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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 34 of 34 Records
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1963 (1) TMI 47 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... m as and from a particular point of time, and that the court should not merely sanction it but also effectuate it from the operational point of time agreed to by the parties. If the court were to accord any such sanction it would be in contravention of the provisions of section 153A, which clearly provides that the transfer can only be by an order of court and not by agreement of parties, and that the transfer and vesting should only follow the order. A statutory order under the section cannot be passed to clothe parties with rights which they cannot acquire merely by the terms of a contract or agreement. In our opinion, there was no transfer on and from January 1, 1952, and that the Swiss company was an independent entity during the relevant assessment years. The department and the Tribunal have reached the correct conclusion in the matter. Question No. 1 is also answered against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the department. Counsel's fee ₹ 250.
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1963 (1) TMI 46 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the plaintiff was entitled to forfeit the amount of ₹ 1,000/- which was paid as earnest money?
Held that:- In the absence of any proof of damage arising from the breach of the contract we are of opinion that the amount of ₹ 1,000/- (earnest money) which has been forfeited, and the advantage that the plaintiff must have derived from the possession of the remaining sum of ₹ 24,000/-during all this period would be sufficient compensation to him. It may be added that the plaintiff has separately claimed mesne profits for being kept out of possession for which he has got a decree and therefore the fact that the plaintiff was out of possession cannot be taken into account in determining damages for this purpose.’ The decree passed by the High Court awarding ₹ 11,250/- as damages to the plaintiff must therefore be set aside.
We direct that the mesne profits be computed at the rate of ₹ 140/per mensem from June 1, 1949 till the date on which possession was delivered to the plaintiff (such period not exceeding three years from the date of decree) together with interest at the rate of six percent on the amount accruing due month after month. The decree passed by the High Court will therefore be modified. It is ordered that the plaintiff is entitled to retain out of ₹ 25,000/- only ₹ 1,000/received by him as earnest money, and that he is entitled to compensation at the rate of ₹ 140/- per mensem and interest on that sum at the rate of six percent as it accrues due month after month from June 1, 1949, till the date of delivery of possession, subject to the restriction prescribed by O,20 r. 12 (i) (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Subject to these this appeal will be dismissed.
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1963 (1) TMI 45 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the amount of Rs. 1,38,000 came out of the savings or withdrawals made by the appellant from her several businesses or was income from undisclosed sources?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Set aside the order of the High Court by which it summarily rejected the application for a reference under section 66 of the Act - direct the High Court to do what it should have done under section 66(2) namely, to require the Appellate Tribunal to state a case on the three questions of law referred to in this judgment and refer them to the High Court for decision.
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1963 (1) TMI 44 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n and cloth, cotton waste, which was a subsidiary product, was normally sold and, in the circumstances, an intention to carry on business of selling the subsidiary product as a part or an incident of the business of the assesssee could be inferred. Here there is no material whatsoever to hold that when the assessee purchased new vehicles it was with the object of selling them to anyone at profit after some use. On the other hand, the fact that the vehicles and motor accessories, which the assessee sold, were unserviceable only indicates a complete absence of the profit motive in the sale of those goods. 7.. For these reasons, our answer to the question referred is that the assessee cannot be regarded as a dealer under section 2(c) of the C.P. and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, in regard to the sales of used up motor vehicles and used up parts like tyres and tubes . The assessee shall have costs of this reference. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1963 (1) TMI 43 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tents or form of notice to be given to the dealer. Rule 58 also provided that the authority empowered to pass an order in appeal, revision, or review should issue to a person likely to be affected adversely a notice in Form XXV. The prescribed form only required that the gist of the order proposed to be passed should be mentioned in the notice. In the present case it cannot be denied that the notice was sufficient indication of the gist of the order that was intended to be passed after fresh assessment. It was not necessary to state in the notice the precise figure of the taxable turnover of sales within the State, and indeed this could not be done before the holding and completion of any enquiry which the Sales Tax Officer was directed by the Sales Tax Commissioner to hold. 6.. For these reasons our answer to both the questions is in the affirmative. The assessee shall pay the costs of this reference. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 100. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1963 (1) TMI 42 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... aler undoubtedly keeps in stock materials depending in quantity on the materials that it hopes to sell in a certain period. To say that the value of the stock depends upon the annual turnover means that the annual turnover is related to the stock. It is some multiple of the value of the stock. The multiple may vary from dealer to dealer, but there does exist some multiple in the case of every dealer. The multiple selected by the Judge (Appeals) in the present case cannot be said to be so arbitrary and exorbitant that we must hold that it is unjustified. The question is, therefore, answered in the affirmative. We direct that copies of this judgment shall be sent under the seal of the Court and the signature of the Registrar to the Judge (Revisions) and to the Commissioner of Sales Tax, U. P.., are required by section 11(6) of the U. P. Sales Tax Act. The Commissioner, Sales Tax, shall get his costs of this reference, which we assess at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1963 (1) TMI 41 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f any appeal under the Act. He cannot do so unless he is named as one entitled so to do under the rules made under section 22(1) of the Act. It may well be that the power to hear and decide an appeal is given to an authority not appointed under section 3. Once the position is reached that the power to hear an appeal is referable to the rules framed under section 22(1), it becomes obvious that an appellate authority hears an appeal qua his powers thereunder and not by virtue of his appointment under section 3, though he may happen to be a person appointed there- under. That being so, we think that an appellate authority is in that capacity not within the expression any person appointed under section 3 to assist him as occurring in section 22-B of the Act. 7.. In the view we have taken, we answer the two questions referred to us in the manner indicated above. We also direct the Commissioner to pay all costs of this reference. Hearing fee Rs. 50. Reference answered accordingly.
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1963 (1) TMI 40 - SUPREME COURT
Correctness and legality of an order by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court refusing to confirm a sale by the liquidators of the assets of a company which is being wound up questioned
Held that:- If the sale of which confirmation was sought was characterised by any deviation from the conditions subject to which the sale was directed to be held or even otherwise was for a gross undervalue in the sense that very much more could reasonably be expected to be obtained if the sale were properly held in view of the figure of ₹ 3,37,000 which had been bid by Nandlal Agarwalla, it would be the duty of the court to refuse the confirmation in the interests of the general body of creditors and this was the submission made by the first respondent. There were thus two points of view presented to the court by two contending parties or interests and the court was called upon to decide between them. And the decision vitally affected the rights of the parties to property. In this view we are clearly of the opinion that the order of the court was in the circumstances, a judicial order and not an administrative one and was, therefore, not inherently incapable of being brought up in appeal. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (1) TMI 31 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Winding up - Powers of liquidator and Power of Tribunal to make calls ... ... ... ... ..... er having a due regard to the available assets of the company. This will show that the duty of the liquidator will be first to realise the assets of the company and make calls only to the extent of the deficiency. But the argument before us runs the other way, namely, that the unpaid call money should first be called up and the claims of the creditors paid off and thereby the properties preserved with a view to their distribution amongst the shareholders. We cannot accept such a contention. Mr. V.V. Raghavan conceded that if the third respondent were to file a suit for specific performance now the official liquidator would have no answer to it. As we said earlier, the offer to sell to the highest bidder at the auction was one made by the official liquidator. It was no doubt subject to the sanction of the court. That sanction was secured. There was, therefore, nothing in the transaction which would invalidate the sale. This appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1963 (1) TMI 30 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB
Transfer to Shares – Power to refuse registration and appeal against refusal and Power of court to rectify register of members
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1963 (1) TMI 29 - HIGH COURT OF ALLHABAD
Winding up – Declaration of solvency ... ... ... ... ..... was not in conformity with the provisions of clause (2)(b) of section 488 of the Companies Act, nor was it drawn up in Form 149, as required by rule 313 of the Companies (Court) Rules. The declaration was thus rightly rejected by him and the voluntary winding up initiated by the resolutions passed on September 22, 1962, cannot therefore be treated as valid and legal. In order to meet the Registrar s objections it will be necessary to start the proceedings afresh, taking care to comply strictly with the requirements of law. The resolutions passed at the meeting on September 22, 1962, purporting to initiate the winding up of the Ajodhia Bank Limited and appointing a liquidator and a committee of supervisors are there fore declared null and void. The Registrar will be entitled to receive his costs from the opposite parties but I make no order for costs in favour of the applicant, Sri Raja Mohan Manucha, as the points raised by him in his petition have not been adjudicated upon.
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1963 (1) TMI 28 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB
Memorandum of association – Alteration to be registered within three months ... ... ... ... ..... of the order becoming void and inoperative. This is a further period which is added to the three months allowed under section 18, sub-section (1). The use of the word revive in the proviso to section 19, sub-section (2), in contradistinction with the word extend occurring in section 18, sub-section (4), is significant. Revive brings back to life what has become moribund. It is synonym to re-enact or re-animate a matter which has become void and inoperative in law, revitalize what was in a state of animation by force of the statute, restore or brought back to life. The use of the word extend in section 18, sub-section (4), and of revive in section 19(2), proviso, is in the context advised and the two expressions are not interchangeable. In this background, I would hold that the petition under section 18, sub-section (4), having been made after the expiry of the period allowed cannot be entertained. The result, therefore, is that the petition fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1963 (1) TMI 27 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Winding up – Suits stayed on winding-up order and Avoidance of certain attachments, executions, etc.
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1963 (1) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the suit instituted by the appellant firm of Illuri Subbayya Chetty and Sons, in the court of the Subordinate Judge at Kurnool, seeking to recover ₹ 8,349 from the respondent, the State of Andhra Pradesh, on the ground that the said amount had been illegally recovered from it under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 (No. IX of 1939)for the years 1952-54 is competent or not?
Held that:- The clause " assessment made under this Act ", which occurs in section 18A, also occurs in section 67 with which the Privy Council was concerned, and in construing the said clause, the Privy Council observed that " the phrase 'made under this Act' describes the provenance of the assessment : it does not relate to its accuracy in point of law. The use of the machinery provided by the Act, not the result of that use, is the test. " These two Privy Council decisions support the conclusion that having regard to the scheme of the Act, section 18A must be deemed to exclude the jurisdiction of civil courts to entertain claims like the present.
In the result, we must hold that the view taken by the High Court is right and so the appeal fails and is dismissed.
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