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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 84 Records
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1962 (8) TMI 107 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t every bank was required to maintain a certain portion of its total assets in the form of Government securities (vide section 42 of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934). There is no reason why we should go behind those facts as found by the Tribunal. Upon these facts, we must come to the conclusion that the holding of the securities and the selling and reinvestment of the same and the final exchange were all done in the due course of business, and applying the tests laid down above, the appreciation in value must be taken as profit which is assessable. The question, therefore, is answered as follows The sum of ₹ 6,09,412-10-3 representing the difference between 3% Government Conversion Loan of 1946 at par and the costs of Government securities held by the assessee and so converted in 1946 must be taken to be the assessable income of the assessee and not capital gain. The assessee must pay the costs of the Commissioner of Income-tax. Certified for two counsel. I agree.
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1962 (8) TMI 106 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... we would allow this appeal to this extent that the appellant would be entitled to receive from the Official Liquidator towards his claim a sum of ₹ 5,665/- only He would also be entitled to receive proportionate costs. 51. For the reasons given in respect of the three appeals, namely, Special Appeal No. 573 of 1960, Special Appeal No. 38 of 1961, and Special Appeal No. 48 of 1961, we make the following order 52. Re Special Appeal No. 573 of 1960--This appeal is dismissed but in view of the special circumstances of the case we make no order as to the costs of the appeal. The parties will bear their own costs. 53. Re Special Appeal No. 38 of 1961 --We allow this appeal in part and hold that the appellant would be entitled to receive a sum of ₹ 5,665/- in all in respect of his claim with proportionate costs. 54. Re Special Appeal No. 48 of 1961 -This appeal is dismissed but in the circumstances of the case we direct the parties to bear their own costs of the appeal.
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1962 (8) TMI 105 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ably follows that since Sama Ayyar was alive, it was for respondent No. 1 to cite him. That being no, the failure to examine Sama Ayyar can be legitimately treated as a ground against respondent No.1 and cannot be treated as a ground against the appellants, and yet, that is precisely what the High Court appears to have done. It would thus be clear that the important question of fact on which the parties are at issue, was decided by the trial Court in favour of respondent No. 1 and by the lower appellate Court in favour of the appellants. As we have already indicated, the broad features of the evidence support the conclusion of the lower appellate Court and so, Mr. Chatterjee is not at all justified in contending that the finding of the lower appellate Court is perverse or is not supported by any evidence. In the result, the appeal must be allowed, the decree passed by the High Court is set, aside and that of the appellate Court restored with costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1962 (8) TMI 104 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on by whom Income Tax or any other sum of money is payable, and (2) a person in respect of whom any proceedings under this Act has been taken for the assessment of his income. It is clear that the person in respect of whom Income Tax is levied under the provisions of Chapter V-A is a non-resident who carries on business as owner or charterer of the ship. It is therefore, difficult to hold, on the strength of the definition of "assessee", that the master of the ship alone is an assessee under the provisions of Chapter V-A of the Act, and no order of assessment could be made against his principal. 12. For the reasons stated above, in our opinion, the Tribunal was right in holding that the application for refund made by the applicant on or about 5th January, 1953, was barred by reason of the provisions of section 44C of the Act. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative. The assessee shall pay the costs of the department. No order on motion.
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1962 (8) TMI 103 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the assessee's case in the face of the other evidence on the record. According to us, therefore, it must be held that the amount of ₹ 2,50,000 standing in the books of the assessee to the credit of Rampratap Agarwal on the 10th October, 1942, and the further entries of Rs. one lakh and of ₹ 40,000 occurring in the said account on 16th March, 1948, and 19th July, 1948, did not belong to the assessee and did not constitute his undisclosed income. 7. In view of our conclusions, the first of the two questions framed for each of the three years under consideration must be answered in the negative. As we have already pointed out earlier, the answer to the said question being in the negative and in favour of the assessee, the second question does not arise for consideration and need not be answered. The second question for each of these years is not, therefore, answered. The assessee will get its costs from the department. 8. First question answered in the negative.
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1962 (8) TMI 102 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and is entitled to be a party and if he is a party there can be no reason why if he is aggrieved by a decision he should not have a right of appeal. We must so construe the provisions of the Act as not to render the remedy provided by it nugatory but to advance it and it seems to us that the provisions of the Act justify an inference that the Charity Commissioner is entitled as of right to appeal against the decision of a tribunal if the decision is against the public charity, even though there is no direct provision enabling him to appeal. This conclusion is further strengthened by the adoption of neutral language in Sub-section (4) of Section 72 which provides for an appeal. It simply says An appeal shall lie to the High Court against the decision of the Court under Sub-section (2) as if such decision was a decree from which an appeal ordinarily lies. This contention of Mr. Jahagirdar, therefore, must be repelled. 6. The rest of the judgment is not material to this report.
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1962 (8) TMI 101 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he institution and is conducive to making the institution an effective vehicle of education for the minority community or other persons who resort to it. We are, therefore, of the view that the Rule 5(2) of the Rules for Primary Training Colleges, and Rules 11 and 14 for recognition of Private Training institutions, insofar as they relate to reservation of seats therein under orders of Government, and directions given pursuant thereto regarding reservation of 80 of the seats and the threat to withhold grant-in-aid and recognition of the college, infringe the fundamental freedom guaranteed to the petitioners under Art. 30(1). The petitioners will therefore be entitled to writs in terms of prayers (a), (b), (c) and (d) insofar as they relate to reservation of seats tinder orders of Government, subject to the modification that reference to cl.12 of the rules in the prayers will be deleted in the writ. The petitioners will entitled to the costs of the petition. Petition allowed.
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1962 (8) TMI 100 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he wanted to crosts-examine witnesses and was denied an opportunity to do so. It is not open to him therefore to raise this question for the first time before us. We have accordingly come to the conclusion that the High Court ought to have held that there was a proper enquiry held against this employee and the management dismissed him on finding on that enquiry that the two charges against him had been fully proved, and that there was no reason to think that the management acted mala fide. The appellant was therefore entitled to an order for setting aside the order of the Industrial Court. Accordingly, we allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and order that the appellant’s application under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution be allowed and the order of the State Industrial Court be set aside and the order of the Assistant Labour Commissioner dismission the employee’s application be restored. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1962 (8) TMI 99 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . As we have already pointed out earlier, the income computed under section 9 is not real or the actual income received, but is an artificially defined income computed on the basis of the bona fide letting out. This is the income for tax purposes of the owner which flows from his ownership of the property and, so long as the ownership remains vested in him, the liability in respect of the income attaches to him. What is the actual income of the property or who gets it are not matters which arise for consideration. Even before the interest of the Baronet vested in the Custodian, the trustees were not getting income of the property. It cannot, therefore, be said that it is as a result of the Baronet having been declared evacuee, and his interest having been vested in the Custodian, that there has been an alienation of the income at the source. Our answer, therefore, to the second question is in the negative. The assessee will pay the costs of the department. Order accordingly.
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1962 (8) TMI 98 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r section 34 of the Act. If the present case had been one where the initiation of the proceedings had been validly launched, it would be open to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in appeal before him, while setting aside the assessment, to issue directions. But it is unthinkable that a direction can be made in the exercise of the powers under section 31 of the Act which goes to the extent of conferring jurisdiction upon the Income-tax Officer if he is not lawfully seized of jurisdiction. To our minds, the direction issued by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner travels far beyond the scope of section 31 of the Act in the circumstances of the case. If direction is neither lawful nor valid, it cannot come within the scope of the saving proviso and serve to remove the bar of limitation. We accordingly answer the question in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to his costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Question answered in the negative.
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1962 (8) TMI 97 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
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... ... ..... einvest in other securities. The accretion arising on sale thus had to be treated as an accretion of the corpus to be re-invested again in the securities giving only the income resulting therefrom to the assessee. The income, interest or dividend from the investments, to which the assessee was entitled under the will, was income as distinguished from corpus as understood under the ordinary law. It may be that, under the Indian Income-tax Act, a part, which will be considered as an accretion of the capital under the ordinary law, may be treated as income for purposes of taxation. Such part of the income, however, could not be said to be receivable on behalf of the assessee, who was not entitled to it under the terms of the will. On the second question also, therefore, the Tribunal was right in the view that it has taken. Our answer to the second question also, therefore, is in the negative. The department will pay the costs of the assessee. Questions answered in the negative.
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1962 (8) TMI 96 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t is that the questions should be answered as follows 1. The application dated 30th December, 1953, was not an application for refund under section 48 of the Indian Income-tax Act, but was an application for granting an abatement. If it is treated as an application for refund under section 48 it is barred by limitation under section 50 of the said Act. 2. In the facts and circumstances of this case, the assessee was not entitled to claim abatement under the A.A.D.T. at the stage in which the application was made, nor could the Income-tax Officer grant abatement at that stage. There was no outstanding demand which could be adjusted under the A.A.D.T. 3. No appeal lay against the order of the Income-tax Officer dated 2nd November, 1954, rejecting the claim for abatement. 4. The question does not arise. An appeal might have been preferred against the original orders of assessment, but such appeals have long ago been barred. There will be no order as to costs. DATTA J.--I agree.
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1962 (8) TMI 95 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ember, 1949, and it is not open to the assessee in this reference to go behind this statement of fact made by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. I also notice that in his application under section 66(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act the assessee admitted that the sale took place in the relevant accounting year, namely, 1356 Fasli. In my opinion there is no substance in the contention put forward on behalf of the assessee on this point. For these reasons I hold that in the circumstances of this case the amount of ₹ 1,30,785, being the excess of sale proceeds of the building, plant and machinery, over the written down value thereof, was rightly taxed as income in the hands of the assessee under section 10(2)(vii) of the Indian Income-tax Act. I would accordingly answer the question referred by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal against the assessee. The assessee must pay the costs of this reference. Hearing fee ₹ 250. Untwalia J.--I entirely agree. Order accordingly.
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1962 (8) TMI 94 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t the Tribunal specifically dealt with the question that this amount must be regarded as profits received by the assessee, whatever may be the manner of his connection with the company from which he received it and whatever might be the nature of the receipt in the hands of the company itself. Whether or not it was income taxable in the hands of the assessee was the point principally decided by the Tribunal and it seems to us therefore that the reference to the amount as dividend in the question as framed by the Tribunal is not at all significant. The real question at issue and one that properly arises from the order of the Tribunal is whether the sum received by the assessee from a foreign company is assessable as profits under the Act. For the reasons that we have already set out, we answer the question in the affirmative and against the assessee. The department will be entitled to its costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 100 in each case. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1962 (8) TMI 93 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... enkataraman, learned counsel for the assessee, submitted that the assessee had raised an alternative contention before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, which however was not considered in view of the finding that the claim for deduction was permissible under section 10(2)(xi) of the Act. This alternative contention was that the machinery sold having come back to the assessee itself, the written down value of ₹ 38,981 as also the profit limited to depreciation allowance of ₹ 5,180 together making up ₹ 44,061 should be allowed as a loss in the computation of the income. We are not expressing any opinion on this aspect of the matter. It will be open to the Tribunal to consider this question and give relief to the assessee if the claim is well founded. The reference is answered against the assessee, and the department will be entitled to its costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Reference answered against the assessee.
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1962 (8) TMI 92 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... None of the decisions referred to by Mr. Joshi therefore helps him and our conclusion is in view of what we have already discussed above that the assessee firm was engaged in business and the income received by it was income from business under section 10 of the Indian Income-tax Act. Our answer to the first question, therefore, must be in the affirmative. We answer it accordingly. It is not disputed that the answer to the second question must follow the answer which we give to the first question, because if it can be said that the assessee firm was carrying on business, it would be a partnership firm within the meaning of the Partnership Act, and since there is no other defect in the application which it has made for registration, it would also be entitled to registration under section 26A of the Income-tax Act. Our answer to the second question, therefore, is also in the affirmative. The department will pay the costs of the assessee. Questions answered in the affirmative.
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1962 (8) TMI 91 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sold away in September, 1954, and taking into account the fact that it was impossible to conceive of the possibility of a person making an investment almost entirely with borrowed money with no expectation of an early discharge of the debt, we are of opinion that the conclusion reached by the Tribunal is correct. There is also some evidence on record to show that the bent of the assessee's mind was to indulge in such activities. We find from the order of the Income-tax Officer that the assessee attempted to purchase another estate called Rathna Estate which, however, he handed over to a limited company anticipating a downward trend in the tea market and the fall in price of tea estates in general. There is enough material on record to support the finding of the Tribunal and we are unable to say that the Tribunal has misdirected itself on a point of law. The reference is answered against the assessee who will pay the costs of the department. Counsel's fee ₹ 250.
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1962 (8) TMI 90 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lot was with him. Under the agreement he had undertaken to submit plans within six months and complete the building within a period of four years. He has done nothing in that direction even though, as it has been found as a fact, he had the means to do so. On the other hand, finding the rise in the market, he has sold the land at a considerable profit. On these facts an inference has been drawn by the Tribunal that the transaction was an adventure in the nature of trade. It cannot be said that the conclusion reached is without any evidence. Merely because another view may possibly be taken it cannot be a ground to interfere with the conclusions arrived at by the Tribunal in exercise of our jurisdiction under section 66 of the Act. We have to keep in mind that we are not exercising appellate jurisdiction. For reasons stated above in our judgment, the answer to the question must be in the affirmative. We answer accordingly. The assessee shall pay the costs of the Commissioner.
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1962 (8) TMI 89 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ; 23,200 was on the basis of a contract, the assessee became bound to pay the amount and the payment being for the purpose of the business, it ought to be accepted at its face value as coming within the scope of section 10(2)(xv). We are unable to accept this argument as at all sound. The onus of establishing that an item of expenditure was properly incurred and became allowable under section 10(2)(xv) rests directly upon the assessee making the claim, and solely for the reason that he has entered into an agreement it does not follow that the requirements of that sub- clause are satisfied. We are, therefore, of the view that on the facts that were available to the Tribunal, the Tribunal could justifiably reach the conclusion that the expenditure was not incurred solely and exclusively for the purpose of the business. The question is accordingly answered in the negative and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the department. Counsel's fee ₹ 250.
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1962 (8) TMI 88 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... case because of its having misquoted the provision of law under which it exercised the jurisdiction. We would only refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in Hazari Mal Kuthiala v. Income-tax Officer 1961 41 ITR 12 (SC) "The Commissioner, when he transferred this case, referred not to the Patiala Income-tax Act, but to the Indian Income-tax Act, and it is contended that if the Patiala Income-tax Act was in force for purposes of reassessment, action should have been taken under that Act and not the Indian Income-tax Act. This argument, however, loses point, because the exercise of a power will be referable to a jurisdiction which confers validity upon it and not to a jurisdiction under which it will be nugatory. This principle is well settled see Pithamber Vajirshet v. Dhondu Navlapa 1888 ILR 12 Bom. 486 ." In our opinion the impugned assessments are quite valid in law. The reference is answered against the assessee, who will pay the costs of the department.
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