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Showing 21 to 40 of 88 Records
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1964 (3) TMI 116 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... le unless, in addition to there being 'sufficient cause for non-compliance with the notice under section 22(4) there was also sufficient cause for non-compliance with the notice under section 22(2), overlooks the importance of the word "or" occurring after the words "that he was prevented by sufficient cause from making the return required by section 22" in the section. We are, therefore, of the opinion, that our answer to the question referred to us should be in favour of the assessee. Our answer is that the Income-tax Officer, having recorded a finding that there was sufficient cause for non-compliance with the notice issued under section 22(4), was bound to cancel the assessment made under section 23(4) and to proceed to make a fresh assessment even though there was no sufficient cause for non-compliance with the notice under section 22(2). The assessee will get his costs in the reference. Advocate's fee, rupees Two hundred and fifty (Rs. 250).
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1964 (3) TMI 115 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... at it was in order to remove any doubt that such distribution of partnership assets could not be said to be a sale, exchange or transfer that the legislature inserted the proviso under consideration. Learned counsel also referred to Killick Nixon & Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1963 49 ITR 244, but there again the Bombay High Court merely followed the decision in James Anderson's case (Supra), which, to our minds, is a decision upon its own facts. We are, therefore, of the view that the case of the assessee fell under the third proviso to section 12B(1) and must, therefore, hold that the sum of ₹ 65,000 could not have been taxed as capital gains. Accordingly, we answer the question referred in the negative. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar shall be sent to the Appellate Tribunal. The assessee shall be entitled to his costs which we assess at ₹ 200. Counsel's fee is also assessed at ₹ 200.
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1964 (3) TMI 114 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... neral Concession Rules was really administrative in character so that the reasonable opportunity that is an essential requisite of quasi-judicial procedure was not attracted to the case. That was the view taken by that Court in the Shivji Nathubhai v. The Union of India (UOI) and Ors. 1960 2SCR775 which decision was reversed by this Court. It might be mentioned that the decision of this Court was rendered subsequent to their judgment now under appeal and therefore the learned Judges had not the advantage of the pronouncement of this Court. 10. The result is that the appeals are allowed and order of the Central Government dated July 9, 1958 and of the High Court dated September 24, 1958 are set aside. The Central Government will consider the review application afresh and dispose of the same in accordance with law and in the light of the observations contained in this judgment. The appellants are entitled to their costs in this Court (Hearing fee one set). 11. Appeals allowed.
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1964 (3) TMI 113 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... re the learned judge held on a construction of section 28 of the Act that no period of limitation can be even impliedly inferred from the other provisions contained in that section. But as the Tribunal is the final appellate authority over orders passed by an Income-tax Officer, it had undoubtedly jurisdiction to set aside the order of penalty, if, after taking all the facts and circumstances of the case into consideration, it was of the view that the penalty should not have been imposed. The question is mainly one of propriety and not of law, and, as the final court of appeal, the Tribunal could exercise all the powers which the original taxing authority had. But this reference was necessitated because the order of penalty was set aside solely on the ground that it was bad in law, and for the reasons already given above this view of the Tribunal was based on a misconception. The question is accordingly answered in the negative, but there will be no order for costs. I agree.
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1964 (3) TMI 112 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... urisdiction to force the purchase on the unwilling purchaser. 11. The conclusion resulting from the aforesaid discussions may be summarised as that though time was not of the essence of the contract, the character of the property, which constituted the subject of the contract, was such that the Court would not exercise its jurisdiction to allow specific performance by compelling the plaintiff to purchase such a property, and the decree for specific performance is likely to result in injustice. As the Court would not compel the plaintiff to purchase such a property, the relief for refund of earnest money must be decreed. Mr. Patnaik's argument is bereft of clear analysis inasmuch as it concentrates on the sole factor that time was not of the essence of the contract. I would accordingly, confirm the ultimate conclusion of the learned District Judge though he was not alive to the considerations discussed above. 12. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1964 (3) TMI 111 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... referred to this court. This court in exercise of its power of redrafting a question cannot substitute a question which was not sought to be referred in the application made under section 66(1); it cannot answer a question which was not mentioned in the application under section 66(1) itself. The application made by the assessee under section 66(1) is not placed before us and we do not know what questions it wanted to be referred to this court and whether the question actually referred by the Tribunal was not one of them. If it was, we have no jurisdiction to amend it by substituting in its place a different question. In the result we find that the question formulated by the Tribunal does not arise out of the statement of the case and return the reference unanswered. In the circumstances of the case we direct that the assessee shall pay to the Commissioner of Income-tax his costs of this reference, which we assess at ₹ 100. Counsel's fee is assessed at ₹ 200.
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1964 (3) TMI 110 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Deputy Commissioner, and so was not liable to be rejected by the District Judge on that ground. This revision petition is allowed and the order made by the District Judge is set aside to the extent indicated. The only amendment which the petitioner should now make of the valuation is to alter the valuation from ₹ 44,064.16 nP. to ₹ 46,064.16 nP. since it is admitted that she is bound to make this alteration. We direct the petitioner, in modification of the order of the District Judge, to pay the deficient court-fee only on this basis and no other. A month's time is granted for the payment of this court-fee if the enhanced court-fee directed by the District Judge has not already been paid. If the court-fee has already been paid pursuant to the order of the District Judge, the excess court-fee shall be refunded to the petitioner. In regard to costs, we direct each party to bear her or its own costs in both the courts. KALAGATE J.--I agree. Petition allowed.
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1964 (3) TMI 109 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... differs substantially from the definition given in section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. From the definition given in the "Act", it is clear that any transfer from one person to another made without consideration in money or money's worth amounts to a gift. There is hardly any doubt that though the transfer made by the assessee was without consideration in money or money's worth, he might have had other considerations in making the transfers. That is not relevant for the purpose of the "Act". For the reasons mentioned above, our answer to the question referred to us is against the assessee. In other words, our answer is that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the transfer of the movable properties of the value of ₹ 1,46,500 to Lakshminarayanan under the registered family arrangement dated October 25, 1957, is a taxable gift under the "Act". The assessee to pay the costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 250.
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1964 (3) TMI 108 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ly from business and thereupon he shall be assessed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder. 17. In the light of what is stated above, we must say that the Agricultural Income Tax Officer is not bound "to follow the computation of income from tea made by the Central Income Tax Officer" and that "he can find out the income from tea plantations applying the provisions of the Indian Income Tax Act and make the assessment exercising his powers under the Agricultural Income Tax Act" and answer the last question in I.T.R. Nos. 42 and 43 and the only question I.T.R. No. 44 in favour of the department and against the assessees. We do so; but, in the circumstances of the case, without any order as to costs. 18. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Appellate Tribunal as required by sub-section (6) of section 60 of the Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1950.
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1964 (3) TMI 107 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on for discarding it. We might also point out that even before the decision of this Court this rule was applied by some of the High Courts and by way of illustration we might refer to the decision of Harries, C.J. in Manickchand Agarwala v. The State AIR1952Cal730 . Before parting, we think it proper to make one observation. The question has sometimes been mooted as to whether the same principle of issue-estoppel could be raised against an accused, the argument against its application being that the prosecution cannot succeed unless it proves to the satisfaction of the Court trying the accused by evidence led before it that he is guilty of the offence charged. We prefer to express no opinion on this question since it does not arise for examination. 23. As stated earlier, if Pritam Singh's case 1956CriLJ805 was rightly decided, it was conceded that the decision of the Judicial Commissioner was right. 24. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. 25. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (3) TMI 106 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hey support the case of premeditated murder. 24. To summarize the accused did not like his wife; even though he was employed in Ahmedabad and stayed there for about 10 months, he did not take his wife with him; he wrote a letter to his father-in-law to the effect that the accused did not like her and that he should take her away to his house; the father-in-law promised to come on Chaitra Sudhi 1; the accused obviously expected him to come on April 9, 1959 and tolerated the presence of his wife in his house till then; as his father-in-law did not come on or before April 9, 1959, the accused in anger or frustration killed his wife. It has not been established that he was insane; nor the evidence is sufficient even to throw a reasonable doubt in our mind that the act might have been committed when the accused was in a fit of insanity. We, therefore, though for different reasons, agree with the conclusion arrived at by the High Court and dismiss the appeal. 25. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (3) TMI 105 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ondent, it must follow that they would both be entitled to recover any damages for the portion of the land occupied by the respondent. The learned Judge, has, however, directed remand of the case for the purpose of ascertaining compensation payable to the appellant by the respondent. We are unable to see on what ground that direction can be justified. But the respondent has not complained against the order by filing any cross appeal memorandum of cross objections. Under the circumstances we leave the direction of the learned judge as it stands. Before concluding we wish to make it clear that the estoppel by which the appellant is precluded from recovering possession of the property from the respondent is purely a personal one. It will not affect the Government, when they ultimately resume possession of the property on the termination of the lease in favour of the appellant after the superstructure is removed. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. 6. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (3) TMI 104 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hat the onus of proving that the rate which the Appellant charged was within this limit was on it and that as no evidence had been led by it on this point he granted the plaintiffs the declaration and injunction they sought. We consider that the learned Judge was in error in this respect. There is no presumption that the rate charged by a licensee contravenes the statutory prohibition. It is for the party who alleges his right to relief to establish the facts upon which such relief could be obtained. It was, therefore, for the plaintiffs to prove by facts placed before the court that the rate charged offended the statutory provision. This they admittedly failed to do and we, therefore, hold that they were not entitled to the declaration and injunction which the learned Judge of the High Court granted. We accordingly allow the appeals and direct the dismissal of the suits. The appellant would be entitled to its costs here and in the High Court-one hearing fee. Appeals allowed
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1964 (3) TMI 103 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
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... ... ..... he impugned order were vitiated and were bad in law. We are therefore of the opinion that the first respondent wrongly applied the provisions of section 178A and equally wrongly invoked the presumption therein contained and cast there under the burden of proving a negative thing upon the petitioner. We are also of the view that in conducting the enquiry and passing the impugned order the first respondent violated the principles of natural justice. ( 9. ) In the result the petition must be allowed and the impugned older dated October 29 1959 must be set aside. The petitioner is also entitled to a writ of mandamus against the respondents directing the return of the two ingots wrongfully confiscated under the order dated October 29 1959 It is however agreed by the learned Advocate General that the petitioner will not demand the return of the two ingots for a period of one month from today. Order accordingly. The respondents will pay to the petitioner the costs of this petition.
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1964 (3) TMI 102 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ands to reason that that satisfactory service and the manner of its discharge in the post he actually fills, should be deemed to be rendered in the parent department also so as to entitle him to promotions, which are often on seniority-cum-merit basis. What is indicated here is precisely what is termed in official language the "next below rule" under which an officer on deputation is given a paper-promotion and shown as holding a higher post in the parent department if the officer next below him there is being promoted. If there are adverse remarks against him in the new department or punishments inflicted on him there, different considerations would arise and these adverse remarks etc. would and could certainly be taken into account in the parent department also, but that is not the position here. In view of the facts of the case it is not necessary to discuss this aspect in any detail or any further. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (3) TMI 101 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , it falls within the purview of clause (d). The transfer contemplated by this clause is a transfer as a result of which the income accrues to the joint family from the properties, the subject-matter of the declaration. There can be little doubt that by this transaction the owner of the property had divested himself of it and vested it completely in the joint Hindu family. He has thus effected a change of ownership of the property. If it is a transfer of property within the terms of clause (xxiv)(d) it is a gift as envisaged in clause (xii) and section 4(a). For these reasons, we are unable to agree with the conclusion of the Tribunal that the conversion of the self-acquired property of an individual into joint family properties cannot be regarded as a gift for the purposes of the Act. We, therefore, answer the reference in favour of the department and against the assessee. The department will get its costs of this reference from the assessee. Advocate's fee ₹ 150.
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1964 (3) TMI 100 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... id to be involved in this prospective operation of the rule that we find it difficult to appreciate. It is possible that before the rules were framed the land now in dispute could have been allotted, but because of this it is not possible to suggest that the rule altering the law in this respect which ex concessis is within the rule-making power under the Act, is invalid. Such a contention is patently self-contradictory. Every law must have a beginning or time from which it operates, and no rule which seeks to change the law can be held invalid for the mere reason that it effects an alteration An the law. It is sometimes possible to plead injustice it', a rule which is made to operate with retrospective effect, but to say that a rule which operates prospectively is invalid because thereby a difference is made between the past and the future, is one which we are unable to follow. There are no merits in this appeal which fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (3) TMI 99 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cipal Boroughs Act. (50) The position under the Mysore City Municipalities Act is similarly one in which there is a single electoral roll for the entire municipality called the Municipal Election Rollvide Section 11--and is which the right to vote is limited to a division under Section 10B, but the right to get elected is enrolment in the municipal Election rollide Section 11(3). (51) I therefore hold that the interpretation suggested by this Court in Gadigappa's case is the correct one, and no case has been made out to depart from that view. (52) My answer to the question referred to the Full Bench therefore is that Rule 11(2) of the Bombay Borough Municipalities Election Rules, 1950, is invalid as being repugnant to Section 11A(2) of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act. ORDER OF THE COURT (53) Our answer to the question of law referred to is that Rule 11(2) of the Rules framed under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act is a valid Rule. (54) Question answered in affirmative.
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1964 (3) TMI 98 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... fact the property consisted of at the date of the partition. About the correctness of this proposition there is no dispute. In what manner this principle can be applied depends however on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, as in the present case, the evidence already adduced before the court shows prima facie that the Karta could not reasonably be expected to have in his hands at the date of the suit any accumulation worth the name in addition to the immovable properties found on evidence to have been acquired for the family, there can be no justification for calling the Karta to account for his past dealings with the joint family property and its income. In the circumstances of this case therefore the order of the High Court that there was no liability on the first defendant as managing member to render any account of any kind prior to the 12th December 1946, on which notice demanding partition was issued, does not call for any modification. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (3) TMI 97 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... al has the jurisdiction to investigate and adjudicate upon questions of fact and where, as we have pointed out, the refusal of the relief by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on the basis that the expenditure was of a capital nature involved a finding that it was not of a revenue nature, the Appellate Tribunal could with propriety reverse that decision. When once it came to the conclusion that the expenditure was of a revenue nature, the entirety of the expenditure has under law to be allowed as an allowance and it does not depend upon the claim to any particular amount being made by the assessee. In this view, therefore, we would hold that the Tribunal had jurisdiction and answer the question accordingly. In the result, except for the question relating to the expenditure of ₹ 45,000 relevant to T.C. No. 178 of 1961, the other questions are answered in favour of the assessees. The assessees will be entitled to their costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 100 in each case.
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