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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 51 of 51 Records
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1964 (2) TMI 33 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Memorandum of association – Special resolution and confirmation by CLB required for alteration of
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1964 (2) TMI 32 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, in the circumstances of the present petitions, we would be justified in acceding to the argument that the veil of the petitioning corporations should be lifted and it should be held that their shareholders who are Indian citizens should be permitted to invoke the protection of article 19, and on that basis, move this court under article 32 to challenge the validity of the orders passed by the Sales Tax Officers in respect of transactions which, it is alleged, are not taxable?
Held that:- We are satisfied that the argument based on the distinction between the two rights guaranteed by article 19(1)(c) and (g) and the effect of their combination cannot take the petitioners' case very far when they seek to invoke the doctrine that the veil of the corporation should be lifted. That is why we have come to the contusion that the petitions filed by the petitioners are incompetent under article 32, even though in each of these petitions one or two of the shareholders of the petitioning companies or corporation have joined.
The second preliminary objection raised by the respondents is upheld and the writ petitions are dismissed as being incompetent under article 32 of the Constitution.
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1964 (2) TMI 31 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
Oppression and mismanagement –Power of Tribunal on application under sections 397 and 398 ... ... ... ... ..... tion of the provisions of section 173 even on this ground. For these reasons I am of the opinion that there was in fact no contravention of the provisions of section 173 which would invalidate the general meeting held on 5th September, 1961 and the resolution passed at the said meeting. The resolution was, therefore, a valid resolution and even if the question of validity of the resolution could be raised by the petitioners in this petition under sections 397 and 398-which as I have already held cannot be done-the attack against the validity of the resolution must fail. These were the only contentions urged before me in support of the allegations of oppression and mismanagement and since I find that there is no substance in them, it is obvious that the petition must fail. The petition is, therefore, dismissed. In view of the special facts and circumstances of the case, I think the fair order of costs would be that each party should bear and pay its own costs of the petition.
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1964 (2) TMI 30 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB
Winding up - Power to order winding up subject to supervision ... ... ... ... ..... h the corporate state and corporate powers of the company (which is being wound up) shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in its articles, continue until it is dissolved. A similar provision appears in section 487 of the Companies Act, 1956. As at present advised, I do not consider that there is any illegality in the company s resolution of the 14th of May, 1963. But even in the case of voluntary winding up, the exercise by the liquidator of the powers to make compromise or arrangement with creditors, contributories, etc., is subject to the control of the court and once the supervision order is made, these powers can be exercised only with the sanction of the court. In view of the supervision order made by me, it will be necessary for the voluntary liquidator to obtain the sanction of the court before implementing the resolution, dated the 14th of May, 1963. The petition is accepted to the extent indicated above, but in the circumstances I make no order as to costs.
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1964 (2) TMI 7 - SUPREME COURT
Whether Parliament was not competent to include Hindu undivided families in the charging section 3 of the Act in view of the provision in Entry 86 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution ?
Whether the provision relating to Hindu undivided families was discriminatory and denied equal protection of laws and was, therefore, hit by article 14 of the Constitution?
Held that:- We have come to the conclusion that these cases must be remanded to the High Court for further consideration after giving parties an opportunity to place full facts in connection with the application of article 14 before it. The High Court itself pointed out that there was no averment on behalf of the writ petitioners before the High Court (now respondents before us) on the lines on which the argument finally developed at the bearing. It is true that some adjournments were granted by the High Court in this connection ; but we are not satisfied that the case for the application or otherwise of article 14 was properly put before the High Court by either side. We should like also to point out that the High Court seemed to take the view that it was for the State to show that article 14 was not applicable. This is not correct, for it is for the party who comes forward with the allegation that equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws is being denied to him to adduce facts to prove such denial. Appeals allowed by way of remand.
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1964 (2) TMI 6 - SUPREME COURT
Validity of certain provisions of the Indore Industrial Tax Rules, 1927 and assessments made thereunder for the years 1940 to 1948 questioned
Held that:- All that section 5 of Act 1 of 1948 requires is the publication of the regulation made thereunder and its being made by Government; and that has been complied with in this case. There is no other formality required for making a regulation and we are therefore of opinion that even though there was a mistake in the opening part of the notification of December 28, 1949, the amendments made in the Tax Rules can be upheld under section 5 of Act 1 of 1948 as a regulation. We therefore reject the contention under this head.
Though the right of second appeal on facts is taken away by the new rule 13 inserted in the Tax Rules, such right is taken away by legislation by necessary intendment. In the circumstances we are of opinion that the right of second appeal after the amendment must be confined in all cases by necessary intendment to questions of law only. The contention under this head also fails.
The present cases are with reference to years 1940-48, that is before the accounting year ending on March 31, 1949. The assessments in these cases were carried on by the old officers under the old law and the Validating Act specifically validates such assessments. In these circumstances we have not been able to understand how it can be said that these assessments have not been validated by the Validating Act. The contention under this head must, therefore, also fail. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (2) TMI 5 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the continuance of the Bhopal State Agricultural Income-tax Act in the Bhopal region would be whether the differentiation arising from the continuation of the levy of the agricultural income-tax was unfair and not supported by a reasonable standard, and the State having the requisite information and opportunity to make the imposts reasonably uniform, had failed or neglected to do so?
Held that:- The petition filed by the company was singularly deficient in furnishing particulars which would justify the plea of infringement of article 14 of the Constitution. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that to make out a case of denial of the equal protection of the laws under article 14 of the Constitution, a plea of differential treatment is by itself not sufficient. The State also did not place evidence before the High Court, which would in the very nature of things be in its possession, showing a rational relation between the differential treatment and the classification and has also not placed any material before the court throwing light on the question whether the continuance of the tax was justified : it merely chose to plead its case as on a demurrer.
We think that this is a case in which the parties should be given an opportunity to plead their respective cases adequately and to go to trial after the requisite evidence which has a bearing is brought before the court. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order and remand the case for re-trial to the High Court.Appeal allowed. Case remanded.
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1964 (2) TMI 4 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the proceedings before an Income-tax Officer under section 37 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (XI of 1922) can be said to be a proceeding in any court within the meaning of section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
Held that:- We are not prepared to accept the appellant's argument that the Bombay High Court was in error in dismissing his complaint on the ground that the condition precedent prescribed by section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure had not been complied with as no complaint had been filed by the Income-tax Officer. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (2) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT
Whether section 34(1A)of the Income-tax Act, 1922 is valid?
Held that:- No hesitation in holding that the challenge made to the validity of section 34(1A) on the ground that the remedy by way of appeals or revisions which is available to the assessees against whom proceedings are taken under section 34(1) is not available to the assessees who are covered by section 34(1A), cannot be sustained.
Once the notice is served under section 34(1) or section 34(1A), the rest of the procedure is just the same and all the remedies available to the assessees are also just the same. Therefore, we see no substance in the argument that the absence of the restriction as to period of limitation under section 34(1A) introduces any infirmity in the said provision. In the result, we must hold that section 34(1A) is valid and has not contravened article 14 of the Constitution. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (2) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT
As the foreign companies whose vessels have contravened Section 52A and in respect of which penalties have been imposed under Section 167(12A) read with Section 183, are not entitled to claim the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution and so, that plea fails.
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1964 (2) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
Mens rea — Entry of vessel carrying smuggled goods — Tribunal — Penalty and fine - Redemption fine - Interpretation — Two constructions
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