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Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 84 Records
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1962 (8) TMI 66 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, on a true construction of sub-section (6), (8), and (9) of section 18A of the Indian Income-tax Act, the interest referred to in sub-section (8) is chargeable for failure on the part of an assessee to submit an estimate of his income and pay tax as required by the terms of sub-section (3) of that section?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Sub-section (9) of section 18A provides for payment of penalty in terms of section 28 upon submission of estimates under sub-section (2) and (3) known or reasonably believed to be untrue or upon failure without reasonable cause to comply with the provisions of sub-section (3). We are unable to see that this provision in any way affects the construction of sub-section (6) or (8) or assists in the solution of the difficulty which has arisen in this case. The penalty under sub-section (9) is in addition to the liability under sub-section (6) and (8) which is not penalty in the real sense, and is leviable for reasons different from those on which the levy of interest under sub-sections (6) and (8) is based. The result, therefore, is that these appeals are dismissed and the decision of the High Court answering the question framed is upheld.
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1962 (8) TMI 65 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d to be operative with reference to the accounting year. The provision about the assessment year and the accounting year in the Act cannot therefore distinguish the decision of the Supreme Court in Mathra Parshad s case(1). The answer to question No. (1) is therefore as follows The grant of an exemption certificate under section 4(2) of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954, before the end of the accounting year 1955-56 operated for the entire business transacted in that year where the fee prescribed was not in relation to the turnover but was fixed annual sum, and not from the date of the application. In view of the answer to the first question, the second question does not arise. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of the judgment may be sent to the Commissioner of Sales Tax as required by section 15(5) of the Act. The assessee shall be allowed costs against the State for these proceedings at the rate of Rs. 80 for each day of hearing. Reference answered accordingly.
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1962 (8) TMI 64 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... act as defined in section 2(c) of the Act cannot now be sustained in view of the decision of their Lordships in Gannon Dunkerley s case(1), and the subsequent repeal of the provision by the State Legislature. We would, accordingly, give an answer to the reference that the word contract as used in the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 4 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, means a contract as defined in the Indian Contract Act and is not limited by the definition under clause (c) of section 2 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act. The reference does not call upon us to answer the further dispute which has been raised in the arguments of the learned counsel that no liability can arise under the proviso to section 4 of the Act. This reference with the answer would now go back to the assessing authority which would deal with the matter in accordance with law. There would be no order as to costs in these references. MEHAR SINGH, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1962 (8) TMI 63 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ministrative spheres and which are extra-statutory, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal cannot be stretched and extended. We see no difference in the language of the provisions of the appellate powers of the Tribunal in the new Act from those of such powers under the previous Act which would enable us to say that the Tribunal has general power of control and supervision over the assessing officials of the department, in respect of both statutory and non-statutory matters. But whether the appellate power of the Tribunal now is of a more extensive character than what it was previously is not really the question before us. The only question is whether the Tribunal can take note of a non-statutory rule and insist upon the administration of that rule or compel the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner to act in conformity with it. We have no doubt that the Tribunal had no such power or authority. The revision petition fails and is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1962 (8) TMI 62 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... includes sugar candy though sugar candy is separately dealt with under Entry 31-B of the Fifth Schedule. It may be, as contended by the learned Government Pleader, that the Legislature wanted to bring sugar candy within the net of taxation. If that was its intention, it failed to convey that intention. At any rate that intention is not made clear. The Courts have to look at the provisions as they stand and if there is any ambiguity, give the benefit of that ambiguity to the assessee. For the reasons mentioned above, I am of the opinion that the tax imposed on the petitioner is not authorised by the provisions of the Act . Hence I direct that the order of assessment impugned in this proceedings be quashed by issuing a writ of certiorari. As the petitioner has succeeded on a ground which he has not taken in his petition, I do not think that there is any justification in granting costs to him. The parties will bear their own costs. AHAMED ALI KHAN, J.-I agree. Petition allowed.
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1962 (8) TMI 61 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... se points here Mr. Phadke urged in both the petitions that the best judgment was capricious and arbitrary and did not partake of that judgment which is contemplated by section 11(4) of the Act. The other contention was that the penalties imposed upon the petitioner in the two years under assessment could not have been levied. It was urged that the penalties were levied under rule 67, item 11-A, and that we have recently held item 11-A in rule 67 as ultra vires of section 16 of the Act, in Special Civil Application No. 375 of 1961 (heard with S.C.A. No. 376 of 1961) decided on 24th August, 1962. Since we are setting aside the orders of the authorities below, we do not think that we should pronounce upon these contentions raised. We merely note them here so that the petitioner may not be prejudiced. These points may be considered by the authorities if raised, before them. The petitions are allowed with costs and the cases are sent back for fresh assessments. Petitions allowed.
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1962 (8) TMI 60 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tax. That question we have not considered. The department appears to have unduly strained the language of explanation 3 to section 2(t) to find out some way to levy sales tax on the petitioner wholly ignoring the inconveniences that are likely to be caused to the commission agents as well as to their principals by adopting the interpretation adopted by it. For the reasons mentioned above, the sales tax levied on the petitioner amounts to an illegal levy. Hence the orders of assessment impugned in these proceedings are quashed by issuing of a writ of certiorari. The petitioner without good reasons had failed to go up in appeal to the Tribunals constituted under the Act. If there was any need to investigate into facts, we should have declined to grant any relief in these petitions. As the petitioner had improperly ignored the Tribunals constituted under the Act, we think we should refuse to grant him any costs in these petitions. It is ordered accordingly. Ordered accordingly.
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1962 (8) TMI 59 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . That shows that the proviso is making provision for a period of time subsequent to the delegation, and the proviso cannot possibly be interpreted to be a condition of the power to delegate contained in the first part of section 16. In fact, in the first part of section 16, the word conditions is used in the clause subject to such restrictions and conditions as may be prescribed , that is to say, by the rules. But we cannot regard the proviso to section 16 as a condition to the opening part of section 16. We therefore think that the entry at serial No. 11-A cannot help the department in getting over the plenary provisions of the proviso, to section 16. In our opinion, the entry at serial No. 11-A is ultra vires of the proviso to section 16. A rule cannot possibly affect the provisions of the parent Act. In the result, therefore, we must allow these petitions and set aside the penalties imposed. The respondents shall pay one set of costs to the petitioner. Petitions allowed.
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1962 (8) TMI 58 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... at is stated in paragraphs 21 and 22 of the return, it was pointed out to him that his submission was without any basis. The Government Advocate thereupon stated that a direction may be issued to the Commissioner to decide the preliminary objections. 9.. It is not that we have not formed our opinion on some of the questions raised in this petition. But we prefer to issue a direction to the Commissioner to decide the preliminary objections with expedition mainly because the counsel for the petitioner pressed for such a direction and the Government Advocate appearing for the Commissioner also agreed that that direction may be issued. 10.. The petition succeeds and is allowed to the extent indicated below. The Sales Tax Commissioner is directed to decide with expedition the preliminary objections raised and argued before him on 1st March, 1962. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order about costs and direct that the security amount shall be refunded. Petition allowed.
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1962 (8) TMI 57 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e of the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957, and the petitioner will not have any right of appeal against the order of the Commercial Tax Officer. But, on the other hand, if the Magistrate is required to go into the question of the liability of the petitioner, the conclusion reached by the Magistrate may be open to scrutiny by this Court under its revisional powers. For the reasons mentioned above, the orders of the learned Magistrate which are impugned in these proceedings are quashed and the learned Magistrate is directed to enquire into the question whether the petitioner is liable to pay the amount claimed from him before taking steps to realise that amount from the petitioner. If he is satisfied that the amount claimed is due from the petitioner, then only he will act under section 13(3)(b). The petitioner has deposited certain amounts during the pendency of these petitions as directed by this Court. The Magistrate will refund those amounts to the petitioner. Petitions allowed.
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1962 (8) TMI 56 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... urs). The expression pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit is an expression of wide import. An order of remand can be properly brought within that expression. We see no reason why these words should be construed narrowly. In fact, if a narrow construction is placed on these words, it may work to the prejudice of the assessees in a large number of cases. There may be occasions when a total remand may be required in the interest of justice. This view of ours is supported by the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in State of U.P. v. Jaipuria Brothers(1). While construing section 12(4) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, which corresponds to section 22(4) of the Act, the Madras High Court held in Kalam Somasundaram Chettiar and Sons v. State of Madras(2), that the Appellate Tribunal had authority to remand a case. For the reasons mentioned above, both the contentions advanced by Sri S.P. Bhat fail and therefore the petition is dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1962 (8) TMI 55 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... se. It is settled law that while the burden is on the revenue authorities to show that a particular turnover is liable to tax, the onus of showing that a particular class of goods is exempt from taxation lies on the assessee vide Keren Kayemeth le Jisroel Ltd. v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue 1932 17 Tax Cas. 27 at p. 58 (H.L.)., Commissioner of Income-tax v. Venkataswamy Naidu 1956 29 I.T.R. 529 (S.C.)., Bacha F. Guzdar v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1955 27 I.T.R. 1 at p. 4. and Raja Mustafa Ali Khan v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1948 16 I.T.R. 330 at p. 335. From what has been stated above, far from discharging the onus that silver wire simpliciter was an exempted article under the notification, the petitioner on its own admission in the deposition of one of its members admitted that the wire becomes kalabattu only after it is twisted with cotton or silk thread. The result is that there is no force in this writ petition and it is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1962 (8) TMI 54 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rs as per the notification dated 3rd July, 1958. It is true that under rule 2 (viii) of the rules framed under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953, Sales Tax Officer means in respect of any place of dealer the Sales Tax Officer appointed as such with Jurisdiction for the area in which such place of business is situated by the State Government under section 3 to assist the Collector . But this rule stands modified in view of the notifications above referred to. We have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the Assistant Commercial Tax Officer has been validly appointed and the delegation made to him is a valid delegation. For the reasons mentioned above, we do not find any substance in the contention of Sri B.V. Katageri that the Assistant Commercial Tax Officer had no jurisdiction to function under the provisions of the Bombay Sales Tax Act. 1953. In the result. these petitions fail and they are dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 (One set). Petitions dismissed.
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1962 (8) TMI 53 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... C. 371. The Madras High Court said The phrase in the same manner, in section 9(3) did not make applicable all the incidents of the local sales tax law to the assessment under the Central Sales Tax Act what was contemplated by that phrase was that the procedure of making an assessment, collection of tax etc. was the same as laid down in the local Sales Tax Act. The application of that procedural provision of the local law did not assimilate other provisions in that law which dealt with the determination of the turnover, which, in so far as the Central Sales Tax Act was concerned, was required to be determined only under the Central Act and the rules framed thereunder. (Headnote). We are in agreement with this view and it follows that the second question also should be answered against the assessee. In the light of what is stated above the T.R.C. has to be dismissed and we do so. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1962 (8) TMI 52 - SUPREME COURT
Whether certain sales were inter-State sales so that it was beyond the power of the State Legislature to tax them?
Held that:- Petition is allowed. The assessment order mentioned in the petition is quashed and we direct the issue of necessary writs restraining the respondents from levying any tax on the sales mentioned in the petition in which the goods moved from outside Mysore into Mysore. In this case also the petitioners had omitted to disclose the permits under which the sales had been made and to state expressly that the sales had been made under the permits and on the terms contained in them with the result that under the contract of sale goods had to be moved from outside Mysore into Mysore. Hence, as in the previous case, here also there will be no order for costs.
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1962 (8) TMI 43 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the assessment orders are wholly void and therefore affect their fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31?
Held that:- Petitions are allowed and we direct that appropriate writs be issued quashing the orders of assessment mentioned in the petitions and restraining the respondents from levying or collecting the tax in respect of sales mentioned in the petitions in which the goods moved from outside into Mysore.
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1962 (8) TMI 42 - SUPREME COURT
Sales tax liability challenged - Held that:- Appeal partly allowed. Sale in the present case there was transport of goods from outside the State of Mysore into the State of Mysore and the transactions themselves involved movement of goods across the border. Thus if the goods moved under the contract of sale, it cannot be said that they were intra-State sales. It was not the volition of the first appellant to supply to the purchaser the goods from any of the factories of the second appellant.
In the result the imposition of the sales tax on the appellant for the year of assessment except for the period April 1, 1955 to September 6, 1955, was illegal and was not leviable for that period. The appeal is therefore allowed to that extent and the writ petition of the appellants succeeds but it will not affect the tax paid for the period above-mentioned.
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1962 (8) TMI 35 - SUPREME COURT
EXEMPTION — INTERPRETATION OF NOTIFICATION EXEMPTING SALE OF HAND-MAD FOOTWEARS BY MANUFACTURER OR MEMBER OF HIS FAMILY
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1962 (8) TMI 20 - SUPREME COURT
This is an appeal with special leave under article 136 of the Constitution, and normally the finding of the court or a tribunal against which an appeal is filed, is not exposed to review on matters of appreciation of evidence. The very reasons submitted by the company in its written statement are capable of an inference that the action of the company was "arbitrary and mala fide", and that .inference has been raised by the authority competent in that behalf. The authority hearing the appeal had not overstepped the limits of its jurisdiction and has" properly addressed itself to the only question which has to be decided by it under section 111 of the Companies Act, 1956. No ground is made out before us which would justify as in reopening the finding and in reappraising the evidence, on what is essentially a question of fact. Appeal dismissed.
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1962 (8) TMI 19 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB
Powers of court to grant relief in certain cases ... ... ... ... ..... the petition to be premature, I do not think I will be justified in expressing my views on this matter at this early stage. All that the notice mentions is that the directors concerned would be liable for prosecution. This is just to indicate to them what the provision of law is. I do not read in the notice a decision on the part of the authorities to prosecute the petitioners. It is then said that the petitioners as directors have reason to apprehend that any proceeding will, or might be brought against them in respect of any negligence, default, etc. If the additional fee had been paid by the directors, that could have been pleaded as a reason in this court for relieving the directors of the criminal liability. It is the case of both the parties that additional fee has not been paid by any petitioner. In these circumstances, I do not think that a case for the grant of the relief under section 633(2) has been made out as yet. I, therefore, dismiss this petition as premature.
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