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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 88 Records
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1964 (3) TMI 96 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nt of the case, are quite clear. Whether the assessee worked the mines or not, he paid consideration for acquisition of the right to dig the surface of the land belonging to the pattadars. They were not payments for surface damages as the works progressed. The payments made by the assessee for the acquisition of the right to dig the surface land, at the beginning of the mining operations, in our opinion, is clearly capital expenditure. Our answer to the question referred is against the assessee, and it is that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the amount of ₹ 5,361 for the assessment year 1953-54, ₹ 3,750 for the assessment year 1954-55, ₹ 19,724 for the assessment year 1955-56, and ₹ 1,200 for the assessment year 1956-57 paid to the owners of the lands for extracting iron ore were capital expenditure in the respective years. The assessee will pay the costs of this reference which we fix at ₹ 250. Question answered accordingly.
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1964 (3) TMI 95 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as all the other trading operations took place outside those territories. In the instant case, there was an acute shortage of cloth and the assessee had virtually a monopoly for its import and its profits were assured as soon as it procured the cloth under the permits which were granted to it for its import from British India. This is, therefore, a case in which the department's assessment of the profits at 20 per cent. cannot be said to be improper or arbitrary, for the assessee had no other operations to perform in order to earn the profit once it had procured the cloth from British India. Under the circumstances, we would answer the fifth question in the affirmative. For the reasons mentioned above, we answer question No. (1) in the negative and questions Nos. (2), (3), (4) and (5) in the affirmative and direct that the assessee shall pay the costs of the two references. Question No. 1 answered in the negative. Questions Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5 answered in the affirmative.
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1964 (3) TMI 94 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the findings are based upon an appreciation of evidence. The Privy Council firmly adhered to this rule and this Court has accepted the Privy Council's practice in this regard. There are numerous decisions on the point but I may refer only to the following as instances of cases in which this Court has refused to disturb concurrent findings of fact Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale v. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi & ors.( ) 1960 1 S.C.R. 733); Gherulal Parakh v. Mahadeodas Maiya & ors.( 1959 Supp. 2 S.C.R. 406); Bhinka & others v. Charan Singh ( 1959 Supp. 2 S.C.R. 798. ); and Shamrao Bhagwanrao Deshmukh v.Dominion of India(A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 249. ). No case has been brought to our notice in which this Court or the Privy Council has re-appreciated evidence in an appeal by special leave or disturbed a pure finding of fact concurrently made by the courts below. To do so now would be to ignore all precedents. As already held by me the appeal must be dismissed with costs.
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1964 (3) TMI 93 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e any circumstances which required to be explained by the assessee, the assessee should be given an opportunity of doing so......." For the reasons mentioned above, our answer to the first question referred to us is in the negative and in favour of the assessee, that is to say, that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was not justified in relying on the statement of another excise contractor without giving an opportunity to the assessee to rebut the same. Now, coming to the second question, Sri K. Srinivasan, the learned counsel for the assessee, did not press for any answer. When we put it to him whether he could contend that whenever best judgment assessment is made on the basis of comparable cases, there should invariably be more than one case, he frankly admitted that he could not contend for such a proposition. We think that the stand taken by him is correct in law. Therefore, our answer to the second question is in the affirmative and against the assessee. No costs.
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1964 (3) TMI 92 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the matter, we do not see how the appellant can seriously quarrel with the validity of the respondent’s action in discontinuing the payment of cash allowance to him. The plea that payment was made for some time after the merger can hardly avail the appellant. in contending that the discontinuance is invalid. In the very nature of things, the respondent could not have decided whether the cash allowance should be continued to the appellant or not without examining the merits of the case, and since a large number of such cases had to be examined after merger, if the payment continued to be made in the meantime, that cannot give any valid ground to the appellant to challenge the legality of the ultimate decision of the respondent to discontinue the payment of the said allowance. The result is, we confirm the decision of the High Court, though on somewhat different grounds. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed. There would be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed
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1964 (3) TMI 90 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... may mention, the argument advanced in Rowe's case( 1955 1 Q. B.D. 573.) before Lord Goddard C.J., that by clearing her deceased husband's name the widow's chances of securing employment would improve was not accepted as creating a pecuniary interest such as to justify granting her permission to prosecute the appeal. Indeed, the legislature has, by limiting in s. 431 of the Code the survival of appeals to appeals against sentences of fine has chosen to recognise only one kind of interest and no other. There could be several other kinds of interest, as was suggested during the arguments at the bar. But this Court, in exercise of its inherent powers or discretionary powers, would not be acting according to correct legal principles in recognising a kind of interest which the legislature has not chosen to recognise. In the circumstances, therefore, I am clear that the applicants ought not to be granted leave to prosecute the appeal. Leave to prosecute appeal refused.
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1964 (3) TMI 89 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... which the appellant was called on to answer did specify the nature of the offence which he was alleged to have contravened, and if evidence which the appellant could have rebutted was brought on record and considered in his presence and that evidence conclusively proved the real nature of the articles imported, there could certainly be no justifiable complaint of violation of the principles of natural justice. The misdescription of the article imported in the Bill of Entry having practically been admitted and there being not much dispute that the goods imported were really com- ponents of the Jackson type single belt fasteners, nothing more was needed to establish a contravention of s. 167(8). The reference therefore to the Nawanagar Industries Ltd. which imported the washers merely confirmed the finding. In these circumstances we do not consider that there is any substance in this objection. The result is that this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (3) TMI 88 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he terms prescribed by an award, in law, and in substance, constitute a fresh contract between the parties. This question appears to have been considered by the Bombay and the Calcutta High Courts. In Jogendra Nath Chatterjee and Sons v. Chandreswar, Singh(A.I.R. 1951 Cal. 29), the Calcutta High Court appears to have taken the view which supports Mr. Setalvad’s argument, whereas in the Modern Mills Ltd. v. V. R. Mangalvedhkar(A.I.R. 1930 Bom. 342), and in V. B. Godse, Manager, Prabha Mills Ltd., v. R. M. Naick, Inspector, under the Payment of Wages Act( 1953 1 L.L.J. 577), the Bombay High Court has interpreted s. 2(vi) to include wages directed to be paid by industrial adjudication. In our opinion, the Bombay view correctly represents the true legal position in the matter. The result is, the appeal fails and is dismissed. The matter will now go back to the authority under the Act for disposal in accordance with law. There would be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed
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1964 (3) TMI 87 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e Act, that it is intended only for the benefit of the judgment-debtor and, therefore, he can waive the right conferred on him under s. 35 of the Act. If that be the legal position, O. XXI, r. 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure is immediately attracted. The concurrent finding of the courts is that by reason of the non- observance of the provisions of s. 35 of the Act no substantial injury was caused to the judgment-debtor. Further, though notice was given to the judgment-debtor, in one case he did not file objections at all and in the other case, though the judgment-debtor filed objections, he did not attend at the drawing up of the proclamation. The sales are, therefore, not liable to be set aside under the terms of the said provision. In the result the orders of the High Court are set aside and those of the Additional Subordinate Judge are restored. The appellants will get their costs throughout from the 1st respondent. There will be one set of hearing fee. Appeals allowed.
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1964 (3) TMI 86 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... option it decided to depart from it and was prepared to record its reasons for adopting that course. It would, We think, be idle to suggest that any Transport Authority functioning in the State would normally refuse to comply with the order issued by the State Government itself. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the decision of the Appellate Tribunal is based solely on the provisions of the impugned order and since the said order is invalid, the decision itself must be corrected by the issue of a writ of certiorari. In the result, we allow the appeal, set aside the order passed by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 692 of 1959 and direct that the said Writ Petition be allowed. There would be no order as to costs throughout. In accordance with this decision a writ of certiorari shall be issued setting aside the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal and remanding the matter to the Regional Transport Authority for disposal in accordance with law. Appeal allowed
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1964 (3) TMI 85 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ems under the heading "provisions" may not be in any real sense its liabilities. In the instant case the amount shown as "proposed dividend" was not a liability on the date of the gift. The Gift-tax Officer therefore rightly refused to deduct this item in computing the value of the company's assets. The result is that the finding of the learned judge with regard to the item of "proposed dividend" is set aside, and his decision with regard to the item of "provision for taxation" is affirmed. As the Gift-tax Officer refused to take into account the item of "provision for taxation", the assessment order and the notice of demand are illegal and liable to be quashed and set aside on that ground. Subject to the observations made above, the appeal be and is hereby dismissed. In view of the divided success, we direct that each party should pay and bear his own costs of and incidental to this appeal. ARUN K. MUKHERJEA J.- I agree.
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1964 (3) TMI 84 - SUPREME COURT
Whether after the coming into force of the Act and the Rules,r. 36 of the 1345-F Rules can still be said to survive?
Held that:- The Act or the 1956 Rules make no provision for any such charge as is provided in r. 36 of 1345-F Rules, the intention being that the duty under the Act will cover all expenses for enforcing it. The fact that members of the supervisory staff are the servants of the respondent makes no difference because they function under the Act and the rules framed thereunder and not under the Hyderabad Act. We are therefore of opinion that reading s. 21 of the Act and r. 143 of the Rules framed thereunder, r. 36 of 1345-F Rules must be held to have been repealed and that it is not saved by the proviso to s. 21. We therefore allow the appeals, set aside the orders of the High Court, and direct the issue of writs as prayed for. Appeal allowed.
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1964 (3) TMI 83 - SUPREME COURT
Whether s. 42(1)(g) of the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes and Settlement Act, 1947 prohibits an employer from taking action against a workman for participation in an illegal strike before it is so declared under s. 41 of the Act?
Whether in an application made under s. 16(3) of the Act the Labour Commissioner has jurisdiction to decide the legality or illegality of the strike?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (3) TMI 82 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 956-57 was not carried forward and set off against the rebate admissible for the assessment year 1957-58 under the provisions of law. This was not done when the assessment order was made. Consequently, there was a short levy of tax in the assessment year 1957-58 to the extent of Rs. 78,894.50 nP. Hence, according to the respondent-Income-tax Officer, it was a mistake apparent on the face of the assessment order which the respondent had passed. Therefore, he rectified it under section 35 of the Indian Income-tax Act. The aforesaid line of reasoning adopted by the respondent-Income-tax Officer in retifying the mistake in the assessment order has not been supported by Mr. Joshi. A copy of the calculations made by the respondent-Income-tax Officer for the purpose of determination of the amount of tax levied on the petitioner company in respect of the assessment year 1957-58 is filed on record by Mr. Joshi. Let it be taken on record and form a part of the record. Petition allowed.
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1964 (3) TMI 81 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on comes within the category of horticulture or agriculture. In our opinion, cocoanuts answer the definition of horticultural produce. In Deputy Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax and Sales Tax v. A.P. Raman 1960 11 S.T.C. 263. the High Court of Kerala proceeded on the assumption that cocoanuts are horticultural produce. It is on that footing the further question was considered whether its fibre constituted horticultural produce or not. The Madras High Court in The State of Madras v. R. Saravana Pillai 1956 7 S.T.C. 541., ruled that arecanut was horticultural produce. The same principle is contained in the case of The State of Madras, In re 1956 7 S.T.C. 546. If arecanut could fall within the definition of horticultural produce, we fail to see why cocoanut does not answer that description. We, therefore, hold that the tax was rightly levied at the sale point. In the circumstances, the tax revision case is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1964 (3) TMI 80 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... herefore final and it is not open for this Court for the first time now to find out whether the order dated 19th March, 1958, is bad in law. Even in this writ petition no writ of certiorari is asked to quash that order. No specific grounds are shown in the affidavit as to why that order is a nullity. That order therefore has become final. What was challenged in the previous writ petition and is now challenged in this writ petition is not the order of 19th March, 1958, but the order of penalty given on 8th May, 1958. The legality of that order has been upheld by this Court in the previous decision. I do not therefore think that there is any force in the contention that the previous judgment does not operate as res judicata. I would, therefore, uphold the preliminary objection raised by the Government Pleader and also as I see no force in the contention raised by the petitioner, I would dismiss the writ petition with costs. Government Pleader s fee Rs. 150. Petition dismissed.
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1964 (3) TMI 79 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e as a cooking medium. Moreover, there is an additional use which is universally recognised to which the vegetable ghee is put. It is commonly used to adulterate pure ghee (animal fat). On the other hand, groundnut oil or even refined groundnut oil without hydrogenation or without being solidified by any other process is wholly unfit for the purpose of adulteration with pure ghee. If all these considerations are kept in view, no doubt is left in my mind that the purchase of raw groundnut oil for the manufacture of vegetable ghee is acquisition of goods for use in the manufacture of goods for sale within the meaning of section 2(ff) of the Act. For the reasons given above, I am of the view that there is no merit in this petition. The same fails and is dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs. PANDIT, J.-I have gone through the judgment of my learned brother and I agree with him that this writ petition should be dismissed with no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1964 (3) TMI 78 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o be held that such a tax can continue to be levied after the commencement of the Constitution irrespective of the partition of the legislative power effected by Article 246 and the entries in the three Lists of the Seventh Schedule. 9.. It is contended that once that continuance has been disrupted by the agreement of the 25th February, 1950, it cannot be resumed. We see no force in this contention. A period of suspension, whether it stems from contract or bounty, does not abrogate the right and extinguish it for ever. 10.. Four questions are raised in each of the two Tax Revision Cases. Only the question dealt with above was pressed at the time of hearing. 11.. In the light of what is stated above the T. R. Cs. succeed in so far as the assessment to sales tax in respect of works contracts prior to the 26th January, 1960, is concerned and fail in all other respects. We decide accordingly but in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1964 (3) TMI 77 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ability is affected by the order would have vital interest at least for the purpose of exercising his legal right of reference under section 22, and from that point of view, a right to move the Financial Commissioner might well be considered to be inherent or implied without the statute expressly saying so. Now, if that be so, then it may give rise to a more serious challenge to the power of the Financial Commissioner in fixing an arbitrary and rigid period of limitation of 90 days beyond which no revision should be entertainable, thereby, denying to the aggrieved party adjudication of his grievance. Be that as it may, it is unnecessary on this occasion to pursue this matter any further because on the facts and circumstances of this case, the Financial Commissioner was, in my view, not bound to consider the revision petition on the merits because of the unexplained delay in making the same and I agree with my learned brother in the answer. Reference answered in the negative.
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1964 (3) TMI 76 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ontent with the findings of fact reached by the Sales Tax Officer and wishes to challenge the legality of the assessment order otherwise, he can do so by filing a revision petition under section 39(1) of the Act. If he does that, he avails himself of the remedy provided by the Act for challenging the assessment. 15.. For all these reasons, our conclusion is that there is no ground for the issue of a writ of certiorari for quashing the order passed by the Sales Tax Officer, Jabalpur, on 11th March, 1955, assessing the petitioner-firm to sales tax for the period from 1st January, 1952, to 31st December, 1952, and the decisions of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Commissioner of Sales Tax upholding the order of the Sales Tax Officer. The result is that this petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 200. The outstanding amount of security deposit, if any after deduction of costs, shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition dismissed.
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