circumstances, we quash the orders passed by the Central Government and direct that the appeals be reheard and disposed of according to law.
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1961 (4) TMI 22 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB
Company – Service of documents on members by and Shares – Power, to discount ... ... ... ... ..... it is found that the resolution, No. 4, of April 30, 1953, does not make a valid, call and yet these three appellants have been held to be bound by the call made under that resolution. If this is an inconsistency, it is only a seeming inconsistency for the defect in the call which is available to others is not available to these three appellants for they were parties to the resolution and are estopped from relying upon this defect to escape liability. The learned counsel then says that there is a distinction between what is due and what is presently due and he points out that in the case of these appellants the call cannot be said to be presently due but that is exactly with what I do not agree for as they are estopped from questioning the propriety of the call so under the resolutions the demand of the call is a present demand from them. In the result the appeals of Major Teja Singh and Gurinder Singh appellants are accepted. Counsel s fee in each appeal is fixed at Rs. 60.
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1961 (4) TMI 9 - SUPREME COURT
Whether a particular policy as regards imports is, on a consideration of all the various factors involved, in the general interests of the public?
Held that:- The attack on the validity of para 6(h) of the Imports Control Order, 1955 fails. The contention that Section 3 of the Imports and Exports Control Act, 1947, is bad to the extent that it permits the Government to make an order as in para 6(h) of the Imports Control Order, 1955, consequently also fails.
The attack on this provision in para 6(h) of the order that it contravenes Article 31 is not even plausible. Assuming for the purpose of this case that the right to carry on trade is itself property, it is obvious that there is no question here of the acquisition of that right. It is clear however that though it was open to these petitioners to apply for licences under the Export Promotion Scheme they made no application for licence thereunder. There is no scope therefore for the argument that they have been discriminated against. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (4) TMI 8 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the proceedings taken against the petitioner in pursuance of the order under section 8A(2) are violative of the guarantee of equal protection of the laws under article 14 of the Constitution
Held that:- The true scope and effect of the sub-section is to enforce the terms of any settlement arrived at in pursuance of sub-section (1) and to recover any sum specified in such settlement as if it were income-tax or arrear of income-tax in accordance with the provisions of sections 44 and 46 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. We are unable, therefore, to accept the construction which learned counsel for the petitioner seeks to put on the sub-section.
In this case everything was concluded before January 26, 1950, when the Constitution came into force, including the issuance of a notice of demand. All that remained to be done was the recovery of the amount according to the notice of demand. Therefore, the crucial question is---is the recovery procedure discriminatory in any way, having regard to the undoubted validity of the proceedings which had been taken against the petitioner before January 26, 1950 ? We are unable to answer this question in favour of the petitioner. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (4) TMI 7 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the transaction is or is not an adventure in the nature of trade?
Held that:- The contention that dealing in buying and selling of shares was not one of its objects is without substance. The Investigation Commission found that dealing in shares was within the objects of the assessee company and this is one circumstance in the totality of the circumstances which must be considered, though by itself it is not determinative of the question. All the circumstances lead to the inference which was rightly drawn by the Investigation Commission and by the High Court. The answer to the first part of the question referred by the Investigation Commission must therefore be in the affirmative.
The constitutional question under article 14 of the Constitution cannot be raised in these proceedings because this court is exercising its advisory jurisdiction and its power is confined to the questions which arise in an appeal. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (4) TMI 6 - SUPREME COURT
Whether it was not open to the High Court in the present reference to go into the question as to the applicability of the proviso to section 10(2)(vii), as it was neither raised before the Tribunal nor considered by it, and could not, therefore, be said to be a question arising out of the order of the Tribunal, which alone could be referred for the decision of the court under section 66(1)?
Whether the sum of ₹ 9,26,532 was property included in the assessee company's total income computed for the assessment year 1946-47?
Held that:- In the present case, the question actually referred was whether the assessment in respect of ₹ 9,26,532 was proper. Though the point argued before the income-tax authorities was that the income was received not in the year of account but in the previous year, the question as framed is sufficient to cover the question which was actually argued before the court, namely, that in fact the assessment is not proper by reason of the proviso being inapplicable. The new contention does not involve reframing of the issues. On the very terms of the question as referred which are specific, the question is permissible and was open to the respondents. Indeed the very order of reference shows that the Tribunal was conscious that this point also might bear on the controversy so that it cannot be said to be foreign to the scope of the question as framed. In the result, we are of opinion that the question of the applicability of the proviso is really implicit, as was held by Chagla, C.J., in the question which was referred, and, therefore, it was one which the court had to answer. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (4) TMI 5 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the assessee's claim for deducting a sum of ₹ 1,24,199 odd under the provisions of section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 be disallowed as done by Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (Calcutta Bench), Calcutta?
Held that:- Special leave to appeal from the decision of the Tribunal dated May 29, 1956, was not properly granted in this case and the appellant is not entitled to ask us to exercise our power under article 136 of the Constitution, when it did not move against the subsequent orders of the Board and the High Court. Appeal dismissed.
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