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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 84 Records
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1962 (8) TMI 87 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... puted." The terms of this section are substantially in accord with the view we have taken. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the two forward contracts are speculative transactions which are in the nature of a business. According to the first proviso to section 24(1), they shall not be taken into account except to the extent of the amount of the profits and gains, if any, in any other business consisting of speculative transactions. The Tribunal having found that the loss was sustained in speculative transactions, directed that it should be allowed to be carried forward and set off against future profits in future speculative transactions. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the view taken by the Appellate Tribunal is correct. The question referred to us, therefore, is answered in the negative and against the assessee. As the assessee has failed, he must pay the costs of the respondent. Advocate's fee ₹ 250. Question answered in the negative.
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1962 (8) TMI 86 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ght of the father to deal with the income from the properties so transferred to her comes to an end and the husband as the proper guardian under the law of his minor wife would be entitled to have control of such income. The legislature has therefore thought that in the case of a transfer of assets to a married daughter, though a minor, the possibility of evasion of tax on such income was very remote indeed. There was thus a very sound reason why the income of a married minor daughter should be excluded from the mischief of section 16(3)(a)(iv). We are accordingly of the opinion that the provision cannot be impugned as offending article 14 of the Constitution of India. The learned counsel has rightly conceded that if the attack on the validity of the provision fails, the second question has to be answered against the assessee. We answer that question accordingly. The assessee will pay the costs of the department. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Questions answered accordingly.
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1962 (8) TMI 85 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tment and affirmed by the Tribunal. It is pointed out by learned counsel for the assessee that, while the Income-tax Officer and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner justified the estimate on the ground of local inquiries made by the Income-tax Inspector of the assessee's financial position and affluence in the business, the Tribunal has justified it on a different ground, namely, that the estimate represented 10 per cent. on gross collections. In our opinion the real question is whether there are materials to support the estimated income of ₹ 30,000. The fact that the department and the Tribunal have not given identical reasons for making the estimate is not a ground which would avail the assessee in challenging the estimate itself as being unsupported by any material on record. In the result the questions are answered against the assessee who will pay the costs of the department. Counsel's fee in each case ₹ 250. Questions answered against the assessee.
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1962 (8) TMI 84 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... te against the prayer for the grant of injunction against the defendantsrespondents in the present suits only on the finding that action of the Ranchi officer under section 34 of the Income-tax Act was not without jurisdiction. To sum up, my findings are these (1) The cases of the plaintiff-appellant were validly transferred from Patna to Ranchi and the Ranchi officer was competent to entertain these cases. (2) The civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain these suits because of the scheme of the Income-tax Act and the second part of section 67 of that Act. (3) Even assuming for the sake of argument that these suits can be entertained by the civil court, the conditions precedent for taking action under section 34 of the Income-tax Act were in existence and, therefore, the proceedings taken by the Income-tax Officer under section 34 cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. In the result, the appeals are dismissed with costs. KANHAIYA SINGH J.--I agree. Appeals dismissed.
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1962 (8) TMI 83 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... to frame any scheme for the administration of the trust and we agree that this is not necessary-at least for the present. It is necessary however that new trustees be appointed for the administration of the trust. of the original 18 trustees all except one are dead and sole survivor is admittedly too old to carry on the administration successfully. The very fact that for many year's he has not discharged any functions as a trustee also makes it necessary that new trustees should be appointed. We therefore direct that suitable persons be appointed by the Trial Court as new trustees after giving an opportunity to the plaintiffs and other responsible members of the Daudi Bohra Community to place their recommendations and objections in this matter. Both the appeals are accordingly allowed, The Plaintiffs will get their costs here and also in the Trial Court and the High Court from defendants 1 to 11. There will be one set of hearing fee for the two appeals. Appeals allowed.
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1962 (8) TMI 82 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to regard them." The assessee in the present case treated the disputed sum as receipt towards principal and, therefore, did not show it in his return for the assessment year 1936-37; he cannot now complain if the income-tax authorities in a subsequent assessment calculate the outstanding principal by deducting the disputed sum from the original principal. My answers to the three questions are Question No. 1--"No." Question No. 2--Does not arise. Question No. 3--"Yes." BY THE COURT.--Our answers to the three questions are Question No. 1--"No." Question No. 2--Does not arise. Question No. 3--"Yes." We direct that a copy of our judgment be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar as required by section 66(5) of the Income-tax Act. We further direct that the assessee shall pay to the respondent his costs of the reference which we assess at ₹ 200. Order accordingly.
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1962 (8) TMI 81 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... disbelieving his version that the amount of ₹ 10,000 entered in his account books was the deposit made by Banarasidas on the ground that the former has failed to produce the latter. The assessee took all the steps that lay in his power to secure the presence of Banarasidas before the Income- tax Officer. In these circumstances it appears to us that the Tribunal wrongly took into consideration the circumstances that Banarasidas had not been produced. On the material on the record there is nothing to refute the allegation of the appellant that this sum of ₹ 10,000 is the deposit of Banarasidas with the assessee firm. The Tribunal had before it no legal material on which it could come to a contrary conclusion. Consequently, we are of opinion that the question of law referred to us by the Tribunal should be answered in favour of the assessee and against the department with costs. We assess the fee of the learned counsel at ₹ 200. Question answered accordingly.
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1962 (8) TMI 80 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the Court of Appeal that the State Government was ill-advised to issue the said order. It may be that the State Government was anxious to preserve industrial peace and so, it proceeded to exercise its jurisdiction under s.10(3). But it is obvious that the full implications of the order were not appreciated by the State Government before it issued the said order.- Indeed, the inappropriateness and the impropriety of the said order gave rise to argument by the appellant that the Government was acting malafide against it, and the State Government had to offer an explanation in the form of an affidavit and by way of a statement made by the Government Pleader at the Bar to meet this challenge. If only the State Government had considered the matter more carefully before issuing the said order, this complication could have been easily avoided. The result is, the two appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. There will be one set of hearing fees in these appeals. Appeals dismissed.
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1962 (8) TMI 79 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... a conclusion is reached, all the pros and cons must be carefully and scrupulously examined and a conscientious effort must always be made not to regard evidence which appears to be unreasonable or improbable as being false and prejured. We have noticed that the judgment of the High Court showed a tendency to regard every witness whose evidence the High Court did not feel inclined to accept as a perjuror and conspirator. This approach again may tend to show, with respect, either lack of experience or absence of judicial poise and balance. It is became the judgment of the High Court showed these glaring infirmities that Mr. Bastri told us at the very outset that in the present appeal, all that he proposed to do was to defend the respondent but not the judgment of the High Court what has been pronounced in his favour. The result is, the appeal is allowed, the decree passed by the High Court is set aside and that of the trial Court restored with costs throughout. Appeal Allowed.
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1962 (8) TMI 78 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... arn income. In T.C. No. 127 of 1958 (Appa Rao v. Commissioner of Income-tax ), to which one of us was a party, the Bombay and Allahabad views have been followed. In that case, the assessee had income from "other sources" and it was held that the interest on borrowed capital can be adjusted towards that income. In our opinion, it is not necessary that there should be income assessable to tax under the miscellaneous head "section 12(1)" before upholding the claim for expenses under section 12(2). If there is no such income the expenses would amount to a loss which will be available to the assessee to be adjusted against the other heads of income under section 24(1) in the same year. In fact, this was the view of the Bombay High Court and as already stated this court had followed that view. The reference is answered in favour of the assessee, who will be entitled to his costs from the department. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1962 (8) TMI 77 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e cannot be said to be illegal yet the Courts will, as a matter of practice, not accept the evidence of such a witness without corroboration in material particulars. The law may be stated in the words of Lord Reading C. J. in R. v. Baskerville ( 1916 2. K.B.658.) as follows "There is Do doubt that the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice is admissible in law (R. v Attwood, 1787, 1 Leach 464). But it has been Ion(,, a rule of practice at common law for the judge to warn the jury of the danger of convicting a prisoner on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, and in the discretion of the Judge, to advise them not to convict upon such evidence, but the judge should point out to the jury that it is within their legal province to convict upon such unconfirmed evidence (R. v Stubbs, Dears 555 In re Heunier, 1894 2 Q.B. 415)". We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the order of conviction and direct that the appellant be released forthwith. Appeal allowed
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1962 (8) TMI 76 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nd" yet we have no hesitatition in holding that the "land", with which we are concerned in these cases, is not an "agricultural land" within the meaning of that expression found either in the Constitution or in the Wealth-tax Act. It was next contended by Sri E.S. Venkataramiah that his client was compelled to hand over possession of the "land" as it was requisitioned and, therefore, he was not a willing party for its conversion. We fail to see any relevancy in this contention. We are not concerned with the question as to how the land became an "agricultural land". Requisitioning was done according to law. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was any illegal conversion. The fact remains that it has ceased to be an "agricultural land" and the change effected cannot be ignored in law. For the reason mentioned above, these petitions fail and they are dismissed. But there will be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1962 (8) TMI 74 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e probate proceedings should also be considered as a part of the "record" of assessment. Ingenious as this argument is, I do not think that there is any strength in it. For the purpose of determining the estate duty leviable the record in the probate proceeding is not relevant. It is only after the estate duty due is determined the question of deduction arises. The question of deduction has nothing to do with the determination of the estate duty due. The operation of section 50 comes in at a stage after the estate duty is determined. Hence, when acting under section 61, the only "record" that the assessing authority can look into is the "record" relating to the assessment and not any other "record." For the reasons mentioned above, this petition is allowed and a writ of certiorari is issued quashing the impugned order of rectification. Under the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs. Petition allowed.
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1962 (8) TMI 73 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nts were made to the assessee as an expression of the esteem which her employer had for her, or that they were made in appreciation of the personality and character of the assessee. Nor could it be said that the sums received by her could not be described as receipts in respect of her employment. Further, in that case, at the material time, the assessee had discontinued to be the Dewan of the Bhavnagar State. Here, as we have already remarked, there is nothing to indicate that the relationship of master and servant had come to an end before the assessee received all these payments. For these reasons, we are unable to assent to the view sought to be pressed upon us in this behalf. It follows that the order of the Tribunal could not be successfully impeached in this reference. We have, therefore, to answer the question in favour of the department and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of this reference. Advocate's fee ₹ 250 (Two hundred and fifty).
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1962 (8) TMI 72 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to include therein the income of his minor child from a partnership in which the assessee is a partner. They went on further to hold that even assuming that such an obligation was cast upon the assessee, the failure on his part to so include it would not amount to failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment for that year. This decision has been relied upon by the learned counsel for the assessee to support his contention that in any event section 34(1)(a) does not apply. We do not think it necessary to canvass the correctness of this decision or the applicability of the observations of the learned judges to the case presently before us, for the reason that we are of opinion that the reopening of the assessment is justified by section 34(1)(b) of the Act. In the view that we have taken, the question is answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the department. Counsel's fee ₹ 250.
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1962 (8) TMI 71 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 50, and, therefore, it has to be taken into account in that year; while, on the other hand, it is the contention of Mr. Joshi that the agreement is of 10th July, 1950, much after the expiry of the previous year, it was payable in instalments and, therefore, the amount, if any, ascertained, cannot be included in the assessment year 1950-51. This aspect of the question has not been gone into by the Tribunal and, therefore, in our opinion, we would not be justified in proceeding to decide the question. For the reasons stated above, our answer to the question as framed by us is in the affirmative. Such part of the sum of ₹ 3,30,000 as is determined by the Tribunal to be attributable to the actual cost in the acquisition of the depreciable assets of the cinema business would be included either in whole or in part in such year or year as the Tribunal would determine. The Commissioner shall pay the costs of the assessee in this reference. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1962 (8) TMI 70 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n a speculative transaction must not be taken into account except to the extent of the amount of profits and gains, if any, in any other business consisting of a speculative transaction. "It is difficult to hold that the proviso (b) to clause (vi) of sub-section (2) of section 10 is a substantive provision of law by reason of the fact that the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 24 is a substantive provision of law. In Aluminium Corporation of India Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1958 33 I.T.R. 367 the question that arose was whether the prior losses should have procedence before the depreciation allowance of the current year and it was held that the depreciation allowance should be adjusted first before setting off prior losses. No other decision has been referred to us by Mr. Ramaswami. For the reasons stated above, our answer to the question referred to us is in the negative. The assessee shall pay the costs of the department. Question answered in the negative.
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1962 (8) TMI 69 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ect the assessee's case in the face of the other evidence on the record. According to us, therefore, it must be held that the amount of ₹ 2,50,000 standing in the books of the assessee to the credit of Rampratap Agarwal on the 10th October, 1942, and the further entries of Rs. one lakh and of ₹ 40,000 occurring in the said account on 16th March, 1948, and 19th July, 1948, did not belong to the assessee and did not constitute his undisclosed income. In view of our conclusions, the first of the two questions framed for each of the three years under consideration must be answered in the negative. As we have already pointed out earlier, the answer to the said question being in the negative and in favour of the assessee, the second question does not arise for consideration and need not be answered. The second question for each of these years is not, therefore, answered. The assessee will get its costs from the department. First question answered in the negative.
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1962 (8) TMI 68 - SUPREME COURT
Constitutional validity of s. 15 of the Punjab Preemption Act (Act 1 of 1913) questioned
Held that:- No doubt, the son and the other members of the family would not have been entitled to a present interest in the property alienated and consequently would not have a right to prevent the alienation (in which event, however, it is needless to add that a right to preempt wan wholly unnecessary as a means of preserving the property), but they would have a legitimate expectation of succeeding to the property-an expectation founded on and promoted by the consciousness of the community. If the social consciousness did engender such feelings, and taking into account the very strong sentimental value that is attached to the continued possession of family property in the Punjab, it could not be said that the restriction on the right of free alienation imposed by s. 15(1)(a) limited as it is to small class of near relations of the vendor is either unreasonable or not in the interest of the general public. The result is the appeal fails.
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1962 (8) TMI 67 - SUPREME COURT
Whether section 2A of the Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1950, as amended by Kerala Act II of 1959 infringes article 14 of the Constitution or whether it can be justified on the basis of the doctrine of classification?
Held that:- Petition dismiised. The impugned section is a temporary provision intended to apply only for one year to tide over a difficult situation brought about by the reorganization of States. It is true that every law, whether it is temporary or permanent, cannot infringe article 14 of the Constitution; but in considering the question of reasonableness of the legislation this circumstance will have some bearing, particularly when the legislature selected one of the many methods open to it. Though the method selected may not be as good as other, we cannot hold that it is unreasonable and, therefore, liable to be struck down.
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