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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 42 Records
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1963 (12) TMI 29 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... al to an amount of sales tax leviable under the Central Sales Tax Act on interState trading and consequently it forms part of the price which was charged. How the trader will disburse the amount received from the customer is immaterial, because the price of the goods in so far as the customer is concerned includes all those amounts which he pays. There is in fact in this case no evidence, except the statement of the assessee, to show that he was going to return the amount. But even assuming that it was returnable, it is part of the price and hence a trading receipt. Even though it is shown as a deposit, these amounts are part of every transaction and are consequently trading receipts. We are clear in our mind that the income- tax authorities were right in their conclusions in dealing with these as trading receipts. Our answer to the reference, therefore, is in the affirmative with costs to the department. Advocate's fee, ₹ 200. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1963 (12) TMI 28 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... mber 3, 1955 and possession was delivered in 1957. We were informed that a sum of ₹ 11,800 per year was deposited in court by way of mesne profits. 24. Now the mortgagees cannot claim to hold the lands and use the amount paid as price of redemption. Even if they were not required to hand over possession till the amount together with the compensation for improvements was paid in full to them, they could not have the use of the money as well. In our opinion, the mortgagees must pay interest on the amount paid by the mortgagors from the date of withdrawal of the amount till possession was delivered to the mortgagors at 6 per annum simple. The extra amount due to the mortgagees by way of compensation will be deductible and accounts shall be adjusted between the parties accordingly. 25. The appeal is thus partly allowed as indicated above. In view of the failure on the main point, the appellants must pay the costs of the appeal to the respondents. 26. Appeal partly allowed.
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1963 (12) TMI 27 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... eover, that application was made by him in his own suit No. 20 of 1953 and the other two suits had also naturally to be adjourned as all the three of them were consolidated. The adjournment of those two suits, therefore, cannot be said to be at the instance of the defendant." Learned counsel was unable to point any Raw in the facts here stated. It would, therefore, follow that the terms of O. XVII, r. 3 were not attracted at all and that suit 134 of 1956 was decreed not on merits but really ex parte as had been expressly stated by the learned Civil Judge when he passed that decree. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the application filed by the appellant under O. IX, r. 13 for setting aside the ex parte decree passed in suit 134 of 1956 is remanded to the trial Judge for disposal on the merits in accordance with law. The appellant will be entitled to his costs throughout. The cost incurred after this remand will be provided for by the Courts below. Appeal allowed.
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1963 (12) TMI 26 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t does not enjoin actual partition and does not enable the mother fo reduce her share into possession. The explanation is intended to be of general application and cannot be treated as saving the abovesaid rule of partition. To uphold the contention would produce most unjust results which could never have been intended by the legislature. 6. We therefore hold that the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener available for division under this section will be such share in the properly as would be allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death amongst the coparceners according to the rules of Hindu law with the qualification that the rule of Hindu law providing a share to the mother and maintenance and marriage expenses of the daughters must be treated as abrogated in view of Section 4 which give; the Act overriding effect. 7. In the result the. appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. 8. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (12) TMI 25 - SUPREME COURT
Whether for the purpose of computing the period of 30 days prescribed under s. 116A (3) of the Act the provisions of s. 12 of the Limitation Act can be invoked.
Held that:- The requirement of a prescription by the special law "of a period different" from that prescribed by the First Schedule is satisfied in the present case. Even on the narrowest construction of the words "different from those prescribed therefor in first schedule" occurring the opening part of s. 29(2), the exclusion of time provided for by Art. 12 of the Limitation Act would be permissible in computing the period of limitation for filing the appeal to the High Court in the case before us. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (12) TMI 24 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the tax levied by the Act can be said to be discriminatory and as such, unconstitutional because it has selected only tea and jute as objects of taxation?
Whether the respondent has shown that the restrictions imposed by the Act by levying a tax on the movement of tea can be said to be reasonable and in the public interest?
Held that:- The mere fact that a validating statute operates retrospectively does not justify the contention that the character of the tax sought to be recovered by such retrospective operation is necessarily changed.
It is very difficult to assume that producers who were taxed under the earlier Act paid the tax without preferring an appeal or revision though they had a grievance against the validity or regularity of the assessment order. Therefore, we do not think the challenge to the validity of s. 34 can be sustained.
It is in regard to such a taxing statute which can properly be regarded as purely confiscatory that the power of the Court can be legitimately invoked and exercised. In our opinion, it would be idle to suggest that a tax imposed by the Act in the present case should be struck down because it has taxed only tea and jute.
In the present case, undoubtedly, tea has been carried over a part of the inland waterways in Assam and that satisfies the test of nexus. The argument of extra-territoriality must, therefore, fail. The argument based on the fact that the goods have been entrusted to the railway for through carriage, and so, the carriage of the goods should be held to be outside the purview of s. 3 of the Act, cannot be sustained.
The power to levy a tax which has been conferred on the State Legislature by Entry 56 cannot, therefore, be said to be controlled by the Tea Act in question. 'It would be noticed that List I does not contain any Entry by which the Central Legislature can pass an Act levying a tax on goods carried which can be said to control Entry 56 in List 11. That being so, we, must hold that there is no substance in the argument that the State Legislature has no power to levy a tax on tea which is carried over- a part of the area of the State of Assam. The result is, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1963 (12) TMI 23 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he property went from one hand to the other. The aforesaid decisions are sufficient authority to show that the property passed from one hand to another. In that view of the matter, the rule must be discharged. Mr. Pal took an objection at a late stage that no rule might have been issued as the petitioner will have complete remedy in appeals if and when occasion arises. It was not taken as a preliminary but was taken as a part of the argument of Mr. Pal who supported the order on its own merits. As the matter was argued by the advocates of both sides, I thought it desirable to express my views over the matter. Mr. Mukherjee argued that all the properties referred to in the order did not come into the hands of the petitioner. These are questions of fact which the petitioner will have ample opportunity to agitate before the trial authority. The rule is, therefore, discharged and the interim order vacated. There will be no order as to costs. Rule discharged interim order vacated.
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1963 (12) TMI 22 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... at the Board had applied its mind to the various aspects of the problem arising for decision. The principle of this decision has no bearing on the present question. As already pointed out, from a consideration of the scheme of the Act and the specific language employed in section 23, it is manifest that an appeal lies to the High Court under section 23 only in a case, where the matter has been taken up by the Board suo motu. This was, in fact, the view taken by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court, consisting of Rajagopalan and Rajagopala Ayyangar, JJ., in Kandaswami Gounder and Brothers v. State of Madras(1), on a consideration of the provisions of section 12(3) of the Madras Act, which are in pari materia with the provisions of section 23 of the Andhra Act. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken in this decision. We hold that these appeals are not maintainable and they are accordingly rejected. The papers will be returned to the Advocate. Appeals rejected.
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1963 (12) TMI 21 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rroneous, for it is not correct to say that when a dealer collects an amount by way of tax from his customer, the customer undertakes to discharge the liability to pay tax on the sale. The liability to pay tax on the sale remains that of the dealer and the dealer merely recovers an amount equal to the amount of tax from the customer. But apart altogether from this fallacy, we find that there is another fallacy affecting this decision and it is that Article 19(5) has not been considered at all by the Mysore High Court. This decision which declares a law to be bad as violating Article 19(1)(f) without considering the question whether the law is saved by Article 19(5) cannot be accepted by us as an authority on the problem before us. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that there is no substance in the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioners and the petition, therefore, fails and the rule is discharged with costs. Costs fixed at Rs. 500. Petition dismissed.
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1963 (12) TMI 20 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ile an appeal against the order of assessment passed by the Sales Tax Officer and chose to file a revision petition under section 39(1) of the Act, it cannot be held that it failed to avail itself of the remedy provided by the Act for challenging the assessment. 18.. For the foregoing reasons, this application is allowed, the decision dated the 10th August, 1960, of the Sales Tax Officer, Rajnandgaon, assessing the applicant-company to sales tax in the sum of Rs. 23,524-25 nP. and imposing on it a penalty of Rs. 30,000, and the decision dated 15th March, 1963, of the Commissioner of Sales Tax upholding the order of the Sales Tax Officer, are both quashed. The respondents are restrained from giving effect to those orders and from making any demand of tax or penalty pursuant to those orders. The petitioner shall have costs of this application. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 200. The outstanding amount of security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner. Application allowed.
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1963 (12) TMI 19 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s had no authority to collect the sales tax as such from the purchaser. The seller could undoubtedly have put up the price so as to include the sales tax, which he would have to pay but he could not realise any sales tax as such from the purchaser. That circumstance could not prevent the sales tax imposed on the seller to be any the less sales tax on the sale of goods. Similarly, under Punjab Act 46 of 1948, the primary liability to pay sales tax is that of the dealer and the fact that sub-section (1) of section 6 of that Act says that the dealer may collect it from the consumer or the purchaser does not prevent the sales tax imposed on the dealer or the seller to be any the less sales tax on the sale of goods. This argument is thus without substance. The consequence is that the two arguments urged on behalf of the petitioner fail and so his petition is dismissed, but, in the circumstances, the parties are left to bear their own costs. KHANNA, J.-I agree. Petition dismissed.
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1963 (12) TMI 18 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . Obviously, the Appellate Tribunal forgot the fact that it was the final fact-finding tribunal it was its duty to go into the facts of the case afresh and decide for itself whether there was justification for rejecting the accounts produced by the assessee, and if the accounts are to be rejected, what is the method by which it could assess the assessee on the basis of best judgment . In this case those aspects were more particularly necessary as the Deputy Commissioner had opined that the formula adopted by the Commercial Tax Officer was inapplicable so far as the assessment of the assessee for the assessment years 1958-59 and 1959-60 are concerned. We are constrained to observe that the order of the Tribunal and that of the Deputy Commissioner are highly unsatisfactory. 3.. For the reasons mentioned above, this petition is allowed, the order of the Tribunal is set aside and the case is remitted back to the Tribunal for disposal according to law. No costs. Petition allowed.
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1963 (12) TMI 17 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s the owners of the vehicles in spite of the fact that the sale by them to the company has already taken place. This is because exhibit B9 is an application for making a note of the hire-purchase agreement in the registration certificate under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The expression owner is defined in section 2(19) of that Act, and under that definition the expression means in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire-purchase agreement the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement. 15.. We entertain no doubt that exhibits B1 to B9 indicate real sales by the customers to the company, that what happens at the termination of arrangements are resales by the company to its customers and that the said resales attract sales tax under the General Sales Tax Act, 1125, as held by the Department. It follows that the petition has to be dismissed and we do so, though in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1963 (12) TMI 16 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e initiated, then no subsequent event can alter the liability of the dealer to be assessed or the authority of the department to make assessment. In the circumstances of the present case and in view of the authorities on the point, I am inclined to take the view that 1.. The Full Bench case of Jullundur Vegetable Syndicate(1) has no application to the facts of the present case, and that 2.. in view of the facts that no intimation was given about the dissolution of the firm as required under the Act and the rules the firm continued to be liable to be assessed and that in any case proceedings having been initiated long before the actual alleged dissolution, order of assessment could properly be made notwithstanding the subsequent dissolution of the firm. For the foregoing reasons, therefore, I find no force in this petition, dismiss the same and discharge the rule. In the circumstances of the case, there would be no order as to costs. FALSHAW, C.J.-I agree. Petition dismissed.
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1963 (12) TMI 15 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Memorandum of association – Alteration to be registered within three months and Exclusion of time required in obtaining copies of orders of Court
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1963 (12) TMI 7 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the asses see is not entitled to relief under section 25(4) of the Indian Income-tax Act, and to what extent ?
Held that:- What was discontinued could not be succeeded to. Even if it was held that on May 30, 1939, there was a succession to the business which we do not think is a correct view to take, that also. would disentitle the appellant to relief under sub-section (4) of section 25 in the years 1948-49 and 1949-50, for it should, in such an event, have claimed the relief in the year 1939-40.
The business which had been subjected to tax in 1918 had been discontinued in October/November, 1937, or on May 30, 1939, and it was not in existence in 1948 so as to permit a succession to it taking place under the instrument of February 7, 1948. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (12) TMI 6 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the income earned by the firm in the year ending March, 1950, could be assessed to tax under section 44 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, after the firm was dissolved?
Held that:- It is for the revenue authorities to ascertain the facts applicable to a particular situation, and to grant appropriate relief in the matter of assessment of tax. Resort to the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction conferred or recognised by the Constitution in matters relating to assessment, levy and collection of incometax may be permitted only when questions of infringement of fundamental rights arise, or where on undisputed facts the taxing authorities are shown to have assumed jurisdiction which they do not possess in attempting to bypass the provisions of the Income-tax Act by inviting the High Court to decide questions which are primarily within the jurisdiction of the revenue authorities, the party approaching the court has often to ask the court to make assumptions of facts which remain to be investigated by the revenue authorities. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (12) TMI 5 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, upon the facts found by the Tribunal, the Income-tax Officer had in this case jurisdiction to proceed to make adjustment in terms of rule 3(b) of the Schedule to the Indian Income-tax Act ?
Is there a general right to correct the errors in the accounts of an insurance company when assessing the income-tax ?
Held that:- Quite clearly the adjustment made in the present case by the Income-tax Officer was not of the variety mentioned in the proviso. He does not say that he made the adjustment because he found that any rate of interest was inconsistent with the valuation of securities or other assets. The adjustment made by him had nothing to do with any rate of interest. It was made only because he thought that the securities had been undervalued. This he had no power to do under the proviso. This again is not in dispute. The result, therefore, is that we find nothing in the rules justifying the adjustment made by the Income-tax Officer in the present cases.
The High Court, as may have been noticed, held that the proviso to rule 3(b) was not intended to cover cases like the present. It would appear, therefore, that the High Court thought that the Income-tax Officer had no power under the rule to make the adjustment. It however none the less answered the question in the affirmative. Obviously, what was meant was that the Income-tax Officer had the power, quite apart from the rule, to make all adjustments to prevent evasion of tax. The High Court in fact expressly said that the rule did not deprive the Income-tax Officer of the power to do this. It is clear that the High Court had travelled beyond the question. No objection having been taken at the Bar to this procedure, we have dealt with the matter from this point of view also. The question framed has to be answered in the negative. Appeal allowed.
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1963 (12) TMI 4 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the income derived from letting of the building constructed on Plot No. 7 is properly to be computed under sections 9, 10 or under section 12 of the Income-tax Act?
Held that:- The rent from the building will be computed separately from the income from the furniture and fixtures and in the case of rent from the building the appellant will be entitled to the allowances mentioned in sub-section (4) of section 12 and in the case of income from the furniture and fixtures, to those mentioned in sub-section (3), and that no part of the income can be assessed under section 9 or under section 10. Appeal allowed.
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1963 (12) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Act contains machinery for assessing dividends deemed to have been distributed by virtue of an order under section 23A in respect of the shares held by a shareholder, when before the date on which the fiction of distribution becomes effective--viz., the date of the relevant general meeting of the company--the registered shareholder has died and his representatives have not been substituted in the register of the company.?
Held that:- The Legislature not having made any provision generally for assessment of income receivable by the estate of the deceased person, the expression " any tax which would have been payable by him under this Act if he had not died " cannot be deemed to have supplied the machinery for taxation of income received by a legal representative to the estate after the expiry of the year in the course of which such person died.
The charge to income-tax has therefore to be in accordance with, and subject to the provisions of the Act, and the Legislature has not provided that the income received by a legal representative which would, but for the death of the deceased, have been received by such deceased person, is to be regarded for the purpose of assessment as the personal income of the legal representative. To assess tax on such receipts on the footing that it is the personal income of the legal representative is to charge tax not in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
We, therefore, agree with the High Court, though for somewhat different reasons. Appeal dismissed.
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