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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 85 Records
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1962 (9) TMI 69 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... #39;s trade or business." Now, if that had been the object of the expenditure or the effect of the liquidation proceedings was merely to change over control from V.V. Chitaley to the liquidator, the rule in Van den Berghs' case 1935 3 I.T.R. (Suppl.) 17 would have come into play. But the effect of liquidation proceedings is not to change over control from the present management to the liquidator, but on the other hand, the effect of liquidation proceedings is ultimately to bring the business to an end by winding it up completely. The expenditure, therefore, incurred by the assessee company in the instant case was not to prevent change over control of business but on the other hand to enable it to run the business. The decision, therefore, has no application to the facts of the present case. For reasons stated above, our answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative. Commissioner shall pay the costs of the assessee. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1962 (9) TMI 68 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he Income-tax Officer. Though the Tribunal has referred to this objection of Mr. Palkhivala in the statement of the case, it has not stated in the statement of the case that the departmental representative or the Income-tax Officer had raised any contention in respect of the quantum of payment before it. If it was the correct position, that the Income-tax Officer or the departmental representative had raised any such contention before the Tribunal, it would be reasonable to assume that the Commissioner would have seen that this fact is incorporated in the statement of the case. This being the position on record, in our opinion, the Tribunal was in error in dealing with the question as to the quantum of payment made by the assessee to Milkhiram. Our answer to the first question referred to us is in the affirmative. In view of our answer to the first question, it is not necessary to record any answer to the second question. The Commissioner shall pay the costs of the assessee.
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1962 (9) TMI 67 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... operly said to have been laid out and expended for the purpose of earning the income. It would be more proper to say that the expenses were incurred by the assessee to justify a wrong step taken by it in the course of carrying on its business. The other question whether, even apart from section 10(2)(xv), the expenses could be claimed as a proper commercial loss in the computation of the profits can easily be answered. It is impossible to contend that the true profits cannot be ascertained without taking the legal expenses of an improper law suit indulged in by the assessee. The assessee having chosen to defy the law and to indulge in vain litigation must quite properly bear the consequences of such acts. It is inconceivable that such expense should go in reduction of its business income brought to tax. The question is answered in the negative and against the assessee, who will pay the costs of the department. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Question answered in the negative.
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1962 (9) TMI 66 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... roceed to make good deficiencies, if there be any; the court must interpret the statute as it stands and in case of doubt in a manner favourable to the taxpayer." This proposition of law is, no doubt, well settled. But the invocation of this principle can arise, only in cases where there is an ambiguity in the language of the statutory provision. We cannot agree that there is any ambiguity in the language of the section. We have reached the conclusion that, on the terms of section 4(3)(i ) of the Indian Income-tax Act, the trust is not entitled to the exemption. It is unnecessary to refer to the decision cited by the learned counsel for the revenue that in cases of immunity from taxation, the statute must be strictly construed, a proposition which, it is only fair to add, Mr. Anwarulla Pasha does not contest. We, therefore, answer the question submitted to us in the negative. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Hyderabad, will have his costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 250.
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1962 (9) TMI 65 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r rendering it incapable of being allowed as a bad debt under section 10(2)(xi). In the absence of any such contention having been raised by the department, we cannot say that the Tribunal has erred in treating the debt as a bad debt under section 10(2)(xi). Even in asking for the questions in the present reference, no question has been either suggested or asked for by the department that the Tribunal had erred in holding that the claim fell under section 10(2)(xi) without ascertaining whether the requirements of the said section have been satisfied or not. In these circumstances, we do not think we will be justified in entertaining the argument of Mr. Joshi that the assessee's claim could not be allowed as a bad debt because there is nothing to show that it had actually written off the loss as a bad debt in its books of account. In conclusion, therefore, our answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative. The Commissioner will pay the costs of the assessee.
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1962 (9) TMI 64 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... payments were not loans in the ordinary meaning of the word, the Court of Appeal unanimously held that the amount was taxable. The House of Lords however reversed this decision by a majority. Even assuming that this decision can be taken to apply to the expression "loan" as it occurs in section 2 (6A)(e), that does not really dispose of the question, for there are undoubtedly other categories of payments referred to in that provision within the meaning of one or the other of which the payments in the present case undoubtedly fall. We are accordingly of the view that the payments in the present case come within the mischief of section 2(6A)(e) of the Act since there were accumulated profits adequate to cover these payments. The debits against the assessee must be regarded as payments of deemed dividends within the meaning of the provision. The second question is answered in favour of the department, which will be entitled to its costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250.
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1962 (9) TMI 63 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on of industrial disputes, but his functions are purely incidental to industrial adjudication. His power is not of the same character as that of an Industrial Court or Board or Tribunal. In our view an 'authority' under s. 2 (cl (iii) to be an industrial tribunal must be a body constituted for the purpose of adjudication of industrial disputes under a law made by a State. The Conciliation Officer not having been invested with any such power, he cannot be regarded as an" "authority" within the meaning of s. 2(c) (iii) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate. Tribunal) Act. The Labour Appellate Tribunal has consistently held, and we think rightly, that an appeal against the order of a Conciliator is not maintainable under s. 4 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, vide Sassoon & Alliance Silk Mills Co. Ltd v. Mill Mazdoor Sabba Both the appeals therefore fail and are dismissed with costs. There will be one hearing fee. Appeals dismissed.
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1962 (9) TMI 62 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ions of s.207 A (6). Sub-section (6) provides that the Magistrate can examine the accused if he thinks it necessary to do SO. Besides, even according to the judgment of the High Court, the failure to examine the accused persons under s.342 did not amount to a material irregularity and could not-by itself, therefore, justify the reversal of the order passed by the learned Magistrate. The result is, the appeal is allowed, the order passed by the High Court is set aside and that passed by the learned Magistrate on the 7th July, 1961, is restored. It is to be regretted that the proceedings taken by the respondent in the High Court and those taken by the appellant after the decision of the High Court have added to the length of the life of this criminal case; and so, it is desirable that the Magistrate should proceed to pronounce his final orders as expeditiously as possible and the case should thereafter be tried by the Court of Session without unnecessary delay. Appeal allowed.
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1962 (9) TMI 61 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... urt having to consider whether he had secreted the articles. We may mention that Mr. Mathur who appears for the State does not even suggest that the articles were stolen by the appellant. Therefore, the contention that he had an opportunity to get at the articles loses all significance and can possibly have no bearing on the question as to the nature of possession attributable to the appellant. In the circumstances we must hold that the prosecution has failed to prove that these letters were in the exclusive possession of the appellant. No presumption can, therefore, be drawn against him that he had secreted them from the mere fact that they were found in the almirah which, at best, may be regarded as being in the joint possession of himself and his father. But, as already stated, even an, inference of joint possession would not be legitimate. For these reasons we allow the three appeals and set aside the conviction and sentences passed against the appellant. Appeal allowed.
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1962 (9) TMI 60 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ules. We do not, however, think it necessary to consider these arguments in the present appeals because of our conclusion that the impugned notices levying the tax @ 9 pies per ton are invalid for two reasons the increase in the rates has not been sanctioned by the State Government under s. 51(2) and an attempt to recover at the increased rate the tax for the years already covered by assessment orders passed in that behalf, is barred by Rule 10.The result is, the appeals and the writ petitions are allowed and an appropriate direction or order is issued restraining the respondent from recovering the tax at a rate higher than 3 pies per ton and also restraining the respondent from recovering any additional tax in respect of the years for which tax has already been assessed against the appellants. The same will be the order in the companion appeals. The appellants will be entitled to their costs, but one set of hearing fees will be taxed. Appeals and writ petitions allowed.
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1962 (9) TMI 59 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as Parimisetti Seetharamamma v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1963 50 I.T.R. 450. total income and it is not open to him to omit any part of his income. If he does so, he does at his peril of attracting section 23(4). In that situation, it is futile to contend that it is only such portion of the income which was not included in the original return that would be liable to tax in the reassessment proceedings. The position obtaining after invoking section 34(1)(a) is the same as it obtained prior to the completion of the original assessment. In that situation, it was open to the department to subject the above-said shares of income to tax. If that were the only item which escaped assessment, proceedings would have been started only under section 34(1)(b). In these circumstances, we have to answer the reference in favour of the department and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the department in R.C. No. 14 of 1961. Advocate's fee ₹ 100 (One hundred).
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1962 (9) TMI 58 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ion of "basic wages" in P. 2 (b) and therefore the decision of the Central Government, which was presumably under s. 19A of the Act, to remove the difficulty arising a out of giving effect to the provisions of the Act, by which such a bonus has been included in the definition of "basic wages" is incorrect. In view of this decision, it is unnecessary to consider the effect of Art. 14 in the present case. We therefore allow the petition and hold that production bonus of the typical kind in force in the Company is excepted from the term "basic wages" and therefore the decision of the Central Government communicated to the Company on March 7, 1962, that provident fund contributions must also be made on the production bonus earned by the employees in 'his Company, must be set aside. As this petition was heard along with petition No.64 of 1962 and the main arguments were in that petition, we order parties to bear their own costs. Petition allowed.
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1962 (9) TMI 56 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ins against the income from other heads of business. But that does not mean that the allowance by way of depreciation, therefore, loses all its character and attributes as an allowance when it is carried forward to the following year, it still retains its character as depreciation allowance and gets added to the current depreciation of the following year when such current depreciation exists for the following year, or becomes current depreciation for the following year where no such current depreciation exists. The only difference which it has from the current depreciation for the following year is as provided under proviso (b) to section 24(2), namely, that its application will be postponed to the prior absorption of the carried forward losses of the previous year. In the view that we are taking, our answer to the question referred to us on the present reference is in the affirmative. The Commissioner will pay the costs of the assessee. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1962 (9) TMI 55 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ot be applicable. Our answer to question No. 1 is in the affirmative. There is a slight mistake in the questions referred to as question No. 2 arises if question No. 1 is answered in the affirmative and not when it is answered in the negative. Since we have answered question No. 1 in the affirmative, question No. 2 arises and our answer is that the principle of mutuality may be applicable to receipts assessable under section 10 under the head "profits and gains of business, profession or vocation" but is not applicable to receipts assessable under the head "income from property" under section 9 of the Indian Income-tax Act. We direct that a copy of this judgment shall be sent to the Tribunal under the seal of the court and the signature of the registrar as required by section 66(5) of the Income-tax Act. We further direct that the Commissioner of Income-tax will get his costs of the reference which we assess at ₹ 200. Questions answered accordingly.
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1962 (9) TMI 54 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e. If that Act held the field, the appellants could have purchased the land, but by reason of the 1960 Act they could no longer do so. Neither the 1955 Act conferred any right as to the superstructure under s. 9 of the Principal Act nor did the 1960 Act take that right away. If this distinction between the land and the superstructure is borne in mind the untenability of the argument would become obvious. The 1960 Act does not in any way affect the appellants’ fundamental right. Therefore, their prayer that the District Munsif should be directed to proceed with the disposal of the applications filed by them under s. 9 of the Principal Act could not be granted. In this view it is not necessary to express our opinion on the question whether the appellants., by reason of the specific stipulation in their lease deeds, would not be entitled to any relief even under the 1955 Act. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. One hearing fee. Appeals dismissed.
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1962 (9) TMI 53 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... The only business income that was available was ₹ 17,866. This profit can certainly be completely wiped out. But, we do not see any basis for working out a loss in the manner done by the Income-tax Officer. But we are not now immediately concerned with the computation of the assessable income of the assessee. It follows that question No. 2 has to be answered in the following manner The depreciation allowance of ₹ 29,485 unabsorbed in the assessment year 1955-56 is available to be added to the depreciation allowance permissible for the year 1956-57 and the aggregated amount can be set off against the business profits of ₹ 17,866 and thereby neutralize the profit but the carried forward depreciation allowance cannot be treated as a loss available for set off against the income of the assessee from other sources. The question is answered accordingly. The assessee having failed completely will pay the costs of the department. Counsel's fees ₹ 250.
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1962 (9) TMI 52 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... or the specific purpose for the payment of future retrenchment compensation under section 25F and of course no trust has been created in regard to this amount. The assessee has still the control and dominion over the reserve, and it would be strictly within its rights to recall the amount from the reserve account and use it for its own business purposes, if the exigencies of the business so require. There has been no transfer of the fund from the assessee to the employees, the contemplated beneficiaries. We are unable to understand how such a mere credit entry to a reserve account can at all be described as " expenditure " within the meaning of the Act. In our opinion, the assessee is not entitled to claim the deduction and the decision of the Tribunal holding in its favour is erroneous in law. The reference is answered in favour of the department. The assessee will pay the costs of the department. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Reference answered in the negative.
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1962 (9) TMI 51 - SUPREME COURT
The petitioners however cannot question the validity of those orders by petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, for the Act under which the orders were passed read with S.R.O. 3315 is not assailed as ultra vires and the only ground on which it is said that a fundamental right has been violated is that there has been by implication a misconstruction of para 6 of S.R.O. 3315 by the Board. The validity of the orders impugned cannot be questioned in a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. The petitions are hereby dismissed.
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1962 (9) TMI 50 - SUPREME COURT
Whether a presumption under Sub-s. 1 of s. 4 of the prevention of Corruption Act arises in this case?
Whether the accused person is entitled to rebut the presumption arising against him by virtue of a statutory provision by offering an explanation which is reasonable and probable?
Held that:- The true position in respect of the construction of this part of s. 4 (1) it would be unreasonable to hold that the word 'gratification' in the same clause imports the necessity to prove not only the payment of money but the incriminating character of the said payment. That being the legal position it must be held the requirements of sub-s. (1) of s. 4 have been fulfilled in the present case and the presumption thereunder must be raised.
No evidence was, however brought to our notice to show that the appellant had at any time asked the complainant to give any money by way of donation to the temple and indeed there is evidence to the contrary to the effect that none of the persons interested in the temple had authorised the appellant to collect any money for meeting the expenses of repairs to the temple. It is because of these circumstances and because it believed the statement of the complainant that the appellant had asked him for a bribe that the High Court did not accept the appellant's explanation that the money was paid by the complainant to him for being passed on to the temple trustee as true. The High Court disbelieved the evidence of Apte and held the letter to be worthless. In doing so it cannot be said that the High Court' has acted unreasonably. Appeal dismissed.
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1962 (9) TMI 49 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the three appellants could be said to have derived "annual net profits from the mines" when the ore mined by them is not sold as such but is utilised for the production of finished products which the appellants sell?
Whether a person could in law be said to derive "profit" from a mine when when the ore extracted is not sold him as such but is utilised by him for the purpose of manufacturing a finished product which he sells?
Whether when a sale or a commercial transaction which might result in a profit takes place not of the commodity itself but of something into which it is transformed, "a profit" could be said to accrue by reason of the acquisition of the basic commodity?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. It is the function of the relevant assessing authorities to determine the annual profits in case of dispute and, besides, there is a residuary provision contained in section 76 of the Act under which in cases where the Collector is unable to ascertain the annual net profits he may determine it on the basis of 6 per cent. It is for these reasons that unable to accede to the submission that the charging provisions should be rejected as inane because of the want of an express machinery for determining the basis of apportionment in cases where the ore is sold not as ore but is converted into other products which are the subject of sale.
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