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Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 88 Records
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1964 (3) TMI 75 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... called an instrument, a nail extractor is a machine and a hand ginning apparatus is a machine. Thus even in its ordinary sense machine would seem to have a wider connotation than the clause intends.............. 7.. From the description of the instrument given by us above it is clear that it directs natural forces with the object of achieving definite result and thus it falls within the second part of the definition given in the Privy Council decision in Corporation of Calcutta v. Cossipore MunicipalityA.I.R. 1922 P.C. 27. Hence we have no hesitation in holding that the cottage basin is a machinery within the meaning of that term in item No. 20 of the Second Schedule to the Act. The view taken by the Tribunal is erroneous. We accordingly allow the petitions, set aside the orders passed by the Tribunal and restore the orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner. The respondent shall pay the costs of the petitioner and bear his own costs. Advocates fee Rs. 100. Petitions allowed.
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1964 (3) TMI 74 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... education of this University. I find it difficult to appreciate the respondent s argument that the dininghall service of the University should be separately treated and qua this activity the University should be treated as carrying on the business of buying or selling. In my opinion, the University is not a dealer as defined by the Sales Tax Act. This petition is entitled to succeed. I would quash the assessment order and prohibit the respondents from proceeding further with the assessment proceedings initiated under notice dated 20th February, 1963. By the Court Civil Miscellaneous Writs Nos. 2572 of 1963 and 1447 of 1963 are dismissed with costs. Civil Miscellaneous Writ No. 1291 of 1963 is allowed with costs. The order of opposite party No. 1 dated 13th March, 1963 (Annexure B to the writ petition) is quashed. The opposite parties are prohibited from pursuing the assessment proceedings initiated under the notice dated 20th February, 1963 (Annexure C to the writ petition).
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1964 (3) TMI 73 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... aw would not justify the application of the doctrine of acquiescence. Section 8 provides for the issue of a notice of demand calling upon the assessee to pay the tax assessed. The law requires him to pay the sum indicated in the demand. Failure or omission on his part to comply with the demand exposes him to penal proceedings. When a statute contains a provision for imposing a penalty in case of non-compliance with an order or direction issued under it, it cannot be said that such compliance amounts to acquiescence. Accordingly, the question referred to this Court must be answered in the affirmative. We direct that copies of this judgment shall be sent to the Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax and the Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., under the seal of the Court and the signature of the Registrar as required by section 11(6) of the Act. The respondent shall be entitled to its costs which we assess at Rs. 100. Counsel s fee is also assessed at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1964 (3) TMI 72 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
whether the loss of Rs. 13,277suffered in the business during the period April 1, 1948, to March 30, 1949,can be set off against income under other heads in the assessment for the assessment year 1949-50 - The sum exempted under section 25(4) is not referred to in section16(1)(a) and is not liable to be included in the total income of the assessee.It is exempt altogether from the operation of the Act - the amendment of the definition of "total income" does not eliminate the distinction between the two categories of exempted sums, those which are exempt from charge as well as from inclusion in the total income and those which are exempt from charge but areliable to be included in the total income - If the assessee has earned a profit during the broken period, it is not liable to be considered for any purpose in respect of the assessment year to which the broken period relates - Held that: assessee is not entitled to have the loss suffered during the period April 1, 1948, to March 30, 1949, set off against the income under other heads under section 24(1) in the assessment for thea ssessment year 1949-50 - Question answered in the negative
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1964 (3) TMI 70 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on the facts the property in the goods sold by auction conducted at Fort Cochin really passed at Fort Cochin in the Madras State?
Whether it passed in Willingdon Island in Travancore-Cochin when the goods were actually delivered to the buyer?
Whether the sale is inside or outside the State?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Exercising the power under clause (2) the Parliament has enacted the Central Sales Tax Act (74 of 1956), and by section 4(2) the doctrine of territorial nexus has been given legislative recognition, though in some- what limited form. Where there is a single contract of sale or purchase of goods situated at more places than one, the provisions of this sub- section shall apply as if there were separate contracts in respect of the goods at each of such places
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1964 (3) TMI 66 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the assessee who had elected the previous year are liable to pay tax in the assessment year 1948-49 according to the rates prevailing during the year?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Application of the relevant law to a problem raised by the reference before the High Court is not normally excluded merely because at the date when the Tribunal decided the question the relevant law was not or could not be brought to its notice. There is nothing so peculiar in the nature of a reference under the Indian Income-tax Act or the Sales Tax Acts that in deciding it the High Court is restricted to the application of the law which has been superseded by legislation since the date when the reference was made by the Tax Tribunal and is obliged to refuse to apply the law which by legislative direction has to be applied to a particular transaction which is the subject-matter of the reference.
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1964 (3) TMI 55 - SUPREME COURT
Whether legislative power to pass an Act retrospectively has been reasonably exercised or not?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. In any event, we do not think that in the circumstances of this case it would be possible to hold that by making the provision of section 2 of the Orissa Sales Tax Validation Act, 1961 retrospective the Legislature has imposed a restriction on the petitioners' fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) which is not reasonable and is not in the interest of the general public.
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1964 (3) TMI 46 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Winding up - Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... s compelled to resign. I might also mention that I told counsel for the petitioner that, if the petitioner so desired, I would convene a meeting of the members of the company to ascertain their wishes. But the petitioner was not prepared for such a course. Even if the allegations made by the petitioner would justify a winding-up order under the just and equitable clause, I think that, on the allegations made, the petitioner s proper remedy would be an application under section 398 of the Companies Act and that he is acting unreasonably in seeking to have the company wound up instead of pursuing that remedy To say that that remedy is not available to the petitioner, since he cannot muster the support required by section 399 of the Companies Act, seems to me no answer and only serves to show that other members are not prepared to subscribe to the allegations made by the petitioner. In the result I allow the application brought by the company and dismiss the winding up petition.
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1964 (3) TMI 37 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Meeting and Proceedings – Power of Company Law Board to Order Meeting to be Called ... ... ... ... ..... d profit and loss account prepared. The administrator will be at liberty to apply to this court for leave to call the annual general meetings for consideration of the balance-sheet and profit and loss account and for adoption of the same, if thought fit. The administrator will act as chairman of such annual general meetings. Voting at such annual general meetings will be subject to and in compliance with the orders for injunctions already made and also in compliance with any other order for injunction that may be made by this court or any other court of competent jurisdiction. The administrator will be at liberty to engage a solicitor, if necessary. He will be also at liberty to incur expenditure to the extent of Rs. 200 per month for the salary and wages of clerical and other staff that he may consider fit to appoint. He will also be at liberty to apply for such further directions as may be necessary. The costs of the petitioner will be paid out of the assets of the company.
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1964 (3) TMI 35 - HIGH COURT OF MYSORE
Winding up – Debts of all descriptions to be admitted to proof, Overriding preferential payments
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1964 (3) TMI 34 - IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
Oppression and mismanagement ... ... ... ... ..... t application form from the company and asserted that he was the beneficial owner of the invention. The second was that he had negotiated for, but had not concluded, a contract for the sale of the prototype machine and had refused to disclose the details to his co-directors. This latter claim seems to me to be clearly chimerical. As to the first I agree with my brothers that this is really a visionary claim. It is quite plain on the pleadings alone and without evidence that during this period between February, 1956, and July, 1957, no use whatever would have been made of the form if it had been returned. Indeed, the plaintiff and his advisers were so taken up with their wrongs that they did not even notice it when it was returned and only woke up to the fact during the hearing before Roxburgh J. in 1959. If ever there was a case for not extending the exception to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle 1956 Ch. 565 1957 27 Comp. Cas.191 it is this case, and I would dismiss the appeal.
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1964 (3) TMI 17 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the profit computed at ₹ 3,11,646 on the sale of shares in Rohtas Industries Ltd. was in accordance with law ?
Held that:- The cost of 31,909 shares, namely, ₹ 5,83,210 must be spread over those shares and the 31,909 bonus shares taken together. The cost price of the bonus shares therefore was ₹ 2,92,141 because the bonus shares were to rank equal to the original shares. The answer to the question given by the High Court was therefore erroneous and the right answer would be that the profit computed at ₹ 3,11,646 was not in accordance with law. The appeal is therefore allowed
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1964 (3) TMI 16 - SUPREME COURT
Whether certain proceedings for the recovery of tax from the assessee under the Income-tax Act, 1922, were invalid and should be quashed as the assessment orders on which they were based had been revised in appeal?
Held that:- If the effect of an appellate order reducing the assessment as in the present case did not wipe out the original order, a most anomalous situation would, in my view, arise. Under section 46(1) of the Act after a default has been committed in terms of section 45(1) the Income-tax Officer may impose a penalty not exceeding the amount of the tax due in respect of which the default has occurred. This penalty may be recovered in the same way as the tax due, that is to say, by a notice under Section 29 and thereafter by a certificate issued under section 46(2). Now suppose the penalty for the full amount of the tax found due by the Income-tax Officer has been imposed and thereafter the appellate order reduces the amount of the tax. What happens to the order of penalty then ? Obviously, it does not automatically stand reduced to the reduced amount of the tax. It would again be absurd if the penalty could be recovered for the full original amount. The only sensible view to take in such a case would be that the order of penalty falls to the ground and the only logical way to support that conclusion would be to say that the original default has disappeared. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (3) TMI 15 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the income received by the appellant is the income of the State of Andhra Pradesh within the meaning of article 289(1)?
Held that:- The High Court was right in rejecting the argument that by virtue of the repugnancy between the material provisions of the Act and the charging section of the Income-tax Act, it should be held that the appellant was not liable to pay tax on its income. Appeals dismissed.
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1964 (3) TMI 14 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in the facts and circumstances of this case the inference drawn by the Tribunal that the fixed deposit of ₹ 5 lakhs in the names of S. P. Agarwalla did not represent the concealed income of the assessee firm was justified in law?
Held that:- We are not in this case called upon to consider whether any question of law arises from the finding of the Tribunal in respect of the two deposit receipts in the names of Raghunath Prasad Agarwalla and B. N. Gupta, but it would be impossible to hold that the finding of the Tribunal in respect of the deposit made on October 11, 1944, in the name of Sheo Prasad Agarwalla was so perverse that no reason able body of persons properly instructed in the law could have reached it. The circumstances relied upon by Mr. Sastri do raise suspicion, but suspicion cannot take the place of evidence. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (3) TMI 13 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the first respondent Corporation is entitled to levy a tax on pensioners in respect of the pensions received by them?
Held that:- The appeal accordingly succeeds and the appellant is held entitled to the relief prayed by him in the petition he filed in the High Court, viz., a writ of prohibition against the respondent-Corporation from enforcing the demand
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1964 (3) TMI 12 - SUPREME COURT
Whether condition would be satisfied whenever a terminal tax (without reference, either to the article on which it was levied or the rate) was being lawfully," levied by the municipality prior to the commencement of the Constitution and as in this case admittedly a terminal tax was being levied on certain, articles, that condition was satisfied?
Held that:- The argument of Attorney-General has to be rejected as lacking any substance, for on no construction or narrow, of the expression " levy " in the pharse " continue to be levied " can such a case be comprehended. From the mere fact that a State enacrtnent has authorised a municipality to levy a tax it cannot said that a tax which had never been imposed was " being lawfully levied " by the municipality, not to speak of the tax, etc., collected being "applied to the same purposes" before the commencement of the Constitutions as contemplated by the concluding portion of the article.
The last portion of article 277 uses the words " continue to be levied " and to be applied to the same purposes ". By reason of this collocation between the concept of the levy and of application of the proceeds of the tax, the Constitution makers obviously intended the word " levy " to be understood as including the collection of the tax, for it is only when a tax is collected that any question of its application to a particular purpose would arise. It is apparent that if the word " levied " were understood in the sense which Mr. Setalvad contends, there could be no " application " of the proceeds of the tax to the same purposes as at the commencement of the Constitution. For ex concessis at that date there were no proceeds to be applied. The decision of the High Court is, therefore, correct and the appeal fails.
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1964 (3) TMI 11 - SUPREME COURT
True construction of the provisions of section 4 of the Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1959 (1 of 1959) questioned
Held that:- The clear intention of the legislature is to save the validity of the notice as well as the assessment from an attack on the ground that the notice was given beyond the prescribed period. That intention would be effectuated if the wider meaning is given to the expression " issued ". The dictionary meaning of the expression " issued " takes in the entire process of sending the notice as well as the service thereof. The said word used in section 34(1) of the Act itself was interpreted by courts to mean " served ". The limited meaning, namely, " sent " will exclude from the operation of the provision a class of cases and introduce anomalies. In the circumstances, by interpretation, we accept the wider meaning the word " issued " bears. In this view, though the notices were served beyond the prescribed time, they were saved under section 4 of the Amending Act. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (3) TMI 10 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the collections by the assessee-company described in its accounts as 'empty bottles return security deposits' were income assessable under section 10 of the Income-tax Act ?
Held that:- The charge now under consideration is a charge additional to that collected under the " buy-back scheme " and this we have earlier said. It has never been in dispute, either in the earlier case or now, that the charge under the " buy-back scheme " which was collected under Government's sanction constituted a taxable income. This court had never said, nor was it ever contended by the assessee, that a collection would not be taxable if it had been made with the sanction of the Government. The first point of distinction sought to be made by the High Court is, therefore, unfounded.
It seems to us that the only reason why the rules required a wholesaler to return the bottles to the distiller was to authorise the imposition of a term of the sale upon the breach of which, the charges made for the bottles would cease to be refundable. all that the rule does is to authorise the making of a contract concerning the deposit on the terms mentioned in it the object apparently being to avoid any question as to its validity arising later. We may here point out that the trade in liquor is largely controlled by Government regulations. It must, therefore, be held that the deposit was actually taken under a contract; it was none the less so though the contract was authorised by the statutory rules. The third point of distinction on which the High Court relied was, therefore, also without foundation. Appeal allowed.
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1964 (3) TMI 9 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Exemption - Termination of partnership ... ... ... ... ..... o doubt described as partners of Kaveti Weaving Mills. But the previous licence was not in the name of Kaveti Weaving Mills. That licence reads thus Messers, K.R. Sankarachari and K.R. Sundarachari, Partners of Kaveti Weaving Mills, Madurai, having undertaken to comply with the conditions prescribed in the Central Excise Rules ..are hereby authorised to manufacture power loom cotton fabrics during the year.. 15. This to my mind is undoubtedly a licence only in favour of the two individuals. If, therefore, there was a division of the looms as between the two persons who operated all the looms under a single licence, it cannot be regarded, notwithstanding the intrusion of a partnership, as an acquisition by these persons from another entity. It should follow therefore that the application of the provisio to the instant case is not justified by the facts. The orders disclose an error of law and are liable to be and are hereby quashed. There will however be no order as to costs.
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